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ABSTRACT
My dissertation explores Louisiana’s political development from 
1S24 to 1S61. Many antebellum state studies have been written, but 
none focus specifically on Louisiana. While sharing the rest of the 
South’s commitment to slavery and cotton, Louisiana possessed atypical 
attributes including: a unique ethnic composition, a sugar cane crop 
dependent upon a protective tariff, and the presence of New Orleans, 
the South’s foremost commercial city. Louisiana’s antebellum 
political situation resulted from the interaction of these distinctive 
traits with the characteristics that Louisiana shared in common with 
the rest of the United States.
The primary focus of this political narrative is the development 
of parties and the interaction between parties and the electorate. 
During the 1820s and 1830s, Louisianans moved from a political system 
based on personality and ethnicity to a distinct party system with 
Democrats competing against Whigs. These parties, which were evenly 
matched, battled until the Whig party collapsed in the lS50s. 
Subsequently, the nativist Know Nothing party rose and fell. And, in 
1861, after an increase in tension over the slavery issue, Louisiana 
seceded from the Union.
Through its examination of Louisiana politics, my dissertation 
addresses several key historiographical questions. I investigate the 
relationship between state and federal parties and the role of 
individuals in party politics. I also explore the impact of both the 
ideology of republicanism and of the politics of slavery. Moreover, I 
probe the role played by ethnic diversity, which often overshadowed
vi
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partisan allegiance. Additionally, I analyze the differences and 
similarities among the parties’ programs— especially concerning the 
value of governmental activism.
My dissertation also discusses the rise of Jacksonian democracy. 
Louisiana’s 1SI2 constitution restricted voting and office-holding. 
Later constitutions, written in IS45 and LS52. adopted universal white 
male suffrage and decreased office-holding requirements. Furthermore, 
extensive campaigning provided an opportunity for voters and non­
voters, including women, to participate in the political process. 
Despite these changes, elites continued to occupy the main positions 
of power. Though elites served in state government and as party 
leaders, I contend that political power remained in the hands of their 
constituents throughout the antebellum period.
vi i
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CHAPTER ONE
THE EARLY STAGES OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT. 1S24-IS29
At first glance, antebellum Louisiana stood in stark contrast
with the other southern states. The South was a region consisting
primarily of rural American-born Protestants involved in the
production of cotton. Thus. Louisiana’s Creole and Catholic
populations, its substantial foreign and northern immigration, its
immense leading city New Orleans, and its large sugar cane crop
combined to make it possibly the most un-southem of the southern
states. A visitor to the state in 1S48, worrying about Louisiana’s
dedication to the region, echoed this assessment.
New Orleans is almost free soil in their[sic] opinions.
The population is one half Northern agents another one 
quarter or one third are Foreigners. The remnant are 
creoles who cannot comprehend their dangers until the
negroes are being taken out of the fields Louisiana will
be the, last if at all to strike for the defense of the 
South.1
While he succinctly captured many of Louisiana’s unique 
characteristics, the visitor inaccurately assessed its southernness. 
Despite these differences, important similarities remained between 
Louisiana and the rest of the South. Staple crop agriculture 
predominated in the Pelican State with cotton joining sugar cane as 
the most important crops. Louisiana shared the rest of the South’s 
commitment to the peculiar institution— in every antebellum census 
slaves composed more than 45 percent of the population. And, most 
importantly, Louisianans joined their fellow southerners in seceding
!Henry W. Connor to John C. Calhoun, January 12, 1849, in J
Franklin Jameson, ed., Correspondence of John C. Calhoun (Washington 
D.C., 1900), 1188-90.
1
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from the Union in early 1861. Perhaps the visitor would have been 
more sanguine about Louisiana's loyalty to her region if he had heard 
a West Feliciana Parish planter assert. ”T consider the wealth & 
prosperity of this state to rest principally upon the labors of 
slaves.. .without our negroes we should be poor indeed.” Another 
planter added that "the slavery question is making strong deep and 
abiding impressions on the minds of our southern— men. The injustice 
of the North is uniting all parties.""
Louisianans, along with other southerners, shared a commitment 
not only to slavery but to the idea of republicanism. What 
politicians and the electorate meant when they used the term 
"republicanism,” however, varied from politician to politician, place 
to place, and over time. The main tenet of this belief involved an 
almost obsessive fear that the people’s Liberty was constantly under 
threat. This menace could come from aristocrats, military despots and 
armies, federal or state government, banks, corporations, or even 
large cities such as New Orleans. Concentrations of power could use 
"intrigue" and "corruption" to usurp the sovereignty and liberty of 
the people and reduce them to the status of slaves.^ A Louisiana
Alexander Barrow to William S. Hamilton, January 25, 1830, William 
S. Hamilton Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections, 
LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Hereinafter LLMVC) (first quote); 
Maunsel White to Pierre Sould, April 23, 1850, Maunsel White Papers, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
(Hereinafter SHC) (second quote).
3The literature on republicanism is voluminous. For a discussion of 
the tenets of republicanism see Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of 
the American Revolution (Cambridge, 1967); and Gordon S. Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic. 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, 1969). For 
republicanism in antebellum politics see Harry L. Watson, Liberty and 
Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York, 1990); and Michael
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congressman traced how this tragic progression worked: the passage of 
a protective tariff. leading to an increase in manufacturing 
establishments, and ultimately industry becoming ”a monster." This 
series would conclude with the formation of a standing army "dangerous 
to the liberties of the people" to protect this "monster.” The 
lawmaker maintained "this government is literally & emphatically 
sustained by public opinion and to keep it from Corruption & 
impurities the people should be enlightened.
In the years immediately following Louisiana’s statehood, 
republicanism did not imply democracy, but as time progressed, the 
commitment to republicanism transformed itself into a devotion to 
Jacksonian democracy. The past and future met on a steamboat in 1S25 
in a conversation between former governor Thomas Bolling Robertson and 
future congressman John B. Dawson. Their exchange illustrates how the 
view of the people’s proper political role would change over the 
course of the antebellum era. Discussing the governor’s power to
appoint local officials, Robertson argued that "the people have no
right to say who is to govern them. The constitution places the power 
in my hands...." He continued, "whenever I hear everybody speak well 
of a man I set him down as a damn rascal." This view may have enabled 
Robertson to capture the governor’s office in 1820, but over time the
F. Holt, Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York, 1978). For its 
application to southern state studies see Mark W. Kruraan, Parties and 
Politics in North Carolina. 1836-1865 (Baton Rouge, 1983); Lacy K. Ford, 
Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina Dpcountrv. 1800-1860 
(New York, 1988); and Jonathan M. Atkins, Parties. Politics, and the 
Sectional Conflict in Tennessee. 1832-1861 (Knoxville, 1997).
Walter H. Overton to William S. Hamilton, January 7, 1832, Hamilton 
Papers, LLMVC.
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people would demand and receive a greater political voice. Dawson 
expressed the creed by which most Louisiana politicians would learn to 
live. Believing "popularity a fair test of merit." Dawson countered, 
"you should never disregard the people's will.. .Because the 
constitution enables you to play the Despot it does not follow you are 
to be one.”'
Louisiana politicians catered to the idea of the people as 
sovereigns in their deeds as well as in their words. The writing, in 
1845 and 1S52. of new constitutions which expanded suffrage, increased 
the number of elective positions, and reduced office-holding 
requirements resulted from politicians following the lead of the 
people. As a state legislator who disagreed with his constituents on 
whom to select as a United States senator affirmed. "It is 
better— not to contend with the people. I have no desire to set up 
my opinion in opposition to theirs.” Those politicians who felt so 
bold as to challenge their constituents’ will frequently found 
themselves out of office. Robertson left the governor’s office in 
1824 to take an appointive judicial position. In 1828. despite his 
ambition, he recognized that he could no longer successfully run for 
governor. By the end of the antebellum period, for Louisiana 
politicians "vox populi" did indeed serve as "vox dei.”^
*John B. Dawson to William S. Hamilton, April 6, 1825, Hamilton
Papers, LLMVC.
6John H. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, November 30, 1828, Josiah 
Stoddard Johnston Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
(Hereinafter HSP); Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "Thomas Bolling Robertson" in 
Joseph G. Dawson, ed., The Louisiana Governors: From Iberville to Edwards 
(Baton Rouge, 1990), 94.
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Louisiana shared a commitment to republicanism with other 
states, but her ethnic heritage differed from the rest of the United 
States. French and Spanish colonists were the first Europeans to 
occupy the territory which would become Louisiana. The French settled 
the region in the early eighteenth century, founding Natchitoches in 
1714 and New Orleans in 1718. The French king appointed the colony's 
governor, and Roman Catholicism was established as the official 
religion. Louisiana’s population grew slowly and by the 1760s 
numbered only ten thousand people, half African slaves. As a result 
of France’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War, control of Louisiana was 
transferred to the Spanish in 1763. A Spanish king now named the 
governor and Catholicism remained the established religion. The 
colony maintained a commitment to slavery and began to grow faster, 
and by 1800 the population exceeded thirty thousand people.
Early in the nineteenth century, Napoleon re-obtained the 
territory for France. But, in 1803, fearing that he could not defend 
it and needing money for his European military campaigns, he agreed to 
sell Louisiana to the United States. From 1803 until 1812, the 
American government, under the auspices of territorial governor 
William Claiborne, ruled the territory. By 1810, Louisiana possessed 
well over the sixty thousand persons required for statehood. A 
constitutional convention met in New Orleans in November 1811, and on 
April 30, 1812, Louisiana officially entered the Union as the 
eighteenth state.
Statehood did not imply homogeneity. Throughout the antebellum 
period, Louisiana lacked cohesion in terms of both population and
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geography. It included French-speaking Catholic sugar cane growers. 
English-speaking Protestant cotton planters. Spanish-speaking Catholic 
fishermen, cajuns on its bayous, and yeomen in its pinev hills. Great 
disparities in population density existed in the state. In 1S60. New 
Orleans, the greatest urban center of the antebellum South, possessed 
almost 150.000 whites, while seven parishes each contained less than 
two thousand white residents. Some areas, especially along the 
Mississippi River, had over 90 percent of their population enslaved, 
while in other areas less than one quarter of the population was held 
in bondage. One could find sections with a majority of Louisiana-bom 
residents, a majority bora elsewhere in the United States, or a 
majority foreign-born. Thus, in order to facilitate an understanding 
of antebellum Louisiana, I have divided it into four regions: the 
Florida Parishes, North Louisiana, Greater Orleans, and South 
Louisiana. (TABLE 1.1)
The Florida parishes were bordered by the Mississippi River on 
the west, the Pearl River on the east, Lakes Pontchartrain and 
Maurepas on the south, and the state of Mississippi on the north.
This region, unlike the rest of Louisiana, was not included in the 
1803 Louisiana Purchase. Instead, these parishes remained part of 
Spanish-owned West Florida until winning their independence in the 
1810 West Florida Rebellion. But in 1812 when Louisiana became a 
state, this area was included within its boundaries. The region 
combined wealthy cotton plantation country in East Baton Rouge and the 
Felicianas with poorer piney woods in its eastern parishes. Anglo- 
Saxon Protestants predominated in the Florida Parishes— almost 90






POPULATION SLAVE IN THE REGION
WHITE SLAVE PERCENT TOTAL WHITE SLAVE
FLORIDA 1320S 11260 44.7 17.6 19.4 17.3
NORTH LA 11603 9189 43.0 14.9 17.0 14.1
ORLEANS 2054S 18435 39.8 32.3 30.2 28.3
SOUTH LA 22756 26229 51.9 35.2 33.4 40.3




POPULATION SLAVE IN THE REGION
WHITE SLAVE PERCENT TOTAL WHITE SLAVE
FLORIDA 14566 17651 53.9 15.2 16.3 16.1
NORTH LA 13078 15799 53.3 13.7 14.7 14.4
ORLEANS 24719 27273 42.3 29.9 27.7 24.9
SOUTH LA 36814 48890 55.2 41.1 41.3 44.6




POPULATION SLAVE IN THE REGION
WHITE SLAVE PERCENT TOTAL WHITE SLAVE
FLORIDA 17493 25875 58.8 12.5 11.1 15.4
NORTH LA 29334 43431 58.5 21.1 18.5 25.8
ORLEANS 66771 33956 28.1 34.3 42.2 20.2
SOUTH LA 44755 65239 57.6 32.1 28.3 38.7
TOTALS 158353 168501 47.8




LOUTSIANA * S POPULATION
POPULATION SLAVE IN THE REGION
WHITE SLAVE PERCENT TOTAL WHITE SLAVE
FLORIDA 22767 32969 58.3 10.9 8.9 13.5
NORTH LA 56773 84416 59.3 27.5 22.2 34.5
ORLEANS 113104 31366 20.1 30.1 44.3 12.S
SOUTH LA 62847 9605S 58.9 31.5 24.6 39.2




POPULATION SLAVE IN THE REGION
WHITE SLAVE PERCENT TOTAL WHITE SLAVE
FLORIDA 25743 37287 58.2 9.1 7.2 11.2
NORTH LA 90669 146783 61.4 33.8 25.4 44.2
ORLEANS 163399 27229 13.5 28.6 45.7 S.2
SOUTH LA 77818 120427 59.5 28.6 21.8 36.3
TOTALS 357629 331726 46.9
1840 1840 1850 1850 1S50 1850
PERCENT PERCENT COTTON % OF LA’s SUGAR % of LA’s
FRENCH AMERICAN BALES COTTON HOGSHEADS SUGAR
FLORIDA 4.5 89.8 31827 17.8 13086 5.8
NORTH LA 4.3 91.2 129964 72.7 4653 2.1
ORLEANS 36.2 42.8 60 0.0 31594 14.0
SOUTH LA 70.4 26.0 16826 9.4 177118 78.2
35.8 58.9 178677 226451
percent of the families had English surnames, and Protestant churches 
accounted for over 85 percent of the church seating capacity. In 
1820, these parishes contained approximately one-sixth of Louisiana’s 
population. The region’s relative population, however, declined in 
each of the succeeding censuses. As the state grew, most newcomers 
settled in either Greater Orleans or North Louisiana, and by 1860 the
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Florida parishes contained less than one tenth of the state's 
populat ion.
North Louisiana, the state's largest region, consisted of all of
the parishes in the state north of the thirty-first parallel, except
for Avoyelles. This section contained both important cotton country
along the Mississippi and Red Rivers and less fertile pinev hills and
swamps between the two rivers. Like their counterparts in the Florida
parishes, white North Louisianans were primarily Anglo-Saxon
Protestants engaged in agriculture. Over 90 percent of North
Louisiana's families had English last names, and Protestant churches
contained over 90 percent of its church seats. And. if cotton were
king in Louisiana, its palace was located in North Louisiana, which in
21850 produced three out of every four bales in the state.
Only sparsely settled when Louisiana obtained its statehood in 
1S12, North Louisiana’s growth outpaced that of the rest of the state 
during the ensuing five decades. In 1824, only five of the state’s 
twenty-eight parishes were in this region, but of the twenty new 
parishes created in the next thirty years, fifteen were in North 
Louisiana. Additionally, in 1820 the area contained approximately 
one-sixth of Louisiana’s population, but by the Civil War, one-third
7Samuel C. Hyde, Jr., Pistols and Politics: The Dilemma of Democracy 
in Louisiana’s Florida Parishes, 1810-1899 (Baton Rouge, 1996), 2-3; 
Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1971), 
10; Derek L. A. Hackett, "The Social Structure of Jacksonian Louisiana," 
Louisiana Studies 12 (Spring 1973), 328-331.
0I have included Avoyelles Parish with South Louisiana because 
deraographically it fits more into that region in terms of birthplace of 
its residents, their ethnicity, their religion, and the parish’s sugar 
production. For another example of grouping Avoyelles Parishes with 
parishes in South Louisiana see Howard, Political Tendencies. 9.
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of alL Louisianans resided here. A significant portion of this growth 
resulted from people moving into North Louisiana from other states.
In 1850, over half of the section's population had been born elsewhere 
in the Union. And. primaril\r because of the cotton parishes along the 
Mississippi River, in I860 the zone contained four out of every nine 
slaves in Louisiana.
South Louisiana consisted of the area east of the Texas border, 
west of the Florida Parishes and Greater Orleans, and south of the 
thirty-first parallel plus Avoyelles Parish. The region contained 
both the South’s foremost sugar-producing region in south central 
Louisiana and sparsely settled prairie in the southwestern corner of 
the state. South Louisiana offers a stark contrast to the state’s 
Anglo-Saxon cotton-producing regions. Its main staple was sugar cane- 
-in 1850 it produced four out of every five hogsheads in Louisiana.
In addition. French heritage dominated— over 70 percent of its 
families in 1840 were of French extraction. Its settlers included 
refugees from French Canada— the Acadians or Cajuns— who had started 
arriving in large numbers in the 1760s. Moreover, Roman Catholicism 
pervaded these parishes with over three-fourths of the seating 
capacity in Catholic churches.
South Louisiana declined relatively in terms of total population 
during the antebellum period from 35 percent in 1820 to 28 percent in 
1860. Even more significant than this decrease was the relative drop 
in its white population. In 1820, over one-third of the state’s white 
population lived in South Louisiana, but by the Civil War this 
fraction had diminished to only about one-fifth. This reduction can
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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be explained by South Louisiana's failure to attract immigrants from 
either other states or abroad. Only about one out of every twenty 
newcomers settled there. In 1S50. almost 90 percent of the section's 
residents were Louisiana natives, compared to approximatel}r 33 percent 
in the rest of the state.
The smallest geographically, but perhaps the most important 
region of Louisiana was Greater Orleans which included Orleans and its 
surrounding parishes: Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines. This 
region, and some would contend the entire state, revolved around the 
city of New Orleans, which Henry Clay called "the pivot" of Louisiana. 
The Crescent City served as one of the nation’s most important 
entrepots and had no rival either commercially or in terms of 
population in the state. By 1860. almost half of Louisiana's white 
population lived in these four parishes. New Orleans split 
culturally, and at times physically, between its competing Creole and 
American populations. In the later antebellum period, an influx of 
immigrants, especially Irish, further changed the social and political 
complexion of the city. In 1850, over one-half of Greater Orleans
Qpopulation had been born outside of the United States.
Because of New Orleans’s commercial and political influence, it 
engendered resentment throughout the rest of the state. Discussing 
the propensity of the Crescent City’s population to exaggerate its own 
importance, a legislator contended, "They had so long had the habit 
here in New Orleans of fancying themselves Louisiana, that they had
gHenry Clay to Josiah Johnston, March 11, 1830, in James F. Hopkins, 
et al., eds.. The Papers of Henrv Clay (11 vols., Lexington, 1959-92). 
8:178-79.
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now come to think themselves the United States." New Orleans 
represented a concentration of power that, according to republican 
ideals, could present a threat to liberty. Many in the country 
parishes feared locating the state capital in such a large city and in 
the Constitution of 1S45 had it removed from the corrupt colossus.
They believed that "there is an influence brought to bear upon the 
minds of the members in a large town, which operates prejudicialIv to 
wise legislation." This corrupting influence extended to the city’s 
voters. Contrasting campaign strategy in northern Louisiana and New 
Orleans, a politician observed that in the former, votes must be 
obtained "in a fair way," while in the latter, "there is an immense 
floating vote which can be &  is every election bought & sold."i!
The Constitution of 1812 established the ground rules for 
politics in Louisiana. Even taking the conservative standards of the 
period into account, Perry H. Howard describes Louisiana’s 
constitution as "ultra-conservative and ultra-aristocratic." Visiting 
Louisiana soon after the charter’s adoption, a young lawyer extended 
the oxymoronic yet accurate observation that "the government is an 
Aristocratic Democracy." Restrictive suffrage and office-holding 
provisions contributed to this view of the document. Suffrage was 
limited to free white males, twenty-one years or older, with a 
residency requirement. Most importantly, only those who had paid a 
state tax or had purchased federal land could vote. The provision
I0Henry Huntington to James Taliaferro, June 2, 1848, James G. 
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Franklin C. Wharton, "Seat of 
Government," 1830, Edward Clifton Wharton Family Papers, LLMVC (second 
quote); John Ray to John Moore, February 11, 1852, David Weeks and Family 
Papers, LLMVC (third quote).
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which stipulated that, in gubernatorial contests, the legislature 
chose between the top two popular vote recipients further stifled 
democracy, as did a law granting it the power to cast the state's 
electoral votes in presidential elections. Requirements for office- 
holding were even more stringent than those for suffrage. Members of 
the General Assembly had greater restrictions on age and residency 
than voters. Additionally, they needed to own landed property worth 
at least S500 in the lower house and 51000 in the Senate. The most 
difficult requirements were reserved for those who aspired to the 
gubernatorial chair— thirty five years of age. six years in the 
Louisiana, and S5000 in landed property. Every four years, the House 
of Representatives was to be reapportioned based upon the number of 
qualified electors with fifty as the maximum number of members and 
without a representative being guaranteed to each parish. Composed of 
fourteen single member districts, the Senate was never to be 
reapport ioned.11
Louisiana’s first elected governor, W.c.C. Claiborne, described 
the constitution as "purely republican in principle, and tolerably 
well adapted to our local situation." The "local situation" in 
Louisiana meant the division between Americans and Creoles. The 
Creoles were people born in Louisiana of French or Spanish descent,
!IHoward, Political Tendencies. 20; John C. Windship to William 
Plumer, Jr., March 20, 1814 in Everett S. Brown, ed., "Letters from 
Louisiana, 1813-1814." Mississippi Valiev Historical Review (1924-25) XI, 
574; For a copy of the Louisiana Constitution of 1812 see Cecil Morgan, 
ed., The First Constitution of the State of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 
1975). The number of senate districts was expanded to seventeen when the 
Florida parishes joined the state a few months after the constitution was 
written.
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while the Americans consisted of settlers from elsewhere in the United 
States.“■ The third most prominent group, the foreign French, 
settlers from France or her colonies, most often aligned with the 
Creoles in opposition to the Americans. The division between these 
two opposing groups rested not only upon language, but upon political 
heritage and religion as well. For much of the early antebellum 
period, political loyalty centered on a candidate’s ethnicity not on 
partisan allegiance. Especially in gubernatorial races, Americans 
generally cast their ballots for American candidates, while Creoles 
cast theirs for Creole candidates."
The explanation for the aristocratic nature of the constitution 
lies in this split between the Creoles and the Americans. In the
•zThe definition of "Creole" is contested. Fred Kniffen agrees that 
it "originally applied to the Louisiana-born of European descent." but 
since then it has lost its precision. Fred B. Kniffen, Louisiana: Its 
Land and People (Baton Rouge, 1968), 127. The third edition of Bennett 
K. Wail, ed., Louisiana: A History (Baton Rouge, 1997), 91, lists several 
possible definitions of Creole including "To some it means native 
colonials of French or Spanish ancestry." For an antebellum definition 
see New Orleans Bee. July 21, 1835, (quoting the Louisiana Recorder) "In 
Louisiana, the term ’creole’ is usually given and limited to the 
descendants of the French and Spanish colonists— often restricted to 
those of the French, seldom if ever extended to those of the Americans." 
I concur with Joseph Tregle that "Creole" should not include any 
connotation of class, wealth, or sophistication, and I admit that Tregle 
is correct in asserting that it can be used to portray a much broader 
group than my definition implies, but I contend that my definition a 
commonly accepted one. Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "On that Word ’Creole’ 
Again," Louisiana History. 23 (Spring 1982), 193-198.
1%.C.C. Claiborne to Robert R. Livingston, January 26, 1812, in 
Dunbar Rowland, ed., Official Letter Books of W.C.C. Claiborne. 1810- 
1816. (6 vols.: Jackson, MS, 1917), 6:40-41. For a series of letters 
discussing the propensity of voters in the 1830 gubernatorial campaign 
to support men in their own ethnic group regardless of party affiliation 
see Dr. R. Davidson to William S. Hamilton, February 4, 1830, April 9, 
1830; W.L. Robeson to Hamilton, February 6, 1830, April 20, 1830,
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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period following the territory's purchase in 1S03. Louisiana began a 
process of Americanization— the gradual movement from Creole to 
American control. Realizing their numerical superiority would erode 
over time, the Creoles concluded that the best way to cement their 
hold on the state would be to freeze political power in time, or at 
least slow the impact of this Americanization. Joseph Tregle asserts 
that "the vehicle chosen for this purpose was the Constitution of 
1812." In his study of the development of the second American party 
system, Richard P. McCormick agrees that "The Louisiana constitution 
of 1812...was a product of the determination of the Creoles to secure 
and retain control of the government."^
With the constitution limiting suffrage to propertv-holders and 
those who paid a state tax, only a fraction of the population 
possessed the ballot. The 1820 census lists Louisiana’s total 
population as 14-3.222 including 21.262 white males eighteen years or 
older. According to the 1821 census of voters, however, only 9.188 
people possessed the franchise and fourteen of Louisiana’s nineteen 
parishes had less than 200 eligible voters. The most extreme example, 
Concordia Parish, which was entitled to both a representative and one 
of the state’s seventeen senators, had 105 eligible voters in 1821 and 
123 in 1829. In the 1824 gubernatorial race, Concordia’s voters cast 
only 24 ballots, while in 1828 they cast 49. Similarly, St. Charles
‘ Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "Political Reinforcement of Ethnic Dominance 
in Louisiana, 1S12-1845,” in Lucius F. Ellsworth, ed., The 
Americanization of the Gulf Coast. 1803-1850 (Pensacola, 1972), (first 
quote on p. SO) and Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Clash of 
Cultures and Personalities (Baton Rouge, 1999), 54-62; Richard P. 
McCormick, The Second American Party Svstem: Party Formation in the 
Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill, 1966), 311 (second quote).
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Parish, which case 51 and ~r voces respectively in these two contests.
containeci I2S voters in IS2i and by 1J>29 this number had only grown to
132. This paucity of voters magnified the power of anyone who could
control a bloc of votes.'3
During this period of Louisiana's political development frequent
mention is made of the importance of "men of influence" who dictated
what their community thought and how it voted. In the words of a
state senator, public opinion was like a stream:
The opinion of men hang upon one another. One man adopts 
the opinion of another on public measures without giving 
himself the trouble of forming one of his own. And 
finally the opinion of the few where there is no immediate 
opposition becomes the uniform opinion of the whole.
Important men and families controlled a significant portion of the
votes in many of the parishes outside of New Orleans. Upon the death
of Henry Thibodeaux, considered one of the "most influential men in
the state," future United States Senator Alexander Porter worried
about the two hundred voters on Bayou Lafourche "who are now from the
loss of his salutary influence left exposed to the seductions of bad
politicians." Porter also asserted that with certain men in Opelousas
including Jacques Dupre, a fixture in the legislature and Louisiana’s
largest cattle rancher, behind a candidate elections were "fixed"
there. A legislative candidate, assessing his own prospects,
complained that in Ascension Parish personal merit often had little
weight when compared to "a Jacgast or Pierrot, supported by his uncles
and cousins, [and] extended family connexions." This lament offered a
i5182l census of voters in Louisiana House Journal. 1822. 27-8; 1829 
list never published but a copy appears in William S. Hamilton Papers, 
LLMVC.
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sharp contrast from the prior year when the same man had been more 
optimistic because two members of the Martin family with "sufficient
influence to make good on their word" had offered to guarantee his
, - 16 election.'
While friends and neighbors possessed significant influence in 
antebellum Louisiana, the development of national parties added 
another element for voters to consider. As national politics 
increased in importance in Louisiana, the federal government 
controlled a greater number of patronage positions and consequently 
more leverage. Before his ascension to the presidency. Andrew Jackson 
complained of the "corrupting influence" of executive patronage in 
Louisiana. With patronage the power of friends of the national 
administration in New Orleans could be felt in the country parishes.
In North Louisiana where it was "not uncommon for a few Demagog[sic] 
Zealots to produce a Wonderful 1 [sic] effect," Martin Duralde, a 
stalwart New Orleans legislator and dispenser of federal patronage, 
"wielded all his immense influence with a zeal and adroitness almost 
super natural," in helping a loyal administration supporter win re- 
election to Congress.*7
I <•
°Charles T. Scott to Josiah S. Johnston, January 27, 1826 (first 
quote), Alexander Porter to Johnston, August 6, 1827, December 8, 1826, 
January 20, 1826, July 2, 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP; Joseph G. Tregle, 
Jr., "Henry S. Thibodeaux," in Dawson, ed., Louisiana Governors. 96-98; 
Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 69-71; Hore Browse Trist to 
Nicholas P. Trist, November 1826, September 25, 1827, Nicholas P. Trist 
Papers, SHC.
nAndrew Jackson to David C. Ker. November 6, 1828, Andrew Jackson 
Papers, Library of Congress, (Hereinafter LC).
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As with most other issues in antebellum Louisiana, the Creole- 
American split also affected influence. Requesting Senator Josiah 
Johnston's support for an appointment, a constituent opposing a 
"creole competitor." decried the John Quincy Adams administration’s 
"rather extraordinary penchant... for that species of our population." 
In consoling a losing a congressional candidate, an adviser claimed he 
had only lost in the Creole parishes where most were "governed by the 
influence of a few." Amongst the Acadians a "social aristocracy" 
ruled, according to historian Carl Brasseaux. and political campaigns 
were essentially personality contests among members of this elite 
group. Joseph Tregle agrees that Creoles submitted "their will and 
their ballots to the decision of those who were their respected 
leaders." Among these was Henry Thibodeaux, who. as "pere" to the 
people along Bayou Lafourche, served as the area’s "undisputed arbiter
toof political power."
Not only did some Americans remain skeptical of the Creoles’ 
ability to participate in a representative government because of their 
susceptibility to the power of influence but also because of their 
monarchical heritage. An American resident of South Louisiana argued 
that out of all the states, Louisiana remained "the most radically and 
essentially unfit for the form of government." Another agreed that 
Louisiana was in "her political infancy" and "the people are just 
getting rid of the prejudices created by national feelings and
ISN. Wilson to Josiah S. Johnston, April 10, 1826, Johnston Papers, 
HSP; S.F. Hunt to William S. Hamilton. July 30, 1826, Hamilton Papers, 
LLMVC: Carl A. Brasseaux, Acadian to Caiun: Transformation of a People. 
1803-1877 (Jackson, Miss., 1992), 48; Tregle. Louisiana in the Age of 
Jackson, 69-71.
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distinctions." Campaigning for Jackson in Louisiana, a friend of the 
General asserted that while Jackson could rely on three-fourths of the 
Americans, the Creoles opposed Jackson because they lacked American 
feeling and were ignorant of American principles of government.
Another reason that Americans doubted the Creoles* ability to 
participate in partisan politics involved allegations that they failed 
to connect state and national political contests. Porter contended 
that the Creoles "cannot understand.. .how any election but the main 
one should turn on the presidential question." The presence of 
Creoles in elective positions supports this contention. While 
electing Creole governors in 1S16. 182S. 1S30, and 183S, not a single 
Creole represented Louisiana in Congress during the first twenty eight 
years of statehood. In Louisiana, the Creoles had used the 
Constitution of 1812 to perpetuate their hold on state government. In 
the lS20s. this determination remained an essential element in 
statewide elections, but it did not play as vital a role in national 
elections. Additionally, while the state elections occurred in July, 
when many Americans had left New Orleans because they feared diseases, 
presidential elections occurred in November. According to an American
settler, that month served primarily as sugar cane harvesting season
10for Creoles, not as a time for politics.
tcJohn H. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, September 30. 1827,
Johnston Papers. HSP; Nicholas Trist to Mrs. Randal. April 10, 1824,
Trist Papers, SHC; David Kerr to Andrew Jackson, November 11, 1828. 
Jackson Papers, LC.
10Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, April 16. 1827. Johnston 
Papers, HSP; Lewis W. Newton, "The Americanization of French Louisiana: 
A Study in the Process of Adjustment between the French and the Anglo- 
American Populations of Louisiana, 1803-1860,” (Ph.D. dissertation,
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In ISI2. despite the Creoles* efforts to use the constitution to 
control Louisiana, the people and the legislature selected the 
V'irginia-born territorial governor William Claiborne to serve as the 
state's first governor. The War of 1812. and especially fear of a 
British invasion of Louisiana, dominated his administration. In 
November 1814, as an attack became imminent, the United States 
commander in the Southwest, General Andrew Jackson, arrived in New 
Orleans. Unsure of the loyalty of the New Orleans residents, 
especially the foreign French and Creoles. Jackson declared martial 
law in the city. On January 8, 1S15, federal troops and state 
militias, including Louisiana’s, routed the British invasion in the 
Battle of New Orleans. After the tremendous victory and ignoring an 
order from Federal District Judge Dominick Hall. Jackson continued to 
rule the Crescent City under martial law. Ultimately, when news of 
the peace treaty reached New Orleans. Jackson terminated martial law, 
but the judge punished him for his earlier impudence with a SI.000 
fine.^'
The victory restored the nation’s confidence and made Andrew 
Jackson a national hero. Nearly every state passed resolutions 
praising his victory, and, as a Tennessee slaveholder, he had a 
special appeal in the South. Paradoxically, Louisiana contained some 
of Jackson’s most ardent disciples and many of his fiercest 
detractors. Some Louisianans would never forget his role as their
University of Chicago. 1929J, 136; Thomas Butler to Edward G.W. Butler, 
October 6. 1828, Butler Family Papers, LLMVC.
21Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 
1767-1821 (New York, 1977), 246-320.
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savior. The Corporation of New Orleans, in proclaiming Jackson "their 
deliverer" exclaimed that but for Jackson "a heap of ashes and 
scattered, ruins would have been all that would have remained of New 
Orleans." More than twenty-five years after the battle, a resident of 
the city, on behalf of his wife, wrote Jackson soliciting "a lock of 
hair from the venerable and honored head of your excel lency." In 
1S43, opposition to refunding Judge Hall's fine of Jackson caused a 
United States senator from Louisiana to lose his bid for re-election. 
Later. New Orleans renamed its central square "Jackson Square" and 
erected a statue to commemorate the hero. Many who fought alongside 
Jackson during the battle found it only a short step from military 
service under General Jackson to political allegiance to presidential 
candidate and Democratic party leader Andrew Jackson.^'
While Jackson’s name evoked reverence for some, others would 
only remember Jackson as the military despot who refused to yield to 
civilian authority. When Jackson ran for the presidency in 1828. a 
former Louisiana governor declared that he would rather support a man 
he disagreed with than one like Jackson, who "runs his sword through 
[the constitution]” when it stands in his way. That same year, the 
Argus reminded its French readers that Jackson had "called you 
TRAITORS" and had tried to have a French adversary shot for contesting 
martial law. In 1853, a longtime Jackson opponent wrote, "Twenty five 
years have I labored to destroy the malign influence of the arbitrary 
conduct of Andrew Jackson upon the republican institutions of my
22Corporation of Orleans to Andrew Jackson. January 1828, John 
Kennedy to Andrew Jackson October 4, 1842, Jackson Papers, LC.
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country." He suggested that the statue honoring Jackson should 
include his horse trampling upon a volume labelled "Laws of the United 
States" and that in the foreground the constitution should appear 
"tom and violated.""
The first American party system, which involved the competition 
between Republicans and Federalists, never achieved a solid foothold 
in Louisiana. During Claiborne's term, the establishment of a new 
state government and fear of British invasion overshadowed partisan 
politics. By the 1816 presidential election, the Federalist Party, 
which never had more than a handful of proponents in Louisiana, had 
almost completely collapsed in the South. In both this and the 
subsequent presidential contest, Louisiana’s legislature cast its 
electoral votes for the victorious Republican candidate. In neither 
the 1816 nor the 1820 gubernatorial eLection did national party 
politics play a role. Each of the elections revolved around the 
Creole-American split with Creole Jacques Vi Here and American Thomas 
Bolling Robertson succeeding Claiborne in the governor’s office.
During his administration. Vi Here attempted to achieve a balance 
between the two groups, but Robertson worked to augment the strength 
of Americans at the Creoles’ expense.^
21Thomas Bolling Robertson to William Robertson. August 22, 1827, 
Walter Prichard Collection, LLMVC (first quote); New Orleans Argus, 
November 4, 1828, (Hereinafter all newspapers New Orleans unless
otherwise specified); Henry Marston to Gales & Seaton, February IS, 1853, 
Henry Marston Family Papers, LLMVC (second quote).
^James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists. 1800-1816 (Baton 
Rouge, 1978), xii, 177; Sidney L. Villere, Jacques Phillippe Villere. 
First Native-Born Governor of Louisiana. 1816-1820 (New Orleans, 1981), 
63-67; Carolyn E. Delatte. "Jacques Phillippe Viller6," and Tregle, 
"Robertson," in Dawson, ed., The Louisiana Governors. 86-96.
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With neither the governor, the legislature, nor the electorate 
associating themselves with a nationaL party. Louisiana lacked any 
semblance of a true party system. This situation changed as the lS20s 
progressed. The presidential elections of 1824 and 1S28 proved to be 
the catalysts for the growth of partisanship, and party division could 
be found in congressional, gubernatorial, and legislative elections as 
well. By the end of the decade, a large proportion of the electorate 
identified themselves as Jackson or Adams men. though the Creoie- 
American division prevented the complete development of political 
parties. This cultural cleavage still often overshadowed partisan 
allegiances, especially in state-level campaigns. With ethnicity and 
party allegiance imperfectly corresponding, voters who called 
themselves "Jackson men" and supported Andrew Jackson for the 
presidency might vote against the "Jackson" candidate for the 
governor’s office or Congress.
The 1824 presidential election served as one of the first 
important steps in the development of the Louisiana’s political 
parties. This growth, nonetheless, remained incomplete, as the 
electorate failed to connect the national race to state contests. 
Though none of the previous presidential elections had generated much 
notice in Louisiana, the 1824 campaign witnessed an increased interest 
in presidential politics especially in New Orleans. The year included 
legislative and gubernatorial elections as well as the selection of 
presidential electors, but generally neither the politicians nor the 
people tied these state and national campaigns together. Instead, 
they chose to view the state races in terms of established Louisiana
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ethnic divisions, and thus political party development in the state 
remained unfinished."
In 1S20. Republican James Monroe had run unopposed for the 
presidency. Since then his party had fractured, and in 1S24 four 
candidates, all calling themselves Republicans, competed for the 
nation's highest office. Traditional Iv. a congressional caucus had 
selected the nominee, but without an opposition party, this method had 
come to be seen as too aristocratic. In February 1S24. only 66 of the 
291 congressmen gathered together and nominated Secretary of the 
Treasury William Crawford, a Georgian. The widespread condemnation of 
this caucus left the field open, and others quickly filled this 
breach. John Quincy Adams, the candidate of New England, ran on his 
record as secretary of state and as a champion of activist government, 
especially the tariff and internal improvements. Kentuckian Henry 
Clay portrayed himself as the candidate of the West and joined Adams 
as a proponent of a strong nationalistic program. Andrew Jackson 
emerged as the wildcard. Known primarily as the hero of the Battle of 
New Orleans and campaigning as an outsider with no specific program. 
Jackson proved immensely popular with the public.
Of these four candidates, only William Crawford generated 
virtually no enthusiasm in Louisiana. His association with the
54 For an excellent discussion of the 1824 presidential campaign in 
Louisiana, see Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson, 145-73.
lhMerrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster. Clay, and 
Calhoun (New York, 1987), 116-131; Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power: 
The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York, 1990), 73-95.
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aristocratic caucus had sealed his fate.*' John Quincy Adams's appeal 
rested upon his record as an experienced statesman, his pro-tariff 
stance, and upon settlers from Nev*" England residing in the Florida 
parishes.'^ Clay and Jackson proved to be the strongest candidates in 
Louisiana. Part of their attraction rested on their claims as 
westerners— an important consideration since for the past twenty-four 
years Virginians had controlled the presidency. Clay joined Adams in 
championing an activist program, which was especially popular among 
the state's sugar cane planters who depended upon a tariff. When 
offered a choice between a Kentucky slaveholder and a New England 
blueblood. the people of Louisiana naturally gravitated to their 
fellow southerner. Clay also benefitted from the power wielded by his 
family connections in the state. His brother and one of his sons-in- 
law were prominent New Orleans businessmen. Meanwhile, another son- 
m-law Martin Duralde was an influential Louisiana legislator.
Jackson profited from his status as the savior of Louisiana in the 
Battle of New Orleans and from his ambiguous stance on the tariff, 
which was favored in the sugar cane regions but disdained in cotton 
areas. His proponents portrayed him as the "CANDIDATE OF THE PEOPLE"
^Louisiana Courier, May 7, 1824; Louisiana Gazette, July 21, 1S24.
70William H. Adams, The Whig Party in Louisiana (Lafayette, La., 
1973), 22; St. Francisville Asvlum. April 10, 17, 1824; Charles T. Scott 
to Josiah S. Johnston. July 24, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP.
19WilliamL. Brent to Henry Clay, September 3, 1824, in Hopkins, ed., 
Clav Papers, 3:827-28.
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and as a modem day George Washington— a military leader/statesman 
devoted to republican principles."'
The most prominent political split in Louisiana in 1S24 remained 
the division between Americans and Creoles, and many approached the 
presidential election from this already established division. The 
Creoles tended to gravitate toward Henry Clay because of their 
preponderance in the pro-tariff sugar cane-producing regions in South 
Louisiana and their leadership's ties to Clay— especially Duralde.
The Creoles also tended to oppose Jackson, because of the perception 
that many of his heavy-handed actions during his defense of New 
Orleans in 1814-15 were directed at them. The Americans primarily 
supported Jackson because they generally came from anti-tariff cotton 
regions and because they admired Jackson for his role in saving 
Louisiana. One of Jackson’s proponents at first observed a 
"lukewarmness" toward the general’s cause but later found that "A 
sense of their obligation to him who saved their liberty from 
impending danger is now gaining the ascendancy."'*
Yet, Louisiana did not neatly divide between pro-Clav Creoles 
and pro-Jackson Americans. Some Creoles, including General Jean 
Plauche, the vice-president of a New Orleans pro-Jackson meeting, 
shared the devotion to Jackson because of his service to the state at 
the Battle of New Orleans. Similarly, some Americans, often despite
inLouisiana Gazette. June 7, 1824.
3iAnthony W. Butler to Edward G.W. Butler, March 7, 1824, June 28, 
1824, Butler Family Papers, Williams Research Center, Historic New 
Orleans Collection, (Hereinafter HNO); John B. Dawson to William S. 
Hamilton, September 8, 1824, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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their personal admiration for Old Hickory, echoed the fear that a 
military chieftain would not be the proper person to elevate to the 
presidency. Governor Thomas Bolling Robertson, while disapproving of 
Clay's tariff stance, preferred "a pure & unmixed republican 
administration" under Clay as opposed to the "Despot" Jackson. 
Additionally, both candidates had loyal friends in Louisiana, where 
personal ties frequently overshadowed all other considerations. The 
appeal of John Quincy Adams, though limited, further demonstrates the 
difficulty in assigning a one-to-one correspondence between the ethnic 
groups and the candidates.”
At this time, the legislature still had the power to select the 
state's presidential electors. During the 1823 legislative session, a 
year prior to actual race. Clay's friends attempted to place 
Louisiana’s electoral votes in his column by forcing an early vote. 
They introduced a bill to establish a legislative caucus in order to 
nominate Clay for the presidency and included a series of resolutions 
praising Jackson to confuse his supporters. Because many believed 
that the bill was brought forward prematurely. Clay partisans lacked 
the votes to pass it. Instead, they backed down and talk of the 
presidential campaign subsided for the rest of the year. The 
legislature that met in early 1824 witnessed an attempt to allow for
n'Louisiana Gazette, June 8, 1824. For Americans wary of the placing 
political power in the hands of a military leader see Philemon Thomas to 
Henry Clay, April 30, 1825, in Hopkins, ed.. Clay Papers. 4:313-14; T.G. 
Slocum to Josiah S. Johnston, December 8, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP; 
Thomas Bolling Robertson to William Robertson, August 12, 1824, Prichard 
Collection, LLMVC. For pro-Clay Americans and pro-Jackson Creoles in 
legislature see Isaac L. Baker to Andrew Jackson. May 3, 1823, Jackson 
Papers, LC.
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the popular election of presidential electors, but the measure failed. 
In the hyperbolic words of the St. Francisville Asvlum. the vote was 
perhaps "the most ultra-aristocratic" decision in state history.
Thus, the legislature that would be elected In July IS24 and would 
meet in November retained the power to select the stateTs presidential 
electors.Jj
While failing to receive the right to vote for presidential 
electors, the people were not completely denied a voice in the 
selection process. The 1824 legislative elections gave the voters a
chance to express their views on the presidency by voting for
candidates pledged to one of the four contenders, but only in New 
Orleans and St. Francisville did the electorate take advantage of this 
opportunity. In New' Orleans, an official Jackson ticket appeared, and 
Jackson supporters sent letters to all candidates soliciting their 
preference for president. Four of the six men on the Jackson ticket 
won, with the two weakest losing to Clay's two strongest men. In St. 
Francisville, where the presidential race was "the only political 
subject that occupies much public attention," not only did several of 
the candidates pledge their vote to a particular candidate, but, at 
the urging of the St. Francisville Asvlum. the people wrote their 
choice for president on their ballots for legislators.^
J Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson, 147-8; Isaac L. Baker to 
Andrew Jackson, February 14. 1823, Jackson Papers, LC; St. Francisville 
Asvlum, February 2, 1823, May 29, 1824.
^James M. Bradford to Josiah S. Johnston, November 11, 1824,
Johnston Papers, HSP; Anthony W. Butler to Edward G.W. Butler, 4 July 
1824 Butler Family Papers, HNO; St. Francisville Asvlum, July 3, 10,
1824. St. Francisville proved to be one of the few John Quincy Adams 
strongholds in Louisiana as he received 65 votes, Jackson— 46, Clay— 9,
Reproduced w ith permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
Outside of New Orleans and St. Francisville. the legislative 
election and the presidential race were not intertwined. A newly- 
elected state senator from Alexandria lamented that "the people in 
this District have no fixed opinion on the [presidential election]." 
Future congressman Walter Overton, a Rapides cotton planter, agreed 
that "the state generally has not been much excited." An Opelousas 
contributor to the Asvlum contended that the election in his region 
had not focused on presidential politics. With newspapers providing 
the populace most of its political information, their absence outside 
of New Orleans and St. Francisville partially explains this apathy. 
While during 1824 New Orleans had five newspapers and St. Francisville 
had two. the rest of the state had only three. Without newspapers, 
these communities lacked an important link between the legislative and 
presidential races.^
The 1824 legislative contests also provided voters an 
opportunity to punish the legislators who had voted against the bill 
providing for the popular selection of presidential electors. Both 
the Louisiana Gazette and the St. Francisville Asvlum printed lists of 
the members who had opposed the change with the latter crusading 
against those who had committed this "political fraud." Of the 
fourteen men on the list only two were re-elected to the next 
legislature. This warning against trampling upon the people’s
and Crawford— 2.
33Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, June 15, 1824, Hamilton 
Papers, LLMVC: Charles T. Scott to Josiah S. Johnston, July 24, 1824, 
Walter H. Overton to Johnston, November 22, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP; 
St. Francisville Asvlum. July 24, 1824.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
30
sovereignty read loud and clear in the capital, and the next session 
saw the passage of a law granting to the people what one legislative 
candidate termed their "usurped right" to choose presidential 
electors. Giving this power to the electorate proved to be a 
significant step in the development of political parties in Louisiana. 
Participation in presidential campaigns provided voters with a new 
link to the national party organizations. 0
While passing a bill granting voters the privilege of selecting 
presidential electors in future races, the legislature that met in 
November 1S24 still had to cast Louisianars votes in the present 
contest. The voice of the electorate regarding the presidential 
question remained unclear. The legislature divided among Clay,
Jackson, and Adams supporters, and none of these groups possessed a 
majority. A plurality championed Clay, while Jackson's men ran a 
close second. Because of the narrow margin separating their 
candidates, both Clay and Jackson men feared that their opponents 
would use intrigue and corruption to wrest the electoral votes of the 
state from their favorite.^ The few members advocating Adams 
possessed the balance of power in Louisiana and were willing to make a 
deal in exchange for two of the state’s five electoral votes. They
^Louisiana Gazette. May 21, July 24, 1824; St. Francisville Asvlum, 
May 29, 1824; Isaac L. Baker to Andrew Jackson, March 21, 1825, Jackson 
Papers, LC. While the Asvlum targeted 14 men, the measure actually 
failed 17-10, and only 11 of the 14 the newspaper labelled opposed it, 
Louisiana House Journal. 1824. 31.
11For intrigue in Louisiana legislature see David C. Ker to Andrew 
Jackson, November 23, 1824, Jackson Papers, LC; Reuben Kemper to Josiah 
S. Johnston, Johnston Papers, HSP; Henry Clay to Francis T. Brooke, 
December 22, 1824, in Hopkins, ed., Clav Papers. 3:899-900; St.
Martinvilie Attakanas Gazette. January 15, 1825.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
31
found the Jacksonian members willing to accept this compromise, and on
November 22. IS24, with some Clay supporters absent, the legislature
selected three Jackson electors and two Adams men.^5 Legislators
championing both Clay and Jackson considered this vote-trading as
"improper” and "an abandonment of principle.” Thus, the "intrigue"
that Clay's proponents had feared had occurred, for they believed that
iethis dirty bargain" had undermined the will of the people.
The vote of the legislature, however, did not mark the end of 
the presidential controversy in Louisiana. Because no candidate won a 
majority of the nation's electoral votes, the names of the top three—  
Jackson. Adams, and Crawford respectively— were submitted to the House 
of Representatives with each state getting one vote. Jackson men 
asserted that Louisiana’s delegation was obligated to support their 
candidate for two reasons. First, they argued that since Jackson had 
received the majority of the state’s electoral votes, the 
representatives should not deviate from this preference. Second, they 
contended that this situation roughly paralleled the normal operation 
of a gubernatorial campaign in Louisiana where the legislature, 
selecting a governor from the top two vote-recipients, had always 
chosen the one with the highest total. According to this reasoning, 
the delegation should cast the state’s votes for Jackson, who had 
received the greatest number of popular and electoral votes. Thus.
38JohnH. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, November 18, 1824, Johnston 
Papers. HSP: Louisiana Senate Journal. 1824-25. 12-13.
1CPhilemon Thomas to Henry Clay, April 30, 1825, in Hopkins, ed., 
Clav Papers. 4:313-14; David C. Ker to Andrew Jackson, November 23, 1824, 
Jackson Papers, LC; John Clay to Josiah S. Johnston, November 30, 1824, 
Johnston Papers, HSP.
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many in Louisiana believed that, as the people in the state and the 
nation had spoken, it was required that Jackson be the choice. 
Unfortunately for Jackson, however, he could count only one friend, 
his former aide-de-camp Edward Livingston, among Louisiana's three- 
member delegation. As early as September 1S24. William Brent, the 
representative of the Third District and an ally of Henry Clay 
declared that Jackson could never get the state's vote.if
Brent’s prediction proved accurate. On February 9. 1S25. 
Louisiana’s congressmen cast their state’s vote for John Quincy Adams, 
helping to elevate him to the presidency. Livingston supported 
Jackson, while Henry Guriev joined Brent in championing Adams. The 
Louisiana Gazette's editor reported the results in dramatic fashion—  
decrying the "shameful treachery unparalleled in history.” outlining 
his paper in black in the traditional method of announcing the death 
of an important individual, and surrounding his columns on the 
election with numerous skulls and crossbones. The paper mourned the 
political deaths of Henry Clay. Gurley, and Brent— the men who had 
subverted the will of the people of Louisiana and the nation. A 
Jacksonian expressed his mortification at this "scandalous intrigue" 
and opined that the "unprincipled" Brent would never return to
40Walter H. Overton to Josiah S. Johnston. November 22, 1824, Isaac 
L. Baker to Johnston, December 21, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP; Louisiana 
Gazette. March 7, 1825; St. Martinville Attakapas Gazette, January 15,
1825.
41William L. Brent to Henry Clay, September 3, 1824, in Hopkins, ed., 
Clav Papers. 3:827-28.
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Louisiana and that Gurley's overwhelmingly pro-Jackson district would
* *punish his treason.'"
The Jackson men's attacks on Gurley and Brent emphasized that 
the congressmen had subverted the will of their constituents and that 
this unrepubiican corruption had threatened the people's liberty. 
Realizing the potency of the labels anti-repubIican and aristocratic, 
both men quickly responded. On March 12, a letter from Gurley 
appeared in the Louisiana Gazette contending that he had no certain 
information on the public feeling in Louisiana, but he did know that 
Clay had the most support in the legislature and that Clay men would 
support Adams before Jackson. Consequently, he had obeyed the will of 
the people of Louisiana. Perhaps sensing the firestorm that would 
accompany the receipt of the delegation’s vote at home. Brent penned a 
letter on February 10— the day after the vote in the House and 
seventeen days before Louisiana received the results. He asserted 
that Jackson could not have won, and thus his vote expressed a desire 
to avoid a constitutional crisis and save the Union— a noble
/Irepub1ican goal.
While the 1824 presidential election contributed to an increase 
in the politicization of the state, the connection between state and 
national politics remained incomplete. Not only did the presidential 
issue fail to surface in many legislative races, but also it played 
almost no role in the July gubernatorial election and the three United
il
' Louisiana Gazette. February 28, 1825: Isaac L. Baker to Andrew 
Jackson, March 21, 1825, Jackson Papers, LC.
43Louisiana Gazette. March 12, 1825: Brent’s letter in Adams, The 
Whig Partv in Louisiana. 24.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
34-
States Senate contests in 1S24-25. Without established parties in the 
state, some thought it desirable to keep these campaigns separate. A 
legislator from the Florida parishes. John B. Dawson expressed his 
desire to remain aloof from the gubernatorial contest though he 
"leanfed] on the French side" because he feared that if he expressed 
his opinion regarding the gubernatorial candidates, it might offend 
someone and thereby lose a vote for Jackson in the legislature.
Instead of connecting the national race to the state campaign. Dawson 
continued to view the gubernatorial race in the traditional manner: a
ftbattle between the Creole and American populations.’
Five men campaigned for the gubernatorial chair in 1S24: two
Creoles— the very wealthy Bernard Marigny and former-govemor Jacques 
Villere— and three Americans— United States Senator Henry Johnson, 
hero of the West Florida Rebellion Philemon Thomas, and former- 
Congressman Thomas Butler. The editor of Le Louisianien lamented that 
"We cannot conceal the fact that the two languages form two opinions 
in regard to the gubernatorial election." The Creoles argued that the 
Americans were violating an unwritten accord which stipulated that the 
office would rotate between the two populations, and according to this 
scenario, it was now the Creoles’ turn. The Americans denied such an 
agreement existed, and that if it had, it violated the sovereignty of 
the people/3
*TJohn B. Dawson to William S. Hamilton, May 26, 1824, Hamilton 
Papers, LLMVC.
^Louisiana Courier. June 11, 1824; Quote from Le Louisianien June
11, 1824, in Newton, "The Americanization of French of Louisiana," 124,
130.
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The campaign involved little debate over specific policies, and 
instead focused on this ethnic split and on charging one's opponents 
with being anti-republican. A letter from a Viliere supporter that 
appeared in the St. Francisville Asvlum decried that in Louisiana 
"each class or tribe has notions, prejudices and opinions peculiar to 
itself.” and the best solution to this unfortunate situation involved 
electing Viliere. The author contended that Johnson would be governor 
of only the American party, while Viliere would be governor of all of 
Louisiana.Opponents on the same side of the ethnic divide accused 
one another of being dupes of the other ethnic group and being 
persuaded to run solely to divide their own group's votes. The anger 
the Creole candidates displayed toward Johnson did not compare to 
their antipathy towards one another. Marigny even accused Viliere of
47the "unforgivable sin of trying to work with the Americans."
Marigny’s massive wealth made him an easy target for being labelled an
anti-republican royalist and "an aristocrat in disguise." Others
accused Johnson’s friends of assuming an unrepublican and "dictatorial
tone, as if his merits were as paramount as his claims are 
48arrogant."
Henry Johnson won the July battle with a one thousand vote 
maj'ority over his nearest competitor, Viliere, and with 43.6 percent
46St. Francisville Asvlum. July 3, 1824.
ifTregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson, 114.
48Isaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, March 5, 1S24, Johnston 
Papers, HSP; Robert Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, June 28, 1824. Butler 
Family Papers, HNO; Louisiana Gazette. May 5, 13. 1824; Joseph G. Tregle, 
Jr., "Henry Johnson,” in Dawson, ed., Louisiana Governors. 98-103.
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of the popular vote. In November. despite an effort to elevate 
Viliere past Johnson, the legislature in a forty-one to fifteen vote 
selected Johnson as the next governor. An examination of the popular 
vote indicates the importance of the Creole-American split and 
sectional preferences within the state. Combining the votes of the 
two Creole candidates and comparing this sum to the total that the 
three Americans received reveals that only sixty-eight votes out of 
over sixty-five hundred separated the two populations, yet the votes 
were not evenly distributed throughout the state- In only eight of 
the twenty-eight parishes which delivered official returns did the 
victorious ethnic group receive less than 70 percent of the vote, 
while in ten parishes over 90 percent of the vote went to one of the 
two ethnic groups. (SEE APPENDIX B)
While Johnson had significant backing throughout the state, the 
other candidates relied on one or two areas of strength. The voters 
of the Florida parishes refused to support either of the Creole 
contenders, casting only 4.7 percent of their ballots for Marigny or 
Viliere. In contrast, Philemon Thomas, a Florida parish resident, 
received four-fifths of his votes there. Like Thomas’s results, 
Butler’s small vote was geographically concentrated, with North 
Louisiana providing him almost two-thirds of his total. Neglected in 
North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes, Marigny won a plurality in 
Greater Orleans and performed competitively in South Louisiana.
Viliere obtained the largest total in this Creole-majority region but 
received less than 30 percent of the vote elsewhere. Johnson captured 
over 50 percent of the vote in both the Florida Parishes and North
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Louisiana, and his respectable minority in the other two zones can be 
partly attributed to his residency in South Louisiana and his fluency
—  iPin rrench. both of which made him tolerable to Creole voters.
In the three Senate elections surrounding the presidential 
election of 1824. no direct connection was made between national and 
state events. In the January 1824 election. Josiah S. Johnston 
defeated Edward Livingston with the Creole-American fight and state 
sectionalism the key issues. On one hand, the Creoles in the 
legislature generally supported Livingston both because his brother- 
in-law Auguste Davezac was a prominent New Orleans Creole legislator 
and because, according to rumor, a Creole had been promised 
Livingston’s vacated congressional seat upon his elevation to the 
Senate. On the other hand, the Americans, especially those outside of 
New Orleans, supported the Red River cotton-planter Johnston. With 
Livingston garnering the city support and Johnston the westerners, a 
struggle ensued over the votes of the Florida parish members. 
Livingston alleged that Johnston favored the maintenance of large 
Spanish land grants at the expense of American settlers and that he 
had supported the Orleans Navigation Company to the detriment of the 
Florida parishes. These allegations could not overcome the members’ 
antipathy toward New Orleans and Creoles, and Johnston was elected by 
a vote of twenty-nine to twenty-seven.50
i9Louisiana Senate Journal, 1824-25. 3.
10Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, January 16, 1824, Hamilton 
Papers. LLMVC; Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, January 20, 1824, 
Johnston Papers, HSP. While no roll call vote was recorded Johnston 
stated that he had gotten all of the American votes with one exception—  
Josiah S. Johnston to [his wife], January 15, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP;
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With Senator Henrv' Johnson's election to the governor's office 
in July 1S24, the subsequent legislature had two United States Senate 
seats to fill in addition to its selection of presidential electors. 
Despite the timing of these two events, no evidence links the 
presidential and senate races. First, to fill the remainder of 
Governor Johnson’s term, the legislators selected Dominique Boulignv. 
a New Orleans Creole who spoke no English. Bouiigny's victory rested 
in part on a bargain between his men and Livingston's, who traded 
votes for Boulignv in November for votes for Livingston in January 
1S25 when he met Josiah Johnston in a rematch of their battle from the 
previous year. The election of Boulignv heightened the country versus 
city tension in the legislature, and, in promoting Johnston's 
candidacy, the Attakapas Gazette decried New Orleans’s ’’greedy spirit 
of monopoly" in its attempt to control both Senate seats and thus 
three of Louisiana’s five representatives in Washington. Even the 
city’s own Louisiana Gazette expressed disbelief that the legislature 
would elect another senator from the Crescent City, though it 
advocated the Florida parishes’ Philemon Thomas not Johnston.^
Once again, proponents of both candidates viewed the votes of 
the Florida Parishes’ legislators as pivotal. They exchanged 
allegations that their opponents supported the Spanish land grants 
over those of the American emigrant population. Also, as in the prior 
year, Johnston had to defend himself against charges that he opposed
Louisiana Senate Journal. 1824. 13.
SiSt. Martinvilie Attakapas Gazette, November 17. 1824; Louisiana 
Gazette January 4, 1825; David C. Ker to Josiah S. Johnston, December 3, 
1S24, Johnston Papers, HSP; Louisiana Senate Journal. 1824-25. 11.
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any investigation into the corrupt Orleans Navigation Company which 
had defrauded many Floridians. An added complication came from the 
candidacy of Philemon Thomas, a resident of the Florida parishes and 
the hero of the West Florida Rebellion. Johnston's coterie believed 
that Livingston had tricked Thomas into running in order to take votes 
away from Johnston. If that had been the plan, it worked well but not 
welt enough. On the first ballot Livingston received twenty-five 
votes. Johnston nineteen, and Thomas fifteen. To win. however, a 
candidate needed a majority not just a plurality. Realizing their 
candidate had no hope of victory. Thomas's men withdrew his candidacy 
on the second ballot, and thirteen of the fifteen pro-Thomas members 
switched to Johnston giving him the victory.ji
The contests between Johnston and Livingston cleariv 
demonstrate that Louisianans viewed the presidential race and state 
contests through different lenses. The opposing sides of the Creole- 
American cleavage exhibited no consistency in the two races. While 
the Creoles had been Clay’s strongest backers in the presidential 
contest, in the Senate race, they generally voted for Livingston. 
Jackson’s former aide. Correspondingly, Johnston, who had spent most 
of 1824 campaigning for Henry Clay in the northeastern states, 
received the vote of the American legislators who had been primarily 
pro-Jackson. Thus, the gubernatorial and senate races demonstrate
"Edward Livingston to Henry H. Gurley, Gurley Family Papers. 
September 24, 1824, Manuscript Department, Tulane University, New
Orleans, Louisiana; David C. Ker to Josiah S. Johnston, December 3, 1824, 
Alexander Porter to Johnston, December 10, 1824, John H. Johnston to 
Johnston, November 18, 1824, December 29, 1824, John Moore to Johnston, 
Januarv 10, 1825, Johnston Papers, HSP; Louisiana Senate Journal. 1824- 
25, 49.
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that, despite the increased interest in the IS24 presidential 
election, no strictly partisan lines had been established in 
Louisiana.''
The 1826 congressional elections provide a further opportunity 
to assess the integration of national and state politics in Louisiana. 
With the three incumbents running, these elections offered the voters 
a chance to express their opinions on their delegation's role in 
electing Adams to the presidency. In the First District, Edward 
Livingston, who had supported Jackson in 1825, easily defeated his 
opponent with national politics not really an issue. The true test of 
the integration of national and state politics and the development of 
parties in Louisiana would come in Gurley and Brent’s districts.
These two races would give the voters a chance to render their 
judgement on the two men who allegedly betrayed the people’s will by
54opposing Andrew Jackson in 1825.
In the Third District, John Brownson and Antoine Garrigues de 
Flaugeac opposed William Brent. Brent’s anti-Jackson stance did not 
prove to be significant, as neither Garrigues nor Brownson was a 
Jackson partisan. The Jacksonians did not present a candidate because 
they feared that this would divide the opposition and ensure Brent’s 
victory. Instead, they backed Brownson. who, though a supporter of 
Adams, pledged himself to stand by whomever received the state’s
53Isaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, October 5, 1826, Johnston 
Papers, HSP.
54The three congressional districts included: First District— Greater 
Orleans and most of the sugar bowl; Second District— Florida parishes 
plus West Baton Rouge, Iberville, and Pointe Coupee; Third District—  
North Louisiana, Avoyelles, and the Attakapas country.
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popular vote if the presidential contest again went to the House of 
Representatives. His two opponents declined to make such a pledge. 
Brownson's northern birth along with his failure to campaign 
contrasted with the Maryland-born Brent's well-managed campaign which 
included the wide distribution of bilingual pamphlets. As in the 
gubernatorial and senatorial contests in the middle 1820s. the 
American-Creole tension surfaced in this race. A Jackson partisan 
moaned that the Creoles could not be persuaded to vote for Brownson 
but hoped that Garrigues de Flaugeac and Brent would split this vote. 
This hope was dashed when, on the first day of the election. Garrigues 
declined in Brent’s favor thus guaranteeing Brent’s victory.^
In the Second District, William S. Hamilton. Gurley's chief 
opponent, made the representative’s vote for Adams the centerpiece of 
his campaign. Hamilton wrote a public letter as "Jeremiah" contending 
that Gurley’s presidential vote was the only noteworthy event to occur 
during his tenure in Congress. Others agreed that the Americans in 
the Florida parishes would not forget his violation of his 
constituent’s instructions in supporting Adams over Jackson in the 
1824 presidential contest. This argument dovetailed with the 
contention that "when a Yankee was to be served," the Connecticut-born 
Gurley, "forgot that he owed any obligation to the people of
5SIsaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, September 25, 1825, October 
5, 1825, November 9, 1825, January 16, 1826, Walter H. Overton to
Johnston, August 2, 1826, John H. Johnston to Johnston, May 9, 1826, July 
25, 1826, L.S. Hazel ton to Johnston, May 24, 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP. 
Results from all three districts can be found in Louisiana Gazette, 
November 7, 1826. Under the 1812 constitution, state elections in 
Louisiana lasted for three days in July and presidential elections for 
three days in November.
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Louisiana." Gurley's proponents responded to this line of attack by 
producing a January 1S25 letter in which Gurley complained that, 
despite his best efforts, he had been unable to obtain the opinion of 
the people which when "clearly and fully expressed ought to be obeyed 
by the Representative" in selecting the president. Hamilton's 
supporters scoffed at this "sophistry" and asserted that legislature’s 
vote, which Gurley had disobeyed, had expressed the people’s will.55
For the first time in Louisiana history, congressional 
candidates, while not running under the banner of parties, at least 
explicitly recognized the connection to presidential politics. 
Alexander Barrow, a prominent planter, described the race as "between 
Adams(viz) Gurley & Jackson(viz) Hamilton," and he had "very little 
doubt of the triumph of Old Hickory." He also believed this election 
would "decide whether the friends of Jackson can with certainty count 
on the support of this state at the next presidential contest." One 
of Hamilton’s advisers assured him that he would be "supported by 
every friend to General Jackson." And, Gurley in his recapitulation 
of the election referred to Hamilton’s friends as "the Jackson party." 
Additionally, a Hamilton advocate alleged that the Adams 
administration had established newspapers in the state to support 
Gurley and Brent and oppose Livingston.57
55Isaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, May 6, 1826, Johnston Papers, 
HSP: Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, March 19, 1826, "Jeremiah"
to the Electors, June 24, 1826, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC, St. Francisville 
Louisiana Journal. June 22, 1826, Louisiana State Gazette. June 21, 1826.
57Alexander Barrow to Edward G.W. Butler, July 1, 1826, Butler Family 
Papers, HNO; Alexander White to William S. Hamilton, May 21, 1826, P.K. 
Wagner to Hamilton, July 30, 1S26, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Henry H. 
Gurley to Henry Clay, August 20, 1826, in Hopkins, ed., Clav Papers.
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Gurley and Hamilton did not limit themselves to debating their 
allegiances to Adams and Jackson. They fought for the title of 
republican and offered contrasting points of view on the role of 
government. Hamilton, of course, alleged that Gurley’s vote for Adams 
had been unrepublican, and that he. as the people’s representative, 
would support their voice even if they were so ungrateful as to choose 
another over their ’’saviour” Jackson. He campaigned as a Jeffersonian 
Republican in favor of states rights and strict construction of the 
United States Constitution and opposed to federally sponsored internal 
improvements. He also placed himself in the mold of Jackson, a 
veteran of the War of 1812 who had retired as an independent planter.
While Hamilton challenged the idea that ’’power is liberty." 
Gurley embraced this theory. He portrayed himself as a proponent of 
Louisiana’s welfare who had encouraged federally sponsored internal 
improvements in the state. One of his supporters mocked Hamilton for 
opposing internal improvements in the very parishes where a 
Washington-New Orleans road would pass, and even one of Hamilton’s 
supporters agreed that a circular he had published on these issues had 
hurt his candidacy. Gurley also reiterated his stance that he had 
acted as a republican in supporting Adams. Through the publication of 
letters, circulars, and newspaper articles, both candidates made 
extensive efforts to place their views before the electorate.
5:634-35.
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exertions indicating that they accepted the republican ideal of the 
sovereignty of the people.
When the results were taliied. Gurley had won re-election to the
House with 52.5 percent of the vote. While some rejoiced that his
majority presented "a very strong answer to the assertion so
repeatedly made, that [he] violated the wishes of [his] constituents"
in voting for Adams, his victory resulted from other causes. Gurley
owed his election to East Baton Rouge and Iberville where he won by
402 votes, whereas in the district's other seven parishes he lost by
267. East Baton Rouge voters supported Gurley because he lived there.
The administration’s appointment of Creoles to key positions.
including the post master of New Orleans, helped sway prominent
Creoles in Iberville to put their influence behind Gurley. Many of
Hamilton's friends chastised the parish’s Creoles for their
59abandonment of him.
Despite these defeats, Jacksonians in Louisiana eagerly awaited 
1828 when they would have a chance to elevate their hero to the 
presidency. In that year, the state’s voters confronted legislative, 
congressional, and gubernatorial races in July, in addition to their 
first opportunity to select presidential electors in November. With a 
national election coming on the heels of the state election, the
58Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, June 21, 1826, Johnston 
Papers. HSP; William S. Hamilton to the People of the Second 
Congressional District in St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. May 25, 
1826; Louisiana State Gazette. May 30, July 25, 1826; Archibald Haralson 
to William S. Hamilton, June 17, 1826, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
59Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, August 31, 1826, Johnston 
Papers, HSP; Alexander White to Williams. Hamilton, September 24, 1826, 
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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opportunity existed for party leaders to connect these two contests. 
Attempts were made to attach party iabels to the gubernatorial 
candidates and Louisiana became more committed to a two party system. 
In the gubernatorial and legislative races, however, traditional 
prejudices prevented the complete assimilation of the state into the 
national political spectrum. Also, with the state elections in July 
and the presidential election not until four months later, combining 
the two remained difficult.
With a multiplicity of candidates, the gubernatorial race, as in 
1824, focused on the American-Creole split. Even eighteen months 
prior to the election the "public mind" was "much distracted” about 
the governor’s race and "at least fifteen [candidates] are talked of.” 
United States Senator Josiah Johnston found himself among those being 
considered, especially because many deemed him the only electable 
American. He preferred the security of his Senate seat to the 
unpredictability of a gubernatorial campaign. Perhaps because he 
combined an American and French heritage, Henry S. Thibodeaux was 
considered the most prominent candidate, but his untimely death in 
October 1827 left the field wide open.“̂ Eventually, the canvass 
narrowed to Pierre Derbigny and Bernard Marigny on the Creole side, 
and Philemon Thomas and Thomas Butler on the American side. As in
0 Henry Adams Bullard to Josiah S. Johnston, January 26, 1827,
Johnston Papers. HSP. Letters soliciting Johnston to run as the only 
American who could win include Alexander White to Johnston, February 7, 
1S27, Walter H. Overton to Johnston, October 3, 1826, Alexander Porter 
to Johnston, April 14, 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP. Thibodeaux was b o m  
an Acadian but, orphaned at an early age, was raised by the influential 
Schuyler family in New York before moving to Louisiana in 1790, marrying 
an Acadian, and settling on Bayou Lafourche.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
46
1S24, both factions feared that a division of their votes would lead 
to the victory of the opposing ethnic group. A letter in the Baton 
Rouge Gazette suggested that a legislative caucus choose between 
Thomas and Butler with the weaker man dropping out of the race, but 
nothing came of this idea. Also, the Americans, in an unsuccessful 
further effort to divide the Creole votes, tried to persuade Martin 
Duralde to run.Bt
With the election of a president in the same year, the 
possibility of combining the two races was discussed but opinion 
divided on the subject. In the 182S presidential contest. Andrew 
Jackson, campaigning mainly on the issue that a "corrupt bargain" had 
usurped the will of the people in 1S24-25. opposed the incumbent John 
Quincy Adams. Because of Gurley and Brent’s roles in the election of 
Adams over Jackson, this issue had particular resonance in Louisiana.
In the gubernatorial contest, one candidate of each ethnic group could 
be associated with Adams (Derbigny and Thomas) and one of each with 
Jackson (Marigny and Butler). Running for re-election to Congress 
from the Third District, William Brent asserted that "the elections in 
July are very important" because "they will fix the votes of our state 
for the fall election." A leading proponent of Jackson’s cause in the 
Third District alleged that the noise, violence, and intolerance of 
the administration men would lead many Americans to support Marigny 
for governor. An effort by Marigny’s supporters to have the Jackson 
nominating convention which met in New Orleans in January 1828 to
5IFor a discussion of Duralde’s running see Montfort Wells to Josiah 
S. Johnston, December 15, 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP: Baton Rouge
Gazette, March 15, 1828.
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declare for a governor failed. "The convention determined to keep the 
Presidential &: Governor's election separate, not to blend the 
questions. "c‘
Despite attempts to connect the two races, most voters still 
viewed the gubernatorial and presidential campaigns as separate 
entities. The failed effort to have the Jackson convention nominate a 
candidate demonstrated that not everyone saw an advantage in 
connecting the two races. A Jackson advocate seemed confused as he 
discussed in the same letter an "Adams ticket" for the legislature but 
"American" and "French" candidates for governor. Another announced 
his determination to support Derbigny because "he does not come out as 
a party candidate. Nor is it necessary that he should." An adviser 
to gubernatorial candidate Thomas Butler avowed the "disposition of 
each [of the populations] to support their own countrymen" and 
predicted that "the Presidential question will not mingle in near so 
great a degree in the gubernatorial election as some imagine." A 
letter in the Louisiana Journal proclaimed, "Happily the presidential 
question does not enter into the canvass." The timing of the two 
elections also added a further obstacle to their connection. With the 
gubernatorial election in July and the presidential contest in
6 William L. Brent to James G. Taliaferro, May 9, 1828, James G. 
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Isaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, October 
5, 1826, Alexander Porter to Johnston, January 24. 1828, Mr. Grima to 
Johnston. January 16. 1828, Johnston Papers, HSP; Isaac L. Baker to 
Andrew Jackson, April 21, 1827, Jackson Papers, LC.
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November, one campaign would end before the other reached its 
c 1 i max.
Also, despite the candidates' association with Adams or Jackson, 
only Bernard Marigny and Thomas Butler openly aligned themselves with 
a particular candidate, and even their attachments remained tenuous. 
Both Adams and Jackson supporters condemned Marigny’s efforts to tie 
himself to Jackson as insincere and chastised "his Ivins pretensions 
to Jacksonism" which he used "only as far as answered his own 
purposes." Although his brother had served as Jackson's chief of 
staff. Butler hesitated to connect the two races. In the November 
1S27 address announcing his candidacy, his proponents declared. "We 
consider the mingling of the national politics, with our gubernatorial 
election, as contrary to the true spirit of our constitution." By the 
election, however, the leaders of the Jackson party in New Orleans had 
endorsed Butler’s candidacy, and he had openly aligned himself with 
the General’s cause. Butler’s friends believed that his defeat could 
be attributed to this belated embrace of Jackson and on his being "a 
little too careful." They asserted that "if he had come more boldly
C Mout in favor of Jackson it would have secured his election." ’
0 Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, March 29, 1827, Hamilton 
Papers, LLMVC; G. Smith to Josiah S. Johnston, January 9, 1827[8].
Johnston Papers, HSP; Samuel H. Harper to Thomas Butler, June 24, 1828, 
Thomas Butler Papers. LLMVC; St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. June 21, 
1828.
f *’Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, January 24, 1828, Johnston 
Papers. HSP; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 219; Butler address 
in Baton Rouge Gazette, November 3, 1827; Argus. July 4, 1828; Caroline 
Bell to Edward G. W. Butler, August 3, 1828, Butler Family Papers, HNO.
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The final results of the election revealed that, once again, the 
Creo!e-American split played a prominent role. Thomas and Butler, 
both from the Florida Parishes, understood that any chance of victory 
would depend on Creole votes. This realization led the latter to 
declare that he entertained "a high opinion of the patriotism and 
republicanism of the Creole French inhabitants." The former agreed 
that he opposed the "party feelings" which had led to the creation of 
an "illiberal distinction" between the two populations. Neither of 
these appeals proved effective as Pierre Derbignv captured 44.5 
percent of the votes, while the other three candidates received from 
16 to 22 percent. Unlike 1S24, where the two ethnic groups received 
almost exactly the same number of votes, this time the Creole 
candidates earned 62.1 percent. One major differences occurred in 
North Louisiana where, mainly because of Derbigny’s moderate stance on 
the ethnic division, the Creole percentage doubled. Additionally, in 
South Louisiana, without favorite-son Johnson running, the Creoles 
solidified their already strong hold.(SEE APPENDIX B)
Of the twenty-nine parishes which reported official results, 
twelve of them recorded a vote of over 90 percent to one of the two 
ethnic groups, while only eight reported a return of less than 70 
percent for the victorious ethnic group. Also, as in 1824, the 
returns did not demonstrate geographic uniformity across the state. 
Thomas won just above 50 percent of the vote in the Florida parishes, 
but this sum represented over 75 percent of his total. Butler had 
more balanced support than in 1824, but two-thirds of his total came 
from Florida and North Louisiana. Marigny again performed best in
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Greater Orleans and South Louisiana but elevated his total in North 
Louisiana as well. Derbigny's victory stemmed from his domination in 
South Louisiana and Greater Orleans. Even if he had received no other 
votes, his 1ST0 votes in South Louisiana would have elevated him to 
the governor' s of f ice.03
In the concurrent legislative elections, the winners were viewed 
in partisan terras— as Jackson or administration men— for the first 
time in Louisiana’s history. A letter to the Louisiana Journal 
denounced the prevailing spirit which viewed all subjects ’’through the 
optics of party” and asserted that in legislative races, "the first.—  
nay the only question to be asked is— ’Is he an Adams or Jackson 
man?*” As in 1824, the connection between the two elections was 
strongest in New Orleans, where a Jackson and an administration ticket 
contested for the legislature. Even in rural St. Mary Parish, 
however, the "friends of the administration" urged support of a pro- 
Adams ticket for governor, Congress, and the legislature. By all 
accounts. Adams men controlled both houses of the legislature, 
especially because of their triumph in New Orleans and the surrounding 
parishes of the First District where not a single Jackson man was 
elected.60
The congressional elections also terminated to the liking of the 
administration men. In the First District, Edward White ousted 
Jacksonian Edward Livingston partly because of White’s "Jacksonian
660fficial election returns in Louisiana House Journal. 1828-29, 5-6.
66Robert Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, July 18, 1828, Butler Family 
Papers, HNO; St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. June 21, 1828; Argus, 
February 22, 1828, July 21, 1828.
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friends” who voted for him because he was a friend to the Creoles and 
a Catholic. Others refused to support Livingston because he opposed 
the tariff on imported sugar cane and because he spent more time in 
N:ew York than in Louisiana. In the Second District. Jackson 
supporters again failed to oust Henry Gurley. The loser Lafayette 
Saunders attributed his loss to his short residence in the state, and 
consequently the voters' unfamiIiarity with him. Also. Gurley 
benefitted from his supporters* determination to keep the 
congressional and presidential contests separated. The Jacksonians 
could only console themselves with a victory in the Third District 
where Walter Overton, campaigning as a friend of Jackson and opponent 
of the tariff, triumphed over Gurley's partner in the 1S24 betrayal, 
the "infamous scoundrel" William Brent, whose extended absences from 
the state further injured him.t,,
These victories led one administration man to exclaim. "Our 
elections in Louisiana have settled the Jackson question in this 
state." Also, they left St. Mary Parish sugar planter Alexander 
Porter exulting "we have preserved the government of this state from 
failing into evil hands for the next four years." Despite holding the 
non-partisan position of associate j'ustxce of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court, Porter acted as a leader the administration’s cause in
S7Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston. May 21. 1828. Isaac L. 
Baker to Johnston, December 15, 1827, May 12, 1828, Johnston Papers, HSP: 
Lafayette Saunders to Andrew Jackson, July 18, 1828, Jackson Papers, LC: 
James Hamilton to Martin Van Buren, July 31, 1828, Martin Van Buren 
Papers. LC; Caroline Bell to Edward G. W. Butler, August 3, 1828, Thomas 
Butler to Edward G. W. Butler, October 6, 1828, Butler Family Papers, 
HNO; Walter H. Overton to William S. Hamilton, September 10, 1828,
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Argus. July 16, 1828.
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Louisiana, and he cheerfully added that "the Jackson party in this 
state are humbled beyond measure." Less than ten days Later. Porter 
admitted that "not a single one of our elections turned exclusively on 
[the presidential question]." Victorious Third District congressional 
candidate Walter K. Overton agreed that "in some parishes the 
Presidential question obtained, whilst in others personal 
considerations governed.” Baker, too. believed that many Adams men 
voted for Overton, while some Jackson supporters had gone with Brent. 
Prior to the election. GurLey had wondered whether "little things [the 
congressional election]" were to be "mixed with great ones[the 
presidential campaign].
The 1S28 presidential campaign gripped the state as none 
previously had. A state legislator rejoiced that "Never was so much 
anxiety, excitement, and impatience universally felt as in the present 
contest. It is a great novelty to witness its influence in this
state." For the first time, Louisiana voters had the privilege of
selecting the state’s presidential electors.^ Perhaps, more 
importantly, in January of 1828. Andrew Jackson returned to the field
of his glory to celebrate the anniversary of his victory in the Battle
of New Orleans. During the antebellum era, presidential candidates
George Eustis to Josiah S. Johnston, August 9, 1828, Alexander 
Porter to Johnston, July 19, 1828 (first quote), July 27, 1828 (second 
quote), Walter H. Overton to Johnston, August 7, 1828, Isaac L. Baker to 
Johnston, May 12, 1828, Johnston Papers, HSP; Henry Gurley to John C. 
Buhler, December 24, 1827, Buhler Family Papers, LLMVC; Wendell H.
Stephenson, Alexander Porter: Whig Planter of Old Louisiana (Baton Rouge. 
1934), 27.
John H. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, August 21, 1828, Johnston 
Papers. HSP.
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did not campaign, so Jackson ostensibly visited solely to participate 
in the anniversary ceremonies. Despite the payment of lip—service to 
the idea that Jackson's visit had nothing to do with presidential 
politics, from the start Louisianans viewed it in no other terms. An 
administration-dominated legislature, not wanting to show disrespect 
toward the hero and anger its constituents, reluctantly invited 
Jackson, but they intentionally failed to provide an appropriation to 
pay for his visit.!u
Not surprisingly, the verdict on the effect of Jackson’s visit 
depended upon which side of the partisan divide the judge fell. While 
a Jackson supporter claimed that "the celebration surpassed anything 
I've ever witnessed," an Adams man asserted, "a poorer display I have 
never seen." He explained how Jackson's friends had sponsored a 
dinner for the General, but, even after decreasing the price, they 
failed to fill the subscription. The Crescent City newspapers, 
especially the Louisiana Courier and the Bee, feuded over the size and 
quality of the General’s reception. Taking advantage of the General's 
visit, Old Hickory’s advocates held a nominating convention in New 
Orleans at which one hundred twenty delegates from twenty-seven 
parishes announced Jackson as their presidential candidate.7*
Partisans of both candidates seized on the idea that only their 
favorite could preserve republicanism in the nation. Adams supporters
70Josiah S. Johnston to Henry Clay, May 19, 1827, Hopkins, ed., Clav 
Papers, 6:568-69.
71 Joshua Baker to Nicholas P. Trist, February 8, 1828, Trist Papers, 
SHC? Philip Yost, Jr., to Henry Clay, January 9, 1828, Hopkins, ed., Clav 
Papers, 7:26; Bee January 22, 1828; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of 
Jackson, 215-9.
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from sixteen parishes assembled at Baton Rouge in November IS2“ and 
produced an address to the voters of Louisiana which denied that 
"bribery and corruption" had elevated Adams to the presidency. More 
importantly, they attacked Jackson as a military despot and proclaimed 
that he had, after the Battle of New Orleans in 1S15,
"substituted...his will to that of the law” and "trampled upon the 
constitut ion." Despite their differences, former Governor Robertson 
announced for Adams maintaining that Adams unlike Jackson respected 
the Constitution. During the election, the Argus denounced Jackson's 
declaration of martial law in 1815. and pro-administration carriages 
had "Adams & the Constitution" painted on their sides.
A Jackson meeting in Baton Rouge almost a year later viewed 
things in a completely opposite manner. It saw the contest as not 
between republicanism and military despotism but as "between 
Republicanism on the one hand, and of Aristocracy on the other." The 
delegates contrasted the "Farmer of Tennessee" Andrew Jackson, "a 
patriot of practical wisdom, republican virtue and simplicity" with 
John Quincy Adams "a notorious aristocrat" who held in contempt the 
idea of a republican system of government. Every pro-Jackson assembly 
repeated the charge that Adams’s election in 1824 had violated the 
will of the people. Jackson proponents labelled him "incorruptible.”
11Baton Rouge Gazette. December 8, 1827; Thomas Bolling Robertson to 
William Robertson, August 22, 1827, Prichard Collection, LLMVC; Argus. 
November 3, 1828; Caroline Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, November 7, 1828, 
Butler Family Papers, HNO.
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and claimed the General’s election would "save our country from the 
polluting grasp of intrigue and corruption.’"'
The proper role of the federal government in the economic sector 
emerged as a key issue in the campaign. Adams and Clay were 
associated with the American System which envisioned an activist 
federal government harmonizing the country’s diverse economic and 
sectional interests. A national bank, a protective tariff, and 
federally sponsored internal improvements were the chief instruments 
of this policy. While the bank received scarcely any mention in the 
state, the other two pillars had a stronger appeal in Louisiana than 
in other southern states- Louisiana sugar cane needed a protective 
tariff to compete against imports from the West Indies. And, 
Louisiana’s extensive river and bayou system needed federal help in 
their development. The proponents of the administration in Louisiana 
never labelled themselves "National Republicans,” preferring either 
"Adams men" or "Administration men,” because of the strong association 
of "National Republicans" with the New England states. Whatever name 
they chose, these Louisianans did clearly adopt the party’s economic 
nationalism and its American System.
The Argus boldly proclaimed its allegiance to the "AMERICAN 
SYSTEM" which contained "the very heart and soul of our nation’s 
independence" and labelled its opponents as "the most short-sighted 
politicians in existence." While admitting that some southerners
' Baton Rouge Gazette. October 25, 1828; Edward G.W. Butler to Thomas 
Butler, February 16, 1828, Thomas Butler Papers, LLMVC; David Kerr to 
Andrew Jackson, November 6, 1828, Jackson Papers, LC; Louisiana Courier. 
November 9, 1827; November 3, 1828.
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found the system's provisions unconstitutional, the Argus asserted 
that "the most liberal construction should be put upon the letter of 
the constitution." It also alleged that if Jackson won the November 
election, the American System would be destroyed. Owning a large 
sugar cane plantation and one hundred and fifty slaves. Alexander 
Porter claimed the termination of the duty on sugar cane would lead 
cane growers to turn to cotton which would cause an over-production of 
that staple and lead to the ruin of ail planters. In Louisiana, he 
concluded that both sugar cane and cotton planters had a vested 
interest in the protective tariff.'
Others, however, celebrated the idea that Jackson’s election 
would destroy the American System and expressed disbelief that any 
southerner could advocate the idea of broad construction. Congressman 
Walter Overton considered the tariff "a tax on the Southern Planter” 
and "oppressive to the cotton grower." A speaker at a pro-Jackson 
meeting in Alexandria deplored the "injurious tendency" a tariff would 
have on southern planters. Just emerging on Louisiana’s political 
scene, John Slidell, a lawyer who had emigrated from New York to New 
Orleans, alleged the tariff would convert "the independent cultivators 
of the soil into slavish tenants of the workhouse." Realizing the 
popularity of the sugar cane tariff in certain areas, the Jackson 
party repeatedly distinguished between a constitutional revenue tariff 
and an unconstitutional protective tariff. Arguing for this strict 
constructionist viewpoint, William S. Hamilton proclaimed that "our
H Argus, June 1, 14, 1828; Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, 
July 2. 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP; Stephenson, Alexander Porter. 28.
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Federal government Is one of limited powers, and can exercise no 
authority wh[ichj is not granted in the consti tut ion. ”'J
In the November election "there never was anything seen like the 
exertion on both sides." In New Orleans, "the administration party 
had hacks running to take all they could find to the polls." In bold 
print, the Argus reminded "FRENCHMEN” that Jackson "banished ail 
Frenchmen after the war." threatened to have their countryman 
Louaillier shot, and called them "TRAITORS [and] mistrusted you all.” 
The pro-Jackson Louisiana Courier countered with "REMEMBER OLD HICKORY 
ON THE PLAINS OF CHALMETTE" and implored its readers to support the 
slave-holding Jackson, "A MAN OF THE SOUTH,’' over Adams, the proponent 
of northern manufacturing. Louisianans responded to the frenzy 
surrounding the contest and came to the polls at their highest rate 
ever. While 63.6 percent of those eligible voted in the July 
gubernatorial election, in November, turnout exceeded 75 percent in 
the state and, in the Florida parishes, reached an astounding 91 
percent. (TABLE 1.2)76
Andrew Jackson triumphed nationally, and, despite the efforts of 
the administration party. Louisiana remained true to her savior, as 
Jackson won the state 4,605 to 4,066. The Florida Parishes, "the
75Walter H. Overton to William S. Hamilton, September 10, 182S,
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Overton to Josiah S. Johnston, September 30, 
1S28, Johnston Papers, HSP; Louisiana Courier. November 9, 12, 1S27;
Slidell quotation from Louisiana Courier. June 13, 1843 quoting Louisiana 
Advertiser May 1827; Hamilton speech written for John B. Dawson to 
deliver, July 1829, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
76Caroline Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, August 3, 1828, November 7, 
1828, Butler Family Papers, HNO: Argus. November 4, 1828: Louisiana
Courier, November 3, 1828.
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backbone of the Jackson party." gave over three-quarters of its votes 
to the General. He also won a large majority in North Louisiana and 
lost a very close contest in Greater Orleans. Adams supporters did 
have some reason to be sanguine with the results in Louisiana. In 
comparison to the rest of the South, where Jackson received over SO 
percent of the vote. Adams’s 47 percent in Louisiana appeared very 
respectable. Undoubtedly. Adams’s relatively strong showing stemmed 
from the attraction of the American System in the Pelican State. He 
won not only in Greater Orleans but also in pro-tariff South Louisiana 
which gave him two-thirds of its votes. (SEE APPENDIX A)77
One month after the presidential campaign, the legislature, 
which had been elected in July, gathered in New Orleans. One of its 
most important tasks was the election of a United States senator. The 
Senate election of January 1829 combined the prominent themes of this 
early party period in Louisiana: partisan preferences, the growing 
power of the voice of the people, and ethnic prejudices. The 
legislature divided between Adams and Jackson partisans, but the vote
77William J. Cooper, Jr., The South and the Politics of Slavery. 
1828-1856 (Baton Rouge, 1978), 5-11; Unidentified newspaper clipping, 
March 20, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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did not simply follow these lines. While the Jackson men united 
behind former Congressman Edward Livingston, the Adams men. who had a 
majority, failed to agree upon a candidate. The Creoies wanted to re­
elect Dominique Bouligny, while the Americans supported former Senator 
and Governor Henry Johnson. Despite fears that a division between 
Bouligny and Johnson might allow Livingston to triumph, both men 
refused to yield. A further complication for the administration men 
stemmed from an effort, especially in the Third Congressional 
District, to have the people instruct their legislators to vote for 
the pro-Jackson Livingston. Rapides Representative John H. Johnston 
planned to vote for Henry Johnson until receiving instructions from 
his constituents to vote for Livingston. He realized the risk in 
opposing the people’s will and changed his preference accordingly. 
Recognizing this danger to their aspirant’s chances. Johnson 
proponents circulated counter instructions supporting their candidate.
While increased partisanship and the people’s instructions 
played a role in the election, the Creole-American conflict could not 
be kept at bay. As the election approached, supposedly Bouligny and 
Johnson worked out a tacit understanding whereby whoever received 
fewer votes on the first ballot would withdraw in favor of the other. 
Despite falling two votes behind Bouligny, Johnson, to whom "office- 
holding was an obsession," stubbornly refused to abandon the race. On 
the fifth ballot, several of Bouligny’s followers switched to 
Livingston, assuring his victory. This defeat resulted in a series of 
bitter recriminations between the two ethnic groups of the Adams 
party. Even an American member of the party blamed Johnson’s ambition
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and contended that by refusing to yield to Bouligny. "Johnson has cut 
his own throat.” And. for the next five years. Johnson's name would 
disappear from the lexicon of Louisiana politics.'’
By 1S29. Louisiana had taken important steps toward the 
formation of popularly based political parties integrated into a 
national party system. First, the electorate, though only a small 
percentage of the total population, had become much more active and 
powerful. The 1824 law granting it the right to select the state’s 
presidential electors had helped spur this change, and over three 
quarters of the eligible voters had taken advantage of this 
opportunity in IS2S. In what would be the first salvo in a long 
battle, the Baton Rouge Gazette in 1S27 announced its advocacy of 
constitutional changes that included expanding the electorate and 
making more offices elective. Additionally, while previously only 
ethnicity had classified legislators, now, politicians, the press, and 
the electorate had begun to view them by their allegiance to national 
leaders— either pro-Jackson or pro-administration. Furthermore, in 
1S28, for the first time, all three congressional races had tied to
national politics with each race having a Jackson and an Adams
79candidate.
78James Erwin to Henry Clay, January 6, 1829, Hopkins, ed., Clav
Papers. 7:590-91: J. Essin to Josiah S. Johnston. January 12, 1829,
Alexander Porter to Johnston, January 13, 1829, Henry Adams Bullard to 
Johnston, January 12, 1829, Johnston Papers, HSP: "Obsession" quotation 
from Tregle, "Henry Johnson," in Dawson, ed., Louisiana Governors. 98; 
Louisiana Senate Journal. 1828-29. 51-52.
79Baton Rouge Gazette, August 11, 1827.
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As the lS20s came to a close, the partisan picture in Louisiana 
remained ciouded. Both parties had reason to be confident as they 
looked forward to IS32 and another combination of gubernatorial and 
presidential races. On one hand, supporters of Adams and the American 
System could proudly claim the governor's office, a majority in the 
legislature, and two of Louisiana's three congressional seats. On the 
other hand. Andrew Jackson's victory in the presidential contest and 
the legislature’s selection of a pro-Jackson senator helped 
Jacksonians remain optimistic. Traditional patterns and prej'udices 
still persisted, however. In the 1S2S gubernatorial race, the 
electorate split not only between Adams and Jackson candidates but 
subdivided between Creole and American proponents. Thus, because of 
this division, the race involved candidates from the following groups: 
Creole-Adams, Creole-Jackson, American-Adams, and American-Jackson.
The 1829 senate race also demonstrated that, while the legislature may 
have divided between Adams and Jackson supporters, strict party 
discipline could not be assumed. The Adams legislators could not put 
aside their ethnic differences to unite behind a single candidate, 
which led to the victory of the minority Jackson party’s nominee.
Until partisan allegiance could overcome the sharp differences between 
the American and Creole populations, party development in Louisiana 
would remain incomplete.
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CHAPTER TWO 
TWO-PARTY POLITICS IN LOUISIANA. 1829-1836
Entering the 1830s. party formation in Louisiana remained 
incomplete. Ethnicity, state sectionalism, and personality 
overshadowed partisan attachment for many Louisianans. Voters often 
supported candidates who stood on their side of the Creole-American 
divide regardless of party. Louisianans preferred aspirants from 
their section of the state, and voters living outside New Orleans 
remained suspicious of nominees from the city. Additionally,
Louisiana parties were incompletely integrated into a national party 
system. Louisianans aligned themselves with Andrew Jackson, John 
Quincy Adams, or Henry Clay but declined to call themselves Democrats 
or National Republicans and frequently failed to perceive any 
connection between state and national races. These elements limited 
party growth and partisan attachment in Louisiana, and state level 
races often witnessed a multiplicity of candidates divided not by 
party but by ethnicity and/or residency.
By 1836, however, party structure in Louisiana had become more 
complete, and the state’s political parties had become more fully 
integrated into the national party system, dividing almost evenly 
between the Democratic and Whig parties. With an increase in partisan 
organization, most races had only two candidates, one from each party. 
The Whigs and Democrats differed primarily in their stances on the 
American System— a national bank, federally sponsored internal 
improvements, and a protective tariff. In Louisiana, Whigs generally 
supported these measures, while Democrats, following President Andrew 
Jackson’s lead, opposed most aspects of the system, only making an
62
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exception for a tariff on sugar cane, one of the staters primary 
staples. Though the American System invoLved national issues, the 
intensity of partisan disagreement over its policies made it a topic 
even in state contests.
While attitudes toward the American System shaped party 
development in Louisiana, ethnicity, regionalism, personality, states 
rights, republicanism, and slavery remained important. Creole- 
American tension and sectional rivalry persisted, but in most cases 
operated within the party system. For instance, voters might prefer a 
Creole Whig over an American Whig or a Florida parish Democrat over a 
New Orleans Democrat. When an ethnic group or region considered 
itself snubbed by the party leadership, these feelings could override 
party loyalty. Personal rivalry, especially among the leaders of the 
Jackson party, further undermined party solidarity. Louisiana also 
contained a small contingent of states rights men who shared the 
Democrats’ hostility to the American System but joined the Whigs in 
opposition to Jackson’s executive tyranny. The parties based their 
claims on the electorate not only on economic issues, but on their 
ability to protect republicanism. By 1836, partisans also battled 
over who could best guard a more tangible southern asset— slavery.
From this period until the Civil War, both Louisiana parties portrayed 
themselves as the best defenders of slavery and contended that the 
peculiar institution would be unsafe in the hands of their opponents.
Party organization among Louisiana Jacksonians began with the 
Andrew Jackson’s defeat of John Quincy Adams in the 1828 presidential 
election. For the first time, his supporters would receive the
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patronage of the federal government in Louisiana. For more than ten 
years, Beverly Chew had served as the Collector of Customs, the most 
prestigious patronage post in Louisiana. Jackson partisans demanded 
"an early example ought to be made of this man." An Adams supporter, 
Chew had committed the unforgivable sin of blaspheming the traditional 
January 8 celebration in honor of Jackson’s victory at the Battle of 
New Orleans. In an angry epistle, a New Orleans Jacksonian alleged 
that Chew, a church vestryman, had refused to raise his church’s flag 
or to ring its bells because Chew believed that he "could not 
celebrate that glorious victory without honoring the chief who 
achieved it." The correspondent suggested that Jackson replace Chew 
with Martin Gordon whose appointment would be "almost as painful to 
the coalition as your election" because of the prominent pro-Jackson 
role Gordon had played in the 1828 presidential contest. Jackson 
concurred and quickly relieved Chew of his post and appointed Gordon 
in his place.1
In the wake of Jackson’s victory, Gordon, a New Orleans 
businessman, brilliantly maneuvered himself into the position of the 
administration’s chief representative in Louisiana. After the 
election, Gordon followed Jackson to Washington and convinced the 
president of his loyalty. Upon returning to Louisiana, Gordon 
received the appointment as Collector, and his New Orleans associates 
received the other prime Louisiana patronage posts. Gordon’s rise to
^David C. Ker to Andrew Jackson, November 15, 1828, Andrew Jackson 
Papers, Library of Congress (Hereinafter LC); Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., 
Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Clash of Cultures and Personalities 
(Baton Rouge, 1999), 229-33.
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the top of Louisiana’s Jackson party was somewhat surprising. Unlike 
most of Jackson’s closest allies in the state, Gordon had not served 
alongside the General in the Battle of New Orleans, not even meeting 
Jackson until 1827. Aware of the importance of linking himself to 
Jackson, Gordon and his friends created a fictitious history between 
the two men. They portrayed Gordon as a valiant defender of the 
ramparts at the Battle of New Orleans, and later even alleged that 
Gordon, at a young age, had earned Jackson’s lifelong friendship by
1coming to the aid of an out-numbered Jackson in a hotel lobby brawl.
The administration’s patronage policy angered three important 
groups in Louisiana: Adams proponents, the Creole population, find 
residents of the Florida Parishes. Obviously Jackson chose not to 
include those who had advanced Adams’s cause in his patronage plans. 
Seemingly unaware that his support of Adams could have angered 
Jackson, Judge Alexander Porter complained that "silly fools" had 
persuaded a man he had befriended twenty years before, when they both 
lived in Tennessee, to turn against him. In a more public display, 
friends of Chew staged a meeting to protest his ouster and, according 
to Gordon, to keep partisan excitement alive.3 The Creoles were kept
2For a list of other Jackson appointments in New Orleans see Tregie, 
Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 233. Letter of introduction from John 
Grymes to Andrew Jackson, November 3, 1827, Jackson Papers, LC. During 
the battle, Gordon left New Orleans for the safer confines of Cincinnati- 
-New Orleans Argus. May 20, 1829. (Hereinafter all papers New Orleans 
unless otherwise noted). For brawl story see J.M. Whitaker, Sketches of 
Life and Character in Louisiana (New Orleans, 1847).
3Alexander Porter to Jesse B. Harrison, December 24, 1829, Burton 
Norvell Harrison and Family Papers, LC; Wendell H. Stephenson, Alexander 
Porter: Whig Planter of Old Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1934), 9-10; Martin 
Gordon to Andrew Jackson, December 10, 1829, Jackson Papers, LC.
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from the public trough because the parishes where they predominated 
had backed Adams in November. Jackson received advice from Louisiana 
which asserted that "The French parishes alone have given majorities 
against you. These people are entirely ignorant of the principles of 
our government. "* With neither the Adams men nor the Creoles offering 
Jackson much electoral support, their absence from patronage positions 
was not startling.
Much more astonishing, however, was the omission of men from the 
Florida Parishes among the key patronage posts. Considered "the 
backbone of the Jackson party,” the Florida Parishes were "run mad 
about Genl. Jackson."* The region’s residents had loyally voted for 
Jackson in the 1828 election and felt that they deserved to be 
rewarded for this fealty. They knew where to place the blame for 
their exclusion: Martin Gordon. Writing to Jackson, a Florida Parish
partisan lamented that despite "the noisy clamors of New Orleans it
was the silent work of modest and noiseless Patriotism in Florida that 
gave us the victory."6 While aware of the role that the Florida 
Parishes played in Jackson’s election, Gordon wished to concentrate 
power in New Orleans generally, and in his own hands specifically. He
*David C. Ker to Andrew Jackson, November 11, 1828, Jackson Papers,
LC.
Unidentified newspaper clipping, March 20, 1830 (1st quote) in 
William S. Hamilton Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collections, LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, (Hereinafter LLMVC); 
T.J. Pew to Josiah S. Johnston, January 31, 1830 (2nd quote), Josiah 
Stoddard Johnston Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
(Hereinafter HSP).
6John B. Dawson to Andrew Jackson, May 26, 1829, quoted in Tregle, 
Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 234-5.
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decided on a plan whereby, in the guise of giving into the Florida 
Parishes’ patronage demands, he would actually diminish their 
political clout even further.
Correctly sensing that one of the region’s leading Jacksonians, 
William S. Hamilton, desired to run for Congress in 1830, Gordon 
attempted to have him removed from the state. Gordon arranged for 
Hamilton to receive a federal patronage post requiring him to move to 
Mississippi. Gordon intended to have one of his allies, Eleazer 
Ripley, a northern-born New Orleanian, run for Congress in Hamilton’s 
place further cementing Gordon’s hold on the Louisiana Jackson party. 
Realizing that "it appeared strange that [the Surveyor General’s] 
office should be given to a person [Hamilton] who had never sought 
it," Hamilton and his friends saw through Gordon’s subterfuge. They 
also stressed that "Florida should be represented at Washington" and 
disparaged the "Yankee" Ripley’s efforts to maneuver his way into 
Congress despite not even living in the district. Hamilton declined 
the office, and he and his alLies learned to beware of the gifts
•Joffered by Gordon.
The competition for control of Louisiana politics took a strange 
turn on October 6, 1829, when Governor Derbigny died from injuries 
sustained in a carriage accident. The state constitution had no 
provision for a lieutenant governor instead stipulating that upon the
7Alexander Barrow to William S. Hamilton, October 28, 1829, (1st 
quote) Lafayette Saunders to Hamilton, November 4, 1829, (2nd quote) 
Hamilton to Saunders December 14, 1829, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC. The 
Second Congressional District included the Florida .Parish region plus the 
parishes of Iberville, Pointe Coupee, and West Baton Rouge but did not 
include Orleans Parish.
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governor's death, the president of the Senate would ascend to the
position. Though this provision may have seemed straightforward to
the constitution’s framers, in practice it proved a "source of great
0deal of confusion" and "a singular predicament." The constitution 
failed to indicate whether the president of the senate actually became 
the governor or whether he simply acted as governor while serving as 
president of the senate. The senate decided that the office 
transferred not to the man but to the position. According to this 
interpretation, the governorship, until the regularly scheduled 1832 
election, would rotate each year when the Senate elected a new
opresident.
Upon Derbigny’s death, Amaud Beauvais, the acting president of 
the Senate, became governor. When the legislature reassembled in 
January 1830, however, the senate elected Jacques Dupr6 as its new 
president, and he replaced Beauvais as governor. Realizing the 
absurdity of this gubernatorial merry-go-round, the legislature 
scheduled a new election for July 1830 despite the absence of any 
constitutional sanction for such an event. Thus, two years earlier 
than anyone had anticipated, the Jackson party and its opponents, most 
commonly called either the Clay or Adams party, were forced to don 
their political armor and return to battle. The 1830 gubernatorial 
battle proved that in Louisiana: (1) political organization had
aSee Article III, Section 17 of 1812 constitution in Constitutions 
of the State of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1930), 86; Alexander Porter to 
Josiah S. Johnston, November 15, 1829, Johnston Papers, HSP (first
quote); Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, October 16, 1829, Hamilton 
Papers, LLMVC; Argus. October 8, 1829 (second quote).
aBaton Rouge Gazette. October 17, 1829; Argus. October 13, 1829.
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advanced but remained incomplete, (2) state sectionalism continued to 
exist, and (3) the split between Americans and Creoles continued to 
undermine party development.^
As in previous gubernatorial elections, a multitude of 
candidates emerged, and four months prior to the July election, the 
Baton Rouge Gazette still listed as many as eleven men vying for the 
position. Despite realizing that victory could best be achieved by 
uniting on a single candidate, neither party possessed an effective 
mechanism for designating a nominee. At the July election, four 
different aspirants, two allied with Jackson and two with the 
opposition, received over five percent of the vote. An exasperated 
Clay partisan recognized both parties’ organizational difficulties 
when he declared, "Our hope is in the divisions of the Jackson party, 
for if they were to unite upon one, they could elect 
him— .Fortunately they are as yet more disunited than we are."11
In their effort to unite on a candidate, opponents of the 
administration benefitted from Henry Clay’s visit to Louisiana in 
February 1830. With "Henry the 1st" in New Orleans, Jacksonians 
worried that "whomever he advocates will be elected." While in the 
state, Clay attended the legislature and spoke to his supporters there 
in an effort to help coordinate their efforts. During this time, two
10Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, January 13, 1830, Johnston 
Papers, HSP; Argus. January 18, 1830; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of 
Jackson. 238-45.
^Baton Rouge Gazette. March 6, 1830. Less than two weeks before the 
Argus had listed fourteen candidates. William C.C. Claiborne, Jr. to 
Henry Clay, April 11, 1830, in James F. Hopkins, et al., eds., The Papers 
of Henry Clav (11 vols., Lexington, 1959-92), 8:190.
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of Clay’s closest Louisiana allies. Senator Johnston and Clay’s son- 
in-law Martin Duralde withdrew from the race in favor of Creole Andre 
Bienvenu Roman. Roman, a wealthy, St. James Parish sugar planter had 
served for a total of ten years in the legislature including four as 
Speaker of the House. Despite Clay’s efforts some Clay partisans
still clung to other candidates, including interim Governor Amaud
12Beauvais who received 17.8 percent of the vote.
In addition to benefitting from Clay’s appearance in Louisiana, 
Roman’s Creole heritage also helped him. Many Creoles had been 
disappointed in the Jackson administration’s patronage policy, which 
had completely ignored them. As a result, the Creoles were determined 
to hold on to the reins of government at the state level and thus 
opposed to Martin Gordon— the proscriptive policy’s architect. While 
the 1830 election, like the 1828 contest, saw two Creoles battle two 
Americans, there was an important difference. In 1828, each party had 
a Creole and an American candidate. In 1830, both Creoles— Beauvais 
and Roman— were proponents of Henry Clay, and the two Americans were 
both Jacksonians.
The Martin Gordon-authored appointment policy of the Jackson 
administration had not only offended Louisiana Creoles, but had 
angered residents of the Florida Parishes as well. In January, the 
Florida Parishes’ William S. Hamilton announced his bid for the 
governor’s office. If Gordon had not wanted Hamilton as a 
congressmen, he certainly did not approve of his gubernatorial bid.
12Dr. R. Davidson to William S. Hamilton, January 20, 1830, Hamilton 
Papers, LLMVC; Henry Clay to Josiah S. Johnston, February 27, 1830, in 
Hopkins, ed., Clav Papers. 8:178.
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Following the announcement of Hamilton’s candidacy, Gordon and his New 
Orleans cronies countered by declaring Congressman William H. Overton, 
a Red River cotton planter, their choice for the office. They 
suggested to Hamilton that he withdraw from the race, and in exchange 
they would support him for the United States senate seat which be 
chosen during the upcoming legislative session. Receiving favorable 
reports about his candidacy throughout the country parishes and 
doubting the Gordon’s sincerity, Hamilton declined the offer and 
decided to stay in the race.^
Gordon’s clique had nominated Overton without even consulting 
him. Writing to Hamilton, Overton asserted that the most important 
goal should be for the party to offer only one candidate, and to 
achieve this goal he would be willing to withdraw in favor of Hamilton 
if necessary. Aware of the anger which Gordon’s policies had produced 
in the country parishes, Overton understood the difficulty of 
campaigning as Gordon’s hand-picked candidate. Many voters living 
outside of New Orleans resented that "dictators" meeting at "Castle 
Gordon" had taken it upon themselves to select the party’s 
candidate.1* Antipathy toward Gordon’s heavy-handed policies resulted 
in a surge of support for Hamilton. He received letters contending 
that "Your being opposed by old Martin Gordon would only make me stick 
more closely to you" and "I should like to see a country candidate 
succeed...if for no other reason than it would surely disappoint a
^Peter K. Wagner to William S. Hamilton, January 21, 1830, Hamilton 
Papers, LLMVC.
^Walter H. Overton to William S. Hamilton, March 5, 1830; W.L. 
Robeson to Hamilton, April 20, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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certain New Orleans Set." After assessing his prospects, Overton 
withdrew from the race and announced for Hamilton.*6
While Overton may have given his support to Hamilton, Gordon and 
his New Orleans faction still did not welcome the idea of a governor 
from the Florida Parishes. Ultimately both sides agreed that the 
calling of a statewide nominating convention would offer the best 
chance to reduce the field to a single Jackson candidate. In response 
to the call for a convention, local meetings occurred in many of the 
Florida Parishes and New Orleans. The remainder of the state, perhaps 
because of the short-notice, did not respond as enthusiastically. 
Meeting in Donaldsonville in early May, the first statewide nominating 
convention in Louisiana’s history proved a total failure as less them 
ten delegates from four parishes attended. Recognizing that they 
could not adequately claim to represent the entire Jackson party in 
Louisiana, they did not offer a nomination, though Hamilton’s 
supporters informed him that he had been the unanimous choice of the 
few delegates present.16 After the convention, all of Hamilton’s 
opponents within the party withdrew except for David Randall, a state 
senator from Ascension. Some Hamilton supporters actually welcomed 
Randall’s candidacy and spoke of the "danger" of his resigning from
liIsaacL. Baker to William S. Hamilton, April 18, 1830, Robert Haile 
to Hamilton, January 27, 1830, Gilbert C. Russell to Hamilton, April 13, 
1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
I6E. A. McConnel to William Hamilton, May 6, 1830, John T. MacNeil 
to Hamilton, May 6, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Baton Rouge Gazette, 
May 15, 1830; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 243-4. In 1830, 
Donaldsonville, in Ascension Parish, served as the state capital. 
Legislators had moved it from New Orleans in 1829 but moved it back to 
the city in 1831.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
73
the field. Like Roman, Randall lived in South Louisiana, where
Hamilton anticipated little support. Hamilton’s men hoped Randall’s
candidacy would cause "terrible havoc on Roman’s party" in that 
17region.
Though Randall and interim Governor Amaud Beauvais would 
receive votes, the contest primarily became a battle between the 
Jacksonian Hamilton and the Clay partisan Roman. Observers disagreed 
on whether party would be the most important variable in determining 
the victor. On one hand, newspapers such as the Baton Rouge Gazette 
"deprecate[d] the idea that the question of Jackson and Adams,
Coalition and Combination, or any other National Watchword should 
influence and decide our local elections." On the other hand, a Baton 
Rouge resident asserted that "The vote of our parish will be divided 
by Adams Clay & Co. vs. Jackson..." These conflicting views of the 
political situation demonstrate that, while party identification had 
become an critical element in voting decisions, its influence was not 
total.1®
As in previous contests, tension between Americans and Creoles 
and sectionalism intermixed with and sometimes overshadowed partisan 
differences. Demonstrating the importance of all three variables, the 
Florida Gazette asserted that voters should support a Floridian, a 
Jackson man, and an American— characteristics which described 
Hamilton. Mocking this claim, the New Orleans Argus countered with
l7W. James to William S. Hamilton, June 25, 1830, Robert Williams to 
Hamilton, May 29, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
18Baton Rouge Gazette. May 6, 1830; Montgomery Sloan to William S. 
Hamilton, February 10, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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its advocacy of a Creole, a Clay man, and a resident of the 
Mississippi River parishes— am accurate description of Andre B. Roman. 
For some voters, ethnicity did not complement but overrode partisan 
concerns. Hamilton received advice that French Jackson men would 
"vote for a French Adams candidate in preference to an American
Jackson man" and that Americans were determined not to vote for a
19French candidate.
Differing not only in ethnicity and section, Roman and Hamilton 
also offered voters divergent views on the American System, especially 
the tariff. The Clay party cheered Hamilton’s candidacy, for they 
believed that his "ultra feelings" made him "the most odious man in 
the state." Tn labelling Hamilton as an "ultra," the Clay party meant 
that Hamilton’s opposition to internal improvement projects and to all
protective tariffs, including the one on sugar cane, were too extreme
2Dfor Louisianans and would guarantee his defeat. Hamilton countered 
that, while he objected to protective tariffs, he did not challenge 
the constitutionality of a revenue duty on sugar cane and that he did 
not oppose internal improvements generally, only monopolies. Despite 
these avowals, some of Hamilton’s friends admitted that the perception 
that Hamilton opposed the sugar cane duty was hurting him. Worried 
that the voters did not understand Hamilton’s tariff views, an anxious
19St. Francisville Florida Gazette in Argus. April 13, 1830; Dr. R. 
Davidson to William S. Hamilton, February 4, 1830, W.L. Robeson to 
Hamilton, April 20, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
10Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, March 10, 1830, T.J. Pew 
to Johnston, January 31, 1830, Johnston Papers, HSP; David Bannister 
Morgan to William S. Hamilton, November 24, 1830, David Bannister Morgan 
Letter, LLMVC.
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partisan a week prior to the election pleaded with Hamilton to "write
me anything about the tariff which if published would benefit you."
In an effort to cloak Hamilton’s views, others advised the candidate
not to issue any circulars because their publication would give "your
Enemies all kinds of chances to tear you to pieces...without securing
21any corresponding advantage.'
Other topics which surfaced in the 1830 gubernatorial contest 
involved the towering image of Jackson in Louisiana and the 
candidates’ commitments to republicanism. Hamilton supporters charged 
that in 1815 Roman had opposed the awarding of a sword to General 
Jackson and wondered whether any friend of Jackson could vote for him 
after such an insult. Stressing the importance of having a governor 
"on terms of intimacy and cordiality with the Executive of the Union," 
they compared Roman’s "general hostility" toward Jackson with the
"ardent reciprocity of attachment" that existed between Hamilton and
22the General. The Jackson party further charged Roman, a wealthy St. 
James Parish sugax planter who owned more than fifty slaves, with 
being "a rank aristocrat" who "treats the poor with contempt."
Hamilton supporters added that Roman had pledged all state offices to 
his relations and Creole connections. On the defensive, pro-Roman
21W. James to William S. Hamilton, June 25, 1830 (first quote), John 
J. Burk to Hamilton, April 1, 1830, Isaac L. Baker to Hamilton, February 
2, 1830 (second quote), Hamilton Papers, LLMVC. For Hamilton’s view of 
the tariff see William S. Hamilton, Writings, 1830, Hamilton Papers.
22On the issue of the sword to Jackson see Louisiana Advertiser. 
January 20 , 29, 1830 and Charles Bullard to William S. Hamilton, May 1, 
1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Louisiana Advertiser. July 2, 1830.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
“6
newspapers denied Roman had made any pledges and proclaimed his 
"independence and truly republican principles."^
Roman triumphed in the July election, capturing 43.8 percent of 
the vote with Hamilton in second with 32.1 percent. The vote of 
Louisiana continued to be divided along sectional lines. Hamilton 
captured over two-thirds of the vote in both the Florida Parishes and 
North Louisiana where his American ethnicity, hostility to the tariff, 
and association with Andrew Jackson had their strongest impact. He 
faltered in Greater Orleans, where Gordon’s faction never embraced his 
candidacy even after Overton’s withdrawal and the Donaldsonville 
convention. Writing to President Jackson, a member of the Gordon’s 
Custom House coalition assured him that "Your friends are as true as 
steel," and that the party had only lost because it had offered 
candidates who "were not our choice." Hamilton also suffered in South 
Louisiana for not only did Roman and Randall live there, but this 
sugar cane-producing region had the most reason to object to 
Hamilton’s anti-tariff stance. As in the previous two gubernatorial 
races, South Louisiana proved the difference. Casting more votes than 
the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana combined, its hostility 
toward Hamilton could not be overcome. (SEE APPENDIX B)
Not only could the Clay party claim the governor’s office, but 
it captured all three of Louisiana’s congressional seats as well.
23Louisiana Advertiser. April 20, 1830, Baton Rouge Gazette. May 15, 
22, 1830. Natchitoches Courier quoted in Baton Rouge Gazette. May 22, 
1830.
24Maunsel White to Andrew Jackson, January 29, 1831, Jackson Papers,
LC.
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Incumbent Edward Douglass White, a sugar planter and law partner of 
Alexander Porter, popular among members of both parties, ran unopposed 
in the First District. In the Third District, Henry Adams Bullard 
carefully assembled the support of influential Creoles and capitalized 
on a mistake of his opponent, who while serving in the legislature 
voted against a measure which would have increased the district’s 
representation.^ Even the overwhelmingly pro-Jackson Second District 
elevated Clay partisan Philemon Thoracis to Congress. As the Hero of 
the 1810 West Florida Rebellion, Thomas had a loyal following in the 
region. During the campaign, he stressed his commitment to internal 
improvements and a fair tariff. To entice Jacksonians, Thomas 
promised to support the people’s choice for president if the election 
went to the House of Representatives. More importantly, Thomas 
benefitted from divisions within the Jackson party. Gordon continued 
to push the candidacy of Eleazer Ripley, but the residents of the 
Florida Parishes balked at Ripley’s fictitious residency in the 
district and nominated Lafayette Saunders. With neither Ripley nor
ycSaunders willing to yield, Thomas easily won the seat.
The 1830 gubernatorial and congressional contests proved that 
the Jackson party in Louisiana continued to have difficulty in 
transferring the popularity of its hero to its candidates for state 
office. According to Alexander Porter, a Clay leader in Louisiana,
25Diedrich Ramke, "Edward Dougla[s] White, Sr., Governor of 
Louisiana, 1835-1839,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly XIX (1936), 280; 
Henry Adams Bullard to Josiah S. Johnston, February 12, 1830, Johnston 
Papers, HSP; Baton Rouge Gazette. July 17, 1830.
26Baton Rouge Gazette. April 24, July 17, 1830; Louisiana Advertiser. 
May 14, 1830.
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"Many Jackson men who bear the name, & avow it, are not so in their
hearts.” The Louisiana Advertiser, a Jackson party organ, agreed that
"something besides an adherence to names is necessary" for the success 
27of the party. The events of the next two years continued to 
demonstrate that. While Andrew Jackson clearly possessed more 
popularity than Henry Clay in Louisiana, the Clay party’s program had 
a strong resonance with the state’s voters. The Clay party won 
Louisiana’s next three United States Senate contests and held onto all 
three congressional seats in 1832, while Jackson easily triumphed over 
Clay in the 1832 presidential election.
In 1830, Henry Clay expressed unrestrained delight at the 
standing ovation he received when he met with the Louisiana 
legislature and pronounced his surprise at the allure his American 
System had in Louisiana. The most important element of Clay’s program 
for Louisianans involved a protective tariff on sugar cane. Pro- 
tariff sentiment in Louisiana could be described as "so general and so 
strong," because by 1829 sugar cane had eclipsed cotton as the state’s 
most valuable crop. While in 1820 the sugar cane crop had been valued 
at slightly over two million dollars and the cotton crop at almost 
seven million dollars, by the end of the decade these numbers had been 
reversed. In 1829, the value of cane products in Louisiana exceeded 
six million dollars, while cotton’s total had slumped to approximately 
two million dollars. Additionally, the number of sugar estates in
27Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, December 1, 1831, Johnston 
Papers, HSP; Louisiana Advertiser quoted in William J. Beard, "The 
Political Career of Josiah Stoddard Johnston," (Master’s thesis, 
Louisiana State University, 1939), 69.
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Louisiana had surged from 193 in 1824 to 691 in 1830. and the number 
of slaves in the sugar region had increased over 86 percent in the 
decade.^
Sugar cane growers in Louisiana relied on a tariff on imported 
cane to remain competitive with imports from the West Indies. 
Politicians from both parties agreed that ending the tariff on sugar 
cane would lead to total ruin in Louisiana, and that the attempt to
IQrepeal the duty on sugar had "goaded the people almost to madness." 
Governor Roman argued that the sugar cane industry "cannot succeed in 
Louisiana, unless the protection hitherto afforded is continued."
These sentiments were not limited to Clay partisans. The Jackson- 
appointed district attorney in New Orleans, John Slidell hoped that 
declining sugar cane prices would "secure us from any attempt to 
reduce the duties on sugar.” Even a call for an anti-tariff 
convention specifically exempted the duty on sugar from discussion.
28Henry Clay to James Brown April 17, 1830 in Hopkins, ed., Clay 
Papers, 8:192, Clay to Josiah S. Johnston, February 27, 1830, ibid.. 
8:178; Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff, 1816-1846," 
(Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1941), 46, 50-51, J.
Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country; The Cane Industry in the South. 1753- 
1950 (Lexington, 1950), 28. See TABLE 1.1 for the size of the slave 
population in 1820 and 1830. The slave population outside of South 
Louisiana had increased 56 percent.
19Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, March 2, 1832, Johnston 
Papers, HSP; Henry Clay to unknown, February 16, 1831, Calvin Colton, 
ed., The Works of Henrv Clav (10 vols, New York, 1904), 4:293-99 (quote 
on 293), Clay to Samuel Southard, February 14, 1831, Hopkins, ed., Clay 
Papers. 8:323; St. Martinsville Attakapas Gazette. October 9, 1831 in 
Louisiana Courier. October 14, 1831.
30Roman address in Louisiana House Journal. 10th leg, 1st sess., 54; 
John Slidell to C.C. Cambreleng, December 6, 1829, John Slidell Letter, 
Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection (Hereinafter 
HNO); Louisiana Advertiser. August 31, 1831.
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Tariff advocates stressed the importance of the maintenance of 
the duty on cane for not only the state’s sugar cane region but also 
for the rest of the South. They convinced Henry Ciav that "all parts 
of the Union would partake of the distress which would certainly 
inflicted upon them" if sugar cane protection was removed. Senator 
Johnston, in a report to the secretary of the treasury, warned that a 
decline in the sugar cane duty would lead to a corresponding decrease 
in the price of slaves throughout the South, possibly cutting their 
value in half. Additionally, protectionists claimed that if Louisiana 
produced less sugar cane, the state would produce more cotton thus 
further lowering that staple’s already decreasing price. Armed with 
this argument, Johnston felt confident discussing the value of the 
sugar cane tariff even at a public dinner in the predominantly cotton- 
producing Rapides Parish.^1
While in Louisiana the pro-tariff forces may have swept the 
field, the rest of the South viewed all protective tariffs, including 
the one on sugar cane, as anathema. The southern wing of the Jackson 
party branded protective tariffs as unconstitutional, arguing that the 
Constitution only sanctioned revenue tariffs. Furthermore, they 
viewed tariffs as a tax on the southern cotton grower to provide 
relief for northern industry. Despite this southern animosity toward 
the tariff, in 1828, Congress passed a tariff containing the highest 
duties of the antebellum era. While most southerners decried the
3IHenry Clay to unknown, February 16, 1831, Colton, The Works of 
Henrv Clay. 4:293; Louisiana Courier. November 15, 1830; Johnston’s 
Report to the Secretary of Treasury in Bee. February 4, 1831; Johnston’s 
speech in Rapides in Niles Weekly Register. June 11, 1831, XL, 258-60.
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tariff of 1828 and labelled it the "Tariff of Abominations." many in 
Louisiana celebrated the bill for its protection of sugar cane. With 
only seven dissenting votes, the Louisiana legislature instructed the 
state’s senators to oppose any change of the measure.
In 1832, in an effort to achieve a compromise between tariff 
advocates and opponents, Congress passed a new tariff which lowered 
duties. Reaction in the South varied. Because the tariff reduced the 
sugar cane duty by one-half cent, two of Louisiana’s three congressman 
voted against it as too mild.33 If Louisiana represented one end of 
the spectrum of southern reaction to the tariff, South Carolina 
represented the other. This hotbed of anti-protection declared the 
tariffs of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional and nullified them. South 
Carolinians led by Vice-President John C. Calhoun argued that because 
the states had created the national government, the states’ authority 
superseded the federal government’s limited powers. This philosophy 
of states rights had considerable allure in much of the South, but in 
Louisiana proponents of this principle were an isolated minority. The 
doctrine had little appeal in Louisiana for two reasons (1) the 
importance of the sugar cane tariff find (2) the vehement opposition of 
the state’s hero, President Andrew Jackson, to nullification. As a
32Martin Duralde to Henry Clay, March 18, 1830, in Hopkins, ed., Clay 
Papers, 8:182-83. For a copy of the legislature’s pro-tariff declaration, 
see Louisiana Legislature to Josiah Stoddard Johnston, March 6, 1830, 
Johnston Papers, HSP; For the South and the tariff and subsequent 
nullification controversy see Richard Ellis, Union at Risk: Jacksonian 
Democracy. States’ Rights, and the Nullification Controversy (New York, 
1987); William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification 
Controversy in South Carolina. 1816-1836 (New York, 1965).
33Bee. July 11, 1832.
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Clay partisan derisively observed, Louisiana Jacksonians’ stance 
regarding nullification would echo the stance of the "God of their 
Idolatry."3* In December 1832, Jackson issued the Nullification 
Proclamation, his reaction to South Carolina’s actions. Written by 
former Louisiana senator and current Secretary of State Edward 
Livingston, the document branded South Carolina’s actions as 
treasonous and threatened federal military intervention.
In the nullification controversy, Louisianans quickly lined up 
on the side of the president in his battle against South Carolina.
Both the Clay party and the Jackson party in Louisiana expressed their 
contempt for the South Carolina nullifiers. In his 1831 inaugural 
address, Governor Roman railed against demagogues who talked of 
disunion, and in 1833 he adamantly declared, "Such doctrines find no 
advocates in Louisiana."35 Writing to the president, Jackson’s New 
Orleans cotton factor asserted that "Your proclamation was hailed here 
by all parties with the greatest enthusiasm," and the Louisiana 
Advertiser offered copies of it for sale. To demonstrate their 
opposition to South Carolina’s course, Louisianans held public 
meetings throughout the state. In New Orleans, even before Jackson’s 
proclamation, an anti-nullification gathering eschewed moderation and 
endorsed a resolution to compel South Carolina "immediately [with] 
sword in hand." A meeting in St. Landry Parish added that the
^Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, December 6, 1832, Johnston 
Papers, HSP.
35Roman’s inaugural address in Louisiana House Journal, 1831, 10th 
leg., 1st sess., 54. Roman’s annual message in Louisiana House Journal. 
11th leg., 1st sess., 4 (quote).
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unconstitutional actions of South Carolina "involv[ed] the entire 
overthrow, and destruction of our Union.
The few Louisianans who sympathized with South Carolina’s stance 
realized the importance of keeping silent if they wished to continue 
their political careers. Not surprisingly, these men were primarily 
found in the Florida Parishes— a region of Louisiana similar to the 
rest of the South in terms of ethnicity* religion, and agriculture. 
Even members of an anti-nullification meeting in this region declared 
that they were not advocates of the tariff and sympathized with the 
South Carolinians who "had suffered grievously" from the oppressive 
duties. Among the most prominent of these Louisiana states rights men 
were former gubernatorial candidate William S. Hamilton and state 
legislator Alexander Barrow. Barrow hoped that the appearance of a 
states rights newspaper would lead, the people of Florida to "the true 
faith" but such a newspaper never materialized. Perhaps Barrow hoped 
for a replacement for the Florida Gazette which two months prior to 
his comments had changed from condemning all tariffs to accepting the 
duty on sugar cane. States rights men in Louisiana faced a double 
difficulty. Not only did the importance of sugar cane in the state 
lead many to champion the tariff, but also because of Louisianans’ 
adoration of President Jackson, few would openly challenge his views. 
After being "denounced as a nullifier" because he did not "laud the
Maunsel White to Andrew Jackson, January 12, 1833, Jackson Papers, 
LC; Louisiana Advertiser. December 28, 1832; Alexander Porter to Josiah
S. Johnston, June 27, 1832, Johnston Papers, HSP; Carl Kohn to Samuel 
Kohn, July 5, 1832, February 1, 1833, Kohn Letter Book, HNO: Louisiana 
Courier. January 29, 30, 1833; Baton Rouge Gazette. January 26, 1833.
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[nullification] proclamation & pronounce General Jackson to be 
immaculate,” Barrow declared that he "would be hung for treason” 
before taking up arms against South Carolina.^
Both sides in the debate over the tariff and nullification 
appealed to the ideals of republicanism, contending that an adherence 
to the competing views would lead to the end of the republic and the 
rise of a military dictatorship. On one hand, for the anti- 
protectionists the passage of a tariff would cause the country to 
change from agriculture to manufacturing. This transformation would 
create large manufacturing enterprises, or "monsters,” requiring a 
standing army to protect them and to suppress the people’s
igliberties. On the other hand, an anti-nullification meeting in St. 
Landry Parish resolved that an acceptance of South Carolina’s view of 
the Union would result in the division of the United States into 
twenty-four countries, each with a standing army protecting its 
borders. To maintain these armies, the people would have to be 
heavily taxed "and finally a military despotism would arise on the 
free republican institutions of our country." A gathering in New
Account of St. Helena Parish anti-nullification meeting in 
Louisiana Courier. January 30, 1833; Alexander Barrow to William S. 
Hamilton, December 9, 1831 (first quote), February 19, 1833 (second 
quote), Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Description of St. Francisville Florida 
Gazette’s change in Louisiana Courier. October 21, 1831.
38WalterH. Overton to William S. Hamilton, January 7, 1832, Hamilton 
Papers, LLMVC.
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Orleans concurred that nullification would lead from disunion to 
anarchy and eventually to the dissolution of republican government.
Though the overwhelming majority of Jacksonians in Louisiana 
dutifully lined up behind Old Hickory in his battle with South 
Carolina and advocated a sugar cane tariff, these actions did not 
signal their acceptance of Henry Clay’s American System.W Most 
Louisiana Jacksonians realized that opposition to the protection of 
sugar cane would mean political suicide in the state. Thus, the 
Jackson party in Louisiana tried to maintain its commitment both to 
the southern opposition to protection and to one of its state’s 
staples. Contending that they only opposed unconstitutional 
protective tariffs, Jacksonians argued that the sugar cane duty was 
not a protectionist measure but a constitutional revenue tariff which 
had existed prior to Louisiana’s entrance to the Union. Without a 
hint of irony, the editor of the Louisiana Courier claimed that "the 
sugar duty. ..ought not to be considered in connection with the 
tariff.” Voters often found the distinction between protection and 
revenue tariffs unclear, and Clay partisans in Louisiana repeatedly 
exploited the electorate’s confusion. They branded tariff opponents 
as nullifiers and asserted that the success of Jackson candidates
39 . .Louis iana Courier. January 29, 1833 (quoting the resolutions of an 
anti-nullification meeting from the Opelousas Gazette); Bee. June 29, 
1832.
*°Bee, June 21, 1832; Louisiana Advertiser. November 14, 1831;
Louisiana Courier. October 21, 1831.
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would mean the end of the sugar cane duty and consequently the
destruction of the state's cane industry.^
The debate over the protective tariff had entered into both of
Louisiana’s 1831 United States Senate contests. With the expiration
of Josiah Stoddard Johnston’s term and with Edward Livingston’s
appointment as Jackson’s secretary of state, the Louisiana legislature
had the opportunity to fill two seats. In both contests, the Jackson
party made an issue of their opponents’ pro-tariff records. The Clay
candidates did not attempt to hide their pro-tariff stances and
instead wore them as badges of honor. They countered the Jacksonian
attacks with the contention that given a choice the Jackson party
would rather have a low tariff and a destitute Louisiana than have a
42protectionist tariff and a flourishing Louisiana.
In January, Clay partisan Johnston ran for re-election against 
John B. Dawson, a Florida Parish Jacksonian. The pro-administration 
newspapers attacked Johnston’s tariff policy, contending that it aided 
New England weavers more than Louisiana sugar planters/3 Despite the 
Jackson party’s majority in the legislature, Johnston easily triumphed 
over Dawson on the first ballot. Johnston’s victory stemmed from 
three causes. First, approving of his conduct as senator, many 
Jacksonians voted for him aside from party considerations. Second, 
Florida Parish Jacksonians had pushed for a nominee from their region, 
and some legislators from other sections "bolted the track" because
^Louisiana Courier. September 7, 1831.
^Louisiana Courier. May 19, 1831; Bee January 10, 1831.
^Louisiana Advertiser. January 1, 8, 1830.
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they found a nominee from this anti-tariff region "a hard chicken to 
swallow." Third, some Creole members, remembering their snub for 
patronage positions, would not vote for a candidate associated to the
itadministration.
When President Jackson selected his former aide-de-camp Edward 
Livingston as his secretary of state, the legislature received a 
second opportunity to elect a senator in 1831. Since Livingston’s 
resignation occurred between legislative sessions, Governor Roman 
legally could have appointed a senator to fill the vacancy. Instead, 
after being reminded that he owed his election to Jacksonians who had 
crossed party lines to vote for him, Roman called a special session of 
the legislature to select a new senator and to respond to the Nat 
Turner slave revolt in Virginia. The Clay party put forward sugar 
planter George Waggaman, an attorney currently serving as Louisiana 
secretary of state. The Jackson party countered with New Orleans 
lawyer Henry Carleton, whose most important asset was his marriage to 
Livingston’s sister.**
In the months preceding the election, the Jackson party tried 
once again to awaken Louisianans to the danger of the Clay party’s 
protective tariff doctrines. Opponents of protection hoped to arouse
**John H. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, January 8, 11, 1831, T.J. 
Pew to Johnston, January 10, 1831, Johnston Papers, HSP; Robert Baile to 
William S. Hamilton, January 19, 1830[1], Hamilton Papers, LLMVC;
Louisiana Courier. December 3, 1830, January 11, 1831. For Florida 
Parishes’ desire to have one of their own in the Senate see James M. 
Bradford to David B. Morgan, August 25, 1830, Sol Wexler Collection, 
Louisiana State Museum.
**Louisiana Courier. May 14, 1831, Alexander Porter to Josiah S. 
Johnston, June 10, 1831, Johnston Papers, HSP; Tregle, Louisiana in the 
Age of Jackson. 125-6.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
88
the state by calling for a Free Trade meeting in New Orleans to select 
delegates to a national free trade convention. They acted in vain. 
Clay party leader Judge Porter predicted that "No meeting of that kind 
speaks at all the sentiments of the state." His prognosis proved 
accurate as protectionists and not free traders controlled the 
assembly. In his opening address, the protectionist chairman 
denounced the men who had called the meeting as nullifiers and 
"temporarily" recessed the meeting for one hundred years/6
The breakdown of the free trade gathering presaged the problems 
that the anti-protection Jacksonians would have in the November senate 
contest. Clay partisans feared that with the election occurring 
during the sugar cane rolling season, some of their strongest pro- 
tariff advocates would miss the vote. Great exertions were made to 
ensure their attendance, and the Clay party stressed the importance of 
uniting behind Waggaman, "the candidate of the party." The Jackson 
party emphasized the need for Louisiana to have at least one pro- 
administration representative in Washington and promoted Carleton as a 
man who could separate the sugar cane duty from protection of 
manufacturing. They caucused in an attempt to unite behind Carleton, 
but with only a minority of their members in attendance, the caucus 
"broke up in confusion." Waggaman won on the first ballot not only 
because of his party’s pro-tariff stance, but also because he received 
support from Jacksonians who resented the nepotism in Livingston’s 
attempt to pass the seat to his brother-in-law. With possibly as many
^Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, September 2, 1831, Johnston 
Papers, HSP; Baton Rouge Gazette. October 1, 8, 1831.
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as ten pro-Jackson Legislators voting for Waggaman, the pro-Jackson
Louisiana Advertiser expressed its disappointment the party’s
"pretended friends" had again let them down.̂
In addition to gaining control of both of the Louisiana’s senate
seats, the Clay party retained all three congressional seats in 1832.
With even the pro-administration Bee admitting that no one was "rash
enough to enter the field against our worthy representative,” Edward
Douglass White again won an uncontested election in the First 
48District. In the Third District, Henry Adams Bullard stressed his
commitment to a national bank and asserted that a reduction in the
sugar cane duty "would be ruinous" to Louisiana. Put forth as "the
champion of Jacksonism," Lafayette Parish’s Alexander Mouton, the
first Creole to contend for Congress in Louisiana, campaigned against
Bullard. To counteract the threat posed by Mouton among the
district’s Creole population, Bullard allied himself with the wealthy
49and influential Jacques Dupr6 and held onto his seat.
In the Second District, incumbent Philemon Thomas reiterated his 
pro-tariff, pro-internal improvement platform of 1830 and added a 
commitment to a national bank. The Clinton Olive Branch repeated
47Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, October 29, 1831, December 
1, 1831, J. Simone to Johnston, November 10, 1831, Johnston Papers, HSP; 
Porter to John Ker, December 12, 1831, Ker Family Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina (Hereinafter SHC); 
Louisiana Courier. May 19, 1831, October 17, 21, 1831; Louisiana
Advertiser. November 17, 1831.
48Bee, May 25, 1832.
49Henry Adams Bullard circular (1832) in James G. Taliaferro Papers, 
LLMVC, Thomas Curry to Josiah S. Johnston, May 6, 1832, Johnston Papers, 
HSP; Louisiana Advertiser. March 29, 1832.
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Thomas’s 1830 claim that presidential politics should have nothing to 
do with the election as Thomas would support the people’s choice for 
president in the House of Representatives. His opponent, Eleazer 
Ripley, argued that while the tariff may be legal it was also "an 
oppressive tax" which should be lowered and asserted the 
unconstitutionality of both federally sponsored internal improvements 
and a national bank. Though the Florida Parishes was the state’s 
strongest Jackson region, Thomas narrowly defeated Ripley. Even a 
Clay partisan realized that Thomas’s victory had more to do with his 
personal popularity than with the candidates’ opinions regarding 
governmental activism- Thomas’s long residency in the region coupled 
with his participation in the 1810 West Florida Rebellion led pro- 
administration papers to admit that he could never be defeated in the 
region. Additionally, Ripley simply possessed too many negatives to 
win— his association with Martin Gordon, his questionable residency 
claims, and his angering prominent Jackson men in the district all 
worked against him.50
Thus, entering the 1832 presidential contest, the Clay party and 
its program clearly held the upper hand in Louisiana with the governor 
and the entire congressional delegation all Clay partisans. This 
contest, however, demonstrated the unparalleled popularity of the 
Andrew Jackson in the state. In the election, Henry Clay armed with
Philemon Thomas to his constituents in Baton Rouge Gazette, May 5, 
1832; Clinton Olive Branch quoted in Baton Rouge Gazette. June 16, 1832; 
Nicholas Baylies, Eleazer Wheelock Riplev of the War of 1812 (Des Moines, 
1890), 104-108; (quote on 105); Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, 
August 3, 1832; Baton Rouge Gazette. May 18, 1833; Bee. August 14, 1832.
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his American System challenged the incumbent Andrew Jackson.'* Even 
Clay’s strongest partisans acknowledged the futility of challenging 
Jackson in Louisiana and only made a half-hearted effort. While the 
Clay party'’s attempts to employ the American System had succeeded in 
state races, against Old Hickory they were casually brushed aside. 
Defeatism pervaded the Clay campaign, and Jackson swept to an easy 
victory, though the total vote in Louisiana was greatly reduced 
because of the presence of a devastating cholera epidemic in New 
Orleans and its environs during the election.
The failed Free Trade meeting of September, 1S31, had provided 
some of the first sparks of the presidential campaign. The meeting’s 
protectionist chairman, a legislator from Baton Rouge, took the 
opportunity to attack Andrew Jackson as well as free-traders. Trying 
to associate Jackson with free-traders, he alleged that the meeting 
had been called "to prop up the remaining popularity of Andrew Jackson 
in this state." While admitting that he had previously supported the 
General, the chairman asserted that Jackson’s recent conduct, 
especially his decision to run for a second term, had driven 
supporters from his ranks. Baton Rouge Jacksonians and Clayites held 
meetings to address the chairman’s remarks. The former called for the 
legislator’s resignation and celebrated Andrew Jackson, while the
For a discussion of the issues involved in the 1832 presidential 
race see Robert V. Remini, "Election of 1832," in Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Jr., ed., History of American Presidential Elections (4- vols., New York, 
1971), 1:495-516. The Anti-Masons entered William Wirt as a third party 
candidate but he had virtually no impact in Louisiana.
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latter praised the chairman's course and condemned Jackson's actions 
as president.
The initial enthusiasm of this anti-Jackson meeting quickly 
disappeared. Even a year prior to the presidential election. Clay 
partisans despaired of his chances in Louisiana. Senator Johnston 
received letters from some of Clay’s most loyal supporters indicating 
that it was "a hopeless business to persist in running [Clay} any 
longer!!" and that unfortunately we "have no other choice but to hang 
to Mr. Clay." In New Orleans, two pro-Clay newspapers, the Bee and 
the Mercantile Advertiser, defected to the opposition. The perceived 
inevitability of Jackson’s election had Clay party leaders wondering 
not how their candidate could win but who would be Jackson’s vice- 
president.53 After achieving so many victories, why did Clay 
partisans in Louisiana give up the election almost by default?
Clayites’ despondency has two explanations. First, they sensed that 
Clay would not win the vote of the rest of the South nor the national 
contest. Thus, their efforts would be in vain. Second, because of 
Jackson’s role in the Battle of New Orleans, supporters of Clay in 
Louisiana realized that they did not challenge a man but a demigod.5* 
While Clay partisans approached the election with apprehension, 
Jacksonians viewed the contest as a chance to show that their party 
represented the majority of the state. They quickly called for a New
53Baton Rouge Gazette. October 8, 22, 1831.
53Thomas Curry to Josiah S. Johnston, November 15, 1831, Alexander 
Porter to Johnston, December 1, 1831, March 26, 1832, Johnston Papers, 
HSP.
5*Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 253-4, 264.
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Orleans convention to choose their electoral ticket. Learning from 
their disastrous attempt at a gubernatorial convention in 1830. this 
time the Jackson leadership created more auspicious conditions. They
held the assembly in New Orleans in January, the city’s busiest time
of year. More importantly, the gathering occurred during the 
legislative session, and the party allowed pro-Jackson legislators to 
serve as delegates for parishes with no other representation. As a 
result, forty-two delegates (twenty-five members of the legislature 
and seventeen selected in parish meetings) representing "nearly every 
parish" attended the convention, and a Clay party leader jealously 
admitted that the "Jackson party was confident of success."^
As in 1828, Jacksonians in Louisiana returned to the theme that
Jackson, because of his services in the Battle of New Orleans, was the 
state’s savior. The first resolution of a pro-Jackson meeting 
declared that Louisiana owed Jackson "a special debt of gratitude." A 
call for another meeting urged the party to come out and support the 
"Victor of New Orleans." The Louisiana Courier concurred that the 
"sons of Louisiana" would show that they "have not forgotten the 
services that Jackson rendered them in times of peril." On the 
opening day of the election, headlines in the Louisiana Advertiser 
screamed "Remember OLD HICKORY on the Plains of Chalmette ON THE 
GLORIOUS EIGHTH JANUARY, 1815." Four years earlier, Jackson’s 
opponents had replied to these arguments by portraying him as a 
military despot who would run roughshod over the Constitution. For
^Louisiana Advertiser. January 13, 1832; Thomas Curry to Josiah S. 
Johnston, January 26, 1832, Johnston Papers, HSP.
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the majority of Louisianans. events had belied this claim and instead 
had shown that his performance in this battle had been "but a preface 
to a more important work.” In 1832 pro-Clay newspapers offered no 
counter to this appeal-^
The Jackson party claimed that Jackson’s actions as president, 
particularly his veto of the bill to recharter the second Bank of the 
United States, had followed the same noble course that he had pursued 
in the Battle of New Orleans. In 1S32, two years prior to the 
charter’s scheduled termination, Clay partisans pushed through 
Congress a bill to recharter the national bank, an institution which 
Jackson had denounced. In Louisiana, few questioned its 
constitutionality, and, following the instructions of the legislature, 
all five of the state’s representatives in Washington voted for the 
bill. In his study of Louisiana banking, George D. Green finds a 
favorable attitude toward the national bank in the state among 
prominent Jacksonians. Some, including Martin Gordon, had even served 
as directors of the New Orleans branch. Additionally, staunch 
Jacksonians such as former gubernatorial candidate Thomas Butler and
former congressman Walter H. Overton desired its recharter in some
57form. Thus, Jackson’s opponents believed that they had placed the
^Louisiana Courier. October 8, 24 (third quote), November 3, 1832; 
Louisiana Advertiser. January 13 (first quote), November 5, 1832 (fourth 
quote); Bee. October 31, 1832 (second quote).
57George D. Green, Finance and Economic Development in the Old South; 
Louisiana Banking. 1804-1861 (Stanford, 1971), 91-92; Thomas Butler to 
Josiah S. Johnston, February 23, 1832, Walter H. Overton to Johnston, 
April 29, 1832, Johnston Papers, HSP; For discussion of Jackson and bank 
war see Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American 
Freedom. 1822-1832 (New York, 1981), 331-73.
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president in a no-win situation. On one hand, he could veto a bill 
popular with much of the electorate. On the other hand, he could 
approve the recharter, after announcing his opposition to the 
institution, and break his word. Clay supporters hoped that either
COcourse would severely damage his popularity.
Delighting in Jackson’s predicament regarding the recharter of 
the bank, a Louisiana Clay partisan only expressed the caveat that "It
is true that [Jackson] gets out of dilemmas better than other
59people." Jackson’s actions quickly proved the accuracy of this 
assessment. Understanding the electorate much better them his 
opponents, Jackson vetoed the bill in a message that the partisan 
press in Louisiana labelled the "Second Declaration of the Rights of 
the People." While previously there had been no outcry against the 
Bank of the United States in Louisiana, once Jackson declared the 
institution "a monster" dangerous to the people’s liberties,
Jacksonians suddenly realized that they had foolishly allowed this 
threat to republicanism to exist in their midst. With the zeal of new 
converts, they acted quickly and spiritedly. The veto message was 
published, and meetings were held in which Jackson was praised for his 
defeat of this anti-republican institution "dangerous to the liberties 
and properties of this Union." With his veto message "as impregnable 
as the lines of the battleground of the 8th of January 1815,"
58Thomas Curry to Josiah S. Johnston, January 26, 1832, Johnston 
Papers, HSP.
55 Ibid.
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Jacksonians claimed that their hero had saved the Onion a second 
time.68
Like its use of the bank recharter, the Clay partyrs attempt to 
employ another plank of the American System— the sugar cane tariff—  
against Jackson also backfired. Having successfully exploited their 
association with the protection of sugar cane to win every state race 
since 1828, Clay partisans now tried unsuccessfully to wield it 
against Jackson. With Jackson?s approval of the tariff of 1832, which 
had only slightly reduced the sugar cane duty, the Jackson party in 
Louisiana contended that he had placed sugar cane on a stable basis; 
he had provided equal protection to agriculture, manufacturing, and 
commerce; and most importantly that he had demonstrated his commitment 
to the Onion in supporting this measure. Jacksonians argued that the 
tariff question had been settled equitably and that the "ultra- 
tariffists," with their insistence that rates on imported sugar cane 
not be reduced, threatened the Union. While in prior state elections, 
advocates of the American System had grouped anti-tariff Jacksonians 
with the nullifiers, now the Jackson party in Louisiana turned the 
tables and contended that the "ultra-tariffists" and the nullifiers of 
South Carolina had formed an unholy alliance in opposition to Jackson 
and to the Union.61
Louisiana Courier. July 25, October 8, 22, 1832; Bee. July 26, 
August 18, October 9, 15 (first quote), November 3, 1832; Louisiana 
Advertiser, October 16, 1832 (second quote); Tregle calls the bank war 
"an imported disagreement in Louisiana," Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of 
Jackson. 258.
6lBee, September 8, October 24, 27, 1832.
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When the election commenced, however, neither the bank, the 
tariff, nor Jackson's role in the Battle of New Orleans were foremost 
in most Louisianans’ thoughts. Instead, the state’s populace was 
"rather looking to the cholera than to the presidential election."^
The people had reason to fear this scourge, and the disease struck New 
Orleans just prior to the election. Governor Roman described 
cholera’s effect in New Orleans as "more fatal than in any of the 
cities of the union," and approximately ten percent of the Crescent 
City’s population died in the two weeks surrounding the election. 
Businesses closed, political meetings were cancelled, and partisan 
newspapers curtailed the number of printings per week. Because of 
this tragedy, many voters stayed home and the total vote decreased by 
twenty-four percent from the 1828 presidential contest.(SEE 
APPENDIX A)
Andrew Jackson once again demonstrated his tremendous popularity 
in Louisiana and throughout the nation. Nationally, he easily 
triumphed in the electoral college, and he won 61.6 percent of the 
vote in Louisiana. Voters in the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana 
continued their overwhelming support of Old Hickory as he received 
approximately three-quarters of their votes. Additionally, Jackson, 
unlike in 1828, captured the vote of Greater Orleans, though receiving
CAWalter H. Overton to Josiah S. Johnston, October 16, 1832, Johnston 
Papers, HSP.
fiJFor a description of the ravages of cholera in New Orleans see 
Theodore Clapp, Autobiographical Sketches and Recollections during a 
Thirtv-Five Years Residence in New Orleans (Boston, 1857), 120-129;
Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 263-4; Annual message of 
Governor Roman, Louisiana House Journal. 11th leg., 1st sess., 2; Bee. 
November 3, 6, 1832.
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fewer votes than he had in 1828. Only South Louisiana, with its 
dependence on the sugar cane duty, favored Clay. While the presence 
of cholera made no difference in the Jackson’s capture of Louisiana’s 
electoral votes, it undoubtedly exaggerated his victory. The total 
vote decreased dramatically in Clay’s two strongest regions— South 
Louisiana and Greater Orleans, but the Florida Parishes saw only a ten 
percent decline and the number of voters in North Louisiana actually 
increased from 1828 to 1832.
While the 1832 presidential election had again demonstrated the 
invincibility of Andrew Jackson in Louisiana, the question of whether 
the Jackson party could transfer this popularity to other candidates 
remained. Clay partisans feared that the indifference on the 
presidential question would allow their enemies to gain control of the 
state government, and the Jackson press wondered what state was 
represented in Washington by Johnston, Waggaman, White, Thomas, and 
Bullard, for it certainly could not be the pro-Jackson Louisiana.®*
The first opportunity to test relative party strength came sooner than 
expected when six months after the presidential election, Senator 
Johnston died in a steamboat explosion on the Red River. Governor 
Roman called for the legislature to fill the remainder Johnston’s term 
in December 1833. Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Alexander Porter 
adroitly lined up members of the legislature behind his candidacy 
months prior to the scheduled session. Fearing the election of this 
pro-bank, "thorough going opponent of the administration," the Jackson 
party tried to unite behind a single candidate, but as in previous
®*Bee. November 15, 1832.
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contests, party organization crumbled. The night before the election, 
the Jackson party changed their nominee from Walter Overton to Joseph 
Walker because of a belief that he would be more likely to attract the 
Creole vote. The switch may have aided their cause, but Porter won 
with a majority of two votes.^
Once again, despite its claim to represent the majority of 
Louisianans, the Jackson party had failed to elect its candidate.
Clay men celebrated the loss of faith that the result had produced 
among the overconfident Jacksonians. In the game of political musical 
chairs following Porter’s election, Governor Roman appointed 
Congressman Henry Adams Bullard to Porter’s vacated state supreme 
court position, and Clay supporter Rice Garland won Bullard’s seat 
without Democratic opposition.®^ Perhaps sensing that national party 
leaders might be questioning his leadership, Martin Gordon immediately 
sent a series of letters to Washington defending his conduct in the 
senatorial contest. He lashed out at his opponents both outside and 
within the party. Calling Porter "an Alien in every sense of the 
word," Gordon falsely accused the Irish-born Porter of not being a 
United States citizen. He railed against "the monied influence" of 
New Orleans banks and chastised national party leaders for depositing 
federal monies in two New Orleans banks which had used their financial
65Nicholas P. Trist to wife, December 26, 1833, Nicholas Trist 
Papers, SHC (quote); Alexander Porter to John Ker, July 8, 1833,
Alexander Porter Letter, LLMVC; Alexander Porter to Ker, October 6, 1833, 
December 20, 1833, James Porter to Ker, December 15, 1833, Ker Family 
Papers, SHC. For the importance of the bank issue in the senate contest 
see Stephenson, Alexander Porter. 29-30.
6%enry Adams Bullard to Daniel Webster, March 8, 1834, Daniel 
Webster Papers, LC.
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leverage against the Jackson party. He attacked the directors of one 
as "violent enemies of Andrew Jackson” and the other as "the corrupt 
machine of which Henrv Clav is the sole director." Gordon further 
attributed Walker’s loss to "Traitors in our Ranks," singling out 
Federal District Attorney John Slidell for vituperation because of his 
alleged betrayal of the party.67
Seeing enemies everywhere, Gordon failed to realize that his own 
actions more than anyone else’s had jeopardized the success of his 
party. Joseph Tregle contends that a possibly unbalanced Gordon had 
come to believe "he was the Jackson party in Louisiana" and that the 
party’s triumph in the 1832 presidential campaign had "emboldened
[Gordon] to bid for the complete mastery of his Jacksonian
68colleagues." "Making himself daily more obnoxious." Gordon arranged 
to have John Slidell dismissed as Federal District Attorney. Caught 
off-guard, Slidell at first tried to repair the rift with Gordon, but, 
after realizing the impossibility of this effort, joined Gordon in a 
competition to enlist the support of national party leaders—
69particularly President Jackson and Vice President Martin Van Buren.
67Martin Gordon to Andrew Jackson, December 13, 1833,(quotes
regarding the banks), December 14, 1833, (alien and traitor quotes) 
Gordon to F.P. Blair, December 16, 1833, Gordon to William B. Lewis, 
December 16, 1833, all in Jackson Papers, LC.
68Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "The Political Apprenticeship of John 
Slidell." Journal of Southern HistoryXXVI (February 1960), 57-70. (quote
p. 62.)
6®Carl Kohn to Samuel Kohn, April 17, 1833, Kohn Letter Book, HNO 
(quote); John Slidell to Martin Gordon, December 13, 1832, Slidell to 
Andrew Jackson, January 7, 1833, Slidell Letter Book, Manuscripts
Department, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana; Slidell to Martin 
Van Buren, March 27, 1833, Van Buren Papers, LC; Jackson to Gordon, April 
9, 1833, Jackson Papers, LC.
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Gordon shrewdly used a two-pronged attack to out -maneuver 
Slidell in the contest for the backing of the national party 
leadership. First, he gained Jackson’s ear before Slidell could 
present his side of the story. He labelled Slidell a nullifier and an 
associate of South Carolinian John C. Calhoun— the leader of the 
nullification movement and Jackson’s sworn enemy. Second, Gordon sent 
a one thousand dollar donation to a Jackson ally in Washington. An 
emotional Jackson recognized that "these friends of mine mean to pay 
back— the thousand dollar fine imposed on me at New Orleans [in 
1815]." Slidell valiantly fought back. He had his supporters, 
including some of Jackson’s closest friends, send a petition to the 
president, and Slidell went to New York to explain the situation to 
Van Buren in person. Jackson, however, was the type of mem who once 
his mind had been made up nothing Slidell or anyone else did could 
change it. Slidell lost his position, and Gordon at least temporarily 
remained the master of Louisiana’s Jackson party.^
Gordon had succeeded in his attempt to control the Jackson 
party, and Senator Porter would assert that in Washington enemies of 
Gordon were considered enemies of the president and that Slidell would 
never be forgiven. Gordon’s victory would soon prove pyrrhic, and 
Slidell’s name not Gordon’s has come to be equated with Louisiana’s 
antebellum Democratic party. If Gordon wished to continue to have the 
confidence of the national party’s leadership, he needed to produce 
results, and his alienation of much of his own party in Louisiana made
7GTregle, "The Political Apprenticeship of Slidell," 66-7; Francis 
Blair to Gordon, April 11, 1833, quoted in ibid., 66; John Slidell to 
Martin Van Buren, March 27, 1833, Van Buren Papers, LC.
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this achievement almost impossible. Porter's victory in the 1833
senate contest demonstrated that the Jackson party would not
automatically line up behind a Gordon nominee, and the subsequent
defeat of Gordon’s hand-picked candidate in the 1834 gubernatorial
contest would signal the end of Gordon’s tenure as undisputed
chieftain of Louisiana’s Jackson party.^
In 1834, Louisianans would witness the state’s first truly
partisan gubernatorial campaign with each party having a single
candidate. Gordon and the Jackson party, which would become known as
the Democratic party by the election, hoisted John B. Dawson’s name
72atop their newspapers as early as 1831. Realizing after the 1830 
governor’s race that he could not afford to alienate the party’s 
stronghold, the Florida Parishes, Gordon and his associates selected 
Dawson, a very popular Florida Parish judge as their choice. Their 
opponents, who would be called Whigs by election day, acknowledged the 
potency of the combination of Gordon and the Florida Parishes. Whig 
leaders recognized the necessity of running their most popular man 
even if not their most capable and concluded "no one else but 
[Congressman Edward Douglass] White has any chance with Dawson." A 
sugar planter and former law partner of Alexander Porter, White had 
demonstrated his popularity as twice the Democrats had declined to 
oppose him for Congress. At White’s urging the party waited until
71Alexander Porter to Jesse B. Harrison, June 1, 1834, Burton N. 
Harrison and Family Papers, LC.
72Louisiana Advertiser, November 21, 1831; For 1834 gubernatorial 
campaign see Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 276-95.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
103
after his victory in the 1832 congressional race to announce
Itofficially his name as a candidate.
With Dawson and White prominently before the public more than 
two years prior to the election, other men were reluctant to come 
forward. The break between Slidell and Gordon did briefly lead to the 
appearance of a third candidate— New Orleans Mayor Denis Prieur. The 
Slidell faction hoped that the popular Prieur could take the Creole 
vote from the two American candidates. Gordon, however, designed a 
clever stratagem to ensure Prieur’s withdrawal from the race. In 
April 1834, two months prior to the gubernatorial election, Prieur 
faced re-election as New Orleans mayor. When Prieur entered the 
gubernatorial canvass, Gordon and his allies placed a candidate in 
opposition to Prieur for the mayoralty. Preferring the security of 
the mayor’s office, Prieur withdrew from the governor’s race, and 
Gordon’s candidate withdrew from the mayor’s race. Thus, the contest 
remained a battle between Dawson and White.^
White remained in Washington lamenting that despite his 
inclination to canvass he lacked-the knowledge or instincts to do so, 
but his partisans in Louisiana proved very adept at campaigning.
Instead of attacking Dawson directly, they aimed most of their barbs 
at Martin Gordon. They labelled Dawson the candidate of the "custom 
house cabal" which already controlling national politics in the state,
^Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, March 18, 1832, May 9, 
1832, Johnston Papers, HSP; Edward Douglass White to George W. Boyd, June 
2, 1832, Edward Douglass White Letter, LLMVC.
7<Carl Kohn to Samuel Kohn, October 3, 1833, Carl Kohn Letter Book, 
HNO; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 277-84.
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now wished to control state level politics, too. Words such as 
"despotic control,” "coterie." "cabal." "dictate." and "faction" 
filled their columns. They argued that if Dawson were to win the 
governor’s race. Martin Gordon would rule the state with Dawson as his 
puppet. Pro-Dawson newspapers complained that White partisans saw 
Dawson and Gordon as twins, and insisted that a separation must be 
made between Gordon advocating Dawson’s election and Gordon 
controlling Dawson. White advocates found no need for such
distinctions and continued campaigning as if Gordon and Dawson were
7Cthe same man. J
If White partisans found their bogeyman in Martin Gordon, Dawson 
proponents found theirs in recently elected United States Senator 
Alexander Porter. The pro-White Louisiana Advertiser realized the 
similar nature of the attacks on Porter and Gordon and alleged that in 
attacking Porter, Dawson men "find their truest model in Martin 
Gordon."^ Dawsonites accused White of being "a passive instrument" 
or "a pet and slave" in the control of Porter’s aristocratic junto.
The papers contrasted Porter and White’s aristocratic contempt for the 
common people with Dawson’s championship of democracy. Dawsonites 
gained political capital from a White advocate’s condescending remark 
that whiskey drinkers favored Dawson, and they contended the race was 
a contest of "DEMOCRACY versus ARISTOCRACY." White proponents did not
^Edward Douglass White to George W. Boyd, January 28, 1834,
Antebellum Letter Collection, HNO; Louisiana Advertiser. January 15, 28, 
April 2, 9, June 2, 1834; Louisiana Courier. October 15, 1833.
Louisiana Advertiser. May 19, 1834; For a discussion of Porter’s 
role in the election see Stephenson, Alexander Porter. 81-87.
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allow Dawsonites sole claim as the party of the people as they 
compared the simple tastes of White with the elaborate trappings of 
Dawson whom they accused of "foppery" and "dandyism."77
The Democrats’ charges of aristocracy reached a crescendo after 
Whig Henry Johnson entered the race for White’s vacated First District 
congressional seat. Having placed Johnson in political exile since 
his refusal to withdraw from the 1829 senate race had led to Edward 
Livingston’s victory, the party in April 1834 welcomed the former 
governor back into its fold. With the election less than three months 
away, the Whigs needed a congressional candidate and Johnson’s 
popularity in the region overcame their five-year old grudge. For 
Dawsonites, the appearance of Johnson provided all the proof they 
needed that an aristocratic conspiracy existed. They charged that 
Porter and Johnson, members of Louisiana’s 1812 constitutional 
convention, had written aristocratic provisions into the document to 
allow themselves to monopolize the offices of the state. Since the 
constitution’s inception, Porter, currently a United States senator, 
had served in the state legislature and as a state Supreme Court 
justice for twelve years, while Johnson had been governor, senator, 
and now wished to be a representative. They had added the three-term
congressman White to their aristocratic inner circle which intended to
78rotate state offices among themselves.
77Bee, June 19 (first quote), 28, July 1, 1834; New Orleans Daily 
News. April 24 (second quote), June 24, 1834 (3rd quote); Plaquemine 
Iberville Gazette quoted in St. Francisvi 1 le Phoenix. September 21, 1833 
(fourth quote).
78New Orleans Daily News. April 17, May 21, 1834; Bee. June 29, 1834.
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While voters may not have accepted this sinister view of Porter
and Johnson’s role in the 1812 convention, debate over the
constitution did offer them a tangible choice. Labelling the document
aristocratic, Dawsonites championed constitutional reform,
particularly the removal of a tax-paying requirement which thwarted
universal suffrage. They also hoped to reduce the governor’s
patronage powers by expanding the number of elective offices, perhaps
even including the judiciary. They charged that their opponents,
especially the aristocratic Porter, felt that the poor deserved no
choice in their government. White and the Whigs did have a different
constitutional vision, as a pro-White platform celebrated their
candidate’s opposition to "a premature change in our state
constitution." Porter admitted that he believed that the property
basis was the proper one for suffrage, and the pro-White Louisiana
79Advertiser asserted that suffrage was extended far enough already.
In addition to debate over the state constitution, national 
issues also played a role in the gubernatorial campaign. As in 
previous contests, the debate over the tariff proved central. White 
partisans alleged that Dawson had nullification propensities, and the 
Democrats were forced once again to explain how they distinguished 
between the sugar cane duty and protective tariffs. Dawsonites 
countered with an attack on White for his vote for the compromise 
tariff of 1833 which lowered the duty on imported sugar cane. They 
alleged that White had betrayed his constituents and had voted on the
79Bee. May 13, 1834; New Orleans Daily News. April 21, 1834;
Louisiana Advertiser. July 2, 7 (platform quote), 1834; Alexander Porter 
to Jesse B. Harrison, June 1, 1834, Harrison and Family Papers, LC.
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same side as the nullifiers. White partisans adroitly parried this 
blow with their contention that White had advocated compromise to save 
the Union and that he had taken the same position on the bill as the 
Democrats5 idol President Jackson. When combined with White5s 
residency in the sugar region, these arguments helped provide him with
flQan overwhelming victory m  the sugar cane producing parishes.
The two candidates also offered contrasting views on the other
two planks of the American System— a national bank and internal
improvements. White supporters compared their candidate5s
championship of these measures with Dawson’s antagonism. Dawsonites
explained how their nominee’s opposition stemmed from his desire to
protect the people’s republican liberties. Echoing the words of
President Jackson, they branded the bank a "monster of corruption"
attempting to establish a "moneyed aristocracy." Federally-sponsored
internal improvements joined the bank in threatening to shackle the
limbs of republican freemen. Dawsonites alleged that the only
legislators who voted for these projects were speculators and those
0!whose local area benefitted from them.
The debate over the value of the American System demonstrates 
the importance of national issues in the campaign. During the battle 
between White and Dawson, the Henry Clay-led opposition to President 
Jackson assumed the name Whigs. The origins of the southern Whig 
party have engendered much debate among historians. Generally these
80Louisiana Advertiser. January 1, February 12, 1834; St.
Martinsville Attakapas Gazette in New Orleans Bee. February 22, 1834.
81New Orleans Dailv News. May 13, 1834.
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scholars fall into one of two schools: those who emphasize the party's
states rights origins, and those who stress its economic antecedents—
specifically debate over the Bank of the United States and the tariff.
Arthur C. Cole has defined the Whig party in the South as a
combination of National Republicans, states rights men, and alienated
Democrats. The relative weight of each of these components varied in
each state, but in most of the South the states rights wing
predominated with the National Republican element often reduced to a
voiceless minority primarily because its American System had little
82appeal in the region.
Though Louisiana’s Whig party possessed the same components as 
other southern Whig organizations— National Republicans, states rights 
advocates, and disaffected Democrats— the formation of the Whig party 
did not lead to an elaborate redrawing of party lines in the state.
In Louisiana, the attraction of Henry Clay’s program had led his 
supporters to dominate state politics, and these men saw no reason to 
overhaul their platform to gain more adherents. In their studies of 
Louisiana Whiggery, Leslie Norton and William H. Adams stress the 
importance of economic origins in the party’s birth, and Charles 
Sellers has even asserted that Louisiana’s Whig party simply 
represented "National Republicanism continued under a new name." This 
conclusion rings true with two caveats. First, while Louisianans had
Arthur C. Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington, 1913), 1- 
38; Charles G. Sellers, Jr., "Who Were the Southern Whigs?" American 
Historical Review. LIX (1954), 335-346; William J. Cooper, Jr., The South 
and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge, 1978), 43-58. By 
1834, the national bank issue involved discussion over the 
constitutionality of the institution and debate over the president’s 
right to remove federal funds from it.
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been lukewarm in calling themselves National Republicans, preferring 
to label themselves the Clay party, they gladly accepted the titie of 
Whigs. Not fully integrated into the national party system during the 
life span of the National Republican party, Louisianans preferred the 
attachment to strong personalities such as Clay or Jackson to partisan 
labels. Also, with the National Republican party being an 
overwhelmingly northern organization. Louisiana’s voters had been wary
Qlof the name.
Second, Sellers’s pronouncement ignores the Louisiana Whig 
party’s states rights minority. Henry Robertson has demonstrated that 
in the Florida Parishes the nationalist Whigs had to enter into a 
coalition with states rights men to hope to achieve victory. States 
rights advocates opposed to the executive tyranny of the president 
they referred to as "Andrew the 1st" joined the Whigs. The two groups 
did not agree on most issues, but they could agree to unite in 
opposition to Jackson’s assumption of too much power in the executive 
branch. In contrast to the rest of the South, where the National 
Republican wing remained silent partners in a states rights Whig 
coalition, in Louisiana the opposite situation prevailed. Former 
congressman Henry Adams Bullard’s description of his successor and 
fellow Whig Rice Garland demonstrates this distinction. He cheerfully 
related that Garland though b o m  in Virginia is "not of the hair 
splitting state rights party” but a proponent of internal improvements
01Leslie M. Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, 1940), 37; William H. Adams, The Whig Party of 
Louisiana. (Lafayette, La., 1973), 41; Sellers, "Who Were the Southern 
Whigs?" 346.
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and a national bank. States rights men did join the Louisiana Whig 
party, but in Louisiana, they entered into the coalition not as 
dominant but as minority partners.
The 1834 congressional elections which occurred simultaneously 
with the gubernatorial race demonstrate the prominence of the American 
System in the origins of the Louisiana Whig party. Across the state, 
even in the Florida Parishes, Whig candidates loudly proclaimed their 
allegiance to the tenets of the American System, and none mentioned 
states rights. Three months prior to the election, the New Orleans 
Whig organ, the Louisiana Advertiser lamented the absence of an anti- 
administration, pro-tariff, pro-internal improvement, pro-bank 
candidate for White’s vacant First District seat. To fill this gap, 
the party welcomed former Governor Henry Johnson back and he faced two 
Democrats divided over the constitutionality of a national bank. The 
relative importance of economic policy in the formation of the Whig 
party can be seen in the Second District, which included the states 
rights Florida Parishes. The popular Philemon Thomas, now sixty-seven 
years old, declined to run for re-election, and four men challenged 
for his position. Even here, the Whig nominee stressed his commitment 
to the tariff and the Bank of the United States, with positions on the 
bank serving as the main difference between the two strongest
84Henry O. Robertson, "The Emergence of the Whig Party in Louisiana’s 
Florida Parishes, 1834-1840,” Louisiana History 33 (Summer 1992), 283- 
316; Henry Adams Bullard to Daniel Webster, March 8, 1834, Daniel Webster 
Papers, LC.
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candidates. A similar situation prevailed in the Third District,
3Cwhere a pro-bank Whig opposed and anti-bank Democrat.
The July elections proved once again that the proponents of the 
American System, whether labelled the Clay party, National 
Republicans, or Whigs, held the upper hand in Louisiana. The Whigs 
had to be satisfied with their employment of economic issues which led 
to capturing the governor’s office, winning two of the three 
congressional races, and achieving a majority in the legislature. 
Obtaining 57.3 percent of the vote, White won a convincing victory in 
the gubernatorial contest. As in previous contests, the Whigs’ allure 
proved strongest in Greater Orleans and the South Louisiana with White 
winning almost two-thirds of the vote in the former and over three- 
fourths in the latter. The performance of White and the Whig 
congressional candidates demonstrate the absence of a Whig appeal to 
states rights men. In the states rights Florida Parishes, White won 
less than one-fifth the vote, and the Whigs lost their only 
congressional race because of weak support in this region. (SEE 
APPENDIX B)
Not only did the election witness the entrance of the Whig party 
into Louisiana politics, but it also marked the termination of Martin 
Gordon’s reign as undisputed master of the Louisiana Democratic party. 
Gordon’s autocratic policies had alienated members of both parties.
85First District— Louisiana Advertiser. April 8, 1834; Bee. June 28, 
1834; Second District— Baton Rouge Gazette. April 5, May 3, 1834; Bee. 
August 13, 1834; Third District— St. Martinsville Attakanas Gazette. July 
5, 1834.
86Bee, July 14, 17, 1834; Louisiana Advertiser. July 14, 17, 1834.
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Once again, his choice for a state office had been defeated, and his
opponents had even effectively used Gordon's association with Dawson
against the candidate. More importantly, in the midst of the
campaign, the news that the United States Senate had rejected Gordon’s
re-appointment as Collector of Customs reached the state. Gordon’s
opponents both outside and within the party celebrated this
announcement which effectively ended Gordon’s stranglehold on the 
87Democratic party.
The growing assimilation of Louisiana political parties into the 
national parties resulted in the partial suppression of the Anglo- 
Creole split. In his study of relationship between American and 
Creoles, Lewis Newton declares that in the 1834 canvass, "Only the 
faintest echoes of the old distinctions" remained from this division 
which had dominated prior gubernatorial campaigns. After Prieur’s 
resignation from the contest, the race did not have a Creole 
candidate. While both candidates portrayed themselves as the better 
friend of the Creoles, they also deprecated any attempts to 
distinguish between the two populations. Each party counted Creoles 
and Americans among its members, and with the strengths of the Whigs 
and the Democrats being approximately equal, any alienation of either 
of the major ethnic groups could prove costly. For the rest of the
87For an example of a Jacksonian alienated by Gordon’s policies see 
Carl Kohn to Samuel Kohn, April 17, 1833, Carl Kohn Letter Book, HNO. 
Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 292-4.
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antebellum period, candidates would be labelled first and foremost as
00partisans, but ethnicity could never be entirely ignored.
The subsequent legislative session confirmed that while partisan 
politics had overshadowed ethnic tensions, the Creole-American rivalry 
could overcome partisan loyalty in races where the candidates 
represented different ethnic groups. In January 1835, a Whig 
legislature elected Democrat Charles Gayarre to the United States 
Senate. Senator Porter could not control his anger at the "petty 
divisions" in the Whig party which prevented it from uniting on a 
nominee and contributed to the "disastrous" election of Gayarre. A 
lawyer and state legislator from New Orleans, Gayarre, a self- 
described "staunch friend— of the present administration," opposed
0Qfederal ly sponsored internal improvements and the bank. In an 
attempt to explain the defeat, an exasperated Whig informed a friend 
that Louisiana politics contained "an element unknown in other 
states— ’creolism’" which undermined party loyalty. Gayarre agreed
that the "personal devotion of three Whig friends" and not
90partisanship had secured his election.
88Lewis W. Norton, "The Americanization of French Louisiana: A Study 
in the Process of Adjustment between the French and the Anglo-American 
Populations of Louisiana, 1803-1860," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Chicago, 1929), 135. For the candidates’ appeals to Creoles see Louisiana 
Advertiser. January 28, June 26, 1834; New Orleans Daily News. March 18, 
24, 1834.
89Alexander Porter to John Ker, January 13, 1835, February 20, 1835, 
Ker Family Papers, SHC; Gayarrd’s self-description in Louisiana Courier. 
January 28, 1835.
90"Creolism” quote in Henry Adams Bullard to Amos Lawrence, February 
28, 1835, Amos Lawrence Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; Charles 
Gayarre, Letter to the Editor of the Washington Union (New Orleans, 
1854), 4.
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Because of illness, Gayarre never took his seat in the senate,
instead he temporarily retired from Louisiana politics and spent the
next eight years convalescing and doing historical research in France.
By the time of the new election in January 1836. the Democrats had
gained control of the legislature. In an effort to capture Democratic
votes, the Whigs nominated Alexander Barrow a states rights Whig from
the Florida Parishes. Barrow had previously been labelled a
"nullifier" and had left the Democratic party because of the "man
worship” of Andrew Jackson. The ploy proved unsuccessful, however, as
on the second ballot, Barrow lost to Democrat Robert Carter Nicholas,
91a sugar planter from Terrebonne Parish.
The presidential election of 1836 provided the Whigs and 
Democrats their first opportunity to challenge each other in a 
national campaign. In 1835, a national Democratic convention 
nominated Vice President Martin Van Buren, a New Yorker who had the 
blessing of President Jackson. The Whigs, both because they realized 
that they were the country’s minority party and because their party 
represented a coalition of groups which could agree to oppose the 
Democrats but on little else, did not hold a national convention. 
Instead, Whig state conventions endorsed three separate candidates: 
Daniel Webster and William Henry Harrison in the North and Hugh Lawson 
White in the South. The candidacy of White, a Tennessean and former 
Jackson party stalwart, represented the Whigs’ attempt to make inroads
9!Alexander Barrow to William S. Hami 1 ton, February 19, 1833, 
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 81.
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into the Democrats’ solid grip on southern voters, especially states
- i s irights men.
The southern Whigs’ strategy involved an attempt to capitalize 
on White’s southern birth, especially in contrast to the New Yorker 
Van Buren. By the mid—1830s. primarily because of the rise of an 
organized abolitionist movement in the North, tensions between the 
sections had increased. The movement’s actions involved sending 
antislavery petitions to Congress, mailing abolitionist tracts to 
southern states, and attempting to end slavery in the nation’s 
capital. Southern Whigs urged voters to consider these attacks and 
ask themselves whether their region would be safer with a Tennessee 
slaveholder in the White House or with Van Buren. According to their 
argument, Van Buren magnified the misfortune of his northern birth 
with voting for Negro suffrage in New York, opposing slavery in 
Missouri, and advocating abolition in the District of Columbia.
Louisianans in the 1830s were as sensitive as their fellow
gisoutherners to threats to slavery. Some presumably recollected the 
Pointe Coupee conspiracy of 1795 which had concluded with the 
beheading of more than fifteen slaves, and many more remembered an
92For a discussion of the presidential election of 1836 see Joel H. 
Silbey, "Election of 1836," in Schlesinger, ed., History of American 
Presidential Elections, 1:577-600.
91For a discussion of the presidential campaign in the South see 
Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery. 74-97.
94For an excellent discussion of the role of slavery in the 1836 
presidential election in Louisiana see Derek L.A. Hackett, "The Days of 
this Republic will be Numbered: Abolition, Slavery, and the Presidential 
Election of 1836,” Louisiana Studies XV (1976), 131-160; and Norton, "The 
Whig Party in Louisiana," 108-125.
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1811 revolt involving more than five hundred slaves in the parishes up 
the Mississippi River from New Orleans in which more than sixty slaves 
died. By the 1830s, fears of slave insurrection in Louisiana had not 
diminished but perhaps had increased. According to the 1830 census, 
slaves outnumbered whites in Louisiana for the first time. Governor 
Dupre, in his annual message of 1831, warned that this disparity 
threatened the state’s peace and security and urged lawmakers to 
restrict the entry of new slaves into the state. The legislators 
failed to heed his advice, but, later that year, Nat Turner’s revolt 
in Virginia "reminded the Citizens of Louisiana of their defenseless 
situation." Governor Roman called a special session of the 
legislature in November 1831 with the dual purpose of responding to 
the revolt and electing a United States senator. Roman repeated 
Dupre’s warnings regarding the inequality between Louisiana’s white 
and black populations, and this time the legislators responded with 
the passage of an act to outlaw the importation of slaves for sale 
into Louisiana.^
A year prior to the 1836 presidential election, fears of slave 
insurrection in Louisiana received a new impetus. While Louisianans 
followed congressional debates over antislavery petitions and the 
mailing of abolitionist tracts, a rumored slave conspiracy in 
neighboring Mississippi further heightened their anxiety. In the
95Dupr§ address in Louisiana House Journal. 10th leg., 1st sess., 10- 
11; Nathan Morse to Andrew Jackson, October 11, 1831, Jackson Papers, LC 
(quote); Judith Kelleher Schafer, "The Immediate Impact of Nat Turner’s 
Insurrection on New Orleans," Louisiana History (1982), 159-78; Roman 
address in Louisiana House Journal. 10th leg., Extra Sess. , 2-3; The ban 
on the importation of slaves into Louisiana was repealed in 1834.
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panic following the uncovering of the alleged Murrell conspiracy, many 
whites and slaves were lynched. This hysteria quickly crossed the 
border into Louisiana and resulted in the formation of vigilance 
committees and in the arrest and punishment of suspicious strangers.
The New Orleans city government, in its Report of a Conspiracy to 
Incite a Rebellion Throughout the Slave States claimed that 
southerners needed to worry both about northern abolitionists and "an 
organized horde of reckless and blood-thirsty barbarians, who prowl 
throughout our own communities." A month later. New Orleanians formed 
the Louisiana Constitutional and Anti-Fanatical Society to combat the 
"misguided fanatics" of the North by forming vigilance committees,
97enlightening northerners, and enforcing current laws more strictly.
In the midst of this tense anti-abolitionist, anti-northern 
atmosphere, the presidential campaign began in Louisiana. While most 
southern Whigs celebrated White’s state-rights heritage and his 
connection to Andrew Jackson, Louisiana Whigs, with their stronger 
attachment to the American System, found little to praise in the anti- 
tariff, anti-internal improvement, anti-bank White. Whig former 
Senator Waggaman claimed that White had always opposed any measures 
beneficial to Louisiana. The only exception to this anti-White 
feeling occurred in the Florida Parishes, where a diarist expressed
96For meetings see Bee. August 10, 19, 1835; True American, August 
6, 8, 17, 1835; Louisiana Courier. August 15, September 29, 1835; For 
arrests and punishments see Bee. September 11, 21, 1835; True American. 
August 10, 1835.
^Hackett, "The Days of this Republic Will Be Numbered," 140-42. 
(Quote from Report of a Conspiracy—  on p. 142); Constitution of the 
Louisiana Constitutional and Anti-Fanatical Society (New Orleans, 1835).
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his satisfaction at voting for the "states rights" White over the
QC"strong government" Van Buren.' To appease this minority, the Whigs 
placed the vocal states-rights proponent Alexander Barrow on their 
slate of presidential electors. Most Louisiana Whigs, however, 
preferred not to celebrate White but to attack Martin Van Buren. Only 
days before the election, the largest New Orleans White gathering 
chose to call itself the "Great Anti-Van Buren Meeting"— stressing its 
opposition to the Democrat candidate over its support for White. 
Concurring with this emphasis, the Commercial Bulletin urged its 
readers to vote for the "Anti-Van Buren Electoral Ticket" without
QQmentioning White’s name.
Because of their distaste for White’s doctrines. Louisiana Whigs 
faced a difficult chore in campaigning for him. For most of them,
White had only two positives: he lived South of the Mason-Dixon line
and he was not Martin Van Buren. The Whigs capitalized on both these 
traits, and the introduction of slavery into the campaign proved a 
godsend for them. They embraced the issue of whether White or Van 
Buren would best protect slavery with an eagerness bordering on 
desperation, and it quickly became the focal point of their campaign. 
Louisiana Whigs found common ground with their fellow southern 
partisans in realizing the importance of protecting slavery and its 
force as a campaign weapon. "Our interests," according to Senator
98For Waggaman’s anti-White contention see Louisiana Courier. June 
22, 1835; Edwin A. Davis, ed., Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes 
of Louisiana. 1836-1846 as Reflected in the Diarv of Bennet H. Barrow 
(New York, 1943), November 8, 1836, p. 183.
99Proceedings of Anti-Van Buren Meeting in True American. October 27, 
1836; Commercial Bulletin. November 10, 1836.
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Porter, "imperatively require a Slave holding president.” Whigs 
attacked Van Buren. alleging he possessed "a decided opposition to the 
institution of slavery.” On the eve of the election, an anti-Van 
Buren meeting declared that Van Buren’s election would imperil the 
South’s domestic institutions.100
Louisiana Democratic leaders recognized the potency of these 
charges and worried about the effect they would have on their party’s 
voters. A year before the election, a New Orleanian wrote Van Buren 
on "the all important subject of Abolitionism" and urged him to "come 
out immediately and declare your sentiments" as "delay will create 
suspicions which might be very hard to eradicate." In New Orleans, 
the Bee and the Louisiana Courier led the defense of Van Buren and 
published more than thirty editorials explaining his stance. And, 
beginning in June, every issue of the two newspapers included a 
statement from Van Buren declaring his opposition to ending slavery in 
the District of Columbia and to interfering with it in the southern 
states.101
White’s candidacy proved doubly difficult for Louisiana 
Democrats to counter. Like their Whig counterparts, they were 
sensitive to the slavery issue. Unlike most Whigs, however, many 
Democrats admired White’s anti-bank, anti-tariff, states rights 
doctrines. Former senatorial and congressional candidate Joseph
I00Alexander Porter to Jesse B. Harrison, January 12, 1836, Harrison 
and Family Papers, LC; Commercial Bulletin. October 31, 1836; True
American. October 27, 1836.
I01William Christy to Martin Van Buren, September 24, 1835, Van Buren 
Papers, LC (quote); Hackett, "The Days of this Republic will be 
Numbered," 147-49.
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Walker touched on both these issues in a letter to Senator Gayarre. 
Worried that ’'prejudice against northern men is such I fear it will be 
impossible to overcome it," Walker added that "The success of White 
could not (by me at least) be considered an evil." Walker lamented 
that White's candidacy had produced "a division in our ranks" and the 
Bee and Courier echoed this concern, particularly after Democrat James
W. Breedlove, Gordon’s replacement as Collector of Customs, announced
102for White. The only concurrent state election, to fill a vacant 
state senate seat, provided justification for these fears as a White- 
Democrat opposed a Van Buren-Democrat. The mixed partisan loyalties 
inspired by the senate race led to a tie between White and Van Buren 
in Livingston parish— the only time in the antebellum period the 
parish did not have a democratic majority.103
Throughout the South, Democrats turned the tables on the Whigs 
by alleging that a vote for White and not a vote for Van Buren was a 
vote for abolitionism. They challenged the Whigs to explain the 
following: if Van Buren was an abolitionist, then why were almost all 
northern abolitionists members of the Whig party.104 Also, they 
repeatedly contended that White had no chance to win the election and 
that the Whigs were using him take southern votes from Van Buren and 
to have the election thrown into the House of Representatives where
102Joseph Walker to Charles Gayarre, November 15, 1835, Charles 
Gayarrd Collection, LLMVC (quote); Bee. July 2, 1835, March 30, 1836; 
Louisiana Courier. July 17, 1835.
101Bee. November 14, 1836.
H U Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery, 94-5; Bee. June 27,
July 18, 1836; Louisiana Courier. September 13, 1836.
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Whig congressmen would elevate William Henry Harrison to the 
presidency. Thus, White simply served as a decoy for Harrison. 
According to the Democrats, a ballot cast for White was a ballot cast 
for Harrison, an imbecile whose abolitionist tendencies were further 
compounded by his advocacy of seLling whites into slavery.106
Though fears regarding slavery proved the paramount election 
topic in Louisiana, other issues surfaced as well. Both sides claimed 
the mantle as champions of democracy and republicanism and accused 
their opponents of trying to usurp the people’s choice. Whigs charged 
that Jackson’s selection of Van Buren as his successor represented 
executive dictation destroying the freedom of election. They added 
that Van Buren’s caucus nomination signalled the triumph of corrupt 
party organization over the people.106 Democrats countered by 
reminding the electorate that a vote for White would place the 
election in the House of Representatives where, as in the 1824 
elevation of Adams over Jackson, the people’s choice would be 
defeated. They alleged that they had uncovered the sinister hand of 
Senator Porter behind this wicked plot. Also, in 1836 and throughout 
the antebellum period. Democrats portrayed themselves as the party of 
the people and accused the Whigs of aristocracy.107
While slavery dominated Louisianan’s political discourse in 
1836, the American System was not completely neglected. Though
106Bee. August 26, September 26, October 19, 27, 1836; Louisiana
Courier. November 2, 1836.
1Q6L 1 Echo. October 16, 1836; True American. October 2, 1836.
107Louisiana Courier, October 26, November 7, 1836; Bee. September 
28, 1836.
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admiring Whiters anti-bank and anti-internal improvement stance. 
Louisiana Democrats maintained that White had sacrificed these views 
because of his unquenchable ambition. Even if White had not changed 
his stance, the rest of the Whig party, including William Henry 
Harrison, favored the American System. Louisiana Democrats claimed 
that Harrison was the only Whig with a chance of winning and therefore 
considered his advocacy of internal improvements and a national bank 
fair game for attack. Democratic editors stressed that a vote for Van
Buren was a vote against the "a 11-corrupting, all-enslaving BANK and
108its Minions!" With the anti-bank states rights wing predominating 
in most southern Whig parties, this argument had strong southern 
potential for the Democrats. In Louisiana, however. Whigs gladly 
accepted the label of the party of the American System. The Whig 
Commercial Bulletin claimed that Harrison with his broad construction 
ideas was indeed the party’s best candidate. After the election, the 
Democratic Bee alleged that if Harrison had won the national bank 
would have been recharted. Whigs in New Orleans may have agreed with 
this sentiment, for they gave "Harrison’s decoy” a narrow victory in 
the city.105
Despite White’s victory in New Orleans, Van Buren triumphed both 
nationally and in Louisiana where he narrowly edged White 3,842 to 
3,583. With only 7,425 people voting, a 31.2 percent decline from the 
1834 gubernatorial election, clearly many Louisianans had found both
108Bee. May 10, July 27, October 19, 1836; Louisiana Courier.
November 7, 1836 (quote).
f QQTrue American. September 17, 1836; Commercial Bulletin. October 
19, 1836; Bee, December 6, 1836.
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the northern and the anti-American System candidate unpalatable. For 
those who did exercise their suffrage, the battle between Whigs and 
Democrats echoed the contest between Jackson and Clay in 1832.
Sixteen of the twenty-three parishes which voted for Jackson in 1832 
went for Van Buren, and all but one of the nine Clay parishes cast a 
majority for White. The combination of the National Republican 
origins of Louisiana Whiggery and the emphasis on slavery can be seen 
in the results of the pro-tariff sugar region of South Louisiana where 
White captured 59.9 percent of the vote. In the states rights Florida 
Parishes, White failed to win a single parish, but his 32.4 percent of 
the vote there was greater than any previous pro-American System 
gubernatorial or presidential candidate. (SEE APPENDIX A)
In Louisiana, the 1836 presidential election inaugurated what 
William Cooper has termed "the politics of slavery," which designates 
the interaction among "the institution of slavery, southern parties 
and politicians, the southern political structure, and the values of 
southern white society." From 1836 until the civil war, every 
presidential race in Louisiana and even some state contests would 
include a debate over which party best protected the South’s peculiar 
institution. The labelling of the opposition candidate as an 
abolitionist or a tool of the abolitionists became standard campaign 
operating procedure. From this election onward, partisan newspapers 
would prominently display candidates’ proslavery quotations for months 
at a time. Almost every national issue, even those such as internal
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improvements or banking without a direct tie to slavery, would be
I IQviewed in terms of the slave question.
The 1834 gubernatorial and 1S36 presidential campaign 
inaugurated a change in Louisiana politicians’ use of republicanism. 
Prior to 1836 campaign, candidates had seen menaces to the republic in 
almost every national issue including: the tariff, the national bank, 
and intemaL improvements. After the introduction of the politics of 
slavery into Louisianans’ world in 1836, threats to the republic from 
the national level came primarily from threats to slavery. The 1834
gubernatorial campaign had transformed the use of republicanism in
political discourse at the state level. This campaign had highlighted 
another obstacle to Louisianans achieving their maximum amount of 
liberty— the 1812 constitution. This aristocratic document denied 
many Louisianans political rights, and repub 1 i can ism became
increasingly intertwined a movement to amend this charter. This
change rested partly on the emergence of Jacksonian democracy— the 
idea that all adult white males should enjoy equal political rights.
In state campaigns, republicanism became a synonym for Jacksonian 
democracy, and Louisiana politicians, particularly Democrats, would 
make a commitment to removing this antiquated, unrepublican blot on 
the state’s political record a staple of their rhetoric.
The 1836 presidential campaign not only included the 
introduction of the politics of slavery into Louisiana, but along with 
the 1834 governor’s race, demonstrated the maturation of Louisiana’s 
political parties. Because of the state’s unique demographics,
llflCooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery, xi.
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however, politicians had to remain aware of factors other than party 
membership. Ethnicity prevailed in the 1835 senate race, as a Whig 
legislature elected Charles Gayarre. a Creole Democrat, and it again 
proved pivotal in the 1837 senate contest. Devastated by Van Buren’s 
victory. Senator Porter resigned, and with the Democrats controlling 
the legislature, the Whigs did not offer a candidate to succeed him. 
Instead, two Democrats, former federal District Attorney John Slidell, 
an American New Orleanian, and Alexander Mouton, a Creole from 
Lafayette Parish, competed for the post. Slidell received the 
majority of Democratic votes, but lost the race, as eighteen of the 
twenty-five Whigs backed the Creole Mouton. Not only did ethnicity 
affect politics, but also personal rivalry played a role. Democratic 
efforts to win both the 1833 senate race and the 1834 gubernatorial 
campaign were hampered by tension between Slidell and Martin 
Gordon.111
Though characteristics such as American-Creole split, personal 
animus, and regionalism never disappeared from Louisiana politics, 
from the 1830s onward they would always be viewed from within the 
prism of party politics. Richard P. McCormick, in his study of the 
rise of the second American party system, asserts correctly that 
"After 1836 [Louisiana] politics came increasingly under the 
domination of the major parties." Louisianans had changed from 
attachment to a national leader such as Clay or Jackson to allegiance 
to a political party. Joseph Tregle agrees that by the mid-1830s
^Alexander Porter to John Ker, December 1, 1836, Ker Family Papers, 
SHC; John Slidell to Martin Van Buren, January 12, 1837, Van Buren 
Papers, LC.
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Louisianans no longer based their political decisions on personality, 
but now emphasized whether a candidate was a Whig or a Democrat. In 
Louisiana. Whigs and the Democrats primarily divided over economic 
issues such as those involved in the American System, and states 
rights played a much smaller role than in the rest of the South. By 
the raid-1830s, Louisiana voters considered supporting one’s party a
normal condition and straying from partisan boundaries as a
IPdeviation. "
112Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party Svstem: Party 
Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill, 1966), 317; Joseph G. 
Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Study of Ego-Politics," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), 462-63.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRATS AND JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, 1837-1845 
By 1837, Louisiana’s Whig and Democratic parties had developed 
identities based on their attitudes toward the American System. Whigs 
championed it, while Democrats deplored it. Though divided by this 
national question, Louisiana parties had not yet offered the 
electorate distinct alternatives on state level issues such as 
government aid to banks and internal improvement companies or revision 
of the state’s 1812 constitution. The Panic of 1837, a national 
economic downturn, would serve as a catalyst for an increasing 
divergence between the two parties on state fiscal policy, with 
Democrats generally viewing state involvement in the economy as 
pernicious and Whigs perceiving it as beneficial. With Louisiana’s 
government heavily in debt for its prodigal policies towards banks and 
railroads, a backlash against state aid ensued. When the state’s 
voters called for a constitutional convention in 1844, Democrats took 
advantage of this opportunity to include articles mandating the state 
government’s withdrawal from the economic sector in Louisiana’s 1845 
constitution.
Delegates to the constitutional convention not only changed the 
state’s economic policies but also included ideas articles expressing 
a commitment to Jacksonian democracy. They rewrote some of the more 
aristocratic and outmoded features of the 1812 charter by removing 
property qualifications for suffrage and office-holding. As with the 
economic situation, the Democratic party benefitted from its 
association with constitutional revision and its advocacy of greater 
democracy. The expansion of the electorate was part of an overall
127
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trend of the inclusion of sore people in Louisiana’s political 
process. This increased participation was aost visible in the 
presidential campaigns of 1840 and 1844, which aobilized the entire 
state to a level that earlier campaigns had not approached. A 
seemingly endless round of barbecues, parades, and meetings 
incorporated voters and non-voters alike. Women, a group which 
previously had almost no role in Louisiana political culture, attended 
rallies, held their own meetings, and even addressed gatherings of 
both sexes.
The incorporation of more people in the political process and 
debate over state economic policy did not replace but added further 
complexity to political issues already discussed in Louisiana 
politics. Disagreement over the American System, division between 
Americans and Creoles, state sectionalism, the politics of slavery, 
argument over which party best protected liberty, and the enduring 
image of Andrew Jackson continued to play roles in the state. Between 
1837 and 1845, Whigs continued to advocate, and Democrats to oppose, a 
protective tariff and a national bank. Both parties remained 
sensitive to the feelings of the Creole population, particularly in 
gubernatorial races. Whigs and Democrats claimed to be the best 
shields for the people’s liberty. Presidential and gubernatorial 
campaigns featured accusations of abolitionism. A United States 
senator would lose his position because of his stance on a fine 
assessed General Jackson almost thirty years earlier. Thus, by 1845, 
new issues had entered Louisianans’ political spectrum and intertwined
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with older ones— a coabination that altered the state’s political 
climate.
The first opportunity for Louisiana’s Democrats and Whigs, 
previously divided primarily on national matters, to incorporate state 
issues in their debates came in the 1838 gubernatorial, congressional, 
and legislative campaigns. In these races, the Democratic party 
portrayed itself as committed to reform in the state banking system 
and to a revision of the 1812 constitution, particularly the abolition 
of the property or tax-paying requirement for voting. The inclusion 
of these new planks did not signal the elimination of traditional 
Louisiana issues, such as ethnicity and the country parishes versus 
New Orleans, but interacted with them. Additionally, the 1838 races 
witnessed the use of the politics of slavery for the first time on a 
state level. In 1836, Louisianans had accused the competing 
presidential candidates of infidelity to the South’s peculiar 
institution, and in 1838, Louisianans charged their instate opponents 
of being unreliable protectors of slavery.
The 1838 gubernatorial campaign season began with a Democratic 
convention in New Orleans in late January. At its opening delegates 
from less than ten of the states thirty-two parishes were present.
Even after allowing members of the legislature from the unrepresented 
parishes to be seated, the convention still contained delegates from 
only fourteen parishes. In a close 24-17 vote, the convention 
nominated Creole Denis Prieur, who had served ten years as New Orleans 
mayor, as its gubernatorial candidate over John B. Dawson, the 
Democrats’ 1834 nominee. The selection of a New Orleans candidate by
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a New Orleans convention with over one-third of its delegates froa the 
Crescent City proved unpopular in some sections of the state. 
Complaining that the "aristocracy of New Orleans" had intrigued to 
place the party "under the heel of city boots," the Deaocratic St. 
Francisville Louisiana Chronicle claimed that "the country in full 
representation never would so vote as to leave a remote chance of 
augmenting the already too great power of New Orleans." Having 
previously advocated Dawson’s candidacy, the newspaper transferred its 
support not to Prieur but to Whig Henry Johnson.̂  The Deaocratic New 
Orleans Bee concurred that the convention had been unrepresentative 
and alleged that the decision of aany of the country parishes not to 
send delegates indicated a desire that the gubernatorial race be non­
partisan. The Bee advocated the candidacy of Whig foraer governor 
Andre Bienvenu Roman, while continuing to advance the cause of 
Democratic legislative and congressional candidates.*
If the Democratic party could be chastised for holding a poorly 
attended nominating convention, the Whig party could be faulted for 
not holding one at all. Instead, two former governors, the American 
Johnson and the Creole Roaan, competed for the support of their fellow 
party leaders. After a struggle which lasted the first four months of 
1838, Roman’s proponents carried the field. They persuasively argued
F̂or proceedings of the convention see New Orleans Louisiana 
Courier. January 29, 1838 and Clinton Louisianian. February 2, 1838; St. 
Francisville Louisiana Chronicle. February 10, 1838 (quote). (Hereinafter 
all newspapers froa New Orleans unless otherwise specified.)
2Bee, January 30, May 17, 1838. In advocating a Whig for governor 
and Democrats for the legislature and Congress, the Bee represented a 
temporary anomaly in the highly partisan world of antebellum Louisiana 
newspapers. It would be sold and would becoae the Whigs' chief organ.
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that the Americans and Creoles had a tacit agreement to rotate the 
gubernatorial office between the two populations. Thus, with Edward 
Douglass White, an American, currently governor, his successor should 
be a Creole, especially if the Whigs wished to have Creole support in 
the 1840 presidential contest. After receiving a letter froa 
seventeen Whig legislators requesting that he retire froa the race 
because of this ethnic rotation, Roaan’s greater popularity, and the 
danger of dividing Whig votes, Johnson withdrew and endorsed Roaan’s 
candidacy.3 Most likely, Johnson reaeabered how his persistence in 
remaining in the 1829 Senate race against the party leadership's 
wishes had led to five years in party purgatory. He also correctly 
surmised that withdrawing froa this race would aake hia the Whigs’ 
leading gubernatorial candidate in 1842.
In the early aonths of 1838, the legislature’s debate over 
reform of the state banking systea overshadowed the gubernatorial 
canvass. Louisiana had chartered banks as early as 1804, and by 1831 
the state possessed four banks capitalized at nine Billion dollars.
With President Jackson’s veto of the bill to recharter the Bank of the
United States and his withdrawal of federal funds froa the
institution, the Louisiana legislature went on an extended spree of 
bank chartering in the 1830s. Between 1831 and 1836, the legislature 
chartered twelve banks having a total capital of forty-six nil lion
3Bee. January 30, May 12, July 2, 1838; Baton Rouge Gazette. May 19,
1838; Henry Adaas Bullard to Jaaes G. Taliaferro, April 2, 1838, Jaaes 
G. Taliaferro Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections, 
LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; (Hereinafter LLMVC) For a Whig who 
believed that Johnson was more popular see Alexander Porter to Jesse 
Burton Harrison, July 7, 1837[8], Burton Norvel Harrison and Faaily 
Papers, Library of Congress. (Hereinafter LC)
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dollars. Describing the 1835-1836 legislative session, in which six 
of these charters were approved, an observer accurately recounted "a 
great indisposition on the part of the wesbers to do anything but sake 
banks," and a historian titles his chapter on this period, "Wild 
Banking. "*
Debate over these Measures did not follow partisan lines but has 
been described as "a aassive tug-of-war" between city and country 
legislators. Soae residents outside of New Orleans characterized this 
bank-chartering binge as "a folly," "a curse," or "the joke."5 Most 
country legislators, however, struggled not to elininate Louisiana 
banks but to have branches established in their parishes and worried 
that New Orleans banks had no aoney to spare for country customers.
One commentator recounted a rumor that the legislature was to 
establish a bank with a capital of ten million dollars and a branch in 
every parish. "The members of the legislature," according to another 
critic of these log-rolling tactics, "are operated on by the promises 
of branches to be established in their different parishes so that 
Avoyelles is to have one & probably Catahoula another." Though every 
bank had its headquarters in New Orleans, the charters provided for
Ĝeorge D. Green, Finance and Economic Development in the Old South: 
Louisiana Banking. 1804-1861 (Stanford, 1972), 18-25; Walter Brashear to 
Robert Brashear, February 7, 1836, Brashear-Lawrence Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina (quote); (Hereinafter SHC); Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking 
History of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1935), 42.
5Green, Finance and Economic Development. 30 (first quote); George 
Kelso to Josiah S. Johnston, February 11, 1831, Josiah Stoddard Johnston 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (second quote), (Hereinafter 
HSP); Alexander Barrow to William S. Hamilton, February 19, 1833, William 
S. Hamilton Papers, LLMVC (third quote); H. Dopson to Jacob Bieller, 
April 15, 1835, Alonzo Snyder Papers, LLMVC (fourth quote).
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forty-six branches in twenty-six separate towns, with thirty-six of 
these branches actually opening in the wealthiest agricultural areas/ 
The legislature’s ardor for internal iaprovewents, especially 
railroads, equalled its passion for banks. While the state was 
blessed with an extensive river systew, this aethod of travel too 
often proved unreliable. In the 1820s, Louisianans complained about 
the length of time for mail delivery, and the difficulty legislators 
had in communicating with their constituents. According to a 
congressional candidate, "Our citizens are very impatient to 
feel. ..the benefical[sic] effects of internal improvements....[T]hey 
want something here.”7 As with bank bills, railroad charters received 
bipartisan support with every legislator wanting a railroad to pass 
through his district. Between 1831 and 1837, the legislature 
chartered twenty-three railroads, fifteen of these rural lines. 
Describing this railroad frenzy, historian Merl Reed contends, "deals, 
conflict of interest, and parochial jealousy were the order of the 
day" and that this policy "scattered the state’s energy into 
meaningless activity.
Green, Finance and Economic Development. 30-1; W. T. Palfrey to 
Boyd Smith, June 8, 1834, David Weeks Papers, LLMVC; George Kelso to 
Josiah S. Johnston, February 11, 1831; Thomas Butler to Johnston,
February 23, 1832, Johnston Papers, HSP (quote).
7John Moore to John Close, March 5, 1823, John Close Papers, LLMVC; 
Edward G. W. Butler to Wife, January 31, 1831, Edward George Washington 
Butler Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University; Henry H. Gurley to Henry 
Clay, August 20, 1826, in Jaaes F. Hopkins, et al., eds., The Papers of 
Henry Clay (11 vols., Lexington, 1959-92), 5:634-635 (quote).
0Merl Reed, New Orleans and the Railrrwls; fbg struggle for 
Commercial Empire (Baton Rouge, 1966), 5-19 (quotes, p. 14, 10).
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
The nationwide Panic of 1837 helped bring an end to the 
Louisiana legislature’s unconditional approval of banks and railroads. 
Throughout 1837 and 1838, commentators coaplained of the scarcity of 
money and the stagnation of business in New Orleans as banks suspended
Aspecie payment. By the end of the decade, Louisiana’s banking and 
railroad systems would both be on the verge of collapse. The bursting 
of the speculative bubble resulted in a fifteen year struggle to 
determine the best way to control banking and internal iaproveaent 
practices. Unlike previous discussions, the debate now took the fora 
of a partisan contest. The Democrats criticized the legislature for 
doing little else the past eight years other than granting and 
amending charters and wasting the tax-payers’ money by backing these 
schemes with state bonds. They argued that the best solution for 
avoiding liberty-threatening consolidations of power was for the state 
to outlaw banks and monopolies and remove government support from all 
private commercial endeavors. Also, Democrats believed that the 
legislature should more strictly enforce the charters of those 
corporations currently in existence and that corporations should be 
treated as individuals without the benefit of special legislation.
Henry W. Huntington to William Mercer, April 4, 1837, William N. 
Mercer Papers, Manuscripts Department, Tulane University, New Orleans, 
Louisiana (Hereinafter TU); F. Wharton to L. Wharton, December 1, 1837, 
Edward Clifton Wharton Family Papers, LLMVC; George Fennell to Samuel 
Fennell, March 1838, George Fennell Letter, Historic New Orleans 
Collection; Edwin A. Davis, ed., Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes 
of Louisiana. 1836-1846 as Reflected in the Diary of Bennet H. Barrow
(New York, 1943), March 3, 1838, p. 108. (Hereinafter Barrow Diary)
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Thus, if a business violated a law, it should be punished and, if 
necessary, its charter revoked.*®
The Whigs proposed a more positive role for the state 
government— government aid and investment in both banks and railroads. 
They maintained that forcing banks to resume specie payments would 
hurt the entire state as the banks pressured rural customers to repay 
loans. The Whigs argued that given time the banks would resume 
payment and the economy would recover. They added that the main 
culprit in the financial crisis was the federal government’s decision 
to remove itself from banking: Andrew Jackson’s veto of the bill to 
recharter the Bank of the United States and his removal of federal 
deposits from the institution. In their view, the Louisiana 
legislature should learn from Jackson’s mistakes and not repeat them 
by rashly withdrawing the government from the state’s financial 
system.11
During the Panic of 1837, most Louisiana banks called in loans 
and suspended specie payments in violation of their charters, and many 
railroads stopped construction. Governor White focused on the 
deteriorating financial situation in his message to the legislature 
which met in December 1837 asserting that Louisiana was in a "state of 
financial embarrassment that is without comparison." White primarily 
blamed the distress on the absence of a national bank, but also
10Clinton Louisianian. March 9, 1838; Edward G.W. Butler to Thomas 
Butler, September 9, 1837, Thomas Butler Papers, LLMVC.
11 Bee. February 16, 1838. For the best examples of Democratic and 
Whig views on banking and internal improvements see the constitutions of 
1845 and 1852 respectively.
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advocated an alteration in state banking policy. Heeding the 
governor’s suggestion, legislators, after three eonths of debate, 
passed a bank refora act. Reaction to the Measure varied, with the 
New Orleans financial coanninity’s organ, the Whig Co— ercial Bulletin, 
urging Governor White to veto and Deaocratic newspapers imploring hia 
to sign the bank billThough Governor White had suggested bank 
reform in his opening address to the legislature, he vetoed the 
measure. White contended that the bill was unconstitutional because 
it violated the sanctity of the contracts between the government and 
the banks, and he charged its proponents with "agrarianism"— a country 
parish bias against New Orleans and its coaaercial system. White’s 
opponents held an anti-veto meeting where they alleged that the 
governor had prostituted himself to the corrupt and aristocratic New 
Orleans bank clique because he needed its support in his bid for the 
First District congressional seat which Henry Johnson had vacated to 
run for governor.1̂
Following White’s veto, Louisiana Democrats and Whigs, who in 
prior races had battled over the expediency and constitutionality of a 
national bank, now clashed over state banking policy as well. Though 
the bank reform bill had been a bipartisan measure, the Democrats 
eagerly embraced it and attacked White’s veto in their legislative, 
congressional, and gubernatorial campaigns. White’s congressional 
opponent, John Slidell, repeatedly criticized the governor for his
^Louisiana House Journal. 13th leg., 2nd sess., 2; Commercial 
Bulletin, February 15, 24, March 2, 1838; Bee. February 26, 1838.
^Commercial Bulletin. March 3, 5, 1838; Anti-Veto meeting in Bee. 
March 6, 1838; Clinton Louisianian. March 9, April 20, 1838.
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veto which went against the wishes of the majority of voters. 
Immediately following the publication of an obscure state 
representative’s speech in the legislature attacking White’s veto, 
Second District Democrats nominated him for Congress.14 Additionally, 
Democratic legislative candidates pledged themselves to support 
banking reform, and, in the governor’s race, the Democratic Louisiana 
Courier frequently attacked Roman for his refusal to take a stance on 
the bank bill.15
More divided over state banking policy, the Whigs tried to 
distance themselves from the issue. They argued that Louisiana’s 
financial woes were not specific to Louisiana but were part of a 
national problem which demanded a national solution— the re­
establishment of the Bank of the United States. Whig candidates ran 
with vague pledges such as the necessity for "wholesome and proper 
regulations" regarding state banking, while asserting that Democrats 
wished to eliminate all banks. At the same time, they adamantly 
declared themselves in favor of a national bank.18 Two of the Whigs’ 
three congressional candidates made the rechartering of a national 
bank a principal plank in their campaigns. Even in the gubernatorial
14The speech took up five columns of the Clinton Louisianian. March 
23, 1838. His nomination appeared in ibid.. March 30, 1838.
^Louisiana Courier. June 2, 9, 1838; Clinton Louisianian. April 13, June 22, 1838.
16Franklin Planters* Banner. December 10, 1837; Alexander Porter to
John Ker, June 28, 1837, Iter Family Papers, SHC; John Lobdell to the 
Electors of the Parish of West Feliciana, 1838 Broadside, Turnbull-Allain 
Family Papers, LLMVC (quote); Baton Rouge Gazette. March 31, 1838;
Clinton Louisianian. May 4, June IS, 1838; Louisiana Advertiser in Bee. May 4, 1838.
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canvass, the Whig True American described the contest between Rowan 
and Prieur as "a question of bank or no bank." While equivocating on 
the state bank reform debate, Rowan boldly championed the national 
bank, rewinding voters that he was a Whig before a party by that nawe 
existed. As early as the 1824 presidential contest, he had backed 
Henry Clay and the aiws of the Awerican System.17
Democrats not only campaigned against the bank aristocracy 
within the state, but also continued their assaults on the national 
bank. Led by John Slidell, the Democrats incorporated the politics of 
slavery, which both sides had used in the 1836 presidential campaign, 
in their attack on this institution. While serving in the 
legislature, Slidell introduced a bill to instruct Louisiana’s 
representatives in Washington to oppose any act calling for the 
chartering of a national bank because the institution would be allied 
with northern abolitionists. He argued that a national bank would be 
based in the northeast, a region which "has exhibited such hostility 
to [southern] institutions" and that therefore it was "not advisable 
and...very dangerous." Slidell’s argument had some appeal as the
measure passed the Whig-controlled house by one vote before failing in
18the senate.
Edward Douglass White, address to legislature, Louisiana House 
Journal 13th leg., 2nd sess., 4-5; Thomas W. Chinn to the Voters of the 
Second Congressional District in Clinton Louisianian. June 15, 1838; In 
the Third District, Whig Rice Garland ran unopposed in 1838 and did not 
make a statement of his views; True American. July 2, 1838; Commercial Bulletin. June 1, 1838.
toLouisiana House Journal. 13th leg., 2nd sess., 27-8.
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Following the introduction of Slidell’s bill, Niew Orleans 
Democrats held a convention that resolved to oppose a national bank 
both because of its unconstitutionality and because men outside the 
South would control southern institutions. Louisiana Democrats soon 
extended Slidell’s argument. They contended that because all
abolitionists were pro-bank men, and all pro-bank men were Whigs,
19therefore all Whigs were abolitionists. Despite its flawed logic, 
their argument succeeded in putting Louisiana Whigs on the defensive. 
Having gained publicity for introducing this concept into the 
legislature, Slidell continued to employ it in his congressional 
contest against Governor White. In the Second District, Democrats 
labelled Whig candidate and national bank champion Thomas W. Chinn, "a 
political brother of the New England abolitionists.” Even Whig 
legislative candidates found themselves forced to explain how an 
assertion that they adhered to the nationalistic doctrines of 
Massachusetts Whig Daniel Webster did not make them abolitionists. In 
a letter discussing his political views, Roman belittled the 
Democratic charges, stating "I am not an abolitionist because it has 
pleased a crazy man to say so.
The Whigs proved less inclined to employ abolitionist charges, 
but did use them against Slidell and Prieur. In the First District 
contest, they questioned the northern-born Slidell's commitment to the
f9Democratic Convention in Louisiana Courier. January 25, 1838; Bee. 
April 24, 1838; Louisiana Courier. May 24, June 7, 1838.
^Clinton Louisianian. May 4, 1838 (first quote); John Lobdell to the 
Electors of the Parish of West Feliciana, 1838 Broadside, Turnbull-Allain 
Family Papers, LLMVC; Commercial Bulletin. June 1, 1838 (second quote).
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South. In the gubernatorial race, Deaocrat Denis Prieur proved 
particularly vulnerable. An unmarried aan, Prieur lived with a free 
woman of color in New Orleans. Possessing a sense of discretion in 
racial and sexual matters, Whig newspapers were reluctant to broach 
this subject, but by the end of the campaign season they referred to 
it, albeit most often in a cryptic manner. Instead of mentioning 
Prieur’s domestic situation directly, the True American worried about 
the possibility of a bad example being set in high places, and 
mentioned a "taint of abolitionism or amalgamation" without specifying 
any details. Safely outside of New Orleans, the Baton Ro»g*» anrmtt^ 
mocked Prieur for having a family but not being married, and then 
openly acknowledged his involvement in an interracial relationship and 
tied it to fears of abolition.21
Not only did the Democrats label their opponents abolitionists, 
but they also portrayed them as aristocrats. In the governor’s race, 
the Democrats emphasized that their party had nominated Prieur at a 
convention, while Roman’s candidacy steamed from "WHIG DICTATION." 
Johnson’s withdrawal from the canvass at the behest of a legislative 
clique bolstered their case, and they especially denounced the 
assumption that Johnson could "give" his votes to Roman. They also 
questioned whether Roman succeeding his successor violated the spirit 
of rotation in office and wondered if the Whigs felt that only 
Johnson, White, and Roman were capable of leading the state.22
21Louisiana Courier, June 28, 1838; True American. July 3, 1838; Baton Rouge Gazette. June 22, 1838.
22Louisiana Courier. May 2, 15, 1838; Donaldsonvi 1 le Advocate in 
Louisiana Courier. June 1, 1838.
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Democrats’ charges of Whig aristocracy coincided with their opposition 
to banks, as they alleged that corrupt Whig bank directors expected 
the masses to submit to their will. Democratic newspapers also 
contrasted the parties’ campaign styles. On one hand, Prieur "The 
Friend of the People," toured the state meeting the electorate until 
illness forced him to return to New Orleans. On the other hand,
Roman, an aristocratic planter, only met with gentlemen and expected 
them to deliver votes in their parishes. Similarly, party newspapers 
contended that their congressional candidate spoke to the yeomen and
j imechanics, while his opponent stood for the rich and well born.
Democrats claimed that their leading principle was opposition to 
consolidations of power and privilege, and consequently they not only 
fought monopolies but challenged the ultimate symbol of Louisiana 
aristocracy, the Constitution of 1812. As in 1834, Democrats proudly 
claimed that if elected they would increase the size of the state’s 
electorate by eliminating the property requirement for suffrage. Both 
Democratic congressional candidates pledged themselves to suffrage 
expansion, while their Whig opponents remained silent upon the 
issue.M The same situation prevailed in legislative races. In 
Ouachita Parish, a planter-lawyer with no political experience,
Solomon Weathersbee Downs, defeated a three-term Whig state senator by 
advancing the cause of universal suffrage. Downs would soon become 
the chief legislative spokesman for constitutional revision. The 
Clinton Louisianian and the Democratic candidates who addressed the
23Louisiana Courier. May 31, June 22, 1838; Bee. May 10, 1838.
24Bee, June 14, 27, 1838; Clinton Louisianian. May 18, 1838.
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voters through its columns advocated universal suffrage. The only 
Whig to use the Louisianian’s coluans did not sent ion suffrage, and 
the newspaper branded hia an opponent of any expansion of the 
electorate. If publicly Whigs attempted to maintain that suffrage 
should not be an issue, privately, retired Whig Senator Alexander 
Porter confessed that he ”fear[ed] that men are not capable of self- 
government.*5
The absence of & Whig stance on universal suffrage did not hurt 
the party too much, for it achieved an overwhelming victory. Whigs 
won the governor’s race, all three congressional seats, and control of 
the legislature. Roman defeated Prieur in all four of the state’s 
regions. In North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes, two areas which 
usually supported Democrats, unf ami liar ity with Prieur and antipathy 
toward a New Orleans candidate contributed to Roman’s victory. South 
Louisiana voted for Roman, one of its favor it e-sons, and continued its 
support for the party of the pro-tariff American System. Roman even 
won Prieur’s home region of Greater Orleans by one vote. The Whig 
party’s alliance with the commercial sector enabled Roman to overcome 
Prieur’s personal popularity in the Crescent City. (SEE APPENDIX B)
Democrats knew exactly where to place the blame for their 
defeat: the corrupt banking system in the state and the friends of a 
national bank. Whigs owed their legislative majority to commercial 
New Orleans where the party won all eight seats contested. The
*5C1 inton Louisianian. January 12, May 18, June 22, 29, 1838;
Louisiana Courier. June 30, 1838; Alexander Porter to John Ker, June 28, 
1837, Ker Family Papers, SBC; Biography of the Honorable Solomon W. Downs of Louisiana (Philadelphia, 1852), 5.
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Clinton Louisianian claired that even in the Florida Parishes Rso 
great was the bank nania" that Whigs would vote for a pro-bank horse 
thief before voting for an anti-bank angel. The Louisiana Courier 
condemned "Bank influence" which had purchased votes and the 
cancellation of Prieur’s state tour for the defeat. Defeated 
congressional candidate John Slidell maintained that former Democratic 
chief Martin Gordon and his son, who were both involved in Louisiana 
banking had deserted the party. Writing to the National 
Intelligencer. A Louisiana Whig concurred that the party had won by 
fighting "openly and boldly under the banner of ’a National Bank and 
sound currency.’”̂
Having used their commitment to a national bank to sweep the 
1838 state elections, Louisiana Whigs hoped to elect a Whig president 
in 1840 who would recharter such an institution. Thus, Henry Clay, 
the founder of the American System, was their first choice for the 
post. In preparation for the 1840 presidential contest, Clay modified 
his nationalist stance to prove more attractive to southern Whigs.
For Louisiana Whigs this step was unnecessary. They not only 
announced their support for Clay, but reaffirmed their commitment to 
his American System, especially the national bank. The New Orleans 
Bee, by 1840 a Whig newspaper, acknowledged that while elsewhere Whigs 
did not advocate a bank, Whigs of Louisiana, "known for their
26* Clinton Louisianian. July 20, 1838 (first quote); Louisiana
Courier. July 25, 1838; John Slidell to Martin Van Buren, April 20, 1839, 
Martin Van Buren Papers, LC; Washington National Intelligencer. July 17, 
1838 (second quote).
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undisguised and shrinking advocacy of such an institution," used the 
issue to distinguish between their party and Democrats.^
In 1839, for the first tiae, the national Whig party held a 
convention to select a presidential noainee. In March 1838, Louisiana 
Whigs chose delegates to represent the state at the forthcoaing 
convention and instructed them to support Henry Clay. The Whig 
party’s choice of delegates reveals its commitaent to & national bank. 
The delegates included long-time national bank champion Alexander 
Porter and George M. Graham, a self-described "Adaas and Clay Whig." 
Only Graham actually attended the 1839 Harrisburg Convention, and on 
every ballot he cast Louisiana’s votes for Clay. Despite having the 
backing of Louisiana and the rest of the South, Clay lost the 
nomination to William Henry Harrison, one of the trio of Whig 
candidates from 1836. Clay failed because Whigs believed he had too 
many enemies and was associated too closely with the American System, 
which not all Whigs embraced. With Harrison being connected with no 
particular policies and with the convention not issuing a platform, 
each state’s Whig party could campaign in any manner it saw fit. In 
Louisiana, Clay’s failure to capture the nomination caused "feelings 
of sorrow and disappointment” for the editor of the Bee, and Alexander
27For Louisiana Whig meeting in favor of Clay see Commercial 
Bulletin. February 6, 1838; Bee. August 19, 1840; For Clay moving away 
from economic nationalism and toward the South see William J. Cooper, 
Jr., The South and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge, 1978), 121-125.
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Porter, reduced to tears, complained that with Harrison atop the 
ticket, the party deserved to lose.
Democrats did not face such surprises with their party’s 
nomination as no one seriously contested President Martin Van Buren’s 
bid for re-election. In Louisiana, the battle between the supporters 
of Van Buren and Harrison involved three main points: which candidate 
best protected the South and slavery, the constitutionality and 
expediency of a national bank, and which party best represented the 
people. The 1840 campaign, however, remains famous not for the 
substance of its debates but for its spectacle— log cabins, hard 
cider, victory balls, parades, and festivals. Louisiana did not lack 
in this aspect of the campaign, and Porter even predicted such 
occurrences a year prior to the election, warning that "our political 
contests have accustomed the public mind to such exaggeration that 
nothing will awaken its attention on anv subject but the strongest 
kind of stimulus."2®
Throughout the South, partisans waged an unrelenting war over 
whether Van Buren or Harrison would best protect slavery from northern 
fanatics. Upon hearing of Harrison’s nomination, the editor of the 
Bee immediately recognized the potency of such barbs, worrying that 
"General Harrison should be popular in this latitude, but we have now
IBCommercial Bulletin. February 6, 1838; Alexander Porter to John J. 
Crittenden, March 9, 1838, December 18, 1839, Alexander Bullitt to
Crittenden (quote), December 21, 1839, John J. Crittenden Papers, LC; 
"The Autobiography of George M. Graham,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly 
XX (1937), 49; Robert Gray Gunderson, The Log Cabin Campaign (Lexington, 
Ky, 1957), 57-66.
29Alexander Porter to Jesse B. Harrison, November 6, 1839, Burton N. 
Harrison and Family Papers, LC (quote).
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
146
to consune so much tine in defending him from suspicion of 
aboLitionisn." He knew the perfect nethod for relieving this 
pressure, ”1 will go to work to show Van Buren’s connection with 
abolitionists and try to put the locofocos on their defense." Charges 
of abolitionism had played a role in the 1836 presidential campaign 
and in the 1838 state elections, but those races compared to the 1840 
campaign neither in terms of the number of accusations of abolitionist 
tendencies nor in the animosity of the attacks. Throughout much of 
the summer and fall, both Democrat and Whig newspapers published 
stories virtually every day on wh&t the Bee described as the "all 
absorbing question of SLAVERY!"^
Within a week of Harrison’s nomination, the Bee was already 
defending his record on slavery. The Democrats’ main allegations 
against Harrison were that he had belonged to an abolition society, he 
had moved from the slave to the free states, he advocated the selling 
of white men into slavery, and he was in favor of emancipation. Even 
if Harrison was not an abolitionist, Democrats charged that his 
closest political allies were and without their support he would have 
never received the Whig nomination. Louisiana Democrats explained 
that the southern Whigs’ distrust of Harrison had led them to vote 
repeatedly against Harrison and for Clay at the national convention. 
Only the unrelenting support of New England abolitionists had secured 
Harrison’s victory over this solid southern opposition.
^Alexander Bullitt to John J. Crittenden, March 9, 1838, John J. Crittenden Papers, LC (first quote); Bee. June 12, 1840. (second quote)
31Bee. January 4, 1840; Louisiana Courier. January 16, 20, 25, February 12, May 12, 1840.
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Democrats claimed that Harrison’s nomination sent the wrong 
message to the nation’s black population. The Louisiana Courier 
merged the charges of abolitionism and selling whites into slavery and 
explained that if Harrison had his way, a free Negro could buy a white 
man and inflict lashes upon his back. Writing from Washington, 
Louisiana’s Democratic Senator Robert C. Nicholas provided more 
damaging evidence against the Harrison movement. Nicholas explained 
that he had witnessed a disturbing scene in the nation’s capital— a 
parade of free blacks in favor of Harrison’s victory. The party 
claimed that Louisianans had to fear the reactions of slaves as well 
as free blacks. Warning of the slave insurrections which would follow 
a Whig victory, the Louisiana Courier advised Louisiana’s planters 
that a Whig vote could lead to the "inundations of your rich plains 
with the blood of thousands."3*
Regarding slavery, Louisiana Whigs adopted the policy suggested 
by the editor of the Bee— a good offense is the best defense. While 
defending the southem-bom Harrison as "the uncompromising advocate 
of Southern Rights” and decrying Democratic slanders against the 
general, the partisan press spent more time assailing Van Buren’s 
record on abolition. Whigs transformed the Democrats’ 
characterization of Van Buren as a "Northern man with Southern 
principles" to one of a "Northern man without principles," especially 
principles regarding the South’s peculiar institution. They charged 
Vein Buren with being an abolitionist, opposing the admission of
32For Washington procession see Louisiana Courier. May 11, July 17, 
1840; For insurrection scare see ibid., June 12 (quote), November 14, 
1840.
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Missouri as a slave state, admitting congressional power to eliminate 
slavery in Washington, D.C., and voting for negro suffrage while in 
the New York legislature. The Whig Central Committee of New Orleans 
reminded Louisiana’s electors that at the same time they voted, black 
men in New York enfranchised by Martin Van Buren were casting their 
ballots.33
While accusations of abolition produced the greatest number of 
campaign articles, the debate over national and state banking occupied 
a prominent position as well. Democrats attacked Whigs as corrupt 
"Federal-Bank-o-crats" whose support had been purchased by the 
national bank. Throughout the campaign, Democrat meetings passed 
resolutions praising Van Buren’s Independent Treasury policy, which 
attempted to divorce the federal government entirely from the nation’s 
banking system. These meetings blamed the nation’s financial distress 
not on Van Buren but on Whig speculators and the remnants of the Bank 
of the United States. They ridiculed the idea of rechartering the 
institution as a "Whig panacea."3* Campaigning for the July 1840 
state elections, Democrats lambasted the Whig-controlled legislature’s 
continued refusal to enact any legislation regulating state banks.
Since Governor White’s veto of the 1838 bank bill, no bank measure had
33Commercial Bulletin. February 3, 1840 (quote); Bee. June 12, 17,1840.
3*Louisiana Courier. March 23 (second quote), June 18, 1840 (first 
quote); F.L. Bosworth to Jacob Bieller, July IS, 1839, Alonzo Snyder 
Papers, LLMVC; For Democrats’ anti-bank, pro-independent Treasury 
resolutions see Resolutions of Democratic Association of West Feliciana, 
1840, in Henry A. Lyons Papers, LLMVC; Fourth of July Speech, 1840, 
William S. Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Louisiana Courier. February 27, March 16, October 30, 1840.
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passed, and the Democrats campaigned under the banner of state bank 
reform. In New Orleans, they charged that the Whig legislative ticket 
was composed entirely of bank directors who would continue to avoid 
the problem.3*
Louisiana Whigs held a polar opposite view of the nation’s 
financial situation. Blaming Van Buren’s policies for the nation’s 
fiscal problems, they offered an easy solution: vote for Harrison and 
a national bank. A Whig address charged Van Buren with undertaking a 
"war on currency” leading to "universal confusion and distress." In a 
letter declining his renomination to Congress, Thomas W. Chinn 
contrasted the prosperity of the country under a national bank to the 
current situation with "commerce prostrated [and] credit ruined.” 
Alexander Porter agreed that Van Buren’s policies had led to pecuniary 
distress and in an open letter urged the Whig leadership in Rapides 
Parish to campaign on this issue.3* Whigs even answered criticism of 
the Whig legislature’s failure to enact bank legislation with the 
assertion that if the Democrats had not crushed the Bank of the United 
States then there would not be a state banking problem. They added 
that restrictions on Louisiana banks would only lead to a flood of
33Louisiana Courier. June 26, July 3, 1840; Shreveport Caddo Free
Press, April 30, 1840.
^Commercial Bulletin. March 4, 1840; Whig address in Bee. June 17,
1840; Letter of Thomas W. Chinn to Hon. Thomas Gibbs Morgan. President 
of the whig convention of the Second Congressional District...
(Washington, 1840), 4-6 (quote p. S); Alexander Porter to Whig Committee of Rapides, May 9, 1840, in Bee. May 30, 1840.
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currency from banks in other states because of the lack of national 
oversight in the absence of the Bank of the United states.17
For both parties, the battle over a national bank directly 
connected to the contest over which candidate best protected the 
republic, or conversely which party most jeopardized the people’s 
freedom. The Whigs warned the electorate, "Your liberties are in 
danger I" and the Democrats readily agreed that voters needed to decide 
if they were "FREEMEN OR SLAVES!" The two parties disagreed, however, 
on precisely what threatened the people’s liberties.1* Democrats 
contended that the battle-lines were drawn between their party and the 
bank aristocrats. They asserted that the nation had always been 
divided between democratic champions of the people and federalist bank 
men who, in arguing for a national bank, perverted the meaning of the 
Constitution to promote the welfare of a few at the expense of the 
many. They mocked the Whig party’s attempt to claim the mantle of the 
party of the people by having "BANK MEN who live in MARBLE PALACES" 
erect log cabins to deceive the honest working men. If elected, these 
men would re-establish a national bank and destroy the people’s 
liberty.19
If the Democrats warned of what might happen with a Harrison 
victory, the Whigs pointed to what had already happened under the rule 
of Martin Van Buren and his minions who were "grinding the people
17Bee, January 25, 1840; Commercial Bulletin. July 8, 1840.
3ftBee, June 12, 1840 (first quote); Louisiana Courier. July 1, 1840 
(second quote).
39Louisiana Courier. July 1, September 24, October 16, 1840.
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under the name of Democrats or friends of the people." If Democrats 
called Whigs "aristocrats," Whigs teraed Democrats "monarchists."40 
According to the Whigs* principal argument, President Van Buren, in 
the tradition of tyrannical Icings, was attempting to unite the purse 
and the sword of the country in his hands. Whigs warned that already 
he had captured the purse with his Independent Treasury scheme, which 
they claimed was only "independent" in that sense that it was removed 
from the people’s control. And, they seized upon the secretary of 
war’s plan to reorganize the militia system as an effort by Van Buren 
to create a two-hundred thousand man standing army answerable only to 
him. Whigs alleged that with purse and sword together, Van Buren 
would have "a union, which has never yet failed, to overthrow public 
liberty— a union which constitutes the very definition of despotic 
power."41
Known as the "Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign," the 
presidential election of 1840 is remembered more for its hoopla than 
for arguments over slavery, banking, or threats to liberty. Observing 
the enthusiasm in Baltimore, Alexander Porter exclaimed, "I could not 
have imagined.. .the excitement which prevails on the Presidential 
election." He remained disappointed, however, that "It is only in
40R.F. McGuire, Diary (typescript), 1839, p. 16, LLMVC (quote); 
Charges of monarchy in Bee. March 7, June 30, 1840; Baton Rouge Gazette. 
October 3, 1840.
41Whig newspapers throughout the campaign abounded with these 
charges. For creation of standing army see Alexandria Red River Whim. 
April 25, 1840; Bee. June 4, 30, 1840; For allegations of uniting purse 
and sword see Letter of Thomas W. Chinn to the Honorable Thomas Gibbs Morgan.... 10; Commercial Bulletin. October 12, 1840; Bee, March 7, 
October 28, 1840; Baton Rouge Gazette. October 3, 1840 (quote).
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Louisiana that I fear we are not so active as we should be." Perhaps
because his first-choice, Henry Clay, had been denied the nomination,
Porter’s depiction of the 1840 canvass in Louisiana was overly
critical. The campaign season in Louisiana had all of the thrills—
log cabins, a never-ending succession of meetings, parades, and
community-wide participation— that were present in the rest of the
nation. The Commercial Bulletin more accurately described 1840 as
"The Year of Conventions" which culminated in huge statewide Whig
convention in Baton Rouge in October. The newspaper proclaimed that,
in Louisiana, "Every citizen seems to have turned politician." In
1840, "every citizen” included the entire community not just voters.
For the first time, women had an active role in the canvass, and the
Baton Rouge Gazette observed that the "political mania" had extended 
42even to children.
In Louisiana, the campaign season began, as it had twelve years 
earlier, with a visit from Andrew Jackson to commemorate his victory 
in the Battle of New Orleans. As Jackson’s arrival approached, New 
Orleans was "all excitement" and business in the Crescent City 
stopped. As in 1828, the coming of Old Hickory inspired party 
wrangling. The Bee labelled it "a party maneuver,” while the 
Louisiana Courier denigrated the Whig-controlled legislature’s refusal 
to treat Jackson as an official guest of state. When Jackson actually 
arrived, however, partisan debate receded, and, instead of party 
strife, parades and celebration moved to the forefront. Even a Whig
^Alexander Porter to William T. Palfrey, June 18, 1840, Palfrey 
Family Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Commercial Bulletin. October 6, 1840 
(second quote); Baton Rouge Gazette. June 20, 1840 (third quote).
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could declare "The glorious 8th, a day doubly dear to all
Louisianans."*̂ A diarist described Louisiana’s obsession with 
Jackson as "man worship in all its glory." The whole community 
participated, including women as well as men. Women waved 
handkerchiefs from balconies as the veterans paraded past, and the 
diarist recounts one man even bringing his wife up to the stage to 
kiss Old Hickory.**
Women may have started 1840 in their traditional role as 
handkerchief-wavers, passively participating in a political 
celebration, but, by the end of the presidential campaign, they had 
assumed and been recognized as having an active political role for the 
first time in Louisiana history. Prior to 1840, newspaper accounts of 
political gatherings never mentioned the presence of women, and when 
politicians did acknowledge women, it was not to invite them into the 
political arena. For example, the toasts at an 1834 political 
gathering included the patronizing, "Woman! Lovely Woman!! The 
ornament of man in his happier hours, and solace when smitten with 
sudden calamity." In 1840, this dismissive attitude toward the 
political role of women changed dramatically. As part of the total 
political involvement of the "Log Cabin and Hard Cider” campaign,
F.M. Weld and Company to J.G. Weld, January 6, 1840, Weld Company 
Correspondence, LLMVC (first quote); Bee. November 16, 1839 (second 
quote); Louisiana Courier. February 27, 1840; Samuel J. Peters, Jr., 
diary, January 8, 1840, LLMVC. (third quote)
**Davis, ed., Barrow Diarv. January 1840, p. 178 (quote); 
Descriptions of celebration in Commercial Bulletin. January 10, 1840; 
Louisiana Courier. January 9, 1840.
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women were addressed in the partisan press and attended political 
celebrations.45
Not only did descriptions of political meetings include mention 
of the number of women present, but they had a partisan role for the 
first time. One orator even boldly proclaimed, "the ladies all are 
Whigs." The Democrats justly objected to this claim, but unarguably 
the Whig party made a greater effort to include women. Women had 
their greatest role at the October state Whig convention held in Baton 
Rouge, and in the parish meetings leading up to this event.45 Each 
parish sent a delegation which included women, and they competed in 
the making of political banners. These banners echoed the themes that 
male politicians discussed, such as "The South will maintain her 
rights," and the final address of the convention was aimed directly at 
the women present. The Baton Rouge Gazette even printed 
correspondence between the city’s Tippecanoe Club and Miss Nicholson 
who had presented a banner. Later that month, the Bee alluded to 
another political role for women when it included an article from a 
New England newspaper showing how a loyal Whig girl had shunned her 
Democratic fiancd until he agreed to vote for a Whig candidate who won 
the subsequent election by a single vote. While none of these 
activities were progenitors of a women’s rights movement in Louisiana,
45Louisiana Advertiser. August 5, 1834; For the role of women in the 
campaign and their association with the Whig party see Gunderson, The 
Log-Cabin Campaign, 135-139; Elizabeth R. Varon, "Tippecanoe and the 
Ladies, Too: White Women and Party Politics in Antebellum Virginia,” 
Journal of American History 82 (September 1995), 494-521.
45Coamercial Bulletin. June 26, 1840 (quote); Louisiana Courier.
November 2, 1840.
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they did show that woaen had begun to have a political role in the 
47state.
Though not all of Louisiana’s woaen were Whigs, enough or its 
voters were Whigs to triuaph in the July elections and to place 
Louisiana in Harrison’s coluan in November. In July, the Whig party 
achieved a narrow three vote aajority for the upcoaing legislature and 
retained two of three congressional seats. In November, Harrison 
defeated Van Buren 11,296 to 7,616. After the presidential contest, 
the Bee hailed New Orleans as the "WHIG CITY,” and this label could 
have applied equally well in the legislative elections where the Whigs 
captured all eight of New Orleans’s seats. Both parties had bound the 
state races to the national contest. The phrase "Harrison and Reform" 
topped the Whig legislative ticket, and the Whig Bee repeatedly 
reminded New Orleans voters of the importance of the upcoaing 
legislature having a Whig aajority. This body would elect a United 
States senator, and to recharter a national bank it was imperative 
that the Senate have a Whig aajority. In the congressional races, 
Edward White easily held onto his seat, and Whig John Moore narrowly 
won the seat vacated by Rice Garland’s appointment to the Louisiana
iS ____supreme court. (SEE APPENDIX A)
The Democrats put a positive spin on the state results. They 
had reduced the Whigs’ aajority in the legislature and gained a 
congressional seat after losing races in all three districts in 1838. 
The Democrats even had a aajority of five legislators in the country
47Baton Rouge Gazette. October 3, 10, 1840; Bee. October 27, 1840.
WBee, November 6, 1840.
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parishes. They perhaps even consoled themselves that political power 
in the state was slowly shifting from the city. Four of the five 
parishes created in the 1830s were in North Louisiana, and the 
region’s vote total had wore than tripled frow 1832 to 1840. In the 
1824 gubernatorial race, only 11.7 percent of the ballots cast cane 
from North Louisiana, but by 1840 this percentage had nearly doubled 
to 21.1 percent. If the Democrats waited long enough, possibly the 
regions outside Greater Orleans and South Louisiana would grow enough 
to enable the party to capture the state. As politicians, however, 
Democrats did not have the patience to wait for North Louisiana’s 
growth to elevate them into control of the state, so they looked for a 
method to obtain greater support from other regions to win Louisiana’s 
1842 gubernatorial race.
In an attempt to make inroads into the Whig-dominated sugar 
parishes, the Democrats chose their 1842 gubernatorial candidate from 
South Louisiana. The February 1840 convention, which appointed 
delegates to the national presidential convention, nominated Alexander 
Mouton, a Creole from Lafayette Parish. A United States senator,
Mouton had previously served in the Louisiana legislature. The 
Democrats reiterated their commitment to Mouton in a January 1842 New 
Orleans convention which, for the first time, included a party 
platform. Mixing national and state topics, the platform included 
opposition to a national bank and congressional interference with 
slavery as well as a desire to reform the state banking system and 
amend the state constitution. These latter two issues along with the
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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division between the American and Creole populations became the
49primary topics in the gubernatorial campaign.
While declining to establish a platform, the Whigs, in a March 
1841 state convention attended by delegates from almost every parish, 
rewarded Henry Johnson for his withdrawal from the 1838 race and 
nominated him as their gubernatorial candidate. With Johnson having 
served as a delegate to the 1812 constitutional convention, as a state 
legislator, as governor, and as a congressman, the Whigs considered 
him one of Louisiana’s greatest statesmen.*0 The Democrats, however, 
viewed Johnson’s experience as a liability not an asset. They charged 
Johnson, Governor Roman, and Congressman White with being an unholy 
triumvirate that desired to rotate the state’s most important offices 
among themselves. Also, with the Democrats championing revision of 
the aristocratic 1812 constitution, Johnson’s association with the 
document made him even less acceptable to them as governor.*1
Although the Democrats had addressed constitutional revision in 
both the 1834 and 1838 governor’s races, in 1842 they made it the 
focal point of their campaign. In July, along with voting for a 
governor, legislators, and congressmen, the electorate would have the 
opportunity to vote for or against the calling of a constitutional 
convention. The 1812 constitution had created a byzantine method for
49Louisiana Courier. February 27, 1840; Baton Rouge Gazette. January22, 1842.
*°Bee, March 10, May 11, 1842; Madison Parish Richmond Compiler. 
March 15, 1842; Baton Rouge Gazette. June 25, 1842.
^Commercial Bulletin. February 3, 1842; Bee. June 14, 1842;
Louisiana Courier, (extra) July 4, 1842.
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amendment which involved both houses of the legislature passing a 
convention bill detailing the specific amendments to be aade, the 
governor signing the bill, and a aajority of the state’s eligible 
voters approving the measure. This saae procedure had to occur in 
consecutive years for a convention to be called. Any aissed step, and 
the entire process had to begin anew. Led by Soloaon W. Downs, 
efforts were aade in the late 1830s to aaend the constitution, and 
twice a convention bill passed the house only to be defeated in the 
senate. Finally in 1842, Governor Roaan signed a convention bill 
which included amendments providing for universal white aale suffrage, 
popular election of the governor, an increase in the nuaber of 
elective offices, and reapportionaent. In July, the electorate would 
be given its first opportunity to express its opinion on revision.
Calling constitutional reform a "great and all-absorbing 
question,” Democrats portrayed thenselves as its champions, and the 
Whigs as its enemy. Not only did the party include a plank in its 
platform advocating revision, but in a well-publicized speech in 
Clinton, Mouton attacked the 1812 constitution as oppressive and 
tyrannical and contended that it treated freemen as slaves. He 
asserted that the best way to rescue the state from the aristocratic 
clique, which had long ruled, would be the implementation of "free 
suffrage" to its full extent. In meetings throughout the state, 
Democrats passed resolutions declaring their commitment to
^While Louisiana voters had previously voted for governor, 
technically the legislators selected from the top two vote-getters. In 
every election, they had picked the people’s first-choice; Ted Ferguson, 
"The Louisiana Constitution of 1845," (Master’s thesis, Louisiana State Univers ity, 1948).
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constitutional change, and in New Orleans they distributed a pro­
convention pamphlet. In addition to the expansion of suffrage, 
Democrats urged the direct election of the governor, making more 
offices elective, and reapportioning the legislature, while charging 
the Whigs with opposing any change in the constitution.*3
Though a Democrat meeting in St. Francisville asserted that 
"revision of the state constitution will furnish a line of demarcation 
between the parties," and Democrats alleged that Henry Johnson had 
called the people "too ignorant to judge" whom should represent them, 
Johnson and the Whig party challenged these declarations. A Whig 
newspaper claimed that both parties favored constitutional change, and 
Johnson maintained that he personally favored revision. He insisted, 
however, that constitutional change was a legislative not: a 
gubernatorial issue. In Ouachita Parish, the Whig challenging Solomon 
W. Downs, the Democratic champion of constitutional revision, tried to 
explain to voters that the parties agreed on universal suffrage and 
contended that the only difference between Downs and himself was their 
attitudes toward a national bank.54
Despite these Whig protests, the parties unquestionably differed 
in their respective stances on constitutional revision. While Mouton
53Louisiana Courier. November 16 (quote), 19, 27, December 1, 1841; 
Bee. June 24, 1842; Remarks on the Propriety of Calling a. Convention to 
Amend the Constitution of the State of Louisiana (New Orleans, 1841).
54St. Francisville Democrat. December 3, 1841; T-ouisiana Courier. 
December 18, 1841; Madison Parish Rirharmd Compiler. May 31, 1842; Baton 
Rouge Gazette. June 25, 1842; For accusation about Johnson see Henry 
Johnson to William Johnson, July 18, 1842, William Johnson Papers,
Mississippi Department of Archives and History (Hereinafter MDAH); Isaiah 
Garrett to Mr. Underwood, May 13, 1842, Isaiah Garrett and Family Papers, LLMVC.
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boldly endorsed refora, & Whig recognized that Johnson suffered 
because of his half-hearted embrace of the convention question. 
Additionally, soae Whigs tried to avoid the argument altogether by 
explaining that the voters and not the parties should decide if the 
constitution needed revision. Other Whigs went further and opposed 
the measure completely. Contending that Mouton and the Democrats 
wanted to make all offices elective, even the judiciary, the Whigs 
warned voters that the Democratic remedy of constitutional change 
could hurt more than it helped. The Baton Rouge Gazette urged the 
electorate to oppose universal suffrage because it would give "the 
greatest vagabond" the right to vote. Privately, retired Senator 
Porter agreed that "the great cause of evil is universal suffrage."
The mixed message sent by Whigs contrasted sharply with the Democrats’ 
one voice in favor of a convention.^
As in the 1838 gubernatorial race, Louisiana’s financial 
situation, especially its banking problems, overshadowed much of the 
campaign. In both 1838 and 1842, the main issue involved what should 
be done with banks that had illegally suspended specie payments.
Since the Panic of 1837 when, in violation of their charters, all 
Louisiana banks had suspended specie payment, the legislature had 
debated bank reform. In 1838, it passed a bill which Governor White 
vetoed. Because the banks had resumed specie payment, the issue was 
avoided in the 1839 session, but when the banks suspended payment
S5Madison Parish Richmond Compiler. February 8, 1842; Bee. June 16, 
17, 1842; Baton Rouge Gazette. June 25, July 2, 1842 (first quote); Henry 
Adams Bullard to James G. Taliaferro, July 22, 1842, Taliaferro Papers, 
LLMVC; Alexander Porter to Isaac Morse, 1842, in Edward C. Morse, Blood of an Enyilshiwn (Abilene, Texas, 1943), 117 (second quote).
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again in January 1840* the legislature resuaed debate on what to do.
In both the 1840 and 1841 sessions, disagreement amongst legislators 
prevented the passage of any bill. By December 1841, the situation 
compelled action as the economic uncertainty "was crippling the 
commercial life of the state."**
In 1842, the legislature passed, and Governor Roman signed "The 
Louisiana Bank Act of 1842.” This bill reflected a bipartisan 
agreement that something needed to be done about the banking crisis. 
Voting on the measure did not split along party lines, but with a Whig 
governor and with the Whigs having a legislative majority, the act was 
associated with that party. In the short run, the bill proved 
disastrous, and in New Orleans, one of the effects was a two-day riot. 
The Whigs continued to blame the state’s dire financial straits on the 
absence of a national bank, but many voters had grown tired of this 
refrain. Democrats, including Mouton, crusaded against the injustice 
of the state’s banking aristocracy and contended that with Whigs
controlling the presidency, the governor’s office, and the legislature
57the fault must lie with their party.
Not only did the Democrats brand Johnson as opposed to 
constitutional change and blame him for the state’s financial crisis, 
they also denigrated his attachment to Louisiana and Louisianans. 
Democrats claimed that the Virginia-born Johnson looked down upon
*fiGeorge D. Green, "The Louisiana Bank Act of 1842," Explorations in 
Economic History VII (1970), 399-412 (quote, p. 403); Irene D. Neu, 
"Edmund Jean Forstall and Louisiana Banking,” ibid., 383-398.
57Opelousas Gazette. July 2, 1842; Louisiana Courier. July 4, 1842; Bee. July 4, 1842.
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Louisiana’s Creole population, while Mouton served as its leader.
They attributed a quote to Johnson in which he supposedly said that he 
did not care what the Creoles did in the election because he could win 
without their votes. Ridiculing the Democrats’ use of the "Creole 
hobby,” Whigs denied the quote and pointed out that Johnson had lived 
in Louisiana for more than forty years, and that in 1838 he had 
withdrawn from the race to allow Roman, a Creole, to become governor. 
Despite these Whig efforts, after the election, Johnson admitted that 
"the Creole question.. .operated powerfully in several [F]rench 
parishes," and, for the first time, a Democratic gubernatorial
58candidate won the predominantly Creole South Louisiana region.
In addition to winning South Louisiana, Mouton defeated Johnson 
9,650 to 8,221 in the state. One Whig succinctly attributed Johnson’s 
loss to "Creolism, the Bank question & the convention question."
Johnson agreed that these three causes, along with the accusation that 
he, White, and Roman had tried to rotate the state’s offices among 
themselves, had led to his defeat. Louisiana Whigs assured national 
leaders that the result was attributable to local causes and did not 
signal a diminishment of the party’s popularity in the state. Though 
losing the governor’s race, the Whigs maintained their majority in the 
legislature and won two of the three congressional races. As in 1840, 
New Orleans proved the key to Whig control of the legislature.
Evidently, either voters in the commercial city did not entirely blame 
the Whigs for the financial crisis or they feared the Democratic
S8Opelousas Gazette. June 11, 1842; Bee. May 4, July 4, 1842;
Louisiana Courier. July 2, 1842; Henry Johnson to William Johnson, July18, 1842, William Johnson Papers, MDAH (quote).
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solution, as Whigs swept the eleven legislative seats in the city. 
Additionally, Johnson won 54.9 percent of the votes in Greater 
Orleans, and the region's voters opposed a constitutional 
convention.*9 (SEE APPENDIX B)
The rest of the state did not share Greater Orleans’s aniaosity 
toward a new charter as 76.9 percent voted in favor of the neasure, 
including over ninety percent in the Florida Parishes and North 
Louisiana. A new constitution with universal suffrage proved so 
popular in North Louisiana that it was later alleged that by 1842 the 
area had already stopped enforcing the property requirement for 
voting. Even in South Louisiana, a Whig stronghold, two-thirds voted 
for the convention. These overwhelming pro-convention percentages 
undoubtedly exaggerate the appeal of constitutional revision.
According to the law, the convention had to be approved by over one- 
half of eligible voters, so simply by not voting, one cast his vote 
against the charter.60 (TABLE 3.1)
Whigs could confidently assert that despite Mouton’s victory and 
the overwhelming demand for a constitutional convention, their party 
remained strong by pointing to Louisiana’s four United States Senate 
elections in the early 1840s. In the 1830s, Whigs had not
59Henry Adams Bullard to James G. Taliaferro, July 22, 1842,
Taliaferro Papers (quote); Henry Johnson to William Johnson, July 18, 
1842, Johnson Papers, MDAH; Henry Clay to John Crittenden, July 21, 1842, 
Crittenden Papers, LC; Election results in Bee. July 12, 19, 21, 1842.
^Constitutions of the State of Louisiana. Art. VII, Sec. 1, p. 562; 
For North Louisianans voting despite not meeting qualifications see 
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention which Assembled at the Citv of 
New Orleans. January 14, 1844rsicl (New Orleans, 1845), 446, 448 , 456. 
(Hereinafter Debates)
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TABLE 3.1




NO IN FAVOR YES
PERCENT 
NO IN FAVOR
FLORIDA 2843 289 90.8
NORTH LA 5013 124 97.6
ORLEANS 1451 1550 48.4





13396 4030 76.9 11229 2767 80.2
consistently supported their party’s nominee for the Senate, but in 
each year from 1841 to 1844 a Whig legislature elected a Whig senator. 
In 1841, with Democratic Senator Nicholas’s term expiring, the Whigs 
offered Alexander Barrow as their candidate, while the Democrats 
countered with the incumbent. Perhaps fearing party defections, the 
Whig party selected Barrow, a former Democratic states-rights 
proponent, and he defeated Nicholas by six votes on the first 
ballot.61 When Senator Mouton resigned in 1842 in order to campaign 
for governor, the Whigs again turned to a former Democrat, New 
Orleanian Charles M. Conrad, who had left the party after Jackson’s 
bank veto and his withdrawal of funds from the institution. Conrad 
ran virtually unopposed, gaining thirty-five votes with his closest 
competitor receiving nine.6*
Having only been elected to fill the remainder of Mouton’s term, 
Conrad hoped for re-election to a full six-year term in 1843. During 
his brief senatorial career, however, Conrad undermined his own
61Louisiana Senate Journal. 15th leg., 1st sess., 16.
6*Louisiana Senate Journal. 16th leg., 1st sess., 60; Baton Rouge Gazette. March 12, 1842.
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chances by blaspheming Louisiana’s savior, Andrew Jackson. In 1842, 
Congress debated remitting the fine which Judge Hall which levied on 
Jackson in 1815 for his refusal to remove New Orleans from martial 
law. Conrad’s vote against this measure raised the ire of both 
Democrats and Whigs in Louisiana, and friends of Jackson swore they 
would defeat his re-election. A minority, Democrats in the 
legislature could not elect one of their own, so they announced that 
they would back retired Whig leader Alexander Porter who easily 
defeated Conrad on the first ballot.*3 Democrats had voted for Porter 
partially because they felt that illness would soon compel him to 
resign his seat, and perhaps enable them to fill it with a member of 
their party. They had correctly predicted that sickness would force 
Porter to resign, but they had underestimated his political savvy. 
Porter carefully timed his resignation for a period when the Whigs 
controlled the legislature and when the disruptive Conrad was absent 
in Europe. In January 1844, the Whigs elected perennial candidate 
Henry Johnson to the Senate, as a reward for his loyal service to the 
party.M
Control of the legislature in 1842 proved doubly important for 
the Whigs, for not only did this body have to power to elect a United
^Edward G.W. Butler to Andrew Jackson, July 17, 1842, James W. 
Breedlove to Jackson, July 18, 1842, October 20, 1842, January 27, 1843, 
Jean B. Plauch6 to Jackson, November 2, 1842, Andrew Jackson Papers, LC; 
New Orleans Jeffersonian. May 30, 1842; Daily Picayune. January 10, 1843.
MHenry D. Piere to Andrew Jackson, January 9, 1843, Jackson Papers, 
LC; John Slidell to Martin Van Buren, February 2, 1844, Van Buren Papers, 
LC; Alexander Porter to John J. Crittenden, December 2, 1843, Crittenden 
Papers, LC; For the importance of any Whig senator but Conrad see 
Alexander Porter to Walter L. Brashear, February 2, 1844, Bras he ar- Lawrence Papers, SHC.
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States senator but also, with the addition of a fourth congressional 
seat in Louisiana, it was vested with the authority to redistrict the 
state. Using what an opponent called "the strictest gerrymandering 
principles," Whig legislators hoped their party would have majorities 
in every district but the third. In July 1843, Louisiana voters went 
the polls to fill the redistricted congressional seats until the 
regularly scheduled 1844 election. Anticipating victories in three of 
the races, Whigs were stunned when the Democrats, who had never 
captured more than one of Louisiana’s three districts, won all four 
contests.**
Negative reaction to the gerrymander contributed to the result, 
but anger over Conrad’s course regarding Jackson’s fine, and party 
attitudes toward constitutional change were probably more significant. 
Resenting the rebuke that Conrad had given to their hero, Louisianans 
were appalled when the Whigs considered running him as a candidate in 
the First District. Though Conrad withdrew, Democrat John Slidell 
continued to campaign against this traitor to Louisiana, and he easily 
won the race.** Throughout the state, Democrats benefitted from the
Alexander Walker to Martin Van Buren, August 6, 1843, Van Buren 
Papers, LC (quote); Thomas Curry to John Liddell, June 2, 1843, Moses and 
St. John R. Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC; The redistricting plan was: 
First District— Orleans Parish below Canal Street and the parishes of 
Plaquemines and St. Bernard; Second District— Orleans Parish above Canal 
Street and the parishes of Jefferson, St. John, St. James, Ascension, 
Assumption, Lafourche, and Terrebonne; Third District— Florida Parishes 
plus the parishes of Carroll, Madison, Tensas, Concordia, Catahoula,
Avoyelles, Fointe Coupee, Iberville, and West Baton Rouge; Fourth
District— the rest of North Louisiana plus the parishes of St. Martin,
St. Mary, Lafayette, St. Landry, and Calcasieu; Baton Rouge Gazette.
August 12, 1843; Daily Tropic. November 24, 1843.
**John Slidell to Andrew Jackson, July 12, 1843, John Claiborne to 
Jackson, July 5, 1843, Jackson Papers, LC.
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congressional election coinciding with the second vote on whether to 
call a constitutional convention. They continued adamantly to deaand 
change, while Whigs reaained lukewarm. With the constitutional natter 
requiring not a majority of the ballots cast but of all eligible 
voters, staying away froa the polls was equivalent to voting against 
the measure. Many Whigs chose this option and soae even reportedly 
left the state to defeat the convention call. Thus, realizing the 
importance of each pro-convention vote, Democratic turnout probably 
exceeded that of Whigs and aided in winning close races.67 (TABLE 3.1) 
With a majority of the electorate voting in favor of a 
convention, the constitution-aaking process in Louisiana finally caae 
to fruition in 1844. In July, an election for convention aeabers 
was held and in August the body aet in the small town of Jackson in 
East Feliciana Parish. Despite the payment of lip-service to the idea 
of a non-partisan convention, Whig and Democratic parish meetings 
nominated candidates and offered the voters a choice of programs. The 
electorate played a significant role as the caapaign generated an 
unprecedented number of candidates’ letters to voters. These letters 
detailing aspirants’ views on revision filled newspaper columns. Both 
parties also modified their original planks to cater to the voters’
67Jeremiah Y. Dashiell to James K. Polk, July 27, 1844, in Herbert 
Weaver and Wayne Cutler, eds., Correspondence Jawes K. Polk
(Knoxville, Tenn., 1969-1996); 7:405-407.
68For a discussion of the 1845 constitution see Judith K. Schafer, 
"Reform or Experiment? The Louisiana Constitution of 1845," in Warren M. 
Billings and Edward F. Haas, eds., In Search of Fundamental Law: 
Louisiana’s Constitutions. 1812-1974 (Lafayette, La., 1993), 21-36; For 
a view with a greater eaphasis on partisanship see Ferguson, "The Louisiana Constitution of 1845."
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dictates. Within the convention, however, the parties did divide on 
several important Measures, particularly those regarding the extent of 
democracy, apportionment, and views toward corporations. Though 
partisan rivalry shaped auch of the convention, hostility between the 
country parishes and New Orleans also played a key role with the 
country parishes insisting that the city’s power be restricted.
Though at least one candidate "[did] not consider [the 
convention] a proper subject for the interference of Party 
Conventions," nost partisans disagreed. With the election for Members 
of the constitutional convention coinciding with the July legislative 
and congressional elections, Democratic and Whig parish meetings 
nominated convention slates at the same time they chose men for those 
offices. While agreeing on the need for universal white male 
suffrage, reapportionment, and the increase in the number of elective 
offices, the parties did offer the voters a choice of programs. The 
Democrats favored more sweeping changes including having only minimal 
residency requirements for voters, making all offices including the 
judiciary elective, abolishing the state banking system, and making it 
illegal for the state to go into debt. They also reminded voters that 
they had long advocated revision, especially universal suffrage, while 
the Whigs had continually tried to maintain restricted access to the 
ballot. Charging Democrats with wanting to fashion radical changes 
such as an elective judiciary, Whigs alleged their opponents sought to
69James Dunlap to Alonzo Snyder, November 18, 1843, Snyder Papers, 
LLMVC (first quote); Louisiana Democratic Association Address, 1844, John 
A. Quitman Papers, LLMVC; Louisiana Courier. January 12, February 10, March 1, April 2, 1844.
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destroy and not to aaend the constitution. In contrast, their party 
would protect the people from this anarchy by minimizing changes in 
the 1812 charter. A few Whigs even claiaed that the convention only 
had the power to aake the specific changes mentioned in the bill 
calling for the convention. The party also wanted longer residency 
requirements, fewer elective offices, and fewer restrictions on 
business than the Democrats.7®
In this campaign, the Louisiana electorate played a greater role 
than it had in any previous contest. In prior races, candidates had 
issued circulars and written letters to their constituents but not to 
the extent witnessed in the convention election. In New Orleans, the 
resolutions of a Democratic convention included a list of the specific 
changes that the party recommended, and at least one country newspaper 
analyzed the 1812 constitution section by section.^ In Madison 
Parish, in response to a list of questions printed in the Richmond 
Compiler, seven candidates wrote letters detailing their views. Only 
one competitor did not publish a letter, insisting that he had 
articulated his position at a parish court meeting. This explanation 
apparently proved unconvincing to the electorate, for, in the 
subsequent week’s issue, he answered the questions. In St. Landry 
Parish, the same situation prevailed. The Opelousas Gazette included 
an inquiry into the nominees’ positions on several key matters, and
70Opelousas Gazette. January 20 , 29, 1844; Vidalia Concordia
Intelligencer. September 30, October 21, 1843; Baton Rouge Gazette. 
January 20, Much 19, 1844; Bee. May 23, June 1, 1844.
77Louisiana Courier. January 12, 1844; St Francisville Democrat. December 3, 1841.
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seven dutifully replied in the following weeks. Discussing 
campaigning, one aspirant wrote, "I am so worn down that I can hardly
write this letter,” while another explained that despite his disdain
72for canvassing he would do so at his friends’ insistence.
Not only did the parties respond to the questions presented in 
newspapers, but as the campaign progressed, they modified their 
stances on several key issues with the positions of the Whigs and the 
Democrats coming closer together as the election neared. After 
receiving the candidates’ responses, the Richmond Compiler observed 
that "there is a general concurrence of public sentiment" in regard to 
most of the changes. Fearing being branded as radicals, most 
Democrats dropped their demand for an elective judiciary. More 
significantly, all but the most conservative Whigs acknowledged that 
the convention was not limited to making only the changes prescribed 
in the bill which passed the legislature but had full power to rewrite 
the constitution. This shift in Whig views clearly illustrates the 
increasing power of the electorate, for the 1812 constitution 
explicitly stated that any amendment must appear in the convention 
bill. Thus, the Whigs who objected to wholesale revision 
unquestionably read the law correctly, but in an effort to gain 
control of the convention, they agreed to accept a more liberal 
interpretat ion.^
72Madison Parish Richmond Compiler. February-June 1844; Opelousas 
Gazette. June 15, 22, 29, 1844; Henry W. Huntington to Moses Liddell, 
June 17, 1844, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC (quote); Edward G.W. Butler 
to Thomas Butler, June 5, 1844, Thomas Butler Papers, LLMVC.
72Madison Parish Richmond Compiler. May 31, 1844; John Moore to 
Charles M. Conrad, December 13, 1843, David Weeks Papers, LLMVC.
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The July election for constitutional convention delegates
overshadowed the concurrent legislative and congressional races. A
Whig declared it "by far the aost important thing that will coae
before the people for years" and the Democratic Louisiana Courier 
74agreed. While over twenty-five letters from convention candidates 
appeared in the newspapers, few letters from either legislative or 
congressional nominees were published. Preferring to channel its 
energy into the convention contest, the Whig party did not offer a 
candidate to oppose Slidell in the First District, and in the Third, 
declinations by Thomas Butler and the venerable Philemon Thomas left 
Democrat John B. Dawson unopposed as well. The Whigs did obtain one 
congressional seat, as Bannon G. Thibodeaux defeated incumbent Alcee 
Labranche in the Second District, and the party’s nominee lost a close 
race to Isaac Morse in the Fourth. The Whigs also won control of the 
legislature. Because of their long association with constitutional 
change, however, the Democrats prevailed in the most significant
battle by electing a majority of their delegates to the constitutional
75convention.
Gathering in Jackson in August, the seventy-seven convention 
members included forty-two Democrats, thirty-two Whigs, and three of 
unknown affiliation. Immediately, the delegates assumed a power to 
rewrite the entire constitution. On this measure and many others, the 
parties concurred, with one delegate proclaiming "We came here as
MHenry W. Huntington to Jaaes G. Taliaferro, September 18, 1843, 
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (quote); Louisiana Courier. February 21, April 2, May 8, 1844.
7SBaton Rouge Gazette. May 25, June 10, 1844; Bee. August 17, 1844.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
172
Louisianians, not as partisans." Whigs even expressed relief that 
though their party did not control the convention, the body had a 
majority of non-radical delegates with its composition guaranteeing 
that the judiciary would not be made elective and that the state would 
not repudiate its debt.76 The delegates symbolically expressed their 
commitment to removing the aristocratic provisions of the 1812 
constitution by changing the preamble from "We, the representatives of 
the people" to "We, the people of the State of Louisiana.” Whigs and 
Democrats concurred on eliminating the property qualification for 
suffrage which "by universal consent [was] denounced and abandoned." 
Additionally, popular election of the governor, election of parish
officers other than judges, and the prohibition of state aid to
77corporations engendered very little opposition.
While the two parties’ positions had become more closely 
aligned, an examination of the votes of the convention demonstrate 
that differences still remained. Democrats exceeded Whigs in their 
commitment to Jacksonian democracy— making suffrage and office-holding 
as broad as possible. Democrat Solomon W. Downs, the Ouachita Parish 
legislator responsible for initially championing the convention bill 
in the legislature, directed the "radical" contingent in favor of the 
lowest possible residency requirements and making all offices 
elective. Desiring to keep the 1812 constitution intact, Whig former
76Debates, 63 (quote); C. G. Forshey to John Liddell, 14 July 184[4], 
Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC; Opelousas St. Landry Whig. February 6, 
1845.
^For an article-by-article comparison of the constitutions of 1812 
and 1845 see Constitutions of the State of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1930). 
The respective preambles appear on p. 7; Debates. 64.
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Governor Andre B. Roman, who believed "most of the states have
extended too far the elective franchise," represented the other
extreme. On six major votes regarding residency requirements and
placing power closer to people, the Democrats and Whigs consistently
opposed one another. On these bills, the index of party disagreement-
-the absolute value of the difference between the Democratic and Whig
78percentages on each measure— averaged fifty-three percent. (TABLE 
3.2)
Partisan conflict, however, was not limited to conflicts over 
democracy. The Democratic Louisiana Courier had proclaimed that the 
most important issue in the convention involved divorcing the state 
from direct involvement in the economy, especially banking. State 
government involvement in the economy had proved disastrous. By 1843, 
the state was responsible for 1.2 million dollars in bank bonds, and 
the treasury had defaulted on interest payments on state bonds 
totalling 1.273 million dollars. Democrats and Whigs agreed that the 
state should no longer purchase or guarantee bonds in corporations but 
disagreed on whether banks should be outlawed entirely and whether the 
state should be allowed to go into debt. The index of party 
disagreement on the prohibition of banks in Louisiana was forty-six 
percent and on the permitting of a state debt of up to one hundred 
thousand dollars was fifty-eight percent. While the Democratic
78Andre B. Roman to Henry Clay, December 2, 1844, Clay Papers. 
10:169-70. For a description of the index of partisan disagreement see 
Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York, 1978), 26-27.
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TABLE 3.2 
184S Constitutional Conveniton 










Elective Judiciary 17 70 53
Against two years voter residency 7 57 50
Elective Secretary of State 17 67 50
Elect governor with plurality 54 94 40
Five year residency for legislators 85 17 68Use of property in apportionment 59 3 56
Average Index of Party Disagreement 53
"Yes" vote on Index
issues of government Whig Democrat of Party
involvement in economy Percent Percent Disagreement
Prohibition of banks 






Vote on constitution 55 97 42
Limit voters on new constitution 86 13 73
Move capital away from New Orleans 48 63 15
Total population basis in senate 77 47 30














32 (43.2%) 42 (56.8%)
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majority succeeded in outlawing banks, a united Whigeffort led by 
Roman succeeded in legalizing a limited state debt.
Wrangling between Whigs and Democrats persisted even as the 
convention came to a close. Ninety-seven percent of the Democrats 
voted in favor of the constitution as a whole, but only fifty-five 
percent of the Whigs concurred. Roman voted against the measure 
arguing that voters had not believed that the 1812 constitution would 
be put down entirely and that the delegates had set aside every 
conservative principle. Having voted in favor the constitution, the 
delegates had to decide on who should approve the constitution. The 
parties differed on whether this group should include those men who 
were currently disfranchised but would be granted the right to vote 
under the new constitution. Again, the parties sharply diverged. 
Eighty-six percent of the Whigs wanted to restrict the ballot to those 
who could vote under the old constitution, but this measure failed as 
only thirteen percent of the Democrats agreed. Consequently, men who 
would receive the right to vote in the constitution of 1845 were 
allowed to cast their votes on the charter.
Though tension between Democrats and Whigs played a role in the 
convention, animosity between the country parishes and New Orleans 
often overcame party affiliation. Throughout the debates, delegates 
much more frequently referred to the conflicting interests of the 
country and city than they did controversies between Democrats and 
Whigs. State sectionalism and partisan affiliation did overlap as
79Louisiana Courier. May 8, 14, 1844; Schafer, "Reform or
Experiment?" 35.
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Whig delegates primarily came from South Louisiana and Greater
Orleans. The country parishes had long resented New Orleans. This
indignation had even led to the capital being briefly moved froa the
Crescent City to Donaldsonville in the early 1830s before a want of
accommodations soon forced its return to New Orleans. Fear of the
corrupting influence of the city contributed to the legislature’s
decision to locate the constitutional convention in the distinctly
non-urban setting of Jackson. Within two weeks* however, the
delegates after a "desperate struggle” succuabed to the siren song of
80the city and agreed to adjourn to aeet in New Orleans in 1845.
Relocation to New Orleans seemed only to heighten country 
members’ "near-paranoid fear of the Crescent City,” particularly 
regarding its corruption and intrigue. And, they exhibited a 
determination to place as many constraints as possible on the city.
They almost unanimously agreed to move the capital out of New Orleans 
but could not agree on where to place it. A cynical observer claimed 
that the ideal solution would be to build a steamboat large enough to 
hold both houses and have it travel throughout the state. In lieu of 
choosing a location for the capital, the country delegates instead
passed an article prohibiting the capital from being located within
81sixty miles of New Orleans.
80Hilary B. Cenas to Margaret 0. Pierce, August 22, 1844, Cenas 
Family Papers, Louisiana State Museum.
8! Schafer, "Reform or Experiment?" 27; Henry W. Huntington to James 
G. Taliaferro, September 24, 1845, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC. The 
subsequent legislature passed a bill moving the state capitol to Baton 
Rouge where it remained for the rest of the antebellum period.
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The most vexing issue in the convention proved to be the 
apportionment of seats in the house and senate. In apportioning the 
legislature, the country delegates feared that, under the new less 
restrictive suffrage provisions, the city with its overwhelming white 
population, would control Louisiana. While basing representation in 
the lower house on qualified electors, in the senate they used total 
population with each slave counting the same as a white person. More 
importantly, the delegates arbitrarily liaited Orleans Parish to one- 
eighth of the senators and one-fifth of the lower house. New Orleans 
delegates complained that "Restrictions, upon restrictions, have been 
piled upon her” and pleaded unsuccessfully that the interest of the 
city and the state were indivisible. Not only was the index of 
partisan disagreement lower on these measures, but much of it can be
easily explained, as the areas around New Orleans had elected more
82Whigs than Democrats to the convention.
In November 1845, the electorate overwhelming voted in favor of 
the new constitution 12,277 to 1,395 as every parish passed the 
constitution which included universal suffrage, a greater number of 
elective offices, the government’s divorce from the economy, and the 
multiple restrictions on New Orleans. Even in Greater Orleans, the 
region stigmatized by many of the constitution’s provisions, the 
charter because of its democratic features passed with over eighty 
percent of the voters in favor. This vote, however, did not signal
universal delight in the measure. A diarist tersely recorded,
^Debates. 154, 162, 611 (first quote); M. Prescott to John Moore,
April 1, April 10, 1845, Weeks Papers.
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"accepting the new constitution, a poor one at that." Though the 1845 
constitution was not an ideal docuaent, voters preferred it to the 
antiquated 1812 charter, or as a Whig explained, "I may yet vote for
ftit, as I would take a leaky boat, when in the power of pirates.
Between the constitutional convention's adjournaent in August 
and its reconvening in January, Louisiana’s parties battled one 
another in the 1844 presidential election. The state had been 
preparing for the contest for several years. Upon President 
Harrison’s death in 1841, Vice President John Tyler had ascended to 
the nation’s highest office. Soon a break ensued between the states- 
rights Tyler and the nationalistic Henry Clay that resulted in Tyler 
being read out of the Whig party. Louisiana’s Whigs did not have to 
debate over which man to support in this struggle. Clay’s personal 
connections along with the appeal of his American System had made him 
for years the their first choice for the presidency. Even in "the 
heart of the great cotton-growing region" Rapides Parish, a Clay Club 
maintained that Tyler’s departure from the American System had hurt 
the South.
In the winter of 1842-1843 and in early 1844, Clay travelled to 
Louisiana for personal and business reasons and to attend dinners and 
balls given in his honor. A Louisiana Whig described his visit as
Davis, ed., Barrow Diary. November 3, 1845, p. 375-6 (first quote); 
Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, June 23, 1845, James G. 
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (second quote).
OfFor discussion of 1844 presidential election see Charles Sellers, 
"Election of 1844," in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., History of 
American Presidential Elections 4 vols. (New York, 1971), 1:747-861; Clay 
Club of Rapides to Henry Clay, June 1842, quoted in Clav Papers. 9:741.
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"enough to convince us all of his being the greatest Ban in the 
world," and the longest entry a woman’s diary recounted trekking 
through the mud to see Clay. In contrast, to the excitement which 
Clay engendered, Whigs viewed Tyler as a traitor or, according to 
Porter, "a juggling mountebank." Louisiana’s Whig party formally 
endorsed Clay’s candidacy at a February 1844 convention in New 
Orleans. Resolutions recommended a national bank and celebrated Clay 
as the champion of a protective tariff on sugar cane. A national Whig
nominating convention concurred, and Clay was unanimously selected as
85the party’s presidential candidate.
Democrats throughout the nation and in Louisiana faced a greater 
difficulty in agreeing upon a candidate. Former president Martin Van 
Buren was the decided favorite, but his candidacy foundered on the 
shoals of his opposition to Texas annexation. Texas, which had 
achieved independence from Mexico in 1836, desired inclusion in the 
United States. With only the Sabine River separating Louisiana from 
Texas, "Texas Fever" gripped the state. A Louisianan warned Van Buren 
that the state’s entire Democratic party and many of its Whigs 
demanded annexation and urged him to write a letter in favor of the 
measure. Van Buren, however, joined Clay in declaring that Texas
OCF.D. Richardson to John Liddell, January 1, 1843, Liddell Papers, 
LLMVC (first quote); Ellen McCollam, diary, January 16, 1844, LLMVC; 
Alexander Porter to John J. Crittenden, July 21, 1842, Crittenden Papers, 
LC (second quote); Bee. February 24, 1844; Baton Ronffg March 23,
1844; St. Francisville Louisiana Chronicle. May 6, 1843.
86Alexander Walker to Martin Van Buren, April 25, 1844, Van Buren 
Papers, LC (first quote); James F. Winston, "Louisiana and the Annexation 
of Texas," Louisiana Historical Quarterly XIX (January 1936), 89-118; and 
Thomas E. Redard, "The Election of 1844 in Louisiana: A New Look at the 
Ethno-Cultural Approach," Louisiana History XXII (1981), 419-33.
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annexation should not be an issue in the presidential contest. Many 
southerners shared the view of a New Orleans Democrat that the Texas 
question "has killed Clay and Van [B]uren in the South." Reacting to 
Van Buren’s public letter on Texas, Solomon W. Downs, designated a 
North Louisiana delegate to the national convention and a Van Buren
presidential elector, resigned these posts in protest of Van Buren’s
87abandonment of the South.
Hoping that public opinion regarding Van Buren’s letter would 
subside, the Louisiana Courier explained that it was only a question 
of time before Van Buren, as president, would annex Texas. An angry 
writer disagreed and declared that the Democratic party’s commitment 
to measures and not men mandated dropping Van Buren from the ticket. 
Tyler’s pro-Texas Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, a South 
Carolinian state-rights champion emerged as the choice of some 
disgruntled Democrats. Even prior to Van Buren’s anti-annexation 
letter, Louisianans had strongly considered Calhoun as a candidate.
In 1842, pro-Calhoun newspapers were established in New Orleans and 
Natchitoches, and party leaders considered him a viable alternative to 
Van Buren. In January 1844, the Louisiana convention to select
87William G. Austen to John C. Calhoun, May 16, 1844, (quote) in 
Robert L. Meriwether, et al., eds., The Papers of John C. Calhoun 18 
vols. (Columbia, SC, 1959- ), 18:516-7; Jean B. Plauchd to Andrew
Jackson, June 2, 1844, Jackson Papers, LC; Speech of S.W. Downs on the
Annexation of Texas (New Orleans, 1844), 3-4; For a Whig woman fearing 
that Texas would doom Clay’s candidacy see Dell Upton, ed., Madeline: 
Love and Survival in Antebellum New Orleans (Athens, Ga., 1996), May 6, 
1844, p. 92; Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery. 189-219.
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delegates to the national convention naaed Calhoun as its second
11choice behind Van Buren.
When Van Buren declined to cone out in favor of Texas
annexation, the Calhoun movement blossomed. in Louisiana, support of
Calhoun’s candidacy was based sore on Texas than on an adherence to
the South Carolinian’s states rights doctrines. A non-partisan
Calhoun for president see ting "connected with all absorbing question
of the reannexation of Texas," was held in New Orleans and the Morning
Herald dropped Van Buren’s naae and endorsed Calhoun’s candidacy. The
question of Texas annexation disrupted the national convention, and
Van Buren was unable to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary for the
nomination. Because of northern opposition and his withdrawal from
partisan consideration, Calhoun had no chance, but Louisiana’s
delegation gave him five of his six votes on the first ballot. A
number of aspirants took turns in the lead, until on the ninth ballot,
the party nominated a dark horse— Tennessean Janes K. Polk s staunch
10advocate of Texas annexation.
Louisiana Democrats celebrated when their party dropped Van 
Buren in favor of Polk and Texas. In New Orleans, a Democrat claimed 
that "Democracy has risen a hundred percent in this market within the 
last hundred days.” Meetings throughout the state praised Polk and
®8John Slidell to Robert Walker, December 2, 1842, John Slidell 
Letters, TU; William A. Elmore to Robert Barnwell Rhett, November 10, 
1842, Robert Barnwell Rhett Letter, SHC; James W. Breedlove to Andrew 
Jackson, December 7, 1842, Jackson Papers, LC; Daily Picayune. January 
11, 1844.
0QEustis Prescott to John C. Calhoun, May 11, 1844, (quote) in The 
Papers of John C. Calhoun. 18:489-90; James H. Campbell to Calhoun, May 
14, 1844, in ibid.. 18:504-4.
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passed pro-annexation resolutions. A delighted partisan wrote the 
candidate that in Louisiana all Democrats and aany Whigs interested in 
the Texas question had welcomed the news of his nomination. Having 
been absent from the state since illness had forced him to resign from 
the Senate eight years earlier, Charles Gayarrd, now running for the 
state legislature, concurred that the state almost unanimously favored
ftAannexation, and he made it the keystone of his campaign.
For Louisianans, Texas annexation was inextricably bound with
slavery. A diarist made the connection explicit when he wrote, "The
main question is slavery & anti-slavery & Texas." Democrats contended
that the acquisition of Texas would provide the South with new slave
states and would help maintain the region’s strength in Washington.
They added that if the United States did not annex Texas then Great
Britain would obtain it, abolish slavery there, and then use it as a
base to menace southern slavery with Louisiana being the first state
that would be threatened. Others charged that Henry Clay’s opposition
to Texas annexation stemmed from his unquenchable ambition, contending
that Clay had sold himself to northern abolitionists and had agreed to
destroy southern slaveholders in order to fulfill his lifelong dream
91of becoming president.
90W.F. Vason to Henry Marshall, September 13, 1844, Marshal 1-Furman 
Papers, LLMVC (quote); Louisiana Courier. June 24, 26, August 1, October 
1844; For more pro-annexation meetings see Speech of S.W. Downs...on the 
Annexation of Texas (1844); R.R. Barrow, Au Comite Central Democratique de la Pariosse Ascension (1844).
91Davis, ed., Barrow Diary. June 20, 1844, p. 330, October 2, 1844, 
p. 340 (quote); Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, November 7, 
1844, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Jean B. Plauch6 to Andrew Jackson, June 
2, 1844, Jackson Papers, LC; Louisiana Courier. June 27, September 17, 1844.
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The Texas annexation question proved extremely difficult for
Louisiana Whigs. Soae partisans valiantly struggled to explain how
Clay’s position on Texas annexation protected the South better than
Polk’s stance. They distributed copies of the anti-annexation speech
of Thomas Hart Benton, a prominent Democratic senator from Missouri,
and published a letter from Senator Barrow in which he explained that
annexation would lead to an unjust war with Mexico and possibly
England and France. Other Whigs joined Barrow in claiming that the
introduction of competition from Texas would decrease the value of
Louisiana’s sugar and cotton plantations and its stock and grazing
business. Unswayed, Democrats responded to Barrow’s letter by
92demanding his resignation for betraying his constituents. In areas 
where Whigs did not think that Barrow’s argument would work, they 
tried a different course. They claimed that the Whig party and Clay 
were in favor of Texas annexation "if compatible with the honor of the 
country and the stability of the Union." Democrats accused the Whigs 
of western Louisiana of issuing a "garbled edition" of Clay’s anti­
annexation letter which implied that Clay actually favored the 
acquisition of Texas. A correspondent from that area asserted that 
Whig legislative candidates had cone out in favor of Texas, and that
92Address of Mr. Barrow, of Louisiana, to His Constituents upon the 
Annexation of Texas. (Washington, 1844); J. J. Sanford to James G. 
Taliaferro, June 13, 1844, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Janes McFarlane to 
James K. Polk, November 11, 1844, Polk Correspondence 8:305-306; For anti-Barrow meetings see Louisiana Courier. June 24, 1844; Speech of S.W. 
Downs— on the annexation of Texas. 57.
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the Whigs’ Fourth District congressional noainee had been "compelled
to shout ’huzza’ for Texas.
Opposition to Texas annexation, however, did not aean that Whigs
forfeited the title as the party that best protected slavery.
Accusations of antislavery sentiaents aaong presidential contenders
had become so routine that a Whig newspaper could refer to Deaocratic
charges as "The Old Story." Before Folk’s noaination, Whig newspapers
had reprinted earlier stories of Van Buren’s votes opposing Missouri
94statehood and favoring Negro suffrage. When the race was reduced to 
two southern slaveholders, Clay and Folk, abolition charges became 
less frequent but did not vanish as both sides accused their opponents 
of an alliance with abolitionists. Appearing in both the New Orleans 
Bee and the Baton Rouge Gazette, an article entitled "Coalition of 
Locofocos and Abolitionists: People of the South Read!!" warned 
readers that while Democrats in the South slandered Clay as opposed to 
slavery, their northern brethren joined with abolitionists in
ACattacking Clay as a cruel southern slaveholder.
As in 1840, Louisiana Whigs campaigned not only as defenders of 
slavery but also as the party of the American System. Whigs 
castigated the Democrats’ use of Texas annexation as a "humbug"
W.F. Vason to Henry Marshall, September 13, 1844, Marshal 1-Furman 
Papers, LLMVC; Baton Rouge Gazette. October 12, 1844 (first quote); 
Louisiana Courier. August 31, 1844 (second quote).
94Bee. August 24, 1844 (quote); Louisiana Courier. February 12, 28,1844.
95Bee, October 2, 1844; Baton Rouge Gazette. October 19, 1844.
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9€designed to distract voters froa aore important issues. While still 
portraying a national bank as the best way to Maintain a sound 
currency, Louisiana Whigs decreased their use of the tera "bank" and 
instead eaphasized their coaaitaent to a stable currency. This switch 
probably occurred because of the increasing antipathy toward banks in 
the state, an enaity which would soon result in the outlawing of banks 
in the 1845 constitution. In this caapaign, Louisiana Whigs placed 
more emphasis on the tariff— ’’the great rock of our strength." In 
1842, Congress had passed a compromise tariff which preserved a duty 
on sugar. Whigs contrasted Henry Clay’s protection of the sugar cane 
industry with Polk’s ruinous free trade doctrines, especially his 
declaration that the sugar cane tariff only benefitted a few nabobs.
In South Louisiana, the St. Landry Whig pleaded "SUGAR PLANTERS 
REMEMBER" that Polk opposed the sugar cane duty and reminded its non­
cane growing readers that the tariff was beneficial to the whole 
97country.
Though preferring to debate Texas annexation, Louisiana 
Democrats acknowledged the American System as a caapaign issue. 
Democratic Congressman John Slidell recognized the potency of the 
tariff issue and implored Polk to make a declaration in favor of a 
revenue sugar cane duty. A West Feliciana Democrat, however, urged 
Polk to continue his free trade doctrines observing that as cotton 
prices went down and the price of goods went up, people had come to
Baton Rouae Gazette. July 20, September 14, 1844.
97Baton Rouge Gazette. October 12, 1844 (first quote); Opelousas St. 
Landry Whig. September 26 (second quote), October 3, 1844; Bee. June 8, 
September 27, 1844.
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blame the Tariff of 1842 and its protectionist doctrines. G&yarrd 
complained the tariff only existed to drain money from the South to 
the North. Democrats also claimed to see through Whig subterfuge 
regarding a national bank. The Louisiana Courier reminded its readers 
that despite the Whigs’ silence on the issue, everyone knew that "The 
Bank is the beginning and the end of Whig principles," and the 
Democratic State Convention declared, "A National Bank is a National 
Curse." The newspaper added that a national bank would establish 
branches in Louisiana negating any restrictions that the new 
constitution placed on state banks. Democrats wore badges informing 
Louisianans that they could have Polk, and the Republic without the
aeBank, or Clay, and the Bank without the Republic.
In 1844, both Louisiana parties sought to outdo the spectacular 
aspects of the 1840 race. In a year with elections to the 
legislature, Congress, and the constitutional convention, in addition 
to the presidential contest, Louisianans were inundated with political 
pamphlets, letters, pole raisings, barbecues, banners, badges, and 
meetings. According to a North Louisianan, the "intense excitement 
— penetrated the remotest regions [of the state]." The presidential 
race culminated with both parties holding statewide conventions in 
Baton Rouge in the weeks preceding the presidential election.
Hyperbole proved the order of the day with the Whigs boasting over 
twelve thousand in attendance at their gathering doubling the
98John Slidell to James K. Polk, June 1, 1844, Polk Correspondence 
7:179; Collin S. Tarpley to Polk, October 26, 1844, ibid.. 8:231-232; 
Louisiana Courier. January 12 (second quote), April 16, August 16, 
September 14, 24 (first quote), October 1, 21, 1844.
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Democrats own extravagant claim of six thousand at their convention.
As in 1840, participation in these political events extended beyond
the electorate with women playing a role and with children wearing 
99partisan badges.
If women had made a slight foray into Louisiana’s political 
culture in the Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign, they extended their 
role in 1844. As in 1840, women played a more prominent part in the 
Whig party, and Clay won a mock election in the Ladies’ Cabin of a 
steamboat, sixteen to five. In her diary for 1844, a New Orleans 
woman recounted avidly reading partisan newspapers, painting a 
partisan illustration, debating politics with male associates, and 
attending a torchlight procession. The "Whig Ladies of East and West 
Baton Rouge" held their own meeting in preparation for the statewide 
Baton Rouge convention and, in the manner of men’s political meetings, 
they elected a chairperson, appointed a secretary, established a 
committee, passed resolutions, and had the proceedings printed in the 
party newspaper. These resolutions announced a competition among the 
parishes for the best banner at the convention and for the parish 
which had the greatest representation.1®0
Whig observers counted as many as two thousand ladies at the 
October convention, including a delegation from Iberville Parish that 
had a plan for obtaining votes. Wearing badges bearing the motto,
99Zenas Preston Diary, 1844, LC; For Catahoula Parish preparations 
for Whig events see Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, August- 
October 1844, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Debates. 757 (quote).
100Bee, May 7, 1844; Upton, ed., Madeline. 75-202; Baton Rouge
Gazette. September 7, 1844.
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"Clay or no Husband," the woaen apparently agreed with an earlier 
newspaper article which contended that woaen controlled one-half the 
state’s votes. No longer related to passive participation, a woaan 
addressed a statewide convention for the first tiae. Mary Gayle, the 
grand-daughter of the aged Phileaon Thoaas who was serving as 
president of the Whig convention, procl&iaed "the principles and 
policies of the Whig party to be the true principles and policy of the 
Federal Constitution."1®1
The Deaocratic party again denied that all ladies were Whigs.
As in 1840, woaen, had a less pronounced role in the party. No 
Democratic women’s meetings were held nor did a woaan address the 
assembly at the party's state convention. The party did, however, 
specifically invite women to its gatherings and soaetiaes listed the 
number in attendance. If denied an overt role, Rowena McGiasey, "a 
thorough going Democrat" gave herself a partisan function. She joined 
her husband, a Democratic doctor, on his rounds and made several 
converts to the Democratic faith. A letter from her husband to Polk 
even indicates that women had adopted one of the less attractive 
features of antebellum politics. The doctor explains how, while 
debating politics with several other females, his wife quieted a Whig 
lady braggart by offering to bet a house-servant on the election’s 
outcome.102
^Convention proceedings in Bee. October 9, 1844; Baton Rouge
Gazette. October 9, 1844 (quote).
IMJohn W.P. McGimsey to Jaaes K. Polk, September 27, 1844 (quote), 
November 1, 1844, Polk Papers, LC; For a woman betting on Texas
annexation see Upton, ed., Madeline. April 30, 1844, p. 91.
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The Whig woaan aade the right decision in declining to accept 
the wager, for Polk and Texas triunphed in the United States and in 
Louisiana where Polk out-polled Clay, 13,782 to 13,083. As in prior 
races, the Democrats performed best in the Florida Parishes and North 
Louisiana, receiving over fifty-five percent of the vote in each 
region. Clay and the sugar tariff had their greatest appeal in South 
Louisiana where he received 56.7 percent of the ballots. Polk’s 
victory rested on Greater Orleans where the Democrats triumphed in a 
presidential election for the first tine. Traditionally elections in 
this section had inspired charges of fraud from both sides, but none 
of the previous irregularities equalled the John Slide 11-orchestrated 
"Plaquemines Frauds" of 1844. Six weeks before the election 
Congressman Slidell was in New York, but after expressing the desire 
that "I shall not feel satisfied with myself were I absent from my 
post on the day of the battle," returned to Louisiana. Slidell’s 
"post" turned out to be a steamboat that shuttled Democrats with 
questionable voting qualifications from New Orleans to Democratic- 
controlled Plaquemines Parish where they voted without objection.
Polk won Plaquemines Parish, which had cast only 290 ballots in the 
1840 election, by an astounding 1,007 to 37 margin, enabling him to 
win Louisiana. Whigs cried fraud, and the state legislature 
investigated, but the results stood.103 (SEE APPENDIX A)
103His political acumen steadily improving, Slidell found a loophole 
in the 1812 constitution which allowed voting anywhere in the county (not 
parish) of Orleans, (counties were larger administrative districts 
primarily used to describe state senate regions) which included 
Plaquemines Parish; John Slidell to James Buchanan, September 22, 1844, 
James Buchanan Papers, HSP (quote); A.B. Roman to Henry Clay, December
2, 1844 in Clay Papers. 10:169-70; Ursin Bouligny, Jr., to Clay, December
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With Polk’s election in 1844 and more importantly with the 
ratification of the constitution in 1845, Louisiana Democrats had 
reason to be sanguine. A partisan declared, "I can safely assert that 
democratic views and feelings predominate throughout Louisiana." In 
addition, the party controlled the governor’s office and three of the 
four congressional seats. Perhaps, the only negative for Democrats 
was the declination of an invitation for Jackson and Polk to visit the 
state after the elect i o n . I n  contrast, the Whig party in Louisiana 
had reached a low point. Not only had it lost several elections, but 
its future appeared bleak as the men newly enfranchised seemed more 
likely to join the Democrats, who had championed constitutional 
change, than the Whigs, who had been lukewarm. Additionally, the most 
prominent Louisiana Whig, Alexander Porter, died soon after resigning 
his Senate seat in 1844. The Whigs’ best hope would be that the 
Democrats would find holding power and making policy more difficult 
than challenging the Whigs.
In 1836, Democrats and Whigs in Louisiana had divided primarily 
over national policy, particularly the American System. In subsequent 
years, while retaining their differences on national issues, the two 
parties’ differences regarding state policy became more apparent with 
Democrats preferring greater democracy and less government involvement 
in the economy than Whigs. In the 1845 constitution, Democratic ideas
6, 1844 in ibid.. 10:173; Journal of the Special Committee Appointed bv 
the House of Representatives of Louisiana to Investigate the Frauds 
Perpetrated in the State. During the Last Presidential Election (New 
Orleans, 1845).
IMPeleg B. Phelps to James K. Polk, July 17, 1844 (quote); Polk to 
Felix Bosworth, December 31, 1844, Polk Papers, LC.
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concerning the role of the state prevailed. Fears regarding 
concentrations of power had been reduced. A larger proportion of the 
state was eligible to vote and to hold office. The capital would so 
be moved beyond the corrupting influence of New Orleans. And, the 
state had divorced itself from the business sector— prohibiting state 
aid to business, outlawing banking, and making incorporation virtually 
impossible.
In Louisiana from 1838 to 1845, not only did Democrats prevail 
but so did Jacksonian democracy. The period saw an expansion of the 
politically active portion of Louisiana’s populace. The 1845 
constitution formally instituted this change. It allowed for 
universal white male suffrage, removed property qualifications for 
office, and increased the number of elective positions. Other changes 
occurred not in law but in practice. Children wore party badges and 
the disfranchised participated alongside the enfranchised at mammoth 
political conventions. Previously denied any political role, women 
were now specifically included in party gatherings, occasionally even 
addressing the crowds. The ideas of the political culture had crossed 
gender lines with women holding their own meetings, betting on 
elections, and voting in mock elections. If in the 1830s, Louisiana’s 
political universe consisted almost exclusively of white male 
property-holders, by 1845, it had expanded far beyond this minority.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONSTITTOTONS AND COMPROMISES: WHIG RESURGENCE. 1845-1852 
In November 1845. Louisianans began living under their new 
constitution. Initially, Democrats benefitted from their association 
with the document, but in less than a decade, the charter would become 
their party’s albatross. Although the constitution had clearly improved 
upon the state’s original charter, many of its fiscal provisions, written 
in reaction to the economic downturn of the 1830s, proved ill-suited for 
an improving economy, and Whigs exploited this flaw. Additionally, 
despite the document being considerably more democratic than its 
predecessor, the people of Louisiana soon felt that it was not democratic 
enough. Since the Democrats had written the 1845 constitution, desire 
for change profited their opponents— the Whigs. By the early 1850s, the 
Whig party had used its advocacy of constitutional revision to gain 
control of both the legislature and a new 1852 constitutional convention.
If reaction to the 1845 constitution shaped state politics, the 
increasing sectional controversy over slavery dominated Louisianans’ 
discussion of national politics. In the 1848 and 1852 presidential 
elections, differences over the American System moved to the background 
as the parties’ stances on the Wilmot Proviso and the Compromise of 1850 
moved to the foreground. Discussion of a national bank and federally 
sponsored internal improvements disappeared from party newspapers, and 
even debate over Louisiana Whigs’ pillar, the protective tariff, 
decreased. Instead, each party claimed that its candidate best protected 
slavery and that its adversaries were either abolitionists or allied with 
abolitionists. Despite growing talk of secession in other southern 
states, Louisianans continued to stress the value of the Union, and
192
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opponents to the Compromise measures found themselves in the minority and 
condemned by both parties.
Not only did debate over the American System decrease in importance 
but two other campaign staples, connection to Andrew Jackson and the 
Creole-American split, also received less emphasis, a s  memories of the 
Battle of New Orleans and French rule in Louisiana faded, politicians 
talked less of these topics, but they did not disappear from campaigns. 
Though Creol e-American tension received less stress, ethnicity still 
remained an issue. The debate now centered on the parties’ attitudes 
towards immigrants. A nativist candidate competed in the 1846 
gubernatorial election, and accusations of nativism surfaced in most 
campaigns during the period. With both the Democratic and Whig parties 
still courting immigrant voters, neither one openly identified themselves 
with nativism.
The first partisan battle following the November 1845 
constitutional ratification came in January 1846. The charter called for 
tin election of a new slate of state officers including the entire 
legislature, a governor, and, for the first time, a lieutenant governor. 
The proximity of ratification and the election truncated the campaign 
season. Instead of having a year or more to debate the candidates, the 
parties only officially had slightly more than two months to canvass the 
state. Foreseeing the difficulties that this narrow time frame would 
cause for campaigning, and correctly anticipating the passage of the 
constitution, both parties nominated their candidates and started 
canvassing prior to the official call for an election. Even with this 
advanced preparation, the campaign season was briefer than usual.
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In July 1S45, the Democrats held a statewide convention in Baton 
Rouge. Partisan newspapers had discussed three possible gubernatorial 
candidates: Joseph Walker, president of the constitutional convention. 
Isaac Johnson, a popular judge from the Florida parishes, and Trasimond 
Landry, an Ascension Parish sugar planter. Prior to convention. Landry 
withdrew his name from consideration for governor, and instead announced 
his desire to be nominated as lieutenant governor. At the convention, 
neither the advocates of Johnson nor of Walker would yield. After four 
hours of debate, Johnson attained a slim 71—61 decision. With their 
choice receiving most of his support from the North Louisiana, Walker’s 
disgruntled friends maintained that Johnson had only won because 
representatives from three northwestern parishes had failed to arrive at 
the convention. The selection of a candidate for lieutenant governor was 
less acrimonious as the delegates unanimously chose Landry.1
Two weeks after the Democrats met in Baton Rouge, the Whigs held 
their own convention in the same city. Their convention also had nearly 
full attendance with only eight parishes missing. Demonstrating the 
Whigs’ continued failure to obtain support in the Florida parishes, three 
of the missing parishes were from this region even though the convention 
was held there. Though similar to the Democrats in terms of location and 
attendance, the Whigs differed in their lack of division over their 
nominees. For their gubernatorial candidate, the Whigs unanimously chose 
William DeBuys, a New Orleans Creole who had held multiple state offices. 
They also did not split over their choice of Edward Sparrow, a Carroll
lNew Orleans Louisiana Courier. July 8, 12, 15, 16, 1845; Baton
Rouge Gazette. July 19, 1845. (Hereinafter all newspapers from New 
Orleans unless otherwise indicated)
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Parish planter and lawyer, as the party’s nominee for lieutenant 
governor^
The Democrats attempted to run a single issue campaign. They 
repeatedly reminded voters that their party had long advocated 
constitutional revision and that they had controlled the constitutional 
convention. Thus, if the people trusted Democrats to write the 
constitution, they should trust the party to put it into operation. 
Making this connection explicit, a New Orleans Democratic meeting 
resolved that "the recent Convention to amend the Constitution of the 
State was the work of the democracy, and that justice and fair dealing 
require that they should be allowed to carry the new Constitution into 
effect.’’3
Democrats argued that Whigs had opposed the call of the convention 
and had voted against reforms there. They contended that only the 
tireless work of Democrats had enabled the convention to take place and 
electing Whigs to office now would nullify its work. A Democratic 
legislative candidate warned voters that improvements would be ’’defeated” 
if the government fell into "impure hands." Even if individual Whigs 
such as DeBuys and Sparrow favored constitutional change, the majority 
of their party did not. And, regardless of the Whig candidates’ personal
9Opelousas St. Landrv Whig. July 17, 1845; Baton Rouge Gazette. July 
12, 19, 26, 1845; Commercial Bulletin. July 23, 1845.
Louisiana Courier. July 23, August 6, September 23, December 23, 
1845 (quote).
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views, everyone who had voted against ratification supported the Whig 
4nominees.
Recognizing the effectiveness of the Democrats’ association with 
the popular new constitution, the Whig party tried to identify itself 
with the document as well. Under the Whigs’ revisionist interpretation. 
the constitution was not a partisan measure but a joint effort of Whigs 
and Democrats. The editor of the Baton Rouge Gazette even argued that 
while the Democrats claimed authorship of the charter, the document’s 
positive attributes stemmed from an alliance of Whigs and conservative 
Democrats who had limited the radical designs of most Democrats. DeBuys 
and Sparrow directly addressed the constitutional issue in a circular 
which claimed that they both had "cheerfully co-operated with a majority 
of their fellow citizens in calling the late Convention" and had voted 
for its adoption. The pro-constitution circular asserted that the 
"excellence of most of its provisions" overshadowed its few defects. The 
Whigs also tried to turn the tables on the Democrats by spreading a rumor 
that Landry, the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor, had opposed 
the constitution.*
Despite these attempts to campaign on the constitutional question, 
most Whigs realized that their best plan involved moving the focus of the
^Terence Carriere "To the Voters of the Parish of St. Tammany," 
August 15, 1845, in Pierre Soule Papers, William R. Perkins Library, Duke 
University (quote) (Hereinafter DU); Louisiana Courier. August 13, 1845, 
January 12, 1846.
*Baton Rouge Gazette. August 16, 1845; Bee. November 1, 1845; "To 
the People of Louisiana from William DeBuys and Edward Sparrow," December 
18, 1845 in Alonzo Snyder Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collections, LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (quote) (Hereinafter 
LLMVC); Louisiana Courier. November 24, 1845.
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campaign away from the new charter. DeBuys and Sparrow’s circular not 
only discussed the charter but also addressed the economy, internal 
improvements, education, and. most importantly, the tariff. They 
attributed "the general prosperity of our People at this time" to the 
virtues of the Whig-authored 1842 tariff, which benefitted both sugar 
cane planters and cotton growers. The independent New Orleans Weekly 
Delta labeLled Sparrow, "a tariff protection mein to the hub," and the 
Whigs gladly assumed this title. They alleged that since the parties had 
settled the constitutional question, the tariff was the primary issue 
dividing them. The Whigs contrasted their united front in favor of 
protection with the Democrats who offered a "mongrel" ticket including 
the anti-tariff Johnson and the pro-tariff sugar-planter Landry whose 
views were at a variance with North Louisiana Democrats.6
The Democrats tried to keep the campaign focused on their 
authorship of the 1845 constitution but recognized that they must address 
the tariff question. As in prior contests, Democrats claimed they 
supported a revenue tariff for sugar cane but opposed protection. 
Considered one of the Democrats’ foremost orators, New Orleans lawyer 
Pierre Sould carried his fiery style throughout the state on Johnson’s 
behalf maintaining that the tariff "devour[ed] the substance of the 
people." Soul6 also connected the tariff to a national bank asserting 
that the Whigs championed both of these oppressive measures. The 
Louisiana Courier repeated this connection between the tariff and the
6"To the People of Louisiana— ," December 18, 1845, in Alonzo 
Snyder Papers, LLMVC; Baton Rouge Gazette. November 15, 29, 1845; New 
Orleans Weekly Delta. December 8, 1845 (quote); Bee. November 18,
December 19, 1845.
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bank. It mocked the Whigs’ connection of "every thing happy and
fortunate to the tariff," observing that previously they had attributed
all beneficial occurrences to the national bank. In his speeches,
Johnson, the Democrats' nominee, emphasized the parties’ differences over
the national bank and the tariff in addition to their contrasting
7constitutional stances.
If the Whigs could not win the campaign on policy, they hoped to 
achieve victory based on DeBuys’s superior qualifications and his Creole 
lineage. DeBuys had served as a legislator, speaker of the house, 
postmaster, and state treasurer. In contrast, Johnson lacked extensive 
political experience, having served only a single term in the legislature 
more than ten years before. Since 1839, Johnson had served in a non­
elective judicial position in the Florida Parishes. The Whigs also hoped 
to capitalize on the historic Anglo-Creole split. They asserted that 
because he was a Creole, DeBuys had a greater attachment to the state 
than Johnson, who, though born in Louisiana, was not of Creole heritage. 
The Whigs hoped that DeBuys’s Creole birth would benefit him, and they 
tried to bolster this support with the assertion that the Democrats had 
criticized DeBuys simply for being a Creole. The Democrats recognized 
the historic potency of this argument and denied attacking DeBuys.
Johnson even tried to court the Creole vote by speaking a few words of
0French at an Iberville Parish Democratic meeting.
7Louisiana Courier. August 19 (second quote), October 10 (Soule 
quote), October 24, December 29, 1845; Arthur Freeman, "The Early Career 
of Pierre Soule,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly (1936).
gOualifications-Baton Rouge Gazette. July 5, 1845; Bee, January 13, 
1845; Creole argument-Baton Rouge Gazette. July 5, 26, 1845; Louisiana 
Courier. July 26, September 13, 1845, January 13, 1846.
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Ethnicity entered the gubernatorial campaign in another form as 
well. For the first time in Louisiana history, a third party entered the 
race for the governor's office. Advocating a revision of naturalization 
laws, a Native American Party based in New Orleans nominated Charles 
Derbigny for governor. The party had little effect itself, as Derbigny 
received only 2.5 percent of the votes, with over half of his votes 
coming in Greater Orleans. Even so, the party did serve as a catalyst 
for a debate between the Whigs and Democrats over naturalization. Many 
Whigs agreed with the doctrines of the Native Americans. Immigrants 
tended to vote for Democrats, and every Whig knew the story of the 
Plaquemines frauds— how illegal immigrant voting in Plaquemines Parish 
had cost Clay Louisiana’s electoral votes in 1844. Many Whigs agreed 
with the St. Landry Whig’s proclamation, "Our naturalization laws must 
be altered." The Whigs, however, saw the existence of a party dedicated 
to nativism as a movement which could only take votes from their party. 
The Bee argued that it did not object to efforts to keep the franchise 
pure but asserted that it must be done within the framework of the two
9party system.
Not only did the Whigs prefer to keep nativism within a two party 
system, but they also wished to keep it in the background of the 
campaign. While the Whig party contained a nativist element, it hoped 
to gamer votes from naturalized citizens, and it ran an Irish immigrant 
for lieutenant governor. Thus, many Whigs preferred to downplay the role 
of nativism in their party. Sensing Whig apprehension over nativism as
Q'Baton Rouge Gazette. September 6, 27, 1845; Opelousas St. Landry 
Whig. November 28, 1844 (quote); Bee. October 2, December 6, 1845,
January 19, 1846.
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a campaign topic. Democrats cheerfully threw fuel onto this fire by 
introducing it into the campaign repeatedly. They claimed that DeBuys 
had been elected vice-president of an 1841 nativist convention, and that 
in 1835 he had advocated the censure of Whig Governor White for promoting 
too many naturalized citizens to office. The Whigs denied that DeBuys 
had been a member of the Native American convention and claimed that more 
Democrats than Whigs had voted to censure White. On the eve of the 
election, New Orleans Whigs responded in kind. In the Crescent City, 
they circulated pamphlets attributing anti-Irish quotes to Johnson.10
The candidates of both parties took their message throughout the 
state. After the narrow split at the state convention, the Democrats 
especially felt the need to placate the entire state party. Prior to the 
convention, Isaac Johnson had worried about jealousy within the party and
reminded a Democratic editor that "We must canvass in harmony & then
by harmony triumph." The close race between Johnson and Walker at the 
convention disrupted Democratic harmony. In an effort to retain party 
accord, Johnson travelled to Walker’s plantation in Rapides Parish and 
met amicably with him before they both attended an Alexandria Democratic 
meeting. The Whigs also campaigned throughout the state, with one Whig 
pleasantly surprised with the enthusiasm that South Louisiana displayed 
for Sparrow, a North Louisiana resident.11
^Louisiana Courier. October 14, December 11, 1845, January 19, 1846; 
Bee, January 12, 17, 1846.
^Isaac Johnson to John F.H. Claiborne, May 18, 1845, John F.H. 
Claiborne Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History (quote) 
(Hereinafter MDAH); Louisiana Courier. October 24, 1845; Baton Rouge 
Gazette. November 15, 1845; Bee. September 10, November 14, 1845; Henry 
W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, August 21, 1845, James G.
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC.
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After the campaigning had ended, the voters agreed with the 
Democrats’ contention that the party which wrote the constitution should 
put it into effect, and Johnson and Landry carried the election. Despite 
his own legislative victory, a Whig complained, "Our defeat throughout 
the state will be overwhelming." This assessment proved accurate as for 
the first time, the Democrats controlled the governor’s office, the 
senate, and the house of representatives at the same time. Unlike 
previous races, the legislative contests did not occupy much space in the 
partisan press. Democratic candidates for the legislature undoubtedly 
echoed the contention that their party should be allowed to enact the 
1845 constitution. With the legislature having the power to pass laws, 
this argument applied in these races perhaps even to a greater extent 
than it did in the gubernatorial contest.
The Democrats again achieved their greatest margin of victory in 
the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana where Johnson obtained over 
sixty percent of the ballots. Whigs had pinned their hopes on South 
Louisiana and especially Greater Orleans, DeBuys’s home. Prior to the 
election, a North Louisiana Whig had optimistically observed that though 
the 1845 constitution restricted the size of the New Orleans legislative 
delegation, it had not curtailed its vote for governor. Anticipating a 
backlash against restrictions on the city, he predicted that a New 
Orleans fire would burn up Johnson’s chances. Even Greater Orleans, 
however, opted for Johnson over its native son. Whigs blamed their loss
12Duncan F. Kenner to William J. Minor, January 22, 1846, Duncan F. 
Kenner Papers, LLMVC (quote). For a Democrat reminding voters of the 
importance of selecting Democrats to put the constitution into practice 
see Terence Carriere, "To the Voters of the Parish of St. Tammany," Sou 16 
Papers, DU.
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in New Orleans on bad weather, bad luck, and the impact of the Native
American candidate. More likely, voters in the Crescent City, many of
whom did not own property, probably welcomed the removal of a property
qualification for voting even more than the residents of the rest of the
state.!j (SEE APPENDIX B)
The Democrats had won the election despite party leader John
Slidell’s absence from the state. Congressman Slidell, at the behest of
his close friend Secretary of State James Buchanan, had resigned his seat
in the House of Representatives and accepted a mission to Mexico in an
attempt to avert a war between the two countries over the annexation of
Texas by the United States. Although Slidell worried that his opponents
would make political capital out of his abandonment of his seat, the
election to fill this vacancy instead, reinforced Slidell’s power within
the party and the state. Slidell hand-picked his successor, Emile La
Sere, a wealthy, trilingual New Orleans merchant who had been Slidell’s
associate in the Plaquemines frauds. After the Democrats nominated La
Sere, the Whigs, recognizing the futility of running their own candidate
in the heavily Democratic district, declined to contest the election
officially, and instead supported a disgruntled Democrat. La Sere
achieved an overwhelming victory in the election which occurred two weeks
14prior to the gubernatorial contest.
^Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, September 24, 1845, 
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC.
14John Slidell to James Buchanan, October 23, 1845, James Buchanan 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (Hereinafter HSP); Louisiana 
Courier, December 16, 17, 24, 27, 1845; Bee. January 6, 1846; A.L. Diket, 
"Slidell’s Right Hand: Emile La Sere.” Louisiana History IV (1963), 177- 
205.
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A similar situation prevailed in the 1846 senate contest to replace 
Whig Alexander Barrow whose term would end in 1S47. Possessing a clear 
majority, the Democrats again realized the value in connecting the race 
to the new constitution. The party caucus selected Solomon W. Downs, the 
north Louisianan who had achieved statewide fame for his championship of 
constitutional reform. Realizing that a candidate from their party had 
no chance, the Whigs threw their support behind John R. Grymes a moderate 
New Orleans Democrat. They hoped that they could persuade enough New 
Orleans Democrats to place city loyalty ahead of party loyalty. As in 
the election to replace Slidell, the Whigs failed in their attempt to 
divide the Democrats, and Downs easily won the election. Barrow died in 
1847 shortly before his term ended, and after Downs and Slidell declined 
to be considered, the Democrats selected Pierre Soul§ to fill the last 
two months of Barrow’s lame duck term before Downs would take the seat.̂
State issues, especially the new constitution, had dominated the 
1846 gubernatorial campaign with the tariff the only national topic 
debated. During the rest of 1846, the tariff remained a prominent issue. 
The national Democratic party, which controlled both the legislative and 
executive branches, passed the non-protectionist Walker tariff which 
significantly lowered the duties on imported sugar. Louisiana’s 
Democratic representatives voted for the bill, and the Louisiana Courier 
celebrated it as a victory for free trade. Louisiana Whigs had a 
different reaction. Estimating that the 1846 tariff lowered duties by
15W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, February 15, 17, 1846, W.W. Pugh 
Family Papers, Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin 
(Hereinafter UT); James K. Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly XII (July 1929), 420.
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almost seventy percent, one planter speculated that many sugar cane 
growers might turn to cotton, and another observed, "the new tariff bill 
has fallen like a thunderbolt here.”16
Louisianans would soon receive another thunderbolt from Washington. 
In the 1846 gubernatorial election, the parties’ positions on slavery 
received no mention. In the months following the election, slavery would 
leap back into Louisianans’ political debate and would remain there for 
the rest of the antebellum period. The Mexican War proved the catalyst 
for the rise of the slavery issue. In 1846, despite Slidell’s efforts 
at negotiation, war with Mexico erupted in May. In August, David Wilmot, 
a relatively unknown Democratic congressman from Pennsylvania, introduced 
a measure into the House of Representatives declaring that slavery could 
never exist on any land obtained from Mexico. Known as the Wilmot 
Proviso, this measure would never become law, but it would sharply 
increase sectional tension and fuel political debate for the next fifteen 
years. In Louisiana and the rest of the South, both Whigs and Democrats 
attacked the measure as anti-southern. Among extreme southern rights 
men, talk of secession increased, but in Louisiana this group amounted 
to no more than a handful.*7
The Mexican War not only led to the Wilmot Proviso but also 
produced a Louisiana military hero. After defeating the Mexican army in
*6Louisiana Courier. July 13, 16, 22, 1846; Moses Liddell to John 
Liddell, July 27, 1846, Moses and St. John Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC; 
Alfred Weeks to John Moore, August 3, 1846, David Weeks Papers, LLMVC 
(quote); Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff, 1816-1846," 
(Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1941), 163-182.
*7WilliamJ. Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856 
(Baton Rouge, 1978), 232-44; Bee. March 4, 1847.
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several battles. General Zachary Taylor, who resided in East Baton Rouge 
Parish, became a national hero. Many in Louisiana viewed Taylor’s 
prominence as a possible springboard to the presidency, and a non­
partisan Taylor movement developed in the state. Though Whigs 
predominated in the movement, prominent Democrats such as former Senator 
Robert C. Nicholas, state legislator Maunsel White, and New Orleans 
banker Jacob Barker aLL backed Taylor’s candidacy. In April 1847, the 
Commercial Bulletin placed his name at the head of their columns, and 
three months later, the Rough and Ready. a Taylor newspaper, was 
established in Iberville Parish. It nominated Taylor for the presidency, 
and. to emphasize its non-partisanship, endorsed Democratic General 
William 0. Butler for the vice-presidency. The Taylor boom increased in 
December and January when Taylor, on his return from Mexico, was feted
ISin New Orleans and Baton Rouge.
Louisiana Democrats eyed the non-partisan Taylor movement with 
suspicion, especially during the 1847 congressional campaign season. In 
the Third and Fourth districts, where the Whig party was weak, the Whigs 
made no nominations, and instead Taylor candidates opposed Democrats. 
In the Second District, a Whig stronghold, however, Whigs made no mention 
of Taylor, and made a regular Whig nomination. The Democratic Louisiana 
Courier labelled the nomination of Taylor candidates as Whig trickery and
(0Commercial Bulletin. April 1847; Maunsel White to George McWhorter, 
September 20, 1847, Maunsel White Papers, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina (Hereinafter 
SHC); Frances Parke Butler to Col. Edward G.W. Butler, July 26, 1847, 
Butler Family Papers, Historic New Orleans Collection (Hereinafter HNO); 
Incidents in the Life of Jacob Barker of New Orleans. Louisiana 
(Washington, 1855), 227-8; Bee. December 1, 6, 1848; Baton Rouge Gazette. 
December 11, 1847.
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urged voters not to be beguiled. Democrats questioned the sincerity of 
Taylor candidates and repeatedly pointed to the Second District where an 
independent convention had nominated Jacob Barker, a Taylor Democrat. 
If the Whigs professed loyalty to Taylor was sincere, the Louisiana 
Courier claimed that then they should support Barker over the Whig 
nominee who had made no commitment to the general. Regardless of their 
opponents’ label. Democrats fared well, only losing to the regular Whig 
nominee in the Second District. The Alexandria Western Democrat’s 
description of the Fourth District results, "Old Rough and Ready’s 
honored name —  could not save them," applied equally well in the First 
and Third Districts.
Though the 1847 congressional campaign produced no change in the 
composition of Louisiana’s delegation, it did spawn a new method of 
campaigning in the state. Congressional nominees had toured the state 
before but never in the manner of the race in the Fourth District. 
Democratic incumbent Isaac Morse describes travelling more than twelve 
hundred miles during the campaign. More significantly, he traversed many 
of these miles in the company of his Whig opponent. According to Morse, 
"we agreed upon a program, and made appointments to speak every day for 
some six weeks, making each day at least one, and sometimes two or more, 
speeches." Never before had opposing candidates canvassed together, but 
after 1847 this method of campaigning became standard in Louisiana. 
Throughout the 1848 presidential race, Whigs and Democrats crossed the 
state together engaging in debates in front of large crowds. The process
19Baton Rouge Gazette, June 5, September 11, 1847; Louisiana Courier, 
July 2, 21, August 4, 19, September 10, October 25, November 11, 1847; 
Alexandria Western Democrat quoted in ibid.. November 15, 1847.
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culminated in what one partisan newspaper described as "an Eight Hours' 
Cannonade between the Great Guns of Whiggerv and Democracy'" held in Baton 
Rouge in September before an audience of several thousand people 
including a significant number of women, who followed the debate as 
closely as the men.^°
If 1847 had seen a rise in non-partisanship in Louisiana, the first 
month of 1848 would provide a lesson in the importance of strictly 
drawing partisan lines. In the legislative elections which coincided 
with the 1847 congressional races, the Whigs achieved a slim two vote 
majority in the forthcoming session. One of the first acts of this 
legislature involved the selection of a United States senator. With one 
Whig legislator pledged to vote for a Democrat the race was a dead heat, 
and both Whig and Democratic newspapers stressed the need for party 
unity. The capital was rife with rumors of under-handed tactics, and 
after witnessing "the open and undisguised efforts at conniption, 
intrigue, and management," one aspirant left the city in disgust. Each 
party held a caucus two days prior to the election with the Whigs
choosing Ascension Parish sugar planter Duncan F. Kenner and the
11Democrats selecting party chieftain John Slidell.
20Franklin Planters’ Banner. October 28, 1847; Isaac Morse Diary 
quoted in Edward C. Morse, Blood of an Englishman (Abilene, Tex., 1943), 
118-9. For debates in 1848 see Vidalia Concordia Intelligencer. November 
4, 1848; Louisiana Courier. August 14, September 7, November 6, 1848; New 
Orleans Weekly Delta. September 11, 1848 (quote); Balie Peyton to John 
J. Crittenden, August 29, 1848, Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress 
(Hereinafter LC).
21Vidal ia Concordia Intelligencer. January 8, 1848; Baton Rouge 
Gazette. November 20, 1847; Commercial Bulletin. January 24, 1848; James 
M. Elam to James E. Elam, January 23, 1848, James Elam Letter Book, LLMVC 
(quote).
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Believing that he had secured the commitments of two Whigs. Slidell 
anticipated winning a narrow victory. On the first two ballots, however, 
he and Kenner deadlocked at sixty-four votes apiece. One Whig voted for 
Slidell, another Whig was mysteriously absent, and Taylor Democrat 
Maunsel White, refusing to cast a ballot for the anti-Taylor Slidell, 
wasted his vote on fellow Taylor Democrat Robert C. Nicholas. Following 
the second ballot, the legislature adjourned, and the parties re-caucused 
with the Democrats switching their nominee from Slidell to Pierre Soule. 
On the subsequent ballot, Soule defeated Kenner with four Whigs voting 
for the Democrat. This result caused an uproar in the Whig party which 
included allegations of vote buying, a scuffle on the house floor, and 
an official investigation. The Whig "traitors” defended their vote by 
arguing that a Whig could not win, and Senator Soule was preferable to 
Senator Slidell.^*
The outcome shook up the Democratic party, too. Slidell maintained 
that only party loyalty prevented him from defeating Sould’s election. 
Having maneuvered for over a year to capture the post, he confessed that 
he was "not a little annoyed at the result” and complained that Sould had 
reaped the benefit of his exertions. A Whig less charitably observed 
that "Slidell is disgusted at the election of Soul€ when he was at the 
expense of bribing two members of the Legislature to elect him." This 
contest contributed to a growing enmity between the two Democratic
11Louisiana Courier. January 25, 26. 27, 1848; Commercial Bulletin. 
January 25, 26, 1848; Report of the Committee— Toni the Investigation 
of the Case of the Breach of the Privileges of the House of at the 
Election of a United States Senator (New Orleans, 1848).
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leaders which wouLd disrupt Louisiana’s Democratic party for the rest of
nthe antebellum period.'"'
Surprisingly, the same Whig newspapers which chastised partisans
for abandoning the Whig party in the senatorial contest trumpeted the
call for a non-partisan Taylor convention in February. Delegates from
more than three-quarters of Louisiana’s parishes met on February 22. the
anniversary of the birth of George Washington another military hero and
president. Only the impassibility of the Red River prevented greater
attendance. The meeting nominated Taylor for president "without regard
to party distinctions" but did not express an opinion on the vice-
presidencv. Stressing that "the people have nominated Genl. Taylor."
delegates opposed the calling of a national convention. Despite
professions of non-partisanship, Whigs predominated at the meeting and
of the twelve Taylor electors chosen (six electors and six substitutes)
1/only one, Robert C. Nicholas, was a Democrat.
Not all Louisiana Whigs celebrated the non-partisan nomination of 
Taylor. Sergeant S. Prentiss compLained, "I have, I repeat, no 
confidence in the independent no-partyism, which has lately exploded in 
[New O r l e a n s ] W h i  le many Whigs, including Prentiss, respected Taylor, 
they preferred the candidacy of the party’s traditional standard-bearer 
Henry Clay. Comparing the candidates, Prentiss asserted that Clay was
->3John Slidell to James Buchanan, February 4. 1848, James Buchanan 
Papers, HSP; Balie Peyton to John J. Crittenden, October 21, 1848,
Crittenden Papers, LC; Louis M. Sears, John Slidell (Durham, NC, 1925), 
77-79.
24Baton Rouee Gazette. February 26, 1848; Commercial Bulletin.
February 24, 1848 (first quote); A.T. Burnley to John J. Crittenden, 
December 12, 1847, Crittenden Papers, LC (second quote).
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"a thousand times better fitted than Gen. Taylor, for the first office 
in the nation.” Clay had only lost the 1844 election in the state 
because of the Plaquemines frauds, and these Whigs saw no reason to 
abandon him or their party label in 1S48. Clay Whigs called for a March 
convention to select delegates to the national Whig convention. Both 
Clay and Taylor Whigs attended, and, in an effort to maintain harmony, 
the platform did not pledge the state's votes to a particular candidate. 
At the June national convention, the Whig party chose Taylor over Clay 
as its candidate for the presidency and balanced the ticket by selecting 
New Yorker Millard Fillmore for the vice-presidency. Louisiana Whigs 
celebrated Taylor’s nomination with a "Monster Ratification Meeting” in
1CNew Orleans with as many as fifteen thousand people in attendance.
The Bee contended that the March state Whig convention had ended 
Taylor no-partyism in Louisiana. If it had not, then the national 
convention certainly did. Taylor Democrat Jacob Barker held a non­
partisan ratification meeting simultaneously with the "Monster 
Ratification Meeting." While thousands attended the latter only fourteen 
people attended Barker’s meeting. Shortly after Taylor’s Whig 
nomination, Robert Nicholas, the only Democratic Taylor elector, 
announced that he maintained his advocacy of Taylor. But, citing his 
disgust with the partisan nature of the campaign, he resigned his post 
as elector. Though Democrats such as Barker and Maunsel White continued
1CS.S. Prentiss speech, February 22, 1848 in George Prentiss, ed., 
A Memoir of S.S. Prentiss 2 vols. (New York, 1856), 2:451 (first quote); 
S.S. Prentiss to George Prentiss, May 22, 1848, ibid., 2:451-3 (second 
quote); W.C.C. Claiborne, Jr. to Henry Clay, April 26, 1848. in James F. 
Hopkins, et al., eds., The Papers of Henry Clay (11 vols., Lexington, 
1959-92), 10:446-7; Commercial Bulletin. March 15, June 14, 26, 1848.
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their zealous championship of Taylor, most others returned to the party 
fold, and White admitted that he "most deeply regretted" the contest 
becoming partisan. By November, party newspapers would find Taylor 
Democrats an endangered species in Louisiana.^
Louisiana Democrats held their own convention on March 15, the 
anniversary of the birthday of Andrew Jackson. Like their Whig 
counterparts, they did not pledge their delegates to a particular 
candidate at the national convention. Instead, the convention passed 
resolutions in favor of the 1846 tariff and condemning the Wilmot Proviso 
as "an attack on the constitutional rights of the siaveholding states.” 
Slidell, a member of the delegation to the national convention, had 
earlier written that "our party here is unanimous in favor of a 
presidential candidate from a free state opposed to the Wilmot Proviso." 
If this description were accurate, then Louisiana Democrats had their 
wish granted as the party nominated Michigan’s Lewis Cass and passed a 
resolution condemning the Wilmot Proviso. The Democrats balanced the 
ticket with General William 0. Butler, a Kentuckian who had served in the 
Mexican War and alongside Jackson in the Battle of New Orleans. A 
northern Democrat attending a New Orleans ratification meeting informed
Cass that "you would think that [Louisianans] would not have supported
27any one than yourself."
26Bee, March 15, 1848; Description of Barker meeting in New Orleans 
Weekly Delta. November 20, 1848; Louisiana Courier. July 6 , September 5, 
7, 1848; New Orleans Weekly Delta. July 17, 1848; Maunsel White to 
unknown, October 17, 1848, Maunsel White Papers, SHC (quote).
27Louisiana Courier. March 16 (first quote), May 31, 1848; John 
Slidell to James Buchanan, November 13, 1847, Buchanan Papers, HSP
(second quote); Stephen A. Douglas to Lewis Cass, June 13, 1848, in 
Robert Johannsen, ed., The Letters of Stephen A. Douglas (Champaign,
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The nomination of Whig and Democratic candidates and the failure 
of Taylor’s non-partisan campaign demonstrates the strength of party 
commitment in the antebellum United States including Louisiana. The 
independent Taylor movement had begun auspiciously, and in December of
1847. a Democrat observed without animus that "I don’t know a man in this 
Parish (a democratic one) of both parties that won’t vote for [Taylor]." 
Antebellum voters, however, viewed the world through their attachment to 
the Whig or Democratic party, and it was easier to have Taylor conform 
to this dichotomy than to dissolve party lines. As the Louisiana Courier
explained, "Party politics are as essential to the vitality of the
republic, as is the unchecked circulation of the blood to that of the 
animal body." More importantly, the protection of the South’s peculiar 
institution required that the South have northern allies in Congress 
which an independent candidate would not have. The turmoil surrounding 
the Wilmot Proviso heightened this need, and southerners were unwilling 
to risk campaigning outside the bounds of party even to elect a southern
1Qslaveholder such as Taylor.
The 1848 presidential campaign illustrates the magnitude of the 
slavery issue in Louisiana, where debate over the candidates’ commitment 
to defense of the institution dwarfed all other topics. Both Whigs and 
Democrats acknowledged that protecting slavery was paramount. In March, 
a Democratic meeting in Sabine Parish had resolved that "we regard all
111., 1961), 160-1 (third quote); Leslie Chase to Franklin Pierce, June 
11, 1848, Franklin Pierce Papers, LC.
28James D.B. DeBow to John C. Calhoun, December 26, 1847 (first
quote), in Chauncey S. Boucher and Robert P. Brooks, eds., Correspondence 
Addressed to John C. Calhoun. 413-5 (Washington, 1930); Louisiana 
Courier. March 18, 1848 (second quote).
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who would endanger the union of the States by agitating the slave 
question as enemies to the country and her interests." A Baton Rouge 
Whig meeting agreed that all attempts to excite passions against the 
South were "dangerous to the Union, and injurious to the public good." 
A Taylor Democrat concurred that "It has long been my opinion that the 
old issues would all fall away before the new absorbing one of North & 
South." During the eight hour debate in Baton Rouge, every speaker 
regardless of partisan persuasion stressed the importance of the 
candidates’ stances on slavery, and accusations of unfaithfulness to the 
South filled the columns of partisan newspapers throughout the fall.
Of course, the parties disagreed over which candidate’s election 
most threatened slavery in the South. The Democrats concentrated their 
venom on the Whig vice-presidential candidate Millard Fillmore. Arguing 
that northern Whigs were antislavery and in favor of the Wilmot Proviso, 
Democrats reminded voters that they could not vote for Taylor without 
voting for Fillmore, an "avowed and notorious abolitionist." Democratic 
orators denied they slandered Fillmore with this label because they 
possessed evidence that Fillmore proudly called himself an abolitionist. 
The publication of a pamphlet detailing Fillmore’s long anti-slavery 
congressional career highlighted their anti-Fillmore campaign. This 
document, which the Louisiana Courier claimed struck the Whigs ranks like 
"a twenty inch shell," inaugurated a pamphlet war. The Whig party 
violently denounced it in their own pamphlet, The Crisis, which the
29Louisiana Courier. March 13, 1848 (first quote); Baton Rouge
Gazette. August 5, 1848 (second quote); Maunsel White to Henry M. Hyams, 
August 7, 1848, Maunsel White Papers, SHC (third quote); New Orleans 
Weekly Delta. September 11, 1848.
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Democrats followed with another tract repeating that ’'Fillmore is in 
favor of every measure of the anti-slavery party."315
At first glance, Taylor, a Louisiana slaveholder, appeared immune 
to attacks regarding his loyalty to the South. In the emotionally 
charged atmosphere of the 1848 campaign, however, even these credentials 
did not preclude Democrats from challenging his willingness to protect 
slavery. They emphasized Taylor’s statements which stressed his 
unwillingness to use the veto power. While the northerner Cass had 
pledged to veto the Wilmot Proviso, Taylor the southerner had refused to 
issue such a pledge. The Democrats presented a scenario where a northern 
Whig-controlled Congress would pass the Wilmot Proviso and Taylor, 
because of his scruples regarding the use of the veto power, would sign 
the document though he might personally oppose it. They also attacked 
Taylor for his refusal to make his opinion known on any subject. 
Democrats asserted that the only stand which Taylor had taken was his 
refusal to run as party candidate. Taylor had violated this pledge, and 
they speculated that a man unreliable in one instance could be unreliable 
in all instances.31
While finding the southern slaveholder Taylor unsound on the 
slavery issue, Louisiana Democrats avowed that the South could not be in 
safer hands than those of Lewis Cass. They proudly quoted Cass’s 
declaration that "the principle [the Wilmot Proviso] involves should be
30Louisiana Courier. June 14 (first quote), July 1, 29, August 4 
(second quote), September 4, November 7, 1848; Mr. Fillmore’s Views on 
Slavery: Answer to ’The Crisis’ (New Orleans, 1848), 2 ( third quote).
31Louisiana Courier. June 30, July 14, September 5, 30, 1848; Facts 
to the People of Louisiana on the Presidential Question: Contradictory 
Letters of General Zachary Tavlor (New Orleans, 1848).
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kept out of the national government.” The Louisiana Courier published
nearly as many articles defending Cass's loyalty to the South as articles
condemning Fillmore’s abolitionist tendencies. Starting on July 6. and
periodically thereafter, the newspaper published seven pro-slavery quotes
attributed to Cass including his pledge to veto the Wilmot Proviso.
According to Democrats, this pledge to protect the South contrasted
sharply with Fillmore’s advocacy of the measure and Taylor’s willingness 
37to sign it. “
Not surprisingly. Whigs disagreed with Democrats’ contention that 
Lewis Cass would protect slavery. Whigs reminded Louisiana voters that 
while Cass might oppose the Wilmot Proviso in 1848, previously he had 
advocated the measure. A Taylor supporter found Cass’s views on slavery' 
"radically unsound," and a meeting in Catahoula Parish condemned Cass as 
a "sectional and exclusively Northern man with Northern prejudices." The 
Whigs alleged that Democrats had produced two campaign biographies of 
Cass— a southern version declaring Cass’s opposition to the Wilmot 
Proviso, and a northern one asserting that he championed the measure.
Whig attacks reached a crescendo after the northern Free Soil 
party, which adopted the Wilmot Proviso as the main plank of its 
platform, nominated Martin Van Buren for the presidency. In the words 
of Louisiana Whigs, Cass and Van Buren became twins. In 1836 and 1840,
52Facts to the People of Louisiana on the Presidential Question. 2; 
Louisiana Courier. June 30, July 6 , 14, 28, September 18, 1848.
33Maunsel White to unknown, October 17, 1848, Maunsel White Papers, 
SHC (first quote); Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. August 14, 1848; Baton 
Rouge Gazette. July 22, August 26, 1848; Commercial Bulletin. July 13, 
October 18, 1848 (second quote).
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Van Buren had campaigned as a northern Democrat with southern principles, 
but in 1848 he revealed his true anti-southern principles. In 1S4S. Cass 
echoed Van Buren’s slogan that he was a northern Democrat with southern 
principles. Whigs contended that just as Van Buren’s avowal of fealty 
to the South eventually proved false, so would Cass’s declaration. They 
argued that the contest had become sectional with the only true options 
being the southerner Taylor and slavery or the northerner Van Buren and 
the Wilmot Proviso. Thus, a vote for Cass would be a vote for Van Buren 
and his abolitionist friends.3*
For Whigs, their candidates unquestionably better protected slavery 
than the Democratic nominees. According to their logic, Zachary Taylor 
did not need to make pledges regarding his political stances. His 
residency in Louisiana and his ownership of slaves rendered absurd any 
attempts to taint him with abolitionism. Whigs observed that while 
southern Democrats claimed that Taylor would not protect the South, 
northern Democrats decried him for being a slaveholder. The Whig party 
placed Zachary Taylor in a class with two other southern military heroes 
who had ascended to the presidency— George Washington and Andrew Jackson. 
These men had protected their section as president and so would Taylor.33
With their belief in the self-explanatory nature of Taylor’s 
loyalty to the South, Whigs concentrated on defending Millard Fillmore
JI>Bee. August 25, 1848; Commercial Bulletin. October 14, 28, 1848. 
The Free Soil party actually held a meeting in Louisiana, and though a 
Louisianan assured Van Buren that "thousands” shared his opinions, only 
six members attended the meeting. Alexander Walker to Martin Van Buren, 
August 28, 1848, Martin Van Buren Papers, LC; New Orleans Weekly Delta. 
August 21, 1848; Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, August 2, 
1848, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC.
33Bee. September 15, 1848; Baton Rouge Gazette, November 4, 1848.
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from charges of abolitionism. The yeoman exertions of Sergeant S. 
Prentiss helped allay fears regarding Fi 11 more's commitment to the South. 
Prentiss. one of the antebellum South's greatest orators had moved from 
Mississippi to New Orleans in 1845. He had campaigned for the Whigs in 
Louisiana in the previous two presidential races, and in 1848 he devoted 
his energy to demonstrating the slanderous nature of the Democratic 
accusations of abolitionism against Fillmore. Prentiss, who had served 
alongside Fillmore in Congress, proclaimed him "as good a friend of the 
South as any north of Mason’s and Dixon’s line." Prentiss’s strenuous 
efforts to remove the taint of abolitionism from Fillmore included 
swimming across a river to attend a rally, engaging in a physical 
confrontation, and making numerous speeches which ultimately rendered the 
orator hoarse and contributed to an illness from which he would never 
recover. While other Whigs might not have equalled Prentiss’s labors, 
the party did devote much of the space in its newspapers columns to 
denouncing Democratic allegations as falsehoods and contending that no 
man was safer for the South than Fi1lmore.^
Although slavery dominated political discourse in the contest, the 
traditional debate over the value of the American System did not 
disappear completely. The Democratic party told voters that the Whigs 
had hidden their principles behind Taylor’s military glory. Democrats 
wondered why the Whigs no longer talked of internal improvements, a 
national bank, and a tariff. They asserted that in an effort to delude
^Prentiss, A Memoir of S.S. Prentiss, 2:451-5; Sergeant S. Prentiss 
to George Prentiss, October 17, 1848, in ibid., 2:455 (quote); Dallas C. 
Dickey, Sergeant S. Prentiss: Whig Orator of the Old South (Baton Rouge, 
1945); Baton Rouge Gazette. August 26, September 2, 9, 1848; Commercial 
Bulletin, July 22, August 3, 5, 1848.
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voters, the Whigs had temporarily removed these issues from view, but if 
Taylor would win the race, the Whigs would quickly try to institute them, 
and with his unwiLlingness to use the veto, Taylor would sign the 
measures. The Democrats claimed that in contrast they had openly avowed 
their positions at the June Democratic ratification meeting which passed 
resolutions in favor of the tariff of 1846 and against a national bank 
and federally sponsored internal improvements.
Louisiana Whigs suppressed debate over the American System in their 
campaign for Taylor for three main reasons. First, Taylor’s position on 
the Whig program remained unclear, and his declaration that he was a Whig 
but not an ultra Whig did little to clarify this attitude. Second, the 
Whigs hoped to gamer support from Taylor Democrats, and emphasizing the 
traditional differences between the parties undermined this goal. For 
instance, Maunsel White, Louisiana’s leading Taylor Democrat, disagreed 
with most Louisiana Whigs on the value of the 1846 tariff. While most 
Whigs condemned the measure, White believed "the tariff as it now stands 
seems to work well enough." Third, the party felt that stressing 
Taylor’s loyalty to the South over Cass’s fealty to the region provided 
a winning strategy which would only be disrupted by discussion of the
19American System.
While avoiding extensive debate on the American System, some 
Louisiana Whigs could not resist addressing the tariff of 1846 which had
37Louisiana Courier. June 9, 16, October 16, 1848; New Orleans Weekly 
Delta. June 12, October 23, 1848; Facts to the People of Louisiana on the 
Presidential Question.... 13-23; Samuel Skofieid to George W. Chase, May,
1848. George W. Chase Correspondence, LLMVC.
^Maunsel White to Hamilton Smith, September 17, 1848, Maunsel White 
Papers, SHC (quote).
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lowered duties on imported sugar. The Commercial Bulletin asked if the 
electorate could vote for Cass who favored the tariff which "is at this 
moment breaking down the interest and prosperity of Louisiana." A 
Louisiana sugar planter expressed the wish that Taylor’s election "may 
bring about— a heavier duty required on foreign importations.” and the 
Rough and Ready, a Whig pamphlet, maintained that Taylor’s election would 
lead to an increase in the tariff. Whigs called for a return to the more 
protective 1842 tariff, and the Commercial Bulletin argued that the 
state’s sugar planters owed the former congressman Millard Fillmore a
IQdebt of gratitude for his advocacy of that measure.
In the final two months of the campaign, Louisiana Whigs added 
another element to the campaign. Whigs decided that if the Democrats 
wanted to attack Fillmore’s congressional record, then William 0. 
Butler’s legislative career was fair game for examination as well. 
According to Louisiana Whigs, an analysis of Butler’s speeches revealed 
that he had condemned the conduct of Louisiana Creoles for their role in 
the Battle of New Orleans. In the 1843 congressional debate over 
refunding Jackson’s fine, Butler, who had served under Jackson during the 
battle, allegedly called Creoles cowards and traitors. Louisiana Whigs 
published a pamphlet, A Defence of the Creoles of Louisiana and Andrew 
Jackson vs. the calumnies of W’illiam 0. Butler, that included excerpts 
from Butler’s speeches. Democrats, who in their ratification meeting 
called Butler "an old and beloved friend of Louisiana," charged that
IQCommercial Bulletin. July 17 (first quote), August 10, September 
30, 1848; Louisiana Courier. September 22, 1848; Moses Liddell to John 
Liddell, November 12, 1848, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC (second quote).
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Whigs had deliberately misquoted Butler and maintained that Creoles would
irtnot be misled by this insult to their intelligence.
Whether this tactic gained Taylor any votes is questionable, but 
on November 5. 1848. the nation selected Zachary Taylor as its twelfth 
president. If the Louisianan did well across the United States, he 
proved equally popular in his home state, where he received 54.6 percent 
of the vote. The candidacy of a favorite son, however, did not alter 
Louisiana’s voting patterns significantly. Though Taylor, a resident of 
the Florida Parishes, received a higher percentage of the vote in that 
region than any previous Whig candidate, he still could not capture this 
traditionally Democratic region. The same situation prevailed in North 
Louisiana where Taylor outperformed previous Whig candidates but did not 
defeat Cass. Not surprisingly, Old Rough and Ready did best in Greater 
Orleans and South Louisiana, traditionally the Whigs’ two strongest 
sections. Taylor’s best results came in South Louisiana where he 
received almost two-thirds of the votes cast. This pro-tariff, Creole 
region with its high slave population continued its championship of the 
Whig cause. (SEE APPENDIX A)
Following the presidential race, Louisiana voters barely had a 
chance to catch their breath before entering into another campaign. A 
governor and four congressmen would be elected the following November, 
and a month after Taylor’s victory, lists of possible candidates began 
to appear in party newspapers. A cholera scare and flooding of the
40St. Martinvilie Creole. October 14, 1848; Franklin Planters’
Banner. October 5, 1848; Commercial Bulletin. September 26, October 10, 
1848; New Orleans Weekly Delta. June 12, 1848 (quote); Louisiana Courier. 
October 7, 9, 12, 1848.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
221
Mississippi River tempered some of the spirit in early 1849. but in May 
both the Democrats and the Whigs held nominating conventions. Partially 
as a reward to North Louisiana, which had loyally supported the 
Democratic party but had never had candidate from its region nominated 
for governor, the Democrats chose Joseph Walker. A Rapides Parish cotton 
planter. Walker had narrowly lost the party’s nomination four years 
before. The party platform opposed banks, tariffs, monopolies, and the 
Wilmot Proviso, while announcing its support for a constitutional 
amendment to make the Judiciary elective. The Whigs looked to Edward 
Sparrow who had run for lieutenant governor in 1846, but on the first day 
of the convention, a delegate read a letter from Sparrow declining 
consideration. Instead, the Whigs selected Alexander Declouet, a Creole 
lawyer from St. Martin Parish. A member urged the body to pass a 
resolution in favor of the elective judiciary but the measure was 
defeated/ 1
Each party looked to its most recent victory in Louisiana for 
encouragement in the gubernatorial campaign. For the Whigs, Zachary 
Taylor’s triumph provided inspiration, and a Whig newspaper urged voters 
to "Stand by the President" by voting for Declouet. Whig meetings passed 
resolutions praising Taylor in addition to those supporting their 
candidate. When Democrats attempted to exploit the forty year-old 
Deciouet’s relative inexperience, the Whigs invoked Old Rough and Ready’s 
name in response. During the campaign a Democratic orator derisively
**New Orleans Weekly Delta. December 11, 1848; Louisiana Courier. 
December 8 , 1848; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. May 16, 1849; Bee, May 
16, 1849; Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, January 30, 1849, 
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC.
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asked. "Who is General Declouet?" Declouet. who had only served two 
brief terras in the state senate, had a quick retort. He compared himself 
to Taylor. Declouet asserted that like Taylor, he did not have an 
extensive legislative background, but like Taylor, his principles and 
honesty would enable him to govern the state effectively.**
For the Democrats, their victory in the 1846 gubernatorial election 
provided them with a blueprint for success. In that election. Democrats 
had defeated the Whigs by campaigning as champions of the 1845 
constitution. In 1849, they deemed this lesson more germane than 
Taylor’s 1848 triumph. Their nominee provided a direct link to the 
charter, for Walker had served as the president of the constitutional 
convention. Advancing democratic reforms had proved effective for the 
Democrats in the 1842 and 1846 gubernatorial campaigns, and in 1849 
Democrats continued along this path. In addition to running Walker, the 
party’s resolutions condemning banks and monopolies referred to the 
outlawing of these measures in the 1845 constitution. Democrats claimed 
that they wished to make the constitution even more democratic by making 
the judiciary elective.**
The debate over making the judiciary elective dominated political 
discourse in the 1849 race with both Democrats and Whigs calling 
themselves champions of the measure. The Democrats campaigned throughout 
the state telling voters that their platform called for a constitutional 
amendment to make the judiciary elective, while the Whigs remained
42Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. September 5, October 31 1849 (quote); 
New Orleans Weekly Delta. July 16, 1849: Moses Liddell to John Liddell, 
August 19, 1849, Liddell Papers, LLMVC.
43Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. May 16, 1849.
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silent. They charged Declouet not only with opposition to an elective 
judiciary but also with having fought against many other democratic 
reforms. When Democrats charged the Whigs with resisting the measure. 
Whigs not only claimed that they welcomed the change. but they falsely 
asserted that they had advocated it before the Democrats did. Whig 
newspapers claimed that Declouet, like many Democrats, had changed his 
mind on an elective judiciary, and the Whig candidate for lieutenant 
governor denied that it could be considered a partisan topic.
The parties’ reaction to the elective judiciary illustrates the 
power of the electorate in antebellum Louisiana politics. Prior to the 
1844 constitutional convention, voters had deemed an elective judiciary 
too radical, and the Democratic party retreated from its advocacy of the 
measure. In 1844 and 1845, the Whigs parlayed their opposition to the 
election of judges into a competitive minority in the convention. 
Furthermore, they considered the absence of a clause providing for this 
change one of their victories at the convention. With the voters having 
changed their mind about the issue, however, the Democrats returned to 
the topic and the Whigs, who feared being branded as undemocratic, 
followed in lock-step. With voters adamantly demanding this alteration, 
the Franklin Planters’ Banner correctly argued "neither party would dare 
retreat from it."**
Though the elective judiciary issue dominated political debate, 
Louisianans continued to bang the traditional drums of ethnicity and ties
itBee, June 12, July 10, 1849; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. June 27, 
October 3, 1849.
**Franklin Planters’ Banner. February 14, 1850.
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to Andrew Jackson. The Whigs took advantage of Declouet’s Creole 
heritage and charged Democrats with slurring him as "the Gumbo and Frog 
Candidate. Trying to capture votes from both Creoles and Americans, the 
Whigs added that Declouet spoke both French and English, while Plauche. 
the Democratic candidate for lieutenant governor, could not speak English 
and therefore could not preside over the senate. The Democrats continued 
to campaign on the coattails of Andrew Jackson. With fewer and fewer 
voters having memories of the Battle of New Orleans, the party did not 
employ its connection to the victory as much as it had in the past. In 
choosing Plauche, a veteran of the battle and in passing a resolution 
celebrating Jackson's victory, the Democrats did hope to inspire some 
nostalgia for the great triumph.
With over one-quarter of the state’s population foreign-born 
including more than half the population in Greater Orleans, immigration 
continued to grow in importance in Louisiana politics. The Democrats 
portrayed themselves as the friends of naturalized citizens and the Whigs 
as their enemies. They reminded naturalized citizens that many of them 
owed their vote to the 1845 constitution, which had given the right to 
vote to propertyless white males— a category which included many New 
Orleans immigrants. In the weeks immediately preceding the election, the 
Whigs of New Orleans went on the offensive in trying to gain immigrant 
votes. They repeatedly charged that Walker, after losing a United States 
Senate contest to Alexander Porter in 1833, cal led his opponent "a damned 
Irishman." Asking "Which of the candidates is the Friend of the
^Franklin Planters’ Banner. October 18, 1849 (quote); Plaquemine 
Southern Sentinel. October 3, 1849; Bee. October 1, 1849.
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Naturalized Citizen?'" Whigs circulated copies of Walker's legislative
votes which they contended proved that Walker had long opposed 
qimmigrants.
The 1849 election demonstrated Louisiana's voters increasing 
involvement in the political process. In the 1S4S presidential election, 
many voters had cast their ballots because Taylor lived in the state, but 
more people voted in the 1849 contest and the concurrent congressional 
elections than had in any prior race including Taylor’s presidential bid. 
Turnout exceeded eighty percent in each of the state’s regions. The 
result was close, but the voters apparently agreed with the Democrats 
that the 1846 gubernatorial contest provided the more appropriate 
yardstick, and Walker won with 51.6 percent of the vote. Walker achieved 
his greatest majorities in the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana where 
he received slightly less than sixty percent of the vote. The Whigs 
continued to dominate South Louisiana with Greater Orleans remaining the 
most evenly balanced region. (SEE APPENDIX B)
In addition, the Democrats captured three of the four congressional 
seats contested. Since the 1843 redistricting, the Democrats had 
dominated the First, Third, and Fourth Districts with the Whigs 
controlling the Second District. In 1849, the parties continued their 
sectional division in these contests. With the Whigs’ stranglehold on 
the sugar cane-producing Second District, the Democrats attempted to 
enlist ambitious former Whig governor Henry Johnson in an effort to 
disrupt the Whigs. Johnson declined their offer, and Whigs Charles M.
^Seventh Census-1850. 61, 243-9; Bee. October 13, 15, 17 (quote), 
19 , 24 , 25, 1849; William H. Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana
(Lafayette, La., 1973), 188-9.
Reproduced w ith permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
226
Conrad easily defeated an independent Democrats. In the First and Third 
Districts, the Whigs’ cause was as hopeless as the Democrats* chances 
were in the Second, and they only made token nominations. Only in the 
Fourth District, which included portions of Democratic North Louisiana 
and Whig South Louisiana, did the parties have a competitive campaign.
4gwith the Democratic incumbent winning a slim majority.
At the national level, conflict between the North and the South 
over slavery continued to increase. A Louisianan worried that "News from 
Washington is gloomy. Dissolution of the Union is threatened." 
Southerners in favor of uniting against northern depredations called a 
regional convention to be held in Nashville in the summer of 1S50. Both 
outgoing Governor Johnson and the recently elected Walker favored 
Louisiana's participation in the meeting. Sensing constitutional 
objections to this southern assembly, Johnson made the controversial 
statement, "It is far better to be lawless than to live under lawless 
rule." In his inaugural address, Walker concurred that antislavery 
agitation was "about to reach a crisis," and that Louisiana must be 
"prepared to make common cause with our neighbors." Following Walker’s 
suggestion, the Democratic-controlied senate passed a bill calling for 
the election of delegates to Nashville. In the house, the Whigs had a 
majority, and members of the party attacked the convention bill as 
unconstitutional. With the Whigs’ announced opposition to the
iffHenry Johnson to John F.H. Claiborne, June 1, 1849, John F.H.
Claiborne Papers, MDAH; Daily Picayune. November 11, 14, 1849.
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convention, the measure never came to a vote, and Louisiana did not send 
delegates to Nashville.'
While some southerners sought a regional solution to northern 
attacks on slavery, others looked to Washington to reduce sectional 
tensions. In Congress, Henry Clay attempted to end sectional controversy 
by introducing a series of measures known as the Compromise of 1850. 
President Taylor opposed the Compromise, but after his death in 1850, 
pro-Compromise Vice-President Millard Fillmore succeeded to the 
presidency. Southerners had decried Fillmore’s commitment to the South 
in the campaign of IS48, but as president, he made many of them re-think 
their opinion of him. Even Louisiana Democrat John Slidell admitted that 
Fillmore’s ascension to the presidency improved chances of settling 
sectional differences. Initially, Clay’s Compromise bill, consisting of 
a number of separate measures bound together, failed. Later, when 
shrewdly introduced by Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas as individual 
bills, Congress passed the measures, which Fillmore signed.*®
The controversy surrounding the Compromise of 1850 disrupted 
Louisiana’s political parties. Louisiana’s delegation to Washington 
consisted of five Democrats and one Whig. The state’s two Democratic 
senators played prominent roles in the debate with Senator Downs 
championing the Compromise and Senator Soule leading the attack against
49Franklin Planters’ Banner. March 28, 1850; Greer, "Louisiana
Politics, 184-5-1861," 574; James M. Elam to James E. Elam, March 10, 
1850, James Elam Letter Book, LLMVC; Louisiana House Journal. 1st sess., 
3rd leg., 11 (Johnson quote), 26 (Walker quote).
John Slidell to James Buchanan, July 13, 1850, Buchanan Papers, 
HSP; David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 (New York, 1976), 
90-120.
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it. In the House, only two of Louisiana’s four congressmen voted on the 
Compromise. In August. Whig Charles M. Conrad vacated his seat to become 
Fillmore’s secretary of war. and Third District Democrat John Harmanson 
was absent from the capitol because of a severe illness which would lead 
to his death in October. Like Soule. Isaac Morse, representing the 
Fourth District, forcefully voiced his opposition to the measures. First 
District congressman Emile La Sere voted like Morse but remained silent 
on the Compromise.51
Though the state’s delegation had not given the Compromise of 1S50 
its endorsement, Louisiana Whigs, and most Louisiana Democrats, praised 
it as a solution to the nation’s sectional problems. A Carroll Parish 
cotton planter asserted, "I am content with the compromise arrangement. 
In my humble opinion the South has obtained a triumph." In the Second 
District, the Whigs passed resolutions endorsing the measures and 
selected a pro-Compromise candidate to succeed Conrad. The district’s 
Democrats divided over the Compromise and made no nomination, but some 
persisted in voting for Whig Henry Johnson. Whigs cheered Senator 
Downs’s support of the measure, and Whig newspapers praised the action 
of their partisan enemy, calling him "a patriot, a representative, and 
a statesman." Most Democrats joined in the celebration of Downs and, 
along with Whigs, greeted his return to the state with a one hundred gun 
salute. To thank Downs for his devotion to the South and the Union, pro- 
compromisers held a giant bipartisan Union Meeting in New Orleans and
SIMary E. Welborn Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 
(Master’s thesis, 1929), 24-44; Leslie M. Norton, "History of the Whig 
Party in Louisiana," (Ph.D. dissertation, 1940), 315-335; For voting 
results see Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict; The Crisis and 
Compromise of 1850 (Lexington, Ky., 1964), 191-200.
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smaller gatherings throughout the state. Between seven and eight 
thousand people attended the Crescent City assembly, and prominent
members of both parties, including Democratic Governor Walker, made
52speeches in favor of Downs's course.
If some Louisiana Democrats celebrated the Compromise and Downs, 
others felt that the Compromise measures favored the North. Congress mem 
Morse called it "a suicidal step for the South" and wondered how it could 
be called a compromise when one side gave up everything, and the other 
side gave up nothing. In the Senate, Pierre Soule delivered one of the 
strongest anti-Compromise speeches and later asserted that submission to 
the oppressive measures would bring "dishonor, disgrace, and ruin to the 
South.” The breach between Louisiana’s Democratic Senators split the 
state’s Democratic party. Already disliking Soule for stealing his 
Senate seat. Slidell charged him with ”produc[ing] fatal dissensions in 
our party,” for his opposition to the Compromise, and another objected 
to Soule’s "several inflammatory. . .speeches.” Only one Louisiana 
newspaper openly supported Soule’s actions, and the Southern Rights 
meeting held to celebrate his return to the state paled in comparison to 
the Union meeting. The almost universal hostility toward Soule’s course 
eventually forced his advocates to publish a pamphlet explaining that he
Hiram B. Tibbetts to John C. Tibbetts, 1850, John C. Tibbetts 
Correspondence, LLMVC (first quote); Plaquemine Southern Sent ine1« 
September 21, 1850 (second quote); Franklin Planters’ Banner. October 17, 
1850; Daily Picayune. September 13, 1850; Bee. May 30, November 21, 28, 
1850; Joseph Fitch to J.G. Weld, November 20,, 1850, Weld Company
Correspondence, LLMVC; John Liddell to Moses Liddell, May 7, 1851,
Liddell Papers LLMVC; Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861" 573-89.
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and Downs differed only in degree and that their votes on the compromise
had actually been very similar.
Support for the Compromise of 1S50 among southern Whigs and among
some southern Democrats contributed to the formation of Union parties in
three southern states: Mississippi. Alabama, and Georgia. In these
states, Whig parties had ceased to be competitive, and an alliance with
pro-Compromise Democrats appeared to be a method to obtain power. Formed
in IS50. Union parties accepted the compromise as a final settlement and
eschewed traditional party labels. Because of the complex interaction
of state and national politics, all attempts to form a Louisiana Union
party failed. A Louisiana Whig ''thought it bad policy to try to
establish a compromise party," and the Bee preferred "maintaining
distinctive and well-understood political landmarks." Louisiana Whigs
considered the establishment of a Union party "bad policy" because in
their state, the Whig party was not a non-competitive minority. The Whig
party’s program had popularity in New Orleans and especially in the sugar
cane growing parishes, and the Whigs had been competitive in every
54statewide election.
Morse Diary, 1850, in Morse, Blood of an Englishman. 123 (first 
quote); Soule speech quote in Bee. December 2, 1850 (second quote); John 
Slidell to James Buchanan, December 16, 1850, Buchanan Papers, HSP (third 
quote); Mr. Sould’s Speech at Opelousas. Louisiana Delivered on the 6th 
of September 1851 (New Orleans, 1851); Pierre Soule to John F.H. 
Claiborne, September 24, 1850, Claiborne Papers, MDAH; Thoughts on the 
Slavery Question and the Clav Compromise, with the Final Action of the 
Louisiana Delegation in Congress. Thereon (New Orleans, 1851); Greer, 
"Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861,” 574-78.
Adams, Whig Party of Louisiana. 223; John Ray to John Moore 11 
February 1852, Weeks Papers (first quote); Bee. December 6 , 1851 (second 
quote); For a discussion of Union parties in the South see Cooper, South 
and the Politics of Slavery. 304-20; Arthur C. Cole, The Whig Party in 
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In Louisiana, not only did the Whigs benefit from their stance on 
the Compromise of 1850, but also they used their advocacy of revision of 
the Democratic-authored 1845 constitution to maintain a strong position 
in the state. William H. Adams, in The Whig Party of Louisiana, argues 
that "the adoption of the new [1S45] constitution would ultimately mean 
the [Whig] party’s demise." The charter, however, actual ly provided the 
Whigs with an opportunity to reinvigorate their party. Much of the 
support for the 1845 constitution had stemmed from disgust with the 
constitution of 1812 and not from enthusiasm for the new document. While 
an improvement, the constitution of 1845, "still contained features that 
were unsuitable to the political and economic milieu of antebellum 
Louisiana."55
Arguing that "virtually all agree some change is necessary," the 
Whigs repeatedly called for a convention to write a new constitution in 
the late 1840s and early 1850s. In February of 1850, the Whig-controlled 
house passed a bill authorizing the formation of a constitutional 
convention, but the Democratic senate defeated the bill by ten votes. 
By 1850, the public attitude had turned against the 1845 constitution 
and, consequently, in favor of the Whigs. The commercial interests of 
New Orleans detested the "absurd" constitution’s severe restrictions 
which had "shackle[d] and fetter[ed]" business. At the same time,
Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800-1861 (Baton Rouge, 1978), 165- 
200.
Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 149 (first quote); Wayne M. 
Everard, "Louisiana’s ’Whig Constitution Revisited: The Constitution of 
1852," in Warren M. Billings and Edward F. Haas, eds., In Search of 
Fundamental Law: Louisiana’s Constitutions. 1812-1974 (Lafayette, La., 
1993), 37 (second quote).
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residents of northern Louisiana complained that voting restrictions in 
the 1845 constitution, especially those regarding state and parish 
residence, were still too severe. Whigs complained that many of the 
provisions of the 1845 constitution originated from ’’temporary 
excitement" and consequently possessed "a degree of ultraism." As the 
party advocating a revision of the constitution, the Whigs benefit ted 
from the widespread desire for change.^
In the 1851 congressional and legislative campaigns, the Whigs 
exploited both national and state issues. At their state convention, 
they wrote a party platform which presented their party as the author of 
the Compromise of 1850 and the protector of southern interests. The 
platform also called for a constitutional convention to write a new state 
charter that would be more democratic and more responsive to the needs 
of business interests. In New Orleans, the Whig party called upon 
prominent businessmen, including lawyer Judah P. Benjamin and railroad 
promoter James Robb, to inconvenience themselves temporarily and run for 
the legislature to advance the commercial prosperity of the state. In 
contrast, because of internal disagreements over the merits of the 
Compromise of 1850 and the need for constitutional revision, the 
Democratic party declined to issue a party platform. Democratic Governor 
Walker, who had served as president of the 1845 constitutional 
convention, steadfastly opposed a convention and could not "see any good 
ground in what has passed for a change of our organic law." The Daily
^Bee, February 11, 1850, May 20, 1851 (first quote); George D. 
Green, Finance and Economic Development in the Old South: Louisiana 
Banking 1804-1861 (Stanford, 1972), 131-3; Daily Picayune. February 21, 
1850, March 8 , 1850; Commercial Bulletin. March 22, 1852 (second quote); 
Vidalia Concordia Intelligencer. February 7, 1852 (third quote).
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Picavune more correctly described pro-convention sentiment as "nearly 
unanimous.” and the Whigs used their advocacy of the Compromise and 
constitutional revision to sweep to their largest legislative majority.^ 
Additionally, the party captured a second congressional seat for 
the first time since prior to the failed gerrymander of 1S43. The Whigs 
used their pro-Compromise stance to add a victory in the Fourth District 
to their traditional control of the sugar cane-growing Second District. 
In the Fourth District, the respective platforms revealed the differences 
between the two parties. Democrats claimed only the South made any 
compromises in 1850, while Whigs asserted that the Compromise of 1850 
settled the nation’s most dangerous questions. Whig John Moore attacked 
incumbent Democrat Isaac Morse for his opposition to the Compromise. 
Calling Morse a secessionist, Whigs contended, "the question in this 
district is whether the doctrines of Gen. Downs or Pierre Soule shall be 
sustained." Fearing that Morse would lose the election, Democrats sent 
the pro-Compromise Downs to the district to stump for him and to try to 
heal divisions within the party. Despite Downs’s effort, Moore defeated
Morse. Moore’s friends celebrated his victory as "a triumph over
58disunion.
S7G.B. Duncan, et al. to James Robb, October 10, 1851, George Peabody 
to Robb, January 5, 1852, James Robb Papers, HNO; John Slidell to James 
Buchanan, December 16, 1850, November 17, 1851, Buchanan Papers, HSP;
Address of Jacob Barker Delivered before the Members of the Jefferson 
Club (New Orleans, 1852), 4; Bee. October 9, 1851; Louisiana House
Journal. 1st sess., 4th leg., 10-11 (Walker quote).
58Franklin Planters’ Banner. September 6 , 20, October 4 (first
quote), 18, 1851; Bee. August 6, October 9. November 13, 1851; Moses 
Liddell to Mary Liddell, November 17, 1851, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC; 
John H. Dinkgrave to John Moore, November 28, 1851 (second quote), Samuel 
Clark to Moore, December 31, 1851, Weeks Papers, LLMVC.
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Having added a congressman to Louisiana's delegation in Washington, 
the Whig party hoped that its control of the 1852 legislature would allow 
it to add a senator as well. Four years after the scandal surrounding 
the 1848 Senate election, when a Whig majority legislature elected 
Democrat Pierre Soule, Whig newspapers swore that they would not allow 
the repeat of such a disgraceful event. A number of Whigs aspired to the 
office, but the party caucus united behind Judah P. Benj'amin, a New 
Orleans legislator who had been elected as an advocate of commercial 
reform. The Democrats nominated the pro-Compromise incumbent Solomon W. 
Downs. They hoped to obtain the votes of several Whig legislators who 
either had pledged their vote to Downs because of his stance on the 
Compromise or who represented Democratic constituencies. Their efforts.
however, proved in vain. Three Whigs crossed party lines, but Benj'amin
59defeated Downs on the first ballot.
The Whigs also employed their legislative maj'ority to pass a bill 
allowing the state’s voters to decide on whether to call a constitutional 
convention. Newspapers throughout the state advocated a constitutional 
convention at the beginning of 1852. The New Orleans Commercial Bulletin 
deemed "a new constitution absolutely necessary, and the Franklin 
Planters’ Banner pronounced the 1845 constitution as "unworthy of the 
genius of our people." The Plaquemine Southern Sentinel argued that "the
Randel 1 Hunt to F.D. Richardson, December 1, 1851, F.D. Richardson 
Papers, SHC; For Whig pledged to Downs see B.H. Payne to John Moore, 
January 22, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC; For controversy over a Whig 
reneging on pledge to Downs see S.W. Downs to John Liddell, November 8 , 
1851, E. Warren Moise to Liddell, November 25, 1851, and John Liddell to 
unknown, December 10, 1851, all in Liddell Papers, LLMVC; For opinion 
that Downs’s nomination actually hurt the Democratic party see Pierre 
Soule to Isaac Morse, February 1, 1852, in Morse, Blood of an Englishman, 
129-30.
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expression throughout the state seems to us almost universal, in behalf 
of a new constitution.” Despite Governor Walker's opposition, most 
Democrats acceded to the people's demands, and the convention bill easily 
passed with seventy-six votes in favor and only seven against.60
The January meeting of the legislature inaugurated what one 
Louisianan described as a "perfect war of politics throughout the year" 
including municipal, statewide, and national contests. The initial 
battle between the Democrats and Whigs occurred in the New Orleans 
municipal elections on March 22. Leaders of both parties acknowledged 
the importance of this campaign as a litmus test of their relative 
strengths. Democratic stalwart John Slidell contended that "if we 
succeed we shall carry the state in November." Speaking at a Whig 
ratification meeting the night before the city elections. Senator-elect 
Benjamin concurred in the magnitude of the New Orleans elections and in 
their connection to the national contest. Additionally, the preamble to 
the resolutions adopted by this Whig gathering emphasized that the 
success of the Whig party in the city election "will insure a Whig 
Convention, a Whig Constitution, a Whig legislature, and the vote of the 
state for a Whig president."6*
Commercial Bulletin. February 20, 1852; DaiIv Picayune. January 21, 
23, 1852; Franklin Planters’ Banner. April 10, 1852; Plaquemine Southern 
Sentinel, January 24, 1852; Vidalia Concordia Intelligencer. January 24, 
1852.
6IWilliam C. Carr to John Moore, July 13, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC; 
John Slidell to James Buchanan, March 19, 1852, Buchanan Papers, HSP 
(first quote); Pierce Butler, Judah P. Beniamin (Philadelphia, 1907), 
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Before 1852. the New Orleans municipal elections had not been 
contested on strictly partisan grounds, and party leaders had not placed 
much stress on them as harbingers of statewide races. Instead, political 
conflict in the Crescent City had revolved around Creole-American 
tension. From 1S36 to 1S52 animosity among the city's ethnic groups had 
led to the physical separation of the city into three virtually 
autonomous municipalities. In February 1S52 the legislature mandated 
consolidation, calling a March election to unify the city under a single 
board of aldermen. Prior to 1852, ethnicity and personality had shaped 
New Orleans elections, but with consolidation, the historic Creoie- 
American contest took on more the form of partisan politics. Leon C. 
Soule, in his study of New Orleans politics, asserts that consolidation 
saw "the emergence of the political party as the dominant factor in 
municipal politics." Democrats and Whigs agreed with this assessment and 
placed a greater emphasis on the municipal contests than in prior 
years.̂
At first glance, the municipal campaign appeared to be an 
unqualified Whig triumph: the party captured the mayoralty, treasurer, 
comptroller, and elected a majority of the Board of Aldermen. Upon 
further examination, however, the election had exposed chinks in the 
party’s armor. With partisan attachments in the city not solidified, a 
third-party movement emerged despite the best efforts of both Whig and 
Democratic newspapers to dissuade their members from straying from the 
fold. Writing in his diary, a prominent Whig observed that "Mr. James
CALeon C. Sould, "The Creol e-American Struggle in New Orleans 
Politics, 1850-1862.” Louisiana Historical Quarterly XL (January 1957), 
54-83. (quote on p. 61).
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Robb got up an independent ticket with a view to injure (it is said) the
Whig party The Whigs will not forget it though [the independents]
efforts prove[d] of little use." Robb, a Whig state senator and 
Louisiana’s most prominent railroad promoter, represented a faction that 
considered commercial advancement more important than partisan 
affiliation. Claiming to represent the business communit\% the 
independent reform movement’s success is difficult to gauge, for though 
they elected seven of the city’s twelve aldermen, ail of their victorious 
candidates were also either Whig or Democratic nominees.63
A month after the city election, in a referendum marred by poor 
turnout, Louisiana voters called for a constitutional convention. Only 
voters in the Florida Parishes, fearing that the capital might be moved 
back from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, cast a majority against the 
measure. Discussing the selection of delegates to the convention, the 
Daily Picayune state, "The interest in these questions is not mixed up 
with ordinary electioneering." The people and the parties disagreed with 
this sentiment and instead concurred with the Plaquemine Southern
Sentine 1 that "electing delegates irrespective of their politics is a
moral impossibility." The Whigs benefitted from their party’s unified 
position in favor of a convention. In the 1851 legislative campaign, the 
Whigs had declared in favor an elective judiciary, free banking, state 
aid to internal improvement companies, and public education. Party 
newspapers also reminded voters that the Democrats were responsible for
63Samuel J. Peters, Jr., Diary, March 23, 1852, LLMVC; Harry H. 
Evans, "James Robb, Banker and Pioneer Railroad Builder of Antebellum 
Louisiana." Louisiana Historical Quarterly XXIII (January 1940), 191-3; 
Daily Delta. March 12, 1852; Commercial Bulletin. March 8, 1852;
Louisiana Courier. March 13, 1852; Daily Picayune. March 20, 24, 1852.
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the "the miserable edifice" of the 1S45 constitution which "hung like an
fitincubus upon the state's prosperity.”
Because of their party's split on the necessity of a new 
constitution, Democrats had campaigned in IS51 without a platform. Some 
Democrats believed that the commercial restrictions in the 1845 
constitution should remain in place, while others echoed Whig calls for 
reforms designed to facilitate commerce. The Louisiana Courier warned 
voters that the Whig call for an elective judiciary was simply a trick 
with the party’s real goal being to remove restrictions on state spending 
and plunge Louisiana into debt. The newspaper asserted that in the 1845 
constitutional convention the Whigs had opposed almost every democratic 
reform, and yet now they tried to convince the electorate that they were 
the party of democracy. Democrats stressed that the 1845 document 
included an amending process that could be used to make it more 
democratic without removing restrictions on government involvement in the 
economy and without calling an expensive convention.^
In the June election, voters chose the Whigs’ united front in favor 
of a convention over the Democrats’ mixed message. The Commercial 
Bulletin called the Whig triumph "unparalleled," as the party captured 
a majority of approximately 30 to 40 of the 125 seats contested. A 
Democratic newspaper admitted that the absence of a pro-convention plank 
had hurt the party, and W.W. Pugh, a Democratic delegate, lamented that 
the results left his party in a position where it could "only object to
64Baton Rouge Gazette. April 17, 1852; Daily Picayune, May 12, 1852; 
Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. May 1, 1852: Commercial Bulletin. April 24, 
1852.
^Louisiana Courier. June 1, 5, 1852.
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disagreeable measures, without having the power to interpose any 
obstacle." The Whigs* victory was particularly impressive in commercial 
New Orleans which had the most to complain about the anti-business 
provisions of the 1S45 const i tution. In the Crescent City. Whigs 
captured twenty-six of the twenty-seven seats.00
The convention assembled on July 5, 1852. with the Whigs employing 
their overwhelming majority to write a constitution based on their 
platform of positive government: state aid to business and internal 
improvements, more liberal banking laws, and public education. The 
succeeded in legalizing state government purchase of stock in internal 
improvement projects, an article which Pugh saw as the "one great and 
controlling desire of the whigs of New Orleans" and decried as 
"graft...solely for the promotion...of speculators." They also passed 
measures that raised the maximum state debt from one hundred thousand to 
eight million dollars, permitted free banking— the formation of banks 
with either general or special laws— and removed limits on the life of 
corporations and monopolies. Not only Whigs found these measures 
attractive, for the constitution passed by an overwhelming 98-8 vote. 
Many of the delegates probably agreed with R.A. Hargis’s assessment. "I 
vote yes, not because I like the new Constitution in all of its details, 
but because I like it better than the constitution of 1845. ”67
^ Commercial Bulletin. June 15, 16 (quote) 1852; W.W. Pugh to
Josephine N. Pugh, July 5, 1852, Pugh Family Papers, UT.
67W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, July 11, 1852 (second quote) and 
July 28, 1852 (first quote), Pugh Family Papers, UT; Journal of the
Convention to Form a New Constitution for the State of Louisiana (New 
Orleans, 1852). Text of the constitution, 91-9, vote on constitution, 98- 
9; (Hargis quote on p. 100); Everard, "Louisiana’s ’Whig’ Constitution
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The IS52 constitutional convention possessed a far greater spirit 
of cooperation than the 1845 assembly. The index of disagreement in the 
approving the constitution was only twenty-five percent with both parties 
voting strongly in favor of passage. The elective judiciary, which had 
engendered so much animosity seven years earlier, passed with the only 
arguments over the length of terms and the number of districts. Also, 
the duration of the convention indicated less partisan controversy or at 
least less debate than the 1S45 convention. In 1S44 and 1845. delegates 
met for over 140 days, while in 1S52 revision took only 27 days. In his 
study of the process. Wayne Everard cites the bipartisanship of the 
convention as evidence that the label "Whig constitution" is a misnomer. 
Though Everard exaggerates the extent of the partisan cooperation, he 
does accurately portray the parties in the 1852 constitutional convention
£9as less antagonistic than in 1845.
Whig papers were ecstatic about the proposed constitution, and the 
Baton Rouge Gazette exclaimed that the Whigs "now have it in our power 
to place Louisiana beyond the reach of Locofocoism and to retain its 
government in our hands for years to come." The electorate still had to 
ratify the constitution, and Democratic opposition to the document soon 
developed over an issue which had nothing to do with the Whigs’ primary 
goals. The charter included an article which based representation in 
both houses of the legislature upon total population, with slaves 
counting the same as free people. Thus, a parish with one thousand
Revisited," 37-51.
^Journal of the Convention. 60-70, 99; Everard, "Louisiana’s ’Whig’ 
Constitution Revisited," 37-51.
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whites and nine thousand slaves would have the same number of legislators 
as one with ten thousand whites and no slaves. In the antebellum period, 
no other southern state used this basis of representation in both houses 
of the legislature."
Residents of parishes. including Orleans. which had low' 
concentrations of slaves objected to this measure which would create a 
nobility of planters and, according to one delegate, would "place the 
African and white man on a level.” Opposed to ratification, the 
Louisiana Courier asserted that "no white man can accept [the 
constitution] without being faithless to his race.” In seizing total 
population in their opposition to the constitution. Democrats acted 
disingenuously because the charter merely extended to both houses the 
method of apportionment that the 1845 constitution, which had been 
written by Democrats, had used for the senate. Additionally, with an 
index of partisan disagreement of less than twenty percent, total 
population did not pass solely as a partisan measure. Instead, it 
emerged as a sectional compromise among the parishes with high slave 
concentrations, parishes with few slaves, and New Orleans. The Whig 
delegates form Orleans Parish supported this measure by a vote of 16 to 
10 because they feared that any other method would include a limit on the 
number of legislators from the city, while the total population method 
did not place a ceiling on the size of any parish’s delegation. Some 
delegates from parishes with low concentrations of slaves supported the 
compromise because, for the first time in Louis iana history, a
bQBaton Rouge Gazette. July 10, 1852; Donald E. Fehrenbacher,
Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slaveholding South (Athens, 
Ga., 1989), 12-3.
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constitution guaranteed each parish a representative in the 
legislature.^
Pro-constitution Whig newspapers argued that voters should accept 
the new constitution with one objectionable article rather than remain 
under the present one with its ''many odious clauses.” The commercially- 
oriented Democratic Dailv Delta concurred that "the choice is between the 
old and new Constitution. It is not. whether you entirely approve both, 
but which do you prefer.” John Slidell possessed a different opinion. 
He argued that all of the necessary changes could have been quickly 
attained through an amendment process and would be made the next year 
even if voters rej'ected the constitution. The electorate apparently 
disagreed with Slidell’s assessment. On November 2, Louisianans accepted 
the 1852 constitution by a vote of 19.286 to 16,004. In no region did 
the pro-constitution vote exceed sixty percent, but only voters in North 
Louisiana rej’ected the measure. Their vote reflected the strength of the 
anti-constitution Democratic party there and the region’s fear of the 
influence of New Orleans.71 (TABLE 4.1)
In 1852, the meeting of a constitutional convention and debate over 
the charter’s ratification occurred simultaneously with a heated 
presidential campaign. Four years earlier, Louisiana Whigs had spent a 
significant amount of the presidential canvass defending their northern- 
born vice-presidential candidate Millard Fillmore from attacks regarding
70Journal of the Convention. 65 (vote on total population), 100 
(quote); Louisiana Courier. October 30, 1852. Whigs voted 51-19 and 
Democrats 25-22 in favor of total population.
7'Baton Rouge Gazette. August 14, 1852 (first quote); Dailv Delta. 
November 2, 1852 (second quote); Bee. November 24, 1852; Slidell letter 
in Louisiana Courier. October 14, 1852.
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NORTH LA 4731 5071
ORLEANS 7046 49SS






his loyalty to the South. By 1852, Fillmore had emerged as the first 
choice of Whigs in Louisiana. One proclaimed. "There had not been a 
better President since the days of Madison," and another agreed that 
"Fillmore is our strongest man.” His conduct as president had removed 
most doubts about his principles. Fillmore had named Louisiana Whig 
Charles M. Conrad as secretary of war, but more importantly he had 
embraced the Compromise of 1850 and enforced its Fugitive Slave Act. 
Because of the president's association with the Compromise, Louisiana 
Democratic kingpin John Slidell acknowledged that "if Fillmore be the 
Whig candidate we shal 1 have a very even and doubtful contest in this 
state."72
Even prior to the Whigs’ March nominating convention, partisan 
newspapers had hoisted Fillmore’s name to their mastheads. Unlike in 
1848, when the party divided between proponents of Henry Clay and Zachary 
Taylor, in 1852, the Whigs united in favor of Fillmore. By 1852, Clay 
was seventy-four years old and ill, and most Louisiana Whigs agreed with
72E.B. Carr to John Moore, April 9, 1852 (first quote); John Ray to 
Moore, February 11, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC (second quote); John
Slidell to James Buchanan, May 22, 1852, Buchanan Papers, HSP (third 
quote).
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
244
the sentiment. ,?CIay would be my man now. but I suppose his day is past." 
Nationally, two other candidates were spoken of: Daniel Webster of 
Massachusetts and General Winfield Scott. Webster’s candidacy had some 
popularity in Louisiana because of his championship of the Compromise of 
1S50. Discussing Webster’s prospects, however, a Louisianan accurately 
described Whig opinion. "Webster cannot get half the vote in the slave 
states that Fillmore would but is probably stronger than General 
Scott. ”7'
Despite his birth in Virginia. Scott’s candidacy had very little
support in the South including Louisiana. Taylor’s presidency had left
Louisiana Whigs skeptical about war heroes and friends of New York free-
soiler William Seward— two categories into which Scott fit. His silence
on the Compromise of 1850 also contributed to their distaste for him, and
one went so far as to contend that the nomination of Scott would
"annihilate the Whig party here." While demonstrating to the North their
strong disapproval of Scott’s candidacy, they had to leave the door open
if Scott became the national nominee. An editorial in the Whig Bee
demonstrates the difficulty of their position:
The Bee has never said that no Southern Whig can or should 
support Genl. SCOTT...What we have said, once, twice, and 
twenty times was that Southern Whigs would not and could not 
support Genl. Scott unless his opinions touching Slavery and 
the Compromise should be distinctly known, and should accord 
with the South.
At the March nominating convention, Whigs made their commitment to 
Fillmore explicit. The state platform announced that Louisiana endorsed
W. Bledsoe to John Moore, May 3, 1852 (first quote), A.J. Sandidge 
to Moore, March 4, 1852 (second quote), E.B. Carr to Moore, April 9, 
1852, all in Weeks Papers, LLMVC; Dailv Picayune. January 1, May 21,
1852;
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Millard Fillmore for the presidency and John C. Crittenden of Kentucky 
for the vice presidency. The platform also declared the Compromise of 
1850 the final settlement of the nation's sectional problems.?i
At the June national convention held in Baltimore, southern Whigs 
won the battle over the platform, which accepted the Compromise of 1850. 
but lost a protracted contest over the nominee as Winfield Scott received 
the nomination on the fifty-third ballot. Not surprisingly, Louisiana 
Whigs reacted unenthusiastically. A Whig legislator complained that 
Scott’s "most disastrous" nomination "will be death" to the state’s Whig 
party. Writing about Scott, the Plaquemine Southern Sentinel declared
"that [Scott] has previously been distrusted by southern Whigs cannot
be denied," and the Commercial Bulletin, describing its own editorial 
position, reported that it was "not a volunteer recruit under the 
standard of General SCOTT." Speaking at a ratification meeting, Senator- 
elect Benjamin added that he had opposed Scott’s nomination but had 
changed his mind with the candidate’s acceptance of the party platform. 
Two of the six Whig electors reacted more extremely and resigned their 
positions in protest of the nomination.7*
While Louisiana Whigs had entered the 1852 presidential campaign 
united, the state’s Democrats realized they needed to heal ruptures 
within their party to reaffirm their ascendancy in the state. In
7*WilliamH. Sparks to John Moore, May 17, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC 
(first quote); Bee. March 18, 1852 (second quote).
'*Wi 11 iam E. Gienapp, "The Whig Party, the Compromise of 1850, and 
the Nomination of Winfield Scott," Presidential Studies Quarterly XIV 
(Summer 1984), 399-415; F.D. Richardson to Moses Liddell, June 28, 1852, 
Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. 
June 26, 1852 (second quote); Commercial Bulletin. June 23, 1852 (third 
quote); Butler, Judah P. Beniamin. 104.
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January. Slidell worried that "a very great majority of our party approve 
of the compromise: yet those who were opposed are sufficiently numerous 
to make our defeat certain in any contest when their support shall be 
withheld." He realized that before challenging the Whigs, the Democrats 
must put their own house in order and hoped that the state convention 
would provide the party this opportunity. At the convention, Louisiana 
Democrats remained sundered. Slidell’s wing favored his friend 
Pennsylvanian James Buchanan, while Soule’s faction preferred Illinois 
Senator Stephen A. Douglas. Though Douglas and Soule disagreed over the 
merits of the Compromise of 1850, Soule supported him partially to 
counter Slidell’s championship of Buchanan. A third group led by Senator 
Downs, whom Slidell believed had reneged on a commitment to Buchanan, 
advocated a return to 1848 presidential candidate Lewis Cass.76
To retain party harmony at the March convention, the members did 
not express a preference for the presidency and sent an unpledged 
delegation to the national convention. Louisiana Democrats agreed to 
abide by the choice of the national party as long as it endorsed the 
Compromise of 1850. At the Baltimore national convention, Democrats 
returned to their winning strategy of 1844, when they nominated the dark 
horse James K. Polk. Instead of nominating one of the prominent 
candidates, the party turned to the obscure governor of New Hampshire 
Franklin Pierce and sanctioned the Compromise of 1850. Heeding calls for
76John Slidell to Howell Cobb, January 28, 1852, (quote) in U.B. 
Phillips, ed., "The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander Stephens, 
and Howell Cobb," American Historical Association. Report vol. 2 (1911), 
276; Slidell to unknown, February 15, 1852, John Slidell Letter, LLMVC; 
Slidell to James Buchanan, February 26, March 19, April 15, 1852,
Buchanan Papers, HSP; Pierre Sou 16 to Isaac Morse, February 1, 1852, in 
Morse, The Blood of an Englishman. 129-30.
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party unity, all factions of the Louisiana Democratic party joined 
together and endorsed the nominee. Soule called Pierce "a man of great 
merit.” and Slidell declared that he would "heartily support Pierce." 
At the June ratification meeting, Slidell stressed the necessity of 
restoring "the ancient discipline of the Democracy.”̂
Louisiana Democrats quickly realized that their best tactic to win 
the election was to attack Scott as an opponent of slavery. Letters to 
John F.H. Claiborne, an editor of the Louisiana Courier, indicate the 
unanimity in favor of this strategy. Writing from Washington, a 
Louisiana Congressman urged that "it would be most prudent, not to attack 
the Whigs as a Party— but confine our attacks —  upon Scott’s free-soil, 
and abolition tendencies." Slidell echoed this viewpoint. "Our true 
policy," according to Slidell, "will not be to attack the whigs as a 
party, but confine ourselves to commentaries upon Scott’s political 
heresies & the character of his original & confidential supporters."
Slidell’s rival Pierre Soule congratulated Claiborne for adopting this
78course but implored him to be even more aggressive.
Louisiana’s Democratic editors did not need to do much research to 
challenge Scott on his loyalty to slavery. They simply could pick up 
copies of Whig newspapers from earlier in the year. Preparing for a
77John Slidell to James Buchanan, April 15, June 23, 1852 (second 
quote). Buchanan Papers, HSP; Address of Jacob Barker delivered before 
the Members of the Jefferson Club (New Orleans, 1852); Pierre Soule to 
Charles Gayarre, August 2, 1852, Charles E.A. Gayarrd Collection, LLMVC 
(first quote); Slidell’s speech at the ratification meeting in New 
Orleans Weekly Delta. June 13, 1852 (third quote).
78A.G. Penn to John F.H. Claiborne, June 25, 1852 (first quote), John 
Slidell to Claiborne, July 6 , 1852 (second quote), Pierre Soule to
Claiborne, August 15, 1852 (third quote), all in John F.H. Claiborne 
Papers, MDAH.
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debate in South Louisiana, a Democrat obtained pre-convention quotes from 
Whigs questioning Scott's fidelity to the region. Everyday during the 
campaign season, the Louisiana Courier prominently displayed an anti- 
Scott quote from a May edition of the Whig Commercial Bulletin. Also. 
Democrats made immense political capital from the defection of two Whig 
electors. One of the Whig electors not only resigned from the Scott 
ticket but endorsed Pierce and made speech in the candidate’s behalf. 
Allegations of partisans crossing party lines appeared in almost every 
antebellum race, but these prominent defections lent credence to reports 
of widespread desertions from the Whig ranks and forced the Whigs to 
spend valuable time countering them. The Louisiana Courier even asserted 
that the backbone of the Whig party, sugar planters, had defected in
)Gfavor of Pierce.
While questioning Scott’s loyalty to the South, Democrats 
celebrated Franklin Pierce’s commitment to slavery. They cited letters 
detailing Pierce’s faithfulness to the Compromise and claimed that with 
Pierce’s election, "the rights of the South would be safe." Below its 
anti-Scott quotes, the Louisiana Courier included a quote from Pierce 
accepting the pro-Compromise Democratic platform. A Democratic orator 
stressed that a southern slaveholding state, Virginia, had introduced 
Pierce’s name at the national convention. If Virginia felt confident in 
Pierce’s stance regarding slavery, then so should Louisiana. According 
to Democratic newspapers, not only had Virginia declared Pierce sound,
79James Muggah essay for debate, September 20, 1852, Muggah Family 
Papers, HNO; W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, July 5, 7, 12, 1852, Pugh 
Family Papers, UT; Louisiana Courier. July through November, 1852; Dailv 
Delta, October 31, 1852.
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but Louisiana Whig Judah P. Benjamin had called him "true to the 
South."80
During the fall campaign season, Louisiana Whigs suddenly 
discovered that Scott was more loyal to the South than they previously 
had believed. Regarding Winfield Scott’s attitude toward slavery, Whigs 
stressed the theme that Scott and not southern Whigs had changed their 
positions. Earlier anti-Scott editorials and speeches could be dismissed 
because they spoke only of a General Scott silent on the compromise 
issue. In contrast, the new Winfield Scott, who had accepted the Whig 
platform, was no longer a friend of the free-soil Whigs but instead a 
champion of the Compromise and, therefore, of the South. For Whigs, a 
re-examination of Scott’s writings revealed that he opposed interference 
with the South’s peculiar institution. Whig planter Joseph Moore 
admitted that he had initially opposed Scott, but ’’on hearing of his 
nomination, I examined myself the grounds upon which were based the 
charges of faithlessness to the South.” After this scrutiny, he "found 
that the conclusion drawn from them is entirely erroneous.” Whigs also 
reminded Louisiana voters that since 1850 their party had united in favor 
of the Compromise, while the state’s Democrats had divided on the
CImeasure.
Louisiana Whigs did more than defend Scott. They attacked the 
northerner Pierce’s fidelity to the South calling him a free-soiler and
flflJames Muggah essay, September 20, 1852, Muggah Family Papers, HNO 
(first quote); Louisiana Courier. July 14, 30 (second quote), 1852.
OfBaton Rouee Gazette. July 3, 31, 1852; Joseph Moore to John Moore, 
August 21, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC.
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alleging that he was ’'tinctured with abolitionism." While perhaps Scott 
possessed free soil friends, the Baton Rouge Gazette boldly stated that 
southerners did not have to worry about Pierce’s friends, they had to 
worry about Pierce. The newspaper unequivocally declared "Franklin 
Pierce Hates and Deplores Slavery." During the campaign. Whig newspapers 
carried quotations beneath their mastheads contrasting the candidates’ 
stances on slavery. Attributed to Pierce, the first two quotes included, 
"I consider slavery a social evil” and "I loathe [the fugitive slave
law].” In third quote, Scott counters, "I am dead for the Constitution—
82dead for the Union— dead for the Compromise.”
In addition to trading accusations of infidelity to slavery, 
Louisiana Democrats and Whigs charged each other with hostility towards 
immigrants. Against Pierce, the Whigs employed nativism and its brother 
in bigotry, anti-Catholicism. Regarding the banning of Catholic office- 
holding in Pierce’s home state of New Hampshire, the Whigs charged, "When 
religious liberty needed a champion General Pierce was found— wanting." 
In a further effort to deter Irish voters from choosing Pierce, Whigs 
labelled him an anglophile. Louisiana Whigs, however, faced the same 
dilemma they had in the slavery debate. As with the slavery issue, the 
Democrats brought forward quotes attacking Scott as a nativist from Whig 
newspapers earlier in the year. In this instance, they asserted that
82Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. September II, 1852; October 1S52; 
Bee. October 1852; Abner L. Duncan to John Moore, September 2, 1852, 
Weeks Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Baton Rouge Gazette. July 31, August 
14 (second quote), 1852.
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Scott, a nativist. desired that naturalized citizens never receive the
- ,right to vote."
Unlike in most other southern states where the traditional debate 
over the American System had disappeared, in Louisiana, the Whigs still 
stressed two planks: a tariff and federally sponsored internal
improvements. The Whig platform maintained a commitment to a tariff to 
protect against "the competition of half-paid[,] half-fed foreign 
paupers’' and to government aid to internal improvements. A Whig editor 
declared, "If you want your rivers and harbors improved vote for SCOTT.” 
while another partisan claimed that, though the Democrats hoped no one 
knew Pierce, his views opposing federal aid to internal improvements 
would soon become known to all. In these arguments, the Democrats 
concurred with the Whigs. Pierce did favor the lower tariff of 1S46 
because it benefitted the whole country, particularly the South. Their 
candidate also justly rejected federal expenditures for internal
g Iimprovements because they were both unconstitutional and wasteful.
Discussion of immigrants and tariffs did not challenge the hold 
that slavery had on voters’ minds, and on the same day that Louisiana 
Whigs celebrated the passage of the new constitution, Pierce defeated 
Scott in the state and across the nation. According to the Bee. 
Louisiana Whigs were "barely beaten" and had "not been routed and
Bee. August 17, 1852 (quote); Baton Rouge Gazette. October 30,
1852; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. September 11, 18, 1852; Louisiana 
Courier. July 24, 1852.
For a discussion of the absence of traditional Whig measures in 
southern platforms of 1852 see Cole, Whig Party in the South. 219-221; 
Baton Rouge Gazette. March 20, 1852 (first quote); West Baton Rouge 
Capitolian Vis-A-Vis. October 27, 1852 (second quote); A.F. Rightor to 
Andrew McCollam, June 20, 1852, Andrew McCollam Papers, SHC.
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shattered into fragments." This description, however, did not apply to 
the national Whig party as Scott only won four states. In most southern 
states, fears regarding the Whigs' position on slavery proved devastating 
to the party’s chances. In Louisiana, however, Scott won the 
historicaliv Whig South Louisiana and lost a close race in New Orleans. 
He even made a respectable showing in North Louisiana and the Florida 
Parishes.85 (SEE APPENDIX A)
Whigs, with their constitution ratified, and Democrats, with their 
victory in the presidential contest, could both look optimistically to 
the state elections scheduled for December 27, 1852. Regarding state 
issues. Louisiana parties had come full circle from November 1845 to 
November 1852. In the former year, the voters had just passed a 
Democratic-authored constitution, while in the latter year. the 
electorate had approved a Whig-authored charter. The Whigs hoped to 
further the parallel and emulate the Democrats’ domination of the ensuing 
elections. The Democrats still maintained that their party favored 
democracy more than the Whigs, and hoped that their success in the past 
three gubernatorial campaigns would continue their reign in the state.
While the state situation may have appeared similar in 1845 and 
1852, the national political climate had changed dramatically. Though 
always a force in presidential politics, slavery had increased in 
importance, and southern firebrands openly talked of disunion. In 1845, 
the Democrats combined their authorship of the constitution with 
possession of the presidency. In 1852, Whigs faced a more precarious 
situation as they combined their constitution with a party sharply
85Bee, November 12, 1852.
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divided over slavery. The national electorate had just repudiated the 
Whig nominee, and in many southern states the Whig party had collapsed. 
Louisiana Democrats hoped and Louisiana Whigs feared that this disease 
could spread to their state.
In the wake of the pair of November 1852 contests. Louisiana 
Democrats and Whigs appeared more similar than ever before. Regarding 
national issues, both of the state’s parties championed slavery and the 
Compromise of 1850. The ratification of the Constitution of 1852 settled 
state differences as well. At the same time, traditional partisan 
distinctions had also receded. Political campaigns engendered less 
debate over the American System and the towering figure of Andrew Jackson 
than ever before. The ethnicity issue had moved from tension between 
Americans and Creoles to a debate over the political rights of 
immigrants. Louisiana Democrats and Whigs had not yet adjusted to this 
new political world, and with an election less than two months away, they 
would have to make quick decisions on how best to adapt.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PARTIES. CAMPAIGNS. GOVERNMENT. AND JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 
During the antebeilum period, the politicaL process in Louisiana 
did not remain static. The provisions of the LSL2 constitution 
reflected a distrust of the common people. It created a small 
electorate with sharply proscribed powers, granting most power to the 
governor. Wealth and age restrictions limited access to these 
positions. Most people remained separate from the government which 
neither collected many taxes nor spent much money. If many 
Louisianans were isolated from their state government, the state was 
almost as isolated from national politics. Political campaigns 
revolved around ethnicity and personality more than policy or party. 
But. even in the early years of statehood, the government did have 
democratic elements: aspirants to office recognized the necessity of 
campaigning; the majority of eligible voters went to the polls on 
election day; and the tax rate was progressive.
The ideals of Jacksonian democracy transformed the state. 
Louisiana’s subsequent antebellum constitutions, the charters of 1S45 
and 1852. transferred more power to more people. The electorate 
expanded as did the number of elective positions. Reduced 
qualifications for office opened the campaign field to more 
participants, and candidates’ unceasing efforts to get their message 
to every voter illustrated their commitment to the people. Political 
parties served as the engines for this transformation, and Louisiana 
developed a remarkably balanced party system. The parties held 
conventions, nominated candidates, organized campaigns, and published 
newspapers. As the early period contained democratic elements, the
254
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party era retained vestiges of iess-democratic elements. Despite the 
removal of property requirements for office, wealthy men continued to 
dominate the legislature. Also, partisan practice did not always 
match the democratic ideal, and party members often charged that their 
opponents' corruption had thwarted the will of the people.
The development of political parties represents perhaps the 
greatest change in Louisiana politics between the state's entrance 
into the Union in IS12 and its secession in 1S61. In 1SI2.
Louisianans based allegiance to a particular candidate on what 
language he spoke and where he lived. Less than twenty-five years 
later. Louisianans would see themselves first and foremost as 
partisans: Democrats. Whigs, and, in the 1850s, Know Nothings. Yet. 
the importance of regionalism did not disappear, and the parties did 
not receive equal support across the entire state. To examine the 
regional strength of Louisiana political parties, the period from 1824 
to 1861 can be divided into four phases: (1) 1824-1832— an era 
characterized by non-partisan contests, (2) 1S34-1844— Whigs and 
Democrats during the period of restrictive suffrage, (3) 1846-1852—  
Whigs and Democrats with universal white male suffrage, (4) 1855-1860- 
-Democrats and different opponents after the decline of the Whigs.
The pre-party era from 1824 to 1832 was characterized by the 
absence of partisan nominations, a multiplicity of candidates, extreme 
regional variations in support, and the importance of ethnicity as a 
campaign topic. In the absence of an organized nominating process, 
four or more candidates received votes in each of the three 
gubernatorial races during this period. Moreover, Louisianans did not
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connect state contests to national contests, especially with 
gubernatorial elections in July and presidential elections in 
November. During this period, candidates would often obtain the 
overwhelming majority of their votes in a single region. For example. 
Philemon Thomas ran for governor in both IS24 and LS2S. Considered 
the founding father of the Florida Parishes. Thomas, in 1S2S. received 
50.2 percent of his home region's votes which represented 78.5 percent 
of his total. Outside of this section. Thomas garnered only 4.~ 
percent of the ballots cast and finished fourth in the race. In 1S30. 
another resident of the Florida Parishes. William S. Hamilton, 
suffered a similar fate. While winning over two-thirds the votes in 
the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana. Hamilton secured only 12.S 
percent of the votes in Greater Orleans and 11.6 percent in South 
Louisiana, dooming his candidacy. (SEE APPENDIX B)
The sectional voting pattern revealed in the votes of both 
Thomas and Hamilton illustrates the importance of ethnicity and 
personality during the pre-party period. In the three gubernatorial 
campaigns during this period, Democrats did not face Whigs.
Louisianans did not identify themselves with parties; instead. Creoles 
opposed Americans. In the Florida Parishes, an American stronghold, 
Creole gubernatorial candidates’ total never exceeded 30.9 percent of 
the votes. At the same time, the Creoles dominated South Louisiana, 
receiving at least 65.5 percent of the ballots in each of the 
contests. From 1824 to 1832. a small population combined with a 
property requirement for voting kept vote totals low and made personal
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relationships extremely important. Especially at a parish Level, the 
support of a few key men and their families often ensured victory.
From LS34 to IS44, Louisiana campaigns and elections changed 
into competitive battles between Democrats and Whigs. The parties 
divided the six major statewide elections: the Whigs won two of the 
three gubernatorial races, and the Democrats captured two of the three 
presidential contests. Overall, the Whigs received 51.9 percent of 
the ballots and prevailed in 110 parishes with the Democrats obtaining 
105 parishes in these six party battles. The results in terms of 
total votes, elections, and parishes captured conveys the impression 
of a balance in the state. This overall symmetry, however, hid a 
series of uncompetitive regional and parish contests. Of the 217 
total parish contests. 134 (61.7 percent) saw one party receive over 
sixty percent of the votes, and in 71 (32.7 percent), the victorious 
party garnered over seventy percent. Parishes tended to support the 
same party repeatedly. Of the forty-five parishes which had returns 
for at least one of these contests, thirty-one (68.9 percent) backed 
either the Whigs or Democrats at least 80 percent of the time.1 
(TABLES 5.1. 5.2, 5.3)
Louisiana Whigs received their most vigorous backing in South 
Louisiana with its pro-tariff sugar cane growers. The electorate in 
South Louisiana gave 60.3 percent of its votes to Whig candidates, who 
won the region in five of the six contests— only in the 1842
‘For the purposes of this section, parishes won refers to those in 
which a party’s candidate received the majority of votes in presidential 
and gubernatorial elections. Legislative and congressional elections have 
not been included.
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TABLE 5.1
Votes by Region
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PARISHES PARISHES PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
WON BY WON BY OF WHIG OF DEM OF TOTAL
WHIGS DEMOCRATS WHIG % DEM ^PARISHES PARISHES PARIESHES
FLORIDA 7 34 l~.l S2.9 6.4 32.4 19.1
NORTH LA 24 35 40." 59.3 21-S 3 3.3 27.4
ORLEANS 15 9 62.5 37.5 13.6 S.6 11.2
SOUTH LA 64 27 70.3 29.7 5S.2 25.7 42.3
110 105 51.2 48.8
TOTAL PARISHES: 215
1845-1S52
PARISHES PARISHES PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
WON BY WON BY OF WHIG OF DEM OF TOTAL
WHIGS DEMOCRATS WHIG % DEM ^PARISHES PARISHES PARIESHES
FLORIDA 3 32 8.6 91.4 3.5 22.1 15.2
NORTH LA 22 72 23.4 76.6 25.6 49.7 40.7
ORLEANS 7 13 35.0 65.0 S.l 9.0 S.7
SOUTH LA 54 28 65.8 34.2 62.8 19.3 35.5


















FLORIDA 7 21 25.0 75.0 15.6 14.3 14.6
NORTH LA 11 69 13.7 86.3 24.4 46.9 41.7
ORLEANS S 8 50.0 50.0 17.8 5.4 8.3
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TABLE 5.3
Parishes m  which Democrats Won 
a Given Percent of Elections'"
1834-1844
PARISHES PERCENTAGE OF ELECTIONS WON BY DEMOCRATS
IN 0-19 20-39 40-59 60-^9 80-100
R E G I O N --------------------------------------------
FLORIDA 7 3 4
NORTH LA 17 4 1 2 2 8
ORLEANS 4 2 1 1
SOUTH LA 17 9 2 3 3
45 15 4 5 o 16
% OF ALL PARISHES 33.3 S.9 II.1 11.1 35.6
1845-1852
PARISHES PERCENTAGE OF ELECTIONS WON BY DEMOCRATS
IN 0-19 20-39 40-59 60-79 80-100
REGION ----------------------------------------------
FLORIDA 7 1 6
NORTH LA 20 2 1 2 1 14
ORLEANS 4 1 1 2
SOUTH LA 17 8 2 1 2 4
48 10 3 5 4 26









PERCENTAGE OF ELECTIONS WON BY DEMOCRATS














4S 1 6 6 12 23
% OF ALL PARISHES 2.1 12.5 12.5 25.0 47.9
"Example: From 1834 to 1844 in 3 or the 7 Florida Parishes,
Democrats won between 60 and 79 percent of the contests, and in 4 the 
party won between 80 and 100 percent of the races.
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gubernatorial race did. Democrat Alexander Mouton. a native of South 
Louisiana’s Lafayette Parish, narrowly edge his Whig competitor.
Whigs won 70.3 percent of South Louisiana's parishes in the six 
elections. South Louisiana also supplied the Whigs a disproportionate 
amount of their statewide support. The region accounted for 35.3 
percent of the total votes cast in Louisiana from IS34 to IS44 but 
provided the Whig party with 41 percent of its votes. In terms of 
parish results. 42.3 percent of the state's contests occurred in the 
region, but the Whigs won 5S.2 percent of their victories here, and in 
nine of South Louisiana's seventeen parishes. Democrats won less than 
twenty percent of the elections from 1S34 to 1844.
If between 1834 and 1844 South Louisiana represented one extreme 
of partisan allegiance, the Florida Parishes represented the other. 
Democratic candidates captured every election but one in this region—  
in the 1838 gubernatorial contest. New Orleans Democrat Denis Prieur 
lost in the Florida Parishes probably because of a bias against 
candidates from the city. In the other five races, the Whigs suffered 
defeat in thirty-one of the thirty-five parishes. During this period. 
Democrats received 60.7 percent of the ballots cast in the Florida 
Parishes and never lost in three of the region’s seven parishes.
Casting 17.2 percent of the total ballots in the state, the area gave 
Democrats 21.8 percent of their total votes. Though the region 
provided less than one-fifth of the total parish returns, it accounted 
for almost one-third of the Democrats’ victories.
The other two regions, Greater Orleans and North Louisiana, 
provided more competitive arenas. In North Louisiana, Democrats
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captured 52.6 percent of the votes but evenly split the six elections 
with the Whigs. The Whigs benefit ted from their dominance in the 
heavily slave parishes along the Mississippi River— triumphing in all 
eleven contests in Concordia. Tensas, and Madison Parishes. Outside 
of these three, they lost 72.9 percent of the parishes. In Greater 
Orleans, the Whigs triumphed in four of the six races and garnered 
52.9 percent of the ballots. Greater Orleans gave the parties 
extremely balanced support. Accounting for 24.5 percent of the 
state's votes, the section gave Whigs 25.0 percent of their votes and 
provided Democrats with 24.0 percent of their ballots.
In the subsequent period, from 1846 to 1S52. the small Whig 
majority in Louisiana disappeared. The Democratic proportion of 
Louisiana's electorate grew from 4S.1 percent to 51.3 percent, and 
this seemingly minor increase had a profound effect on election 
results. Whig candidates lost all three gubernatorial contests, and 
one of the two presidential battles, only gaining Louisiana’s 
electoral votes for native-son Zachary Taylor in 1848. The Democrats 
triumphed in 145 of the 232 parish battles (62.5 percent) in the five 
elections. In 23 of the 48 parishes (47.9 percent), the Democrats 
swept every gubernatorial and presidential race from 1846 to 1852. 
Although the Whig party became a minority, it was not without support, 
and Whig candidates received 48.7 percent of Louisiana’s votes. While 
competitive in many parish races (in 53 percent of the parishes 
involved in these elections, the winning candidate received less than 
60 percent of the votes), by the end of 1852, the Whigs were a 
minority party in Louisiana.
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From IS46 to 1S52. the Whig party's strength became increasingly 
concentrated in South Louisiana. Whig nominees received 56.” percent 
of South Louisiana's votes, and it was the only region which gave them 
a majority. South Louisiana continued to provide the Whig party a 
disproportionate amount of its support. The section accounted for 28 
percent of Louisiana's votes and 35.5 percent of its parish contests 
but furnished the Whig party with 32.5 percent of its votes and fifty- 
four of its eighty-six (62.S percent) parish victories. Conversely, 
in eight of South Louisiana's seventeen parishes, the Democratic party 
won less than 20 percent of the contests during this period. In 
contrast, the Democrats won less than 20 percent of the votes in only 
two of Louisiana's other thirty-one parishes.
Outside South Louisiana, while the Whigs may have won some races 
and remained competitive in most parishes, they clearly had been 
reduced to a minority party. In the five elections from 1846 to 1S52, 
Democrats captured 78.5 percent of the parishes in the other three 
regions. This total includes 91.4 percent of the contests in the 
Florida Parishes where the Whigs mustered three victories in St. 
Tammany Parish but none in the other six parishes. A similar 
situation prevailed in North Louisiana where the minimal Whig support 
remained highly concentrated. As in the earlier period, Whigs relied 
on Concordia, Tensas, and Madison Parishes. These parishes, when 
combined with Morehouse Parish, supplied a Whig majority in seventeen 
of their twenty contests. In the other sixteen parishes of North 
Louisiana, the Democratic party dominated— triumphing in sixty-nine of 
seventy-four parish elections (93.2 percent). North Louisiana and the
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Florida Parishes, which accounted for 55.S percent of the state's 
parish contests, provided Whigs with only 29.1 percent of their 
victories, and in twenty of their twenty-seven parishes Democrats won 
SO percent or more of the elections. Greater Orleans continued as the 
state's most balanced region. The Democrats* voting support did rise 
from 4~.l percent to 51.9 percent in this section.
After 1S52. with the disappearance of the Whig party, analyzing 
Louisiana’s voting patterns becomes more complicated. In the 1S55 
governor's race and the 1S56 presidential election. Democrats faced 
Know Nothing opponents. In 1S59. however, an anomalous Opposition 
party including renegade Democrats and former Know Nothings challenged 
the regular Democrats. In the 1S60 presidential election, Louisiana 
voters picked among two Democrats and a Constitutional Unionist.
Despite the confusing nature of these races, some conclusions can be 
drawn. The regular Democrats, a group most closely linked to Senator 
John Slidell, controlled the state. Their candidates triumphed in all 
four of the elections. Slidell Democrats won 76.6 percent of the 
parish battles, including a remarkable forty-six of the forty-eight 
parishes in the 1859 gubernatorial election.'
With the collapse of the Whigs and the rise of the Know- 
Nothings, sectional voting patterns did not mirror the Whig-Democratic 
pattern of earlier periods. South Louisiana, where the Whig party had 
received its strongest backing, switched its allegiance to the
JFor 1S60, Democratic victories include those parishes where the 
Slidel 1-supported Democrat John C. Breckinridge won a plurality of the 
votes. The three parishes where Democrat Stephen A. Douglas captured a 
plurality are included with the Opposition.
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Democrats. The Democrats had only captured South Louisiana for 
favorite-son Alexander Mouton in 1842. but they received a majority of 
its votes in the first three elections of this period— including over 
60 percent in two of the elections— and achieved a plurality in the 
1S60 presidential race. Religion provides the best explanation for 
the region's switch to the Democracy. The Know Nothings' anti- 
Catholic proclivity did not resound well in South Louisiana which, 
according to the 1S50 census, had 76.4 percent of its church seating 
capacity in Catholic churches. Faced with a choice between their old 
opponents and the Know Nothings, many South Louisianans chose the 
former, and the Democrats obtained 52.6 percent of the region's 
ballots /
If the opposition to the Democrats foundered in South Louisiana, 
it flourished in Greater Orleans. The Know Nothings' anti-immigrant 
message played well among the American-born in this region which in 
1S50 contained 89.9 percent of the state's foreign-born population.
In New Orleans, the Know Nothings left little to chance. They 
combined their opposition to immigrants with threats and violence 
which dissuaded many Democrats from coming to the polls. The 
Democratic party lost all four elections in the region and received 
only 36.7 percent of Greater Orleans’s votes— the lowest total any 
party received in any region during the antebellum era. In 1856, 
Democrats received only 29.9 percent of the votes in Greater Orleans, 
and in 1S60 their presidential candidate garnered just 25.0 percent of 
its ballots. The region accounted for 25.1 percent of Louisiana's
''Seventh Census. 1850. 489-91.
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voces during this period but provided the Democrats' opposition with 
33.5 percent of its support.
In North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes, voting patterns did 
not change significantly. The two sections continued their loyal 
allegiance to the regular Democratic party. Democratic candidates 
triumphed In both these regions in all four elections. Furthermore, 
they captured 5^.5 percent of the votes and ninety of the one hundred 
and eight parishes (S3.3 percent) in these six years. In sixteen of 
the twenty-seven parishes in North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes. 
Democrats swept all four contests, and the party won at least one 
election in each of the parishes. The opposition particularly 
suffered in North Louisiana. The parishes of this region held 41.7 
percent of the elections in the four races, vet North Louisiana 
supplied the opposition with only 24.4 percent of its total support.
In addition to examining partisan allegiance on a regional 
basis, party support can be examined on economic and social bases. 
Louisiana Whigs have been depicted as aristocratic planters and
CDemocrats as small farmers and laborers.J This portrayal is too 
simplistic, though it has some merit. Leaders of all of antebellum 
Louisiana’s political parties were wealthy men. The Whig leadership 
did include prominent planters such as Alexander Porter and Andre B. 
Roman. But, Democratic chieftains from John B. Dawson and Martin 
Gordon in the 1830s to John Slidell and Thomas Overton Moore in the 
1850s also numbered among the richest Louisianans. Conversely, no
^Roger W. Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. (Baton 
Rouge, 1966 reprint, orig in 1939), 152.
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parcy could win elections in Louisiana relying solely on the votes of 
planters. Democrats may have called themselves the party of the 
people, but Whigs and Know Nothings did not abdicate their claim to 
this title. Their candidates campaigned for and received the votes of 
all classes of citizens just as the Democrats did.
A division of Louisiana’s parishes into groups based on the 
percentage of slaves in their population reveals that the higher the 
concentration of slaves the greater the likelihood of a parish voting 
for Whig candidates. The Whigs captured 5S.4 percent of the races 
contested in the parishes with the highest slave concentrations, and 
these twelve parishes accounted for 37.2 percent of the party's 
victories. But. more importantly, this categorization also 
demonstrates that a one-to-one correspondence between slave percentage 
and Whig vote certainly did not exist. Even among these heavily slave 
parishes. Whigs lost 41.6 percent of the contests between 1S34 and 
1S52. Additionally, four of the these twelve parishes voted for 
Democrats in at least 80 percent of the elections. As slave 
concentration decreased, so did the Whig vote. But. even in the 
parishes with less than 40 percent of their population enslaved, Whigs 
managed to win 30 percent of the races, and two of these parishes 
voted for Whig candidates over 80 percent of the time.6 (TABLE 5.4) 
Louisiana’s antebellum agricultural production also belies the 
idea that the presence of staple crops equated to Whig victory. The 
parishes which produced the largest amount of cotton actually voted in
sThe data for variables such as slave concentration, cotton, sugar 
cane, and church seating come from Seventh Census. 1850. 481. 484, 486, 
4SS-91.
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TABLE 5.4-
Parish Results Based on a Given Variable'
Slave Percentage
Percent of Percent Percent Over Over
Slaves in fc of of Whig of Dem. 80% S0%
Population Par. Whig Dem. Whig % Votes Votes Whig Dem.
6S.9-90.0% 12 / J 52 58.4 37.2 “t 1 "* 6 2
55.1-68.5% 12 55 55 50.0 2S.1 22.5 3 3
41.7-54.1% 12 41 74 35.7 20.9 30.3 3 —
15.1-38.8% 11 27 63 30.0 13.8 25.S 2
Sugar Cane Production
Percent Percent Over Over
Hogsheads O»(• of Whig of Dem. S0% S0%
of Sugar Par. Whig Dem. Whig % Votes Votes Whig Dem.
9000+ 10 75 29 72.1 3S.3 11.9 6 1
4000-9000 10 57 51 52.S 29.1 21.0 4 3
1-2700 11 32 67 32.3 16.3 27.6 ■> 6
0 16 32 96 25.0 16.3 39.5 1 10
Cotton Production
400 lb. Percent Percent Over Over
Bales of # of of Whig of Dem. 80% 80%
Cotton Par. Whig Dem. Whig % Votes Votes Whig Dem.
o000+ 9 32 57 36.0 16.4 23.3 2 4
2400-4999 12 41 63 39.4 21.0 25.7 3 6
100-3999 13 22 90 19.6 11.3 36.7 1 10
0-100 13 100 35 74.1 51.3 14.3 8 1
Catholic Church Seating Capacity
% of Seats Percent Percent Over Over
in Catholic f of of Whig of Dem. 80% 80%
Churches Par. Whig Dem. Whig % Votes Votes Whig Dem.
100% 8 49 31 61.3 25.1 12.7 3 2
40-86% 11 73 43 62.9 37.4 17.6 5 1
6-29% 7 28 40 41.2 14.4 16.4 2 3
0 21 45 130 25.7 23.1 53.3 4 15
7Election data from presidential and gubernatorial races, 1834-52.
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favor of the Democratic party in 64 percent of the erections. In 
fact, the Whig party received its greatest support in those parishes 
which produced the least, not the most cotton. Whigs captured T4.l 
percent of the races in this group. The parishes which had a yield of 
less than 100 bales of cotton accounted for over half of the parishes 
won by Whig candidates between 1S34 and 1S52. The parishes which 
produced the least cotton had a Whig tendency, however, not because 
they produced very little cotton but more likely because they produced 
a large quantity of sugar cane. Of the thirteen parishes with the 
lowest cotton production, eight of them were among Louisiana’s top ten 
sugar cane parishes.
The presence of sugar cane, like that of slaves, can be 
associated with Whig victories. The ten parishes which accounted for 
the most hogsheads of sugar cane voted for Whig candidates in 72.1 
percent of the gubernatorial and presidential elections between 1S34 
and 1852. As the amount of sugar cane decreased the Democratic vote 
increased. In sharp contrast to Whig victories in the sugar cane 
areas, the sixteen parishes which produced no sugar cane returned 
Democratic majorities in 75 percent of these races. As with the 
presence of slaves, the presence or absence of sugar cane does not 
explain every parish’s voting pattern. For instance, at the mouth of 
the Mississippi River, Plaquemines Parish produced 16,835 one-thousand 
pound hogsheads of sugar, the fifth largest amount in Louisiana, yet 
returned a Democratic majority in all eleven elections from 1834 to 
1852. Conversely, Morehouse and Madison Parishes, which produced no 
sugar cane, voted for Whig candidates in fourteen of the fifteen
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contests. On an individual level. Thomas Overton Moore, elected as a 
Democratic governor in IS59. cultivated the largest sugar plantation 
in Rapides Parish, and he was one of the top fifteen producers in the 
state.*
Louisiana’s parishes did not split solely in terms of crops or 
slaves, but they also divided religiously. Catholics predominated in 
South Louisiana, but in North Louisiana, the majority of parishes did 
not have any Catholic churches. GeneralIv. the greater the percentage 
of a parish's church seats in Catholic churches, the more likely a 
parish would vote for Whig nominees. The eight parishes which had 
Catholic churches but no Protestant churches voted in favor of the 
Whigs 64.3 percent of the time. In contrast, the twenty-one parishes 
without a Catholic church returned Democratic majorities in “4.3 
percent of the elections, and fifteen voted for Democrats in at least 
80 percent of the elections. Like agricultural production.
Catholicism did not precisely equate to Whiggery. Democrats captured 
3S.7 percent of the races in parishes with only Catholic churches, and 
four of the twenty-one parishes without Catholic churches supported 
Whig candidates in over 80 percent of the elections.
Factors such as the presence of sugar cane, cotton. Catholic
churches, and the number of slaves undoubtedly influenced voting
patterns, but they cannot entirely explain why antebellum Louisianans
supported a particular party. Examining these variables demonstrates 
the presence of general trends but they fail to account for all
3For Moore’s crop see P.A. Champomier, Statement of the Sugar Crop 
Made in Louisiana in 1858-59 (New Orleans, 1859), 1.
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partisanship. Though the proportion of staves in the population 
indicates a tendency to vote Whig. in each of the groupings at least 
one parish voted Democratic and at Least one voted Whig in over SO 
percent of the contests. This caveat applies to each of the variables 
examined. In each division of each of the four variables at least one 
parish voted for each of the parties over SO percent of the time. A 
closer Look at the voting behavior of four North Louisiana parishes—  
Ouachita. Morehouse. Carroll, and Madison— buttresses the contention 
that other local forces such as personality must also must have shaped 
contests.
In 1S44. the legislature split Ouachita Parish into two separate 
parishes: leaving one with the name Ouachita and designating the other 
one Morehouse. By 1850, Ouachita Parish had a total population of
5,008 including 2,708 slaves (54.1 percent); produced 3.4S6 bales of 
cotton and no sugar cane; had no Catholic churches; had a Protestant 
church seating capacity of 300 people; and had livestock valued at 
5140,745. Its neighbor to the north, Morehouse Parish, had a 
population of 3.913 including 2,006 slaves (51.3 percent); produced 
3,303 bales of cotton and no sugar cane; had no Catholic churches; had 
a Protestant church seating capacity of 300 people; and had livestock 
valued at $131,760. Despite their exceedingly similar 
characteristics, the two parishes had opposite voting patterns.
Between its formation in 1S44 and 1852. Morehouse Parish participated 
in six contests— three presidential and three gubernatorial— and it 
had backed the Whig candidate in every race. Its voters had cast 61.7 
percent of their ballots for Whigs. In these same six party battles,
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the Ouachita Parish electorate had never returned a majority for the 
Whig candidate and had given the Democratic party 5~ percent of its 
votes r
Located next to one another along the Mississippi River in North 
Louisiana. Carroli and Madison Parishes, both of which had once been 
part of Concordia Parish, exhibit a parallel pattern. In 1S50. they 
possessed almost the exact same total population: S.7S9 (Carroll) to 
S. 7"3 (Madison). Both parishes had high concentrations of slaves 
(73.3 and 83.3 percent respectively): numbered fifth and sixth in 
terms of cotton produced in the state (15.544 and 12.771 bales): and 
had strikingly similar livestock value (S252.982 to S23~.500) and 
total farm value (S2.712.SS2 to S2,666.046). Like Morehouse and 
Ouachita Parishes, however, their statistical resemblance did not lead 
to a correspondence in party loyalties. In the six elections from 
1S44 to 1852, five times Carroll Parish returned Democratic majorities 
and five times Madison returned Whig majorities.^
The voting pattern of these four parishes underscores the 
complexity of politics in antebellum Louisiana and warns against 
simple explanations of voting behavior. If parishes with the same 
characteristics could vote in a manner completely opposite of each 
other, then undoubtedly voters did not just count the number of 
slaves, measure crop production, or calculate church seating capacity 
when deciding how to vote. The narrowness of party triumphs also 
shows the danger of broad generalizations of voting patterns. Of the
Ŝeventh Census. 1850. 475-91.
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449 parishes races between 1S34 and 1852. in 206 of them (45.S 
percent), the victorious party received less than sixty percent of the 
votes. So. even within parishes voters disagreed over which party to 
support, and the data does not exist to examine either voting or 
demographic factors at sub-parish levels.
Another explanation of antebellum voting behavior emphasizes the 
role of personality within the parishes. As late as 1S5S. thirty-five 
of Louisiana's forty-eight parishes possessed less than one thousand 
voters. Extended families, close friends, business partners, or 
settlers who had travelled together from another state could control 
enough votes to change the political complexion of a parish. For 
example, in Carroll Parish, the settlement of Tennessee Democrats 
probably contributed to its Democratic bent. The influence of the 
prominent Mouton family helped make Lafayette Parish a Democratic 
island in the Whig sea of South Louisiana sugar cane parishes. 
Throughout his study of Louisiana during the early Jacksonian period. 
Joseph G. Tregle stresses the role of personality, bloc voting, and 
the presence of "strong men" who "reputedly could marshal hundreds of 
voters to march to their command."11
Just as Louisiana’s parishes and regions did not provide the 
state’s parties with equal support, they did not themselves receive 
equal representation in the state legislature. Apportionment methods 
changed, but the writers of all three antebellum constitutions kept a
1 Tennessee Democrats in Carroll Parish see Felix Bosworth to James 
K. Polk, June 12, 1844, June 15, 1844, Polk Papers, Library of Congress;
Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Clash of 
Cultures and Personalities (Baton Rouge, 1999), quote on p. 70.
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wary eye on Nrew Orleans because they feared its corruption could be 
contagious. By basing apportionment on qualified voters and/or total 
population, they successfully- ensured that Greater Orleans’s 
representation would never equal its share of Louisiana’s white 
population. During the antebellum era. North Louisiana made the 
greatest strides in apportionment. In 1S30. the region had the least 
seats (17.9 percent), but by i860 its expanding white population and 
extensive slaveholdings combined with changes in apportionment had 
enabled it to elect more legislators than any other section of 
Louisiana.
Contradicting itself, the 1812 constitution stipulated "equal 
and uniform” representation in the entire legislature while making 
senate seats "which shall forever remain indivisible." The 
constitution called for the lower house to be reapportioned on the 
basis of qualified electors every four years, and this process 
occurred on schedule until 1826. After that year’s redistricting. the 
legislature failed to pass an apportionment bill for the next fifteen 
years. The 1845 constitution kept the number of voters as the basis 
of apportionment in the lower house but for the Senate changed the 
method to total population with slaves counting the equivalent of 
white people. The 1852 constitution again altered the apportionment 
method, making total population the basis in both houses and 
guaranteeing each parish a representative. Surprisingly, despite 
these varied apportionment methods, regional representation in
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Louisiana remained fairly proportional throughout the antebellum 
era."
In IS30. South Louisiana had more than twice as many 
representatives as any other section. The section elected twenty-nine 
of the state's sixty-seven legislators, and its representation closely 
corresponded to its share of the total population, white population, 
and electorate. Restricted to three of the seventeen senate seats. 
Greater Orleans at first glance appeared to suffer from the 
constitution’s provisions. In 1830. it possessed 29.9 percent of the 
Louisiana's total population and 27.7 percent of its white population, 
yet only 19.4 percent of the state’s legislators represented the 
region. In terms of eligible voters, however. Greater Orleans’s 
representation was correct, for because of property and residency 
requirements it possessed only 19.9 percent of the electorate. Both 
the Florida Parishes which elected thirteen legislators and North 
Louisiana which chose twelve had representation that corresponded to 
their fractions of Louisiana’s population and voters. (TABLE 5.5)
With the legislators unable to pass an apportionment bill in the 
1830s, the regions elected exactly the same number of legislators in 
1840 that they had in 1830. Although Louisiana’s white population had 
expanded 77.6 percent in the decade, apportionment still closely 
corresponded to an estimate of qualified voters taken in 1841. South 
Louisiana continued to elect the most representatives, and its 43.3 
percent of the seats precisely equaled its proportion of Louisiana’s
p‘For a comparison of apportionment methods see Constitutions of the 
State of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1930), 33-7: Emmett Asseff, Legislative 
Apportionment in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1950), 10-30.
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TABLE 5.5 
Legislative Apportionment by Region' 
1S30 Lesisiature
Percent % of White % of Total Voters 
Seats of Seats Population Population 1S29
FLORIDA 13 19.4 16.3 15.2 19-3
NORTH LA 12 17.9 14. ~ 13.7 13.1
ORLEANS 13 19.4 27.7 29.9 19.9
SOUTH LA 29 43.3 41.3 41.1 47.7
Seats
1S40 Legislature
Percent % of White % of Total 
of Seats Population Population
Voters
1341
FLORIDA 13 19.4 11.0 12.5 16.7
NORTH LA 12 17.9 IS. 5 21.1 16.7
ORLEANS 13 19.4 42.2 34.3 23.3
SOUTH LA 29 43.3 28.3 32.1 43.3
1850 Legislature
Seats
Percent % of White % of Total 
of Seats Population Population
Voters
1847
FLORIDA 13 9.9 8.9 10.9 10.3
NORTH LA 35 26.7 22.2 27.5 24.7
ORLEANS 37 28.2 44.3 30.1 32.1
SOUTH LA 46 35.1 24.6 31.5 32.9
1860 Legislature
Seats
Percent % of White % of Total 
of Seats Population Population
Voters
1858
FLORIDA 13.5 10.4 7.2 9.0 9.3
NORTH LA 43 33.1 25.3 33.8 35.8
ORLEANS 33 25.4 45.7 28.6 33.7
SOUTH LA 40.5 31.2 21.8 28.6 31.2
^Senate seats which overlap regions are counted as .5 for each 
region.
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electorate. Greater Orleans's white and total population had 
increased at a rate higher than the rest of the state. In 1S40 42.4 
percent of the state's white population and 34.3 percent of its total 
population lived in the region. Because of suffrage requirements, 
these percentages continued to exceed Greater Orleans’s share of the 
electorate (23.3 percent) which came fairly close to its 19.4 percent 
of the seats.
Between 1S40 and 1S50. Louisianans ratified a new constitution 
which like the 1S12 constitution uses qualified voters as the basis 
for representation in the lower house but made total population the 
basis for the senate. In 1850, South Louisiana continued to possess 
the largest percentages of total population and voters and 
consequently elected the most representatives, though its proportion 
declined from 43.3 percent to 35.1 percent. The Florida Parishes 
still elected thirteen representatives but since the legislature had 
almost doubled in size, the region’s proportion had been sliced nearly 
in half. This reduction reflected the section’s relatively slow 
growth. The 1845 constitution easing of suffrage requirements aided 
Greater Orleans as its percentage of Louisiana’s voters increased from 
23.3 percent to 32.1 percent. Both because of the inclusion of slaves 
in the basis for senate representation and a cap on the number of 
senators from New Orleans, the section’s fraction of the seats 
persisted in lagging sLightly behind its proportions of white and 
total population and voters. North Louisiana benefitted from: the 
liberalization of suffrage, population growth, and the use of total 
population as the senate’s apportionment method. The section’s
Reproduced w ith permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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proportion of the legislature grew from I-.9 percent in LS40 to 26.~ 
percent in 1850.
In IS52. the electorate approved another constitution which 
again changed the method of apportionment in the Louisiana 
legislature. Both houses would be apportioned according to total 
population with each parish guaranteed a representative in the lower 
house. The distribution of seats in the I860 legislature corresponded 
to the total population figures of the 1860 census and also closely 
paralleled the number of voters in each region. Using this method. 
North Louisiana replaced South Louisiana as the region with the most 
seats. In 1S30. North Louisiana had only 13.~ percent of Louisiana's 
population and 13.1 percent of its voters. By 1S60. the region held
33.8 percent of the population and 35.S percent of the electorate. 
Apportionment reflected this growth, and North Louisianans elected
33.1 percent of the representatives in 1S60. South Louisiana elected
31.2 percent of the legislators which equaled its percentage of the 
voters and slightly exceeded its proportion of the total population. 
Greater Orleans’s white population still surpassed its share of the 
total population, voters, and legislators, and the Florida Parishes 
continued to straggle behind in all areas.
The sections of the state not only struggled against each other 
for seats during apportionment debates, but also competed to have men 
from their regions nominated for elective offices. Prior to the 
development of organized parties, several prominent regional 
candidates would oppose one another at elections. After parties 
formed and backed a single nominee for office, partisan devotion
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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overshadowed competing regional claims. Following nominating 
conventions, partisans stressed party loyalty over any other claims of 
aLlegiance. In 1S45. a candidate for lieutenant governor articulated 
this partisan sentiment declaring that "he who would let his feeling 
of personal attachment influence more than his regard for his party, 
is not— a true Whig." "True" Democrats shared this party-first 
attitude, and by the end of the antebellum era. Louisianans lived in 
what a West Baton Rouge newspaper derisively termed as "An Age of 
Party Spirit." Most Louisianans would agree with this description but 
would probably disagree with the editor's negative attitude toward the
, ldevelopment of parties.lT
The nomination and election process changed substantialIv during 
the antebellum period. The Creole majority at the 1812 constitutional 
convention placed state elections in a three day period in July in 
order to keep Louisiana elections separate from national contests 
which were held in November and to reduce the power of the American 
vote. Fleeing from diseases such as cholera and yellow fever, many 
Americans left their Louisiana homes during the summer months, 
particularly if they resided in New Orleans. In contrast, Creoles, 
who were believed to be resistant to disease, remained in the state 
year-round, and thus July elections would help them maintain control 
of the state. Addressing the difficulty of keeping people in the 
state for July elections, the Whig party in 1840 passed a resolution 
imploring "every true whig” to "remain in his parish or district until
14Opelousas St. Landry Whig. August 21, 1845 (first quote); West 
Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. May 3, 1856 (second quote).
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after the July elections, and return before November next [for a 
presidential election].’*1'
Ultimately, both of the Creole framers* goals succumbed to the 
pressures of Jacksonian democracy. By the middle of the 1830s. 
Louisianans had become enmeshed in the national party system with 
Whigs and Democrats replacing Americans and Creoles as the main 
divisions in the state. The migration of Americans from other states 
also eventually overcame any Creole stratagems to maintain power.
These newcomers, along with many native Louisianans. objected to the 
lack of democracy in the 1S12 charter. Although Creoles had made 
amendment of the 1S12 constitution difficult, after years of trying, 
detractors of the instrument in 1844 succeeded in calling a 
constitutional convention. The resulting document, the Constitution 
of 1S45. articulated the transformations in Louisiana’s political 
climate. The charter provided for periodic redistricting of both 
houses to reflect changes in population, and all subsequent state 
elections were moved to a single day in November to coincide with 
national contests.50
With the development of political parties in Louisiana, the 
nominating process changed. In the 1820s, prior to the maturation of 
Louisiana’s political parties, prominent men, or more likely a group 
of men, sent letters to newspapers suggesting nominees for office. A 
field of perhaps ten to fifteen men would be whittled down by private
I;>Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 55-9; Baton Rouge Gazette. 
May 30. 1840 (quote).
^Constitutions of the State of Louisiana. 36-9.
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agreements or candidates withdrawing from the field because they 
believed that they could not win. Stubbornness and overly optimistic 
reports from friends unwilling to transmit bad news usually kepc too 
many men in the race. Also, competitors might encourage a weak 
opponent to stay in the field if they felt that this aspirant would 
take votes from a chief rival. This irregular process did not easily 
allow for the reduction of the field and contributed to the 
multiplicity of candidates receiving votes in early elections.
Once parties became involved in the nominating process, it 
became more organized, and party conventions— state, district, and 
parish— formally nominated men for office. Describing the selection 
of candidates in 1S36. the New Orleans Bee declared. "Some system of 
[party] discipline had now become absolutely essential for the welfare 
of democracy." By LS55, a Morehouse Parish Know Nothing could observe 
without surprise that "The Democrats have nominated everything from 
constable up." An acceptance of party nominations ultimately became a 
dependence upon them. For instance, despite pleas for non- 
partisanship, the election of delegates to constitutional conventions 
and to the judiciary became partisan because no other effective 
apparatus existed. Election post mortems demonstrate this emphasis on 
partisan organization. After losses or at the start of campaigns, 
partisan newspapers would stress that only a want of organization had 
prevented the victory of their candidates in the last election. This
17Tregle, Louisiana m  the Age of Jackson. 74. Five men received 
votes in the 1824 gubernatorial election: 4 in 1828: and 4 in 1830.
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lament inevitably would be accompanied by pleas for better 
organization in forthcoming contests.^
Even after parties developed, the initial step in campaigns 
remained the same, in the months, or sometimes more than a year, 
prior to an election, partisan newspapers or parish meetings would 
suggest men for office— usually a prominent partisan from the region 
that the newspaper served. Sometimes candidates preferred to have 
their name placed in front of the people as early as possible to 
dissuade other aspirants. Other hopefuls, though equally desirous of 
office, preferred to have their names held back hoping that the people 
would draft them as candidates. As more aspirants entered the field, 
debate would begin over where and when to hold a nominating 
convention. Parties generally chose to held their gubernatorial 
conventions in Baton Rouge because of its central location, because 
many delegates distrusted New Orleans, and because, after 1847, it 
served as Louisiana’s capital. The site for congressional nominating 
conventions proved a much greater source of friction and could on
occasion lead to two conventions of the same party meeting on
19different dates in different parishes.
IQNew Orleans Bee. October 21, 1835 (first quote); J.D. Richardson 
to John Liddell, September 4, 1855, Liddell Family Papers, Louisiana and 
Lower Mississippi Valley Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State 
University (Hereinafter, LLMVC): For want of organization see William F. 
Weeks to John Moore, August 8 . 1844, David Weeks Papers. LLMVC; New
Orleans Louisiana Courier, July 11, 1840; and New Orleans Bee. October 
9, 1851. Hereinafter all newspapers from New Orleans unless otherwise 
noted.
19For example, prior to the Democrats’ 1855 gubernatorial convention 
northern Louisiana interior parishes suggested Congressman John Sandidge 
of Caddo Parish, the northern Louisiana river parishes called for W.S. 
Parham of Madison Parish, the Florida Parishes urged Robert C. Wickliffe
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The method of selecting parish delegates to a state or district 
convention varied depending on party organization within a parish and 
the perceived importance of an election. On one hand, sometimes 
parishes would send no delegates to a convention or would designate 
its legislators as delegates or grant their votes by proxy to another 
parish's delegation. On the other hand, some parishes practiced the 
democracy that ail Louisiana politicians preached. These more 
organized parishes might even go to the extent of having ward meetings 
or holding ward elections to select men to the parish convention. The 
men elected to the parish convention would in turn vote for delegates 
to the district or state convention and possibly instruct them on 
which candidate to support there.
The operation of state and district conventions varied as well. 
In some years, a single candidate, especially a congressmen running 
for re-election, would stand out and receive a unanimous vote on the 
first ballot. Or, perhaps party leaders would have worked out an 
agreement prior to the convention and only one name would be put 
forward.20 In other years, heated debate would ensue over how to 
allot votes to each parish and several ballots would be necessary in 
order to agree on a nominee. Usually after one person had received a 
majority of the votes, one more vote would be taken to make the choice
of West Feliciana Parish, and southwestern Louisiana championed former 
Governor Alexander Mouton of Lafayette Parish— Baton Rouge Democratic 
Advocate. April, May 1855; For a candidate’s desire to be nominated but 
not have "exclusive ground" taken for him prior to the convention see 
Isaac Johnson to John F.H. Claiborne, May 18, 1845, Claiborne Papers, 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, MS.
7(1Bee, August 6, 1851.
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unanimous. On occasion, congressional nominating conventions would 
adjourn without making a nomination and reschedule a convention for 
later in the year. This occurrence could arise when delegates either 
had no specific instructions on whom to support or when they feared to 
deviate from instructions they had received- In these cases, parish 
conventions would reconvene in order to provide their delegates with 
further instructions before the convention met again.
The conventions themselves represented a combination of 
dictation and democracy. Behind the scenes "wire-pulling’' could 
reduce the field to a single candidate prior to the convention or 
could secure an aspirant enough votes that the delegates did not 
really have a choice. The opposing party and occasionally disgruntled 
members of the party itself made allegations such as this Whig 
editor’s description of an IS52 Democratic convention: "Matters were
’cut and dried* and decided ’in chambers’ before the meeting
22assembled." In contrast, other evidence such as the number of votes 
taken or the close nature of the selection indicate a more democratic 
process. Normally, parties printed fairly short synopses of their 
conventions in partisan newspapers. In 1845, however, St. Landry
£At the 1855 Democratic state convention, five men’s names were put 
forward for governor. Robert Wickliffe won the nomination on the first 
ballot but with only 52.1 percent of the 215 votes. Eight men received 
votes for attorney general, and three ballots were necessary to nominate 
a superintendent of public education, Louisiana Courier. June 22, 1855. 
Other conventions see Clinton Louisianan. February 2, 1838; Bee, March 
10. 1841. For delegates not deviating from instructions in congressional 
nominating convention see John Ellis to Tom Ellis, August 20, 1855, Ellis 
Family Papers, LLMVC.
» m
^Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. May 22. 1852.
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Parish Whigs, in an effort to refute charges that a few influential 
men had controlled the nominating process, published a more detailed 
version of their parish convention. The Whigs* report showed that 
representatives from each of the parish’s twelve wards had cast votes 
for two senators, five representatives, one sheriff, and one parish 
clerk. Five men received votes for senate, twelve for the state 
house, and two each for sheriff and clerk.. With each ward 
representing approximately seventy of St. Landry Parish's Whigs, this 
case demonstrates the level of democracy which could be achieved in 
convent i ons.“
After their nominations. Louisiana candidates began the arduous 
process of canvassing their districts. The lack of an adequate 
transportation network made campaigning difficult, but the demands of 
the voters made it necessary. From 1822 to I860, the number of 
Louisianans eligible to vote increased from less than ten thousand to 
more than fifty thousand. To reach this expanded electorate, 
campaigning became more essential and more organized. Even in 1824, 
however, a concerned friend counseled an aspirant to the legislature, 
"I think it is advisable that you should visit the citizens of Bouef 
Prairie. Dear Creek, & Bayou Mason [precincts of his parish] prior to 
the election." Campaigning would be imperative since his opponent had 
already "taken the rounds." In 1840, the Bee hoped that the Whig 
state convention would only select candidates "who will mingle freely 
with the people —  take the stump, traverse the different sections of
^Opelousas St. Landrv Whig, August 28, 1845.
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the state." adding that "this policy has every thing to recommend
•*, lit.
By the iS40s and the IS50s. the willingness to campaign was an 
assumed condition of receiving a nomination. A Whig congressional 
convention required that its nominee pledge "to canvass the whole 
District. Parish by Parish, and cabin by cabin, and to use all 
honorable means to ensure his triumphant election." In IS52. a Whig 
newspaper declared. "It is by practice made absolutely necessary that 
the State should be thoroughly canvassed in order to ensure that 
success which is within our reach." A transplanted New Englander 
found the extent of campaigning worth commenting upon: "In political 
contests it is usual for men here who are prominent or well acquainted
with the subject to take the stump This practice of stump speaking
is pursued even by the parish candidates for every office." Realizing 
the necessity of an active canvass, candidates whose personal or 
pecuniary interests prevented them from taking to the stump declined 
party nominations. To alleviate some of the financial burdens of
campaigns, parties would solicit contributions from wealthy members to
25help sustain their nominee in the field.
2*'G.W. Lovelace to James G. Taliaferro, June 5. 1824, James G.
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (first quote): Bee. February 29, 1S40 (second 
quote); For the importance of campaigning even in the 1820s see Tregle, 
Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 76: Samuel C. Hyde, Jr.. Pistols and 
Politics: The Dilemma of Democracy in Louisiana's Florida Parishes. 1810- 
1899 (Baton Rouge, 1996), 62.
2CJDailv Tropic. February 29, 1844 (first quote); West Baton Rouge 
Capitolian Vis-a-Vis, September 1, 1852 (second quote); T.V. Davis to 
Alonzo Snyder and T. Scott, April 24, 1844, Snyder Papers, LLMVC; F.M. 
Kent to Moody Kent, February 19, 1857, Kent Family Papers, LLMVC (third 
quote); For declinations because could not campaign see Maunsel White to 
David Shephen, March 27, 1849, Maunsel White Papers, Southern Historical
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After party conventions, nominees and their fellow partisans 
went to great extremes to present their message to the voters. In his 
IS46 reelect ion bid. Isaac Morse, a Democratic congressman from 
Louisiana’s Fourth District, which stretched from the Arkansas border 
to the Gulf of Mexico, rode his pony over twelve hundred miles during 
a six-week tour of his district. Relatives and friends often worried 
about the toll that this travelling took on candidates. One nominee’s 
son wrote to his sister. ”1 am not sorry that [father] declined. It 
will save him a great deal of disagreeable riding and annoyance." 
Another candidate's son worried of the ’’animosities and heart burners" 
that campaigning inflicted upon his father. Many candidates shared 
their relatives* distaste for the strain of canvassing. In 1S44. 
succumbing from hunger and claiming to be almost too weary to pick up 
his pen and write a letter, a Whig nominee for the constitutional 
convention considered withdrawing "from a laborious and thankless 
duty” but his friends persuaded him not to desert the party.^
Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. North Carolina 
(Hereinafter, SHC); L.V. Reeves to John Perkins, June 14, 1S55, Perkins 
Papers, SHC; For campaign contributions see Joseph P. Horner to Thomas 
Overton Moore, October 8 , 1S60, Thomas Overton Moore Papers. LLMVC; Henry 
Marston to James Perkins, August 2S, 1853, Marston to John Buhler, 
September 3, IS53, Marston to George C. McWhorter, September 4. 1853, 
Marston Papers, LLMVC.
*1C
L Isaac Morse Diary in Edward C. Morse, Blood of an Englishmen 
(Abilene, Texas, 1943) 118-9; Worries about illness see A.M. Lobdell to 
Lewis Stirling, June 3, 1838, Lewis Stirling Papers, LLMVC; Richard E. 
Butler to Anna Butler, June 10, 1844. Anna and Sarah Butler
Correspondence. LLMVC (first quote); Robert Brashear to Fanny Brashear, 
August 20, 1836, Brashear-Lawrence Papers, SHC (second quote); Henry W. 
Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, June 17, 1844, Taliaferro Papers, 
LLMVC (third quote).
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Politicians often adopted ambitious speaking schedules. During 
his six-week journey in 1846. Morse and his adversary- made at least 
one speech each day and sometimes two or more. In the weeks preceding 
the IS56 presidential election, a know N'othing spoke at ten locations 
in three parishes over thirteen days. During the midst of the IS60 
presidential campaign, the West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter published 
the correspondence among adherents of the three presidential 
candidates. Their letters are enlightening because the men disagreed 
not on the necessity of debating repeatedly before the people but only 
on the specific dates, places, and speaking arrangements. Canvassing 
seven parishes, the Breckinridge elector wanted to speak seventeen 
times in less than four weeks. Unable to keep this specific 
appointment schedule, the Beil proponent made a counter offer to 
debate nineteen times in twenty-six days. The Bell man published this 
correspondence in an effort to refute accusations that he had refused 
to appear before the people. Instead, he simply could not keep the 
other speaker’s schedule but did wish to bring the people his 
message.4'
Generally, partisans’ appointments consisted of speaking before 
the community for several hours. The candidates, however, did not 
rely solely on their oratorical skills and issue-oriented messages to 
attract crowds. Inevitably, the local party organized a barbecue to 
accompany campaign speeches. These rallies served a social as well as 
a political function. In sparsely settled sections of the state,
^Broadside (1856), Ellis Papers, LLMVC; Morse, Blood of an 
Englishman. 118-9; West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. September 27, 1860.
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barbecues provided not oniy an opportunity to meet candidates but to
spend a day visiting with neighbors and seldom seen friends.
Steamboats often brought loyalists from other parishes to add to the
excitement. Most importantly, the parties treated those in attendance
to free food and alcohol. In the twentieth century, a Baton Rouge
resident recollecting the excitement of these gatherings wrote of the
days of food preparation and added that at the event, "liquor was
abundant and fully indulged in.'' and consequently a barbecue without a
few fights [was] a dull affair indeed.”4'
Not only did the attendees receive free food and drink, but also
the events provided an opportunity to mingle with the opposite sex.
Barbecue announcements often included specific invitations to women,
and frequently seats were reserved for them. Prior to political
gatherings, women often cooked or made partisan banners. At the
event, they joined men in listening to hours of speeches and. on rare
occasions, addressed the gatherings. Orators praised women's devotion
to their cause, and parties, especially the Whigs, claimed to have the
support of a majority of Louisiana’s women. To add to the social
aspect of rallies, in many cases, dances followed the speeches and
eating. While women most likely attended these barbecues with their
male relatives, a Democratic diarist recounts his wife and her best
29friend going to a barbecue while he remained home.
JOJohn McGrath Scrapbook, newspaper clipping from New Orleans State- 
Times. December 3, 1920 (quote), LLMVC: For steamboat for $3 see A.F. 
Rightor to Andrew McCollam, June 28, 1852, Andrew McCollam Papers, SHC.
1C■ Emile Watts to Neppie, October 8, 1852, William S. Hamilton Papers, 
LLMVC; Edwin A. Davis, ed., Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes of 
Louisiana. 1S36-1844 as Reflected in the Diarv of Bennet H. Barrow (New
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Many Louisiana women took an active interest in political 
campaigns beyond their attendance at rallies. In 1S46. Madeline 
Edwards wrote a poem for the N'ative American which urged women to ”Be 
up electioneering." Despite women being denied accessed to the 
ballot. Edwards claimed that women could and should influence men's 
votes. Women closely followed politics. They read political 
newspapers, gambled on elections, discussed political topics, and 
referred to themselves as partisans. In the weeks preceding the 183S 
election, a woman exclaimed. "I don't hear a word besides the election 
of our governor." Women’s letters also expressed preferences such as. 
"If my wish could control the election [Zachary Taylor] would be 
president." Living with President Taylor's family in Washington. Anna 
Butler anxiously awaited the returns from Louisiana's state elections, 
and she attended Congress at every opportunity. Another women 
accurately analyzed the importance of campaigning. "I think the 
election of a candidate," she argued, "does not depend on his merit or 
abilities but on his skill in electioneering.”30
Many male politicians corresponded with their female relatives.
In addition to discussing family topics, these letters also addressed 
political matters. Some women did more them read letters from men 
describing political events— they wrote back offering their opinions.
York. 1943), November 1, 1844, 342-3.
30Dell Upton, ed., Madaline: Love and Survival in Antebellum New' 
Orleans (Athens, Ga., 1994) (first quote): Rosella Parker to unknown, 
July 2, 1838, Brashear-Lawrence Papers, SHC (second quote); Sarah Gibson 
to Mrs. George L. Guion, November 1848, Gibson and Humphrey Papers, SHC 
(third quote); Anna Butler to Robert Butler, November 1849 to April 1850. 
Butler Family Papers, LLMVC; Eliza Taylor to Louisa Millard, July 7. 
1S44, Miles Taylor Papers, LLMVC (fourth quote).
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Writing to her brother in 1S28. Caroline Bell provided prescient 
political appraisai of state and national elections. She analyzed how 
ethnicity, bloc voting- the connection between state and national 
issues, and election day chicanery affected the outcome of both the 
gubernatorial and presidential races in Louisiana. In 1S52- Mary 
Moore, the wife of a congressman, not only reported the content of 
several newspaper editorials regarding her husband's actions in 
Congress but also took the opportunity to render her judgment.
Although the newspapers approved of Congressman Moore's performance, 
his wife criticized him for occupying "the very same ground [his] late 
congressional opponent took."^1
In the days following barbecues, partisan newspapers recorded 
the number of women and men in attendance. They spared no hyperbole 
in describing the events. On almost every occasion their own party’s 
gatherings had the largest crowds ever seen in the parish or the 
state. Announced attendance figures gave the impression that a 
parish's entire population had turned out. Possibly, the greatest of 
all the state's antebellum gatherings took place during the 1844 
presidential campaign when the Whigs claimed twelve thousand people, 
including two thousand women, attended a rally in Baton Rouge. In 
contrast, partisans portrayed their opponents’ functions as suffering 
from disappointing attendance, and often added that even those few
%»
Caroline Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, August 3, November 7, 1828, 
Butler Papers, HNO; Mary Moore to John Moore, May 13, 1852, Weeks Papers, 
LLMVC (quote).
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people present either had come only out of curiosity or were not 
eligible voters.”
In trying to spark the electorate's interest, the parties did 
not limit themselves to barbecues. In 1844. a Democrat asserted, that 
his party was "reIuct[antJ to omit any means that may conduce to the 
success of our cause." and this message could apply to Louisiana 
parties throughout the antebellum era. Torchlight processions, 
parades, booming cannons, campaign songs, and the formation of 
countless clubs stimulated the populace. Especially in New Orleans, 
elaborate parades often accompanied by fireworks drew large crowds. 
Local party members also competed in pole raisings, such as in 1S52. 
when Democrats in Alexandria built a 117 foot pole, only to have the 
competing Whig pole exceed it by 24 feet. While rarely openly 
encouraged by candidates and illegal during most of the period, 
gambling on elections also aroused interest in campaigns. Newspapers 
carried lists of possible bets based on the majority a candidate would 
obtain in Louisiana or the nation. A typical campaign tactic involved
12Bee, October 3, 1844; For party comparisons see Henry Marston, 
Diary, 1S56. A supporter of Millard Fillmore’s presidential aspirations, 
Marston records three to four thousand at a pro-Fillmore, Jackson 
barbecue, September 13, 1856: five to seven thousand at a pro-Fillmore, 
Baton Rouge torchlight procession, October 1, 1856: only one thousand 
("Considered it a complete failing”) at a Democratic barbecue which ended 
when a man was killed in a fight, October S, 1856, Marston Papers, LLMVC. 
A.F. Pugh, Diary. A Breckinridge advocate, Pugh admits that a pro-John 
Bell meeting had a "fair sized meeting" but it was composed of "the 
lowest dregs of society," August 1, 1860, LLMVC.
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asserting that one’s opponents had boldly predicted victory but then 
refused to accept bets.”
Regardless of the ambitious nature of a candidate's speaking
schedule, he could not reach every voter in his district. Thus, in an
attempt to have their message conveyed to the entire electorate, 
office-seekers did not limit themselves to speeches. Parties flooded 
Louisiana with pamphlets and circulars during campaign season hoping 
to get documents into every voter's hands. A Congressman described 
his mornings as running about Washington attending to his
constituents’ interests and his evenings as writing and sending
documents to them. In 1S44. the Whigs even tried to obtain complete 
voter lists in order to conduct a direct mail campaign in the remote 
areas in northern Louisiana. In LS5I, the N’ew Orleans Bee called upon 
ward organizers to "learn the name, residence, and opinion of every 
voter," and to "stir up and arouse the lukewarm." Partisan newspapers 
printed extra editions and often included lengthy addresses from 
either the party or the candidate himself.
"J.Y. Daishel to Alonzo Snyder. April 24, 1844, Snyder Papers. LLMVC 
(quote); Alexandria pole raising in P.H. Deffenworth to James E. Elam. 
September 29, 1852, James Elam Letterbook, LLMVC; Baton Rouge pole
raising see John W.P. McGimsey to Polk, September 27, 1844, LC: For 
betting on elections see John Smith to John Moore, November 19, 1S51. 
LLMVC; M. Watson to Henry Marston, September 25, i860, Marston Papers; 
Vidalia Concordia Intelligencer, December 23, 1847 claims that of 40 men 
indicted for betting— 38 had their cases postponed and the other 2 were 
acquitted.
^L. Knox to John Perkins, June 6, 1855, Perkins Papers, SHC; Roland 
Jones to Anne N. Jones, January 25, 1854 in J.W. Cadenhead, Jr., ed., 
"The Correspondence of Congressman and Mrs. Roland Jones, between 
Shreveport, Louisiana and Washington, D.C. (December 1853— September 
1854)" North Louisiana Historical Association Journal VI (Winter 1975), 
47; J.J. Sanford to James G. Taliaferro, May 7, August 19, 1S44,
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Bee. October 9, 1851 (quote).
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Newspapers provided the lifeblood of antebellum Louisiana's 
parties and campaigns. In la50 the state possessed thirty-four 
political newspapers which printed over eight million copies annually. 
By 1S60 the number of political newspapers had doubled to sixty-eight. 
Outside New Orleans, and in the later period Baton Rouge, most 
newspapers were four-page weekIies almost exclusively devoted to 
politics. They included announcements of candidates, meetings, 
barbecues, and parades. Afterwards, they printed the proceedings of 
party meetings and the platforms of party conventions. During 
campaign season, prominent politicians used their columns to publish 
letters to their constituents. Editors pulled no punches in dealing 
with their adversaries, and the barbs hurled during a heated campaign 
season often led to duels. In 1S43 in one of the most notorious 
examples, the editor of the Whig Baton Rouge Gazette mocked the 
courage of a Democratic congressman-elect. Insults were exchanged, 
and ultimately the two men resorted to a duel where the editor died 
from shotgun wounds.^
Election day culminated the campaign process. Prior to 1845. 
election day was actually three days beginning the first Monday in 
July. The 1845 constitution moved elections to a single day in 
November. Throughout the antebellum period, Louisianans selected 
congressmen, the entire house of representatives, and one-half the 
senate every two years. Each fourth year, they also voted for 
governor. Parish judges and election commissioners selected the
^ Seventh Census. 1850, 487; Eighth Census. 1860. 321; Baton Rouge 
Gazette. August 12, 26, 1843.
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number and location of polling places in a parish. Parties usualiy 
provided voters with ballots and often transported them to the polls 
where they submicted their ballot to poll commissioners.
Commissioners matched the voters name against a list of eligible 
voters, and if the name did not appear, the voter could produce a tax 
receipt or swear an oath attesting to his el igibii ity.’5
Not limited to the campaign trail, the social aspects of 
politics continued on election day. Candidates and their allies often 
provided voters with free food and drink. This treating not only 
brought men to the polls but hopefully influenced their votes. Though 
illegal, this method of bribery was widely practiced and mostly 
tolerated. After the IS44 presidential election, a Whig complained 
that a reverend had persuaded drunken men to continue drinking "with 
the hope probably that with the utter loss of reason they might be 
caused to vote for [James K. J Polk." Following election day in the 
1S46 gubernatorial contest, a New Orleans laborer solemnly recorded in
his diary, "attended the General elections enjoyed myself very Weil
and Rather to[o] Merrily for a man of my circumstances I am hereby
resolved to drink no ardent Spirits.”77
Election day corruption was not limited to purchasing liquor for 
voters. Other charges included providing fraudulent tax receipts, 
starting false rumors about the presence of yellow fever, or printing 
bogus ballots to trick careless or illiterate voters. Charges and
76Tregle, Louisiana in the Ase of Jackson. 59-61.
7 7 Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, November 7, 1844,
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Walter Nichol, diary, January 19, 
1846, SHC (second quote).
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countercharges of fraud accompanied the results of many close 
elections in Louisiana with tne presidential election of 1844 che most 
infamous example. In 1S44 John Slidell, in what came to be known as 
the Plaquemines Frauds, transported immigrant voters from New Orleans 
to Plaquemines Parish. Their votes provided the margin of victory in 
Louisiana for James K. Polk over Henry Clay*. Slidell's tactics were a 
variation on a process so common that it had a name— colonizing. 
Colonizing consisted of a party, in the week proceeding an election, 
recruiting the purchasable voters in a parish with promises of free 
meals and liquor. The "colonists” would be taken to a remote area and 
guarded until they could be led to the polls on election day. In 
close races, the votes of these twenty to thirty purchasable men could 
make a difference.
Historians have disagreed both on the number of Louisianans who 
had the right to vote and on the proportion that actually went to the 
polls on election day. All women, blacks, and children were excluded 
from the electorate as were many white males. Roger Shugg, the first 
historian to examine suffrage in the state, tried to prove that 
antebellum Louisiana was an aristocracy of slaveholders. In his 
Marxist-influenced study Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana, Shugg 
contends that the 1812 constitution barred two-thirds of Louisiana 
freemen from the polls, while actually 42.2 percent could vote in 1820
jgTregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson, 77; For Democrats alleging 
Whig corruption in 1844 see James G. Bryce to James K. Polk, November 15, 
1844; Felix Bosworth to Polk, November 6, 1844, James McFarlane to Polk, 
November 11, 1844, Polk Papers, LC; For Whigs charging Democrats in same 
contest see Andre B. Roman to Henry Clay, December 2, 1844, Clay Papers, 
LC; For good descriptions of "colonizing" see Baton Rouge Weekly Morning 
Comet, November 2, 1S56; McGrath Scrapbook, p. 33, LLMVC.
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and 44.3 percent In the IS30. Outside Greater Or Leans a higher 
fraction of the population owned property, and 55.9 percent of adult 
white males could vote in IS30. Shugg correctly disputes the idea 
that the 1S4-5 constitution provided for universal white male suffrage. 
But. his claim that residency requirements "left the franchise in the 
hands of two-fifths the adult freemen" Is highly exaggerated. In 
fact. 5S.5 percent of adult white males could vote in 1S50. Again, 
outside Greater Orleans, where residency requirements had their 
greatest impact, suffrage was more extensive, and SI.6 percent of 
aduIt white men couid vote. ( TABLE 5.6)
Most historians of the period have correctly disagreed with 
Shugg's assertions about voter eligibility, but they have 
underestimated the turnout at Louisiana’s elections. Turnout is 
simply the ratio between the votes cast at a given election and the 
total number of voters. While Shugg underestimated the size of the 
electorate, most scholars of antebellum Louisiana politics have 
overestimated it and compounded their error by miscounting the number 
of ballots cast. Derek L.A. Hackett has persuasively demonstrated 
that historians, w'hile realizing Shugg’s mistakes, have erroneously- 
contended that the number of voters in Louisiana equalled the number 
of white males who were at least twenty-one years old. This 
definition ignores the constitutional restrictions on voting which
Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle m  Louisiana. 122. 130 (quote).
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TABLE 5 .  t>
Voter Eligibility and Turnout 
IS20
WHITE MALES IS22 PERCENT IS24 ESTIMATED
OVER IS VOTERS ELIGIBLE VOTES TURNOUT
FLORIDA 3627 2022 1372 6".9
NORTH LA 3476 1520 43-7 ~~~> 50.S
ORLEANS 858" 1817 21-2 1278 ~0.3
SOUTH LA 5572 3620 65.0 313S "3.1
21262 S9"9 42.2 6560 73.1
IS30
WHITE MALES IS29 PERCENT 1S30 ESTIMATED
OVER 21 VOTERS ELIGIBLE VOTES TURNOUT
FLORIDA 3912 2222 56.8 1842 S2.9
NORTH LA 3735 1748 46.8 1159 66.3
ORLEANS 9471 22SS 24.2 1611 70.4
SOUTH LA 8842 5250 59.4 3698 70.4
25960 11508 44.3 S310 72 - 2
1840
WHITE MALES 1841 PERCENT 1840 ESTIMATED
OVER 21 VOTERS ELIGIBLE VOTES TURNOUT
TOTAL 50110 24500 48.9 20212 82.5
1850
WHITE MALES 1850 PERCENT 1852 ESTIMATED
OVER 21 VOTERS ELIGIBLE VOTES TURNOUT
FLORIDA 5766 4111 71.3 4042 98.3
NORTH LA 13801 11367 82.4 9881 86.9
ORLEANS 39867 15165 38.5 12217 80.6
SOUTH LA 14643 12423 84.8 9762 78.6
73597 43065 58.5 35902 S3.4





















Include a tax-paying requirement (tantamount to property ownership)
trand residency restrictions.*'"
Though Hackett accurately addresses the problem of exaggerating 
the number of eligible voters, he undercounts the number of votes cast 
in five of the six elections between IS34 and 1S42 because he relies 
on incomplete returns. In some elections, the results in the official 
journals of the legislature omit parishes that did not turn their vote 
counts into the secretary of state in time to be published. In the 
cases when parish vote totals are not extant, one cannot assume that 
no one in the parish voted in that election, but instead estimates of 
the votes should be included or eligible voters from that parish 
should be removed from computations of turnout. In 1S40, the 
presidential election returns omit four parishes, but New Orleans 
newspapers indicated that each of them held elections. Hackett 
asserts that 77.5 percent of Louisiana’s electorate participated.
IQDerek L.A. Hackett, "’Vote Early! Beware of Fraud! ’ A Note on Voter 
Turnout in Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections in Louisiana, 1828- 
1844," Louisiana Studies XIV (Summer 1975), 179-88. Despite Hackett’s 
work, historians continue to assert mistakenly that turnout in Louisiana 
was extremely low. For example Samuel C. Hyde claims a 39.4 percent 
turnout in 1840 and 43.0 percent in 1844, while the actual percentages 
nearly doubled these figures, Hyde, Pistols and Politics, 47-8.
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When the four missing parishes are included this figure increases to
t *S2.5 percent.'1
Louisiana's antebellum turnout, when adjusted for voting 
constraints and the absence of official returns, was actually high 
throughout the period and rose in almost every decade. According to 
the 1S29 census of voters. IL.50S Louisianans possessed the franchise. 
The following year, in a governor's race. S.310 (72.2 percent) 
exercised this right. The Florida Parishes had the highest turnout 
with S2.9 percent of the region's eligible voters casting ballots. In 
L840. after the excitement of the Log Cabin and Hard Cider campaign, 
approximately 20.211 (S2.4 percent) of the estimated 24.500 
Louisianans eligible to vote went to the polls on election day. and 
again the Florida Parishes led the way with a turnout exceeding 80 
percent.
In the spirit of Jacksonian democracy, the 1845 constitution 
removed property requirements for voting, and by 1850 Louisiana had 
43,065 eligible voters. Turnout remained high. In the 1852 
presidential election, 83.4 percent of the electorate cast ballots, 
and every region had a turnout of over 75 percent. Turnout remained 
highest in the Florida Parishes where over 95 percent of the voters 
exercised their suffrage right. According to the 1858 census of 
electors, Louisiana’s electorate had increased to 50,036 people. One 
year later, when Democrat Thomas Overton Moore defeated an Opposition 
party candidate in Louisiana’s least-competitive antebellum election, 
turnout dipped but only slightly to 82 percent. With the excitement
4*'Louisiana Courier. November 12, 1844; Bee. November 12. 1844.
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of the IS60 presidential election, however, the electorate returned to 
the polls in record numbers with 50.509 Louisianans casting ballots, 
which exceeded the number of eligible voters in IS5S.
Intensive campaigning over extensive areas and high turnout at 
elections contributes to a portrait of a democratic antebellum 
Louisiana. An examination of the slaveholdings. wealth, and 
occupations of the men that Louisianans elected to the state 
legislature, however, provides a different perspective. Though many 
Louisianans participated in the electoral process, elective positions 
were reserved for the select few. Property qualifications limited 
access to these posts prior to the writing of the 1S45 constitution. 
After the ratification of the IS45 charter, property requirements for 
office-holding were eliminated. Yet, throughout the antebellum 
period, the electorate continued to elect to the statehouse a group 
that one European visitor characterized as ”a very' respectable class 
of men.”*"
The census did not begin to record the value of property 
holdings until 1850. but despite the absence of precise figures, the 
wealth of men who served in earlier years can be estimated. First, in 
order to meet requirements, all legislators had to hold property worth 
five hundred dollars to be elected to the House and one thousand 
dollars to be elected to the Senate. More importantly, the census did 
include an important barometer of wealth in the antebellum South—  
slaveholdings. In 1830, fifty-seven of the sixty seven legislators
19“G.W. Feat hers tonaugh. Excursion through the Slave States. 2 vols. 
(London, 1844). 1:265 (quote).
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could be located in the census* Of these, only two did not own 
slaves. Twenty-nine (43.3 percent) owned between one and nineteen 
slaves. Twenty-six (45.6 percent) owned twenty or more with fifteen 
of these men having more than fifty slaves. An examination of the 
fifty-six members of the 1840 legislature who can be found in the 
census uncovers an even greater concentration of wealth. While the 
number of members without slaves increased from two to five, twenty- 
nine legislators (51.8 percent) owned more than twenty slaves. Ten of 
these men held more than 100 slaves. In IS30 and 1840. as suggested 
by its higher property requirements, the state Senate contained a 
higher percentage of large slaveholders than the House. In these two 
legislatures, only one of the thirty-one senators owned no slaves, 
while fifteen (4S.4 percent) held fifty or more bondspeople. (TABLE 
5.7)
The 1850 census began to list the real wealth of heads of 
households, and the 1860 census added a listing for personal property. 
In his study of antebellum southern legislators, Ralph Wooster finds 
that 49.4 percent of the members of the 1850 Louisiana legislature 
possessed at least five thousand dollars in real property, and in 
1S60, 68 percent did. In addition to their real property, 67 percent 
of the members owned at least five thousand dollars worth of personal 
property in 1860. Louisianans persisted in electing slaveholders, 
particularly owners of large slaveholdings, to office/3 In 1856,
ijRalph A. Wooster, The People in Power: Courthouse and Statehouse 
in the Lower South. 1850-1860 (Knoxville. 1969), 137; Wooster provides 
data on slaveholding in the 1850 and 1860 legislature but his placement 
of all members he could not find in the census in the no slave category 
undermines the usefulness of his charts. For instance, Wooster did not
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TABLE 5-7 
Siaveholaing in the Legislature
1S30 Legislature
# of
Slaves House Percent Senate Percent Total Percent
0 1 2.3 1 j - 0 3.5
1-9 14 31.8 3 23.1 1" 29.8
10-19 12 27.3 0 0.0 12 21.1
20-49 8 IS.2 3 23.1 II 19.3
50-99 S 18.2 5 3S.5 13 22.8
100+ 1 2.3 i 7.7 2 3.5
1840 Legislature
# of
Slaves House Percent Senate Percent Total Percent
0 5 12.5 0 0.0 5 S.9
1-9 11 27.5 1 6.3 12 21.4
10-19 8 20.0 12.5 10 27.9
20-49 4 10.0 4 25.0 S 14.3
50-99 nl 17.5 4 25.0 11 19.6










find anv information (birthplace, occupation, age, etc.) on thirty-s 
legislators in 1850 yet assumes that these men owned no slaves.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
3 0 4
twenty men who owned more than fifty slaves attended the session, and
in 1S60 seventeen of these large planters participated in the
legislature. Wealthy planters had their greatest role at the IS6I
secession convention. The mean slaveholding of the delegates exceeded
sixty per person with forty members owning more than fifty and half of
atnose owning more than one hundred slaves.
With so many of Louisiana's antebellum legislators owning 
slaves, the preponderance of planters and farmers in the state capitol
«cis not astonishing. In 1827, the New Orleans Argus published a list 
of occupations represented in the legislature, and it found 65." 
percent of the members engaged in agricultural pursuits. In later 
sessions, planters did not control to this extent, but they continued 
to occupy approximately half of the seats. This figure actually 
underestimates their true influence since it only includes the 
occupation recorded in the census. Many legislators who listed their 
profession as lawyer or merchant undoubtedly engaged in large-scale 
agricultural operations as well. For example, the list of planters 
excludes such men as R.C. Downes, a representative in the 1S56 
legislature from Iberville Parish who appeared in the 1S60 census as a 
lawyer but who owned seventy-eight slaves, and Zebulon Pike, a member
Joseph Karl Menn, The Large Slaveholders of Louisiana-1860 (New' 
Orleans, 1964): Ralph Wooster, "The Louisiana Secession Convention." 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly XXXIV (April 1951). 112-8.
While in historical scholarship the term planter connotes a person 
with twenty or more slaves and farmer a. person owning fewer than twenty, 
it appears that census workers and legislators often used these terms 
synonymouslv. Therefore. I have grouped them together in my examination 
of the legislature.
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of the secession convention from Concordia Parish, who is also listed 
as a Lawyer despite owning sixty-seven slaves who produced 435 bales 
of cotton in lS60.io (TABLE 5.S)
Like planters, lawyers also had a significant presence in the 
capitoi. Approximately 20 to 25 percent of all Legislators considered 
themselves primarily lawyers, but as with planters, this figure 
undoubtedly excludes men who listed themselves as planters or farmers 
but also practiced law. Perhaps because of the important legal issues 
involved. lawyers had a greater than usual presence at the secession 
convention where they occupied 32.3 percent of the seats. In the 
1330s. a traveller described the members as "principally* planters and 
lawyers.” and this description could have applied throughout the
antebellum era. Their combined total was a majority in both houses in
each of the legislatures examined, and they dominated the Senate. In 
each legislature analyzed, at least seventy-five percent of the 
senators were lawyers or planters, and in 1827 only the presence of 
two doctors prevented them from holding every seat in that body.
With lawyers and planters occupying as much as seventy to eighty
percent of the seats in the legislature, no other profession had a
notable presence, though generally five percent of the Legislators 
listed their occupation as doctor and another five percent as 
merchant. One of the most noticeable transformations during the 
antebellum period involved an increase in the number of members who
*aArgus quoted in Baton Rouge Gazette, March 3, 1827; 1S56 data from 
William F. Foster, Statistical Chart of the 44th Session of the Louisiana 
Legislature (New Orleans, 1856), W.W. Pugh and Family Papers, LLMVC.
nFeat hers tonaugh, Excursion through the Slave States. 1:265 (quote).





House Senate Total Percent
Planters 34 10 44 65."
Lawyers 11 5 16 23.9
Doctors *> 1•T- 6.0
Merchant 3 0 3 4.5
1850
House Senate Total Percent
Planters 30 10 40 46.5
Lawyers 13 6 19 22. 1
Doctors 2 2 4 4.7
Merchant 3 1 4 4.~
Other 19 19 22. 1
1856
House Senate Total Percent
Planters 48 IS 66 55.0
Lawyers 22 12 34 28.3
Doctors 4 3 7 5.8




House Senate Total Percent
Planters 42 12 56 57.1
Lawyers 16 3 19 19.4
Doctors 2 2 6 6.1
Merchant 4 4 4.1
Other 13 13 13.3
48Legislators who listed two occupations are included in both 
categories. Men who grew large quantities of staple crops, but who did 
not list an occupation are included with planters.










were neither planters, lawyers, doctors, nor merchants. In 182r. the 
legislature did not include men of any other occupations. In the 
legislatures of IS50. i860, and the LS6L secession convention, 
however, between ten and twenty percent of the members listed other 
professions. The elimination of property requirements for office- 
holding in the IS45 constitution probably helped elevate such men as 
an engraver, a carpenter, a brick mason, a cooper, a blacksmith, and a 
ferryman to the statehouse in 1850. In the House, the percentage of 
men from other occupations exceeded fifteen percent in I860 and twenty 
percent in 1850, while it remained much lower in the more prestigious 
state senate.
Just as planting remained the most common career among 
legislators throughout the antebellum period, Louisiana remained their 
most common birthplace. In 1827, thirty-four of the sixty-six 
legislators were native sons. Though this percentage declined. 
Louisianans always made up the largest group in the capitol. That 
their highest proportion occurred in 1827 is not surprising. First, 
in that year the Creole-American split still overshadowed party 
politics, and many men campaigned, and others voted, with birthplace
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as an important consideration. Second, the growing influence of North 
Louisiana in the state capitot tended to reduce the percentage of 
Louisiana-bom legislators as the period progressed. From 1830 to 
1S60. North Louisiana's proportion of seats increased from l“.9 
percent to 33.L percent. This region contained the state's largest 
percentage of residents born outside of Louisiana but within the 
United States. Thus, as North Louisiana's proportion grew, so did the 
number of Legislators b o m  in the South but not in Louisiana. From 
1S2~ to LS60. the proportion of members b o m  in the South outside of 
Louisiana increased from 19.. percent to 39.8 percent. (TABLE 5.9)
The northern states and the border states each supplied about 
ten percent of Louisiana's legislators. The foreign-born membership 
fluctuated. In 1827. 12.1 percent of the legislators were born 
outside of the United States, reflecting both Louisiana's French 
heritage and the presence of refugees from Santo Domingo. In the mid 
IS50s. at the height of the anti-immigrant fervor created by the Know 
Nothing party, no foreign-born members sat in the House and only two 
in the Senate, and both of these had been elected in IS53. By 1860 
and 1861, after the Know Nothing party had disappeared and the power 
of the anti-immigrant message had dissipated, this percentage had 
increased slightly with five naturalized citizens serving in the i860 
legislature and nine in the 1S61 secession convention.3®
i9' The South includes the states which seceded from the Union. The 
border states include the slave states which did not secede and 
Washington, D.C.; Seventh Census. 1850. 488.
3®For a foreigner realizing the impossibility of winning a race in 
1855 see John Kingsbury Elgee to James Robb, June 14, 1S55, James Robb 
Papers. Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection.




House Senate Total Percent
Louisiana 2S 6 34 51.5
South 9 4 13 19.7
Border 5 1 6 9.1
North 4 L 5 7.6
Foreign 4 1-r 8 12.1
1850 Leg isiature







House Senate Total Percent
Louisiana 35 14 49 41.5
South 30 10 40 33.9
Border / 5 12 10.2
North 13 0 15 12.7























Conclusive data regarding Legislators' age and marital status 
are unavailable for much of the period. Throughout the antebellum 
era. members of the lower house only had to be twenty-one years old. 
but until the 1S52 constitution removed age restrictions, state 
senators had to be at least twenty-seven. Apparently, most 
legislators had no trouble meeting these age requirements. In IS50. 
1S56. and I860, the median age of members of each house was 
approximately forty with senators slightly older than representatives 
in each year. And, in each case, less than fifteen percent of the 
legislators were below the age of thirty. Marital status is less 
available, but in a survey of men serving in the capitol in 1856, 67.7 
percent listed themselves as married, 2S.8 percent as single, and 3.4 
percent as widowers.̂ 1
Thus, the typical Louisiana legislator was a married forty-year 
old planter or a lawyer. He owned slaves and had been born in the 
South, probably within Louisiana’s borders. His profession and wealth 
stood him apart from the rest of his community. The elite status of
5lFor median age in 1850 (39 in house, 42 in senate) and 1S60 (41 in 
house. 43 in senate) see Wooster, Politics and Power, 19: For 1856 (37
in house. 40 in senate) see Foster, Statistical Chart of the Louisiana
Legislature. LLMVC.
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members of the legislature raises the question of how these men 
continued to have a dominating presence after the onset of Jacksonian 
democracy— the introduction of universal white male suffrage and the 
reduction of office-holding requirements. There is an easy 
explanation. Whether because of deference or because the affluent 
have more time and money to devote to politics or because they have 
greater name recognition. American voters have continually elected 
prominent members of their community to public office. So. in that 
sense, the above-average wealth and social status of Louisiana's 
antebellum legislators seems more typical than extraordinary.
Also, both the willingness of candidates to campaign and the 
intensity of these campaigns demonstrates that prominent men did not 
rely on their wealth and stature to achieve office. Instead, a 
successful candidate would meet and treat the voters and would make 
every effort to portray himself as one of the people. The C o m m e r c i a l  
Bulletin acknowledged that "the democratic form of the government 
gives a consequence to the meanest citizen, about the time of the 
election." With candidates generally wealthier than those whose votes 
they solicited, stump speaking and treating served as a method to 
connect with the voters. Of course, with the relatively small number 
of people voting in a legislative contest, a prominent candidate 
probably already had contact with much of the electorate. Some voters 
were relatives through blood or marriage and others probably knew a 
candidate from business dealings or attendance at church services.
‘̂Commercial Bulletin. February 21, IS3S (quote).
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Almost routinely, a candidate would couple his own claim as one 
of the people with accusations of aristocracy and snobbery against his 
opponent. In 1843. a congressional candidate who had retired from the 
canvass because of illness returned to the field to counter reports 
that he was "a nabob to proud to shake a poor man by the hand" and 
"that he hates poor people and will not permit one to live near him.” 
Louisiana Democrats, following the lead of their hero President Andrew 
Jackson, tried to establish their party as the party of the people 
engaged in a battle against silk-stocking Whig aristocrats. In 1S49. 
the Democratic Louisiana Courier described a Whig nominee as a "rich 
[man] not wanting in ambition, [who] stands well with his order, the 
rich sugar planters of the state." Whigs did not forfeit the title of 
"party of the people" to the Democrats. In another campaign, the 
Concordia Intelligencer described a Whig candidate for the legislature 
as ”a plain bacon and greens man" in contrast to "those aristocratic 
democrats who mingle with the people only during a canvass."^'
In his 1S55 novel The Master’s House. Thomas Bangs Thorpe, a 
prominent Louisiana Whig who edited the Concordia Intelligencer, 
depicted this aspect of antebellum campaigns. In the novel, two 
candidates battle for a vacancy in the legislature: Mr. Moreton. a 
wealthy planter, and Duffy White, an illiterate yeoman. Recognizing 
the need to appear as one of the people, Moreton campaigns in an old 
carriage, wearing homespun clothes, and his overseer’s hat. White’s
■'Maria Marshall to Mary Taylor, October 6, 1843, Marshal 1-Furman 
Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Louisiana Courier, October 30, 1849; Vidal ia 
Concordia Intelligencer, October 2, 1847 (third quote); Other examples 
Jefferson Parish Lafavette Citv Advertiser. July 3, 1842.
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supporters label their candidate "the poor man's friend" and the
”pin[e]v woods pom'.’* They issue an extra edition of a newspaper
accusing Moreton of refusing to shake hands with poor men. denying
them seats at his table, and not allowing them in his presence unless
they acted like slaves. Moreton attempts to combat the effect of
these charges by treating the voters to liquor, barbecued beef, and
biscuits on election day. Accurately portraying the solicitation of
votes, Thorpe's novel departs from the reality of antebellum campaigns
when the voters select White, the actual common man. and not Moreton.
*̂the upper class man parading as a commoner, to the legislature."
Wealthy legislators did not rely solely on claims of attachment 
to the voters to gain office. In this era of Jacksonian democracy, 
Louisiana politicians practiced the democracy that they preached, and 
they continually allocated more power to the people. From 1S24 to 
1861. politicians expanded both the size of the electorate and the 
number of elective positions. In 1S24, only property-owners possessed 
the right to vote, and even this group’s power was circumscribed.
These men directly elected only legislators and congressmen and 
expressed a preference for governor. The legislature chose the 
governor from the two candidates with the highest vote totals and cast 
the state’s vote for president. The governor possessed vast patronage 
powers, and he appointed almost all of the other state officers from 
secretary of state to judges to parish sheriffs. By 1861, the onset 
of Jacksonian democracy had revolutionized the situation in Louisiana. 
An enlarged electorate included all white males who met a minimal
^Thomas B. Thorpe, The Master’s House (New York, 1855), 326-45.
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residency requirement. This broader electorate had broader powers. 
Voters now chose the governor directly and selected Louisiana's 
presidential electors as well. Additionally, many offices which had 
been appointed by the governor now were elective including sheriffs, 
the attorns}' general, the state treasurer, and even judges.■“
Additionally. the tax structure of Louisiana undoubtedly 
contributed to the legislators' ability to maintain the support of the 
voters. Prior to 1S4S. Louisiana taxes were low. and planters and 
professionals paid the bulk of them. The state collected 
approximately fifty thousand dollars per year in property taxes. Each 
parish had a quota writh Orleans Parish responsible for about thirty- 
percent of this total. Other than the property tax. the rest of the 
tax rates affected only the most wealthy of Louisianans or those 
involved in commerce. Slaveholders paid one dollar per slave 
regardless of the slave's age or value. Cows and horses were taxed 
but with owners of twenty-five or fewer cows and ten or fewer horses 
exempt, small farmers did not have to pay a levy for their animals. A 
luxury tax was also placed on the ownership of carriages, billiard 
tables, and stock in corporations. Professionals such as doctors, 
lawyers, merchants, retailers, tavern owners, peddiars, brokers, and 
auctioneers paid yearly licensing fees. A tax on gambling 
establishments and lotteries also contributed a significant sum to the 
state.33
"^Tregle. Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 57.
^Henry A. Bullard, ed., A New Digest of the Statute Laws of the 
State of Louisiana, from the Change of Government to the Year 1S41. 
inclusive (New Orleans. 1S42.), 699-735.
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All of these taxes did not add up to a tremendous sum of money. 
In IS33- the treasurer predicted total revenue of S3G“.0G0. With 
approximately 110.000 slaves in the state, the one dollar per slave 
levy proved the largest source of state income 135.S percent). The
S50.000 property tax represented 16.2 percent of total revenue but 
amounted to only S.56 per white Louisianan. and this small levy was 
the only tax that many Louisianans paid. Taxes on professions and on 
corporate stock contributed another S50.G00 to the state. Gambling 
added to Louisiana’s coffers with gaming licenses providing S53.000 to 
the government. Duties on auction sales amounted to another S30.000 
in income with the remaining S14.000 split among various other 
sources."' (TABLE 5.10)
Obviously, with the government receiving only a minimal revenue 
in the iS20s and. lS30s. it did not spend much money either. In 1S33. 
the state treasurer predicted expenses of $284,000 with most of this 
sum allocated to keeping the government functioning. The executive 
department budget, which included governmental salaries and the 
expenses of collecting taxes, accounted for 5101,001 (35.6 percent), 
and 540,000 (14.1 percent) was slated to cover the operating costs of 
the legislature. Expenditures for schools, hospitals, and asylums 
amounted to another 587,000 (30.6 percent). The only other
significant budget item, payments relating to the prosecution of
58criminals, was estimated to be 535,000 (12.3 percent).
^ Louisiana House Journal. 11th leg., 1st sess.. 14. 
53 ibid.
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TABLE 5.10 
Revenues and Expendi tures 
1833
REVENUES EXPENSES
Amount Percent Amount Percent
Slave taxes SI 10.000 35.S Executive Dep. S101.000 35.6
Property taxes 50.000 16.3 Legislature 40.000 14.1
Occupation taxes; 50.000 i6.3 Schools 5~.000 20.1
Auction duties 30.000 9.S Hospital/Asylum 30.000 10.6
Gaming licenses 53.000 I".3 Crime prosecution 35.000 12.3







Slave taxes S440.000 17.6 Exec./Leg Dept. $350,000 14.3
Property taxes 730,000 29.2 Internal Imps. S20.000 33.4
Licenses 240.000 9.6 Education 570.000 23.2
Swampland sales 355,000 14.2 Bond sale Int. 150,000 6.1
Bank loan 300,000 12.0 Loan repayment 110.000 4.5
Other 435.000 17.4 Other 450,000 IS.5
$2,500,000 $2,450,000
In 1848, Louisiana simplified its tax code. Now ali property, 
including land, slaves, animals, carriages, and stocks in 
corporations, would be taxed at an ad valorem rate. Thus, instead of 
allocating property tax quotas to each parish and counting the number 
of slaves and horses, assessors would ascertain the total value of 
property owned and assign a tax based on this amount. This process 
seemingly made the tax system uniform and less progressive, but it 
continued to tax most Louisianans only insignificantly. In 1852, the
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ad valorem rate was Sl.iO per SI.000 of property and by IS56 it had 
only increased to $L.6~ per Si.000. The tax burden did grow as 
Louisiana's Legislature, in an effort to improve the state's deficient 
school system, instituted a poll tax of SI on every white male twenty- 
one years or older and then a one percent mill tax. To develop public 
works, the legislature in the 1850s instituted another .25 percent 
mill tax with the proceeds earmarked for the state's internal 
improvement fund. Certain professions and the owners of hotels, 
taverns, theaters, warehouses, and businesses also continued to have 
to pay a yearly licensing fee.^?
Because of the state’s commitment to the development of schools 
and internal improvements, the tax burden of all Louisianans rose. By 
1S59. the state’s tax receipts had increased to over S2.5 million in 
taxes (more than eight times the LS33 amount), which equalled just 
over seven dollars per white person ($3.60 per total population). 
Possessing both valuable slaves and valuable land, slaveholders paid 
the greatest sums. For example, the 1.384 white residents of North 
Louisiana’s Concordia Parish, who owned 10.990 slaves, paid $42,733.25 
in taxes or $30.88 per white person. In contrast, the white 
population of the same region's Winn Parish which numbered 4.314 and 
owned i,00S slaves paid only $4,379.20 in taxes or $1.02 per white 
person- Though not possessing a high concentration of slaves, Orleans 
Parish because its residents possessed expensive property and 
businesses also contributed a significant sum to the state. With only
_________________ -x _____
•'"Consol idation and Revision of the Statutes of the State of 
Louisiana, of a General Nature (New Orleans, 1852),’485-7; U.B. Phillips, 
ed., Revised Statutes of Louisiana (New Orlearns, 1856), 458-462.
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36.3 percent of Louisiana's white population, the parish paid 40.2 
percent of the taxes and 6c.::, percent of the professional fees.5'
An examination of the S2.5 million in revenue received by the 
Louisiana government in IS5S demonstrates the changes in Louisiana's 
tax system. Some sources were similar to 1S33 budget. The tax on 
property excluding slaves contributed the largest proportion of 
revenue 5x30.000 (29.2 percent). The slave tax produced another
5440.000 (1“.6 percent) and licensing fees S240.000 (9.6 percent).
Other significant revenue sources in 185S did not exist twenty-five 
years earlier. Sales of swampland provided 5355.000 (14.2 percent) 
and a bank loan that nearly equaled the entire 1S33 budget furnished 
the state with another 5300.000 (12 percent).51
Louisiana's expenditures reflected the state's dedication to 
schools and internal improvements. Whereas expenses associated with 
the legislature and salaries of public officials had been the largest 
budget items in the 1840s, by 1858, they occupied just 14.3 percent of 
the budget. This change did not mean that the amount of money spent 
on these administrative functions had decreased. Their totals had 
increased from 5141,000 to 5350,000, but their growth did not match 
the ballooning budget. Total expenditures expanded from 5284,000 in 
1S33 to S2.4 million in 1858. Not appearing in the 1833 budget, 
internal improvements, including both aid to railroads and allocations 
for levees totalled 5820,000 (33.4 percent) in the 1858 budget.
^"Report of the Auditor of Public Accounts,'' 107-8 in Legislative 
Documents. 1859 (New Orleans, 1859).
61 ibid.
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Education occupied the second largest expenditure, accounting for 
S5~0.00Ci (23.2 percent). The only other state expense which 
represented over five percent of the budget also tied to internal 
improvements. Interest on state bonds which had been issued to 
finance these projects accounted for about six percent of the 
expend itures .Ci
The tax structure, both before and after the ad valorem rate, 
demonstrates that the Louisiana legislature responded to its 
constituents. Although the tax burden increased during the period, it 
remained low for most Louisianans with the wealthy, especially 
slaveholders, continuing to bear the brunt of it. In 1S52. the 
electorate expressed its desire to have better schools and a better 
transportation network by electing a Whig majority to the 
constitutional convention and then ratifying its work. Democrats 
controlled every subsequent legislature, but with the electorate 
having spoken, they continued to pledge Louisiana’s tax dollars to 
institute the Whig program. Especially prior to the 1S4S change to 
the ad valorem rate, slaveholders paid the majority of taxes. The one 
dollar levy per slave contributed the largest portion of Louisiana’s 
revenue, even before their real estate and luxuries were taxed. After 
the institution of the ad valorem rate, the tax on slaves continued to 
represent one-half the property tax revenue outside of Orleans Parish.
Roger Shugg’s study of suffrage and representation in antebellum 
Louisiana begins by claiming that "slavehoiding Louisiana never 
pretended to be a democratic state” and concludes that "Louisiana was,
62 ibid.
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truth to tell, a slave state policed by gentlemen, and the masses, 
having no real voice in the government received from it no benefit." 
Shugg entitles his chapter. "Government by Gent Ieraen." and his title 
is literally accurate as Louisiana voters throughout the antebellum 
period elected prominent men to office. The chapters assertions that 
these men neglected the people and that the people did not have a 
voice in the government, however, cannot be sustained. The expansion 
of suffrage, the increase in the number of elective positions, the 
removal of restrictions for ascending to these posts, vigorous 
campaigning, and high turnout on election day demonstrate that 
Louisiana's governing bodies, its political parties, and. most 
importantly, its people did more than pay lip-service to the ideals of 
democracy.CJ
Between 1824 and 1S61, the ideals of Jacksonian democracy 
triumphed in Louisiana. Whether Democrats. Whigs, or Know Nothings, 
party leaders stressed the importance of individual voters and 
committed themselves and their parties to getting their message to 
each one of them. At their best, parties not only provided voters 
with information, but also gave them a role at nominating conventions 
and a choice on election day. The onset of Jacksonian democracy did 
not cause deference and dictation to disappear. At their worst, 
political parties could thwart democracy. Leaders could rig 
nominating conventions, and purchasable voters could change results on 
election day. Overall, however, the development of parties, the
B̂ Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 121-56; quotes on 
pp. 121 and 156.
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writing of new constitutions, the regional breakdown of votes, the 
apportionment of the legislature, the stress on the necessity of 
campaigning, and the conduct of legislators demonstrates that during 
the antebellum period Louisianans discarded most of the aristocratic 
ideas of the IS 12 constitution and embraced the tenets of Jacksonian 
democracy.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LOUISIANA KNOW NOTHING PARTY. 1S52-LS56 
The years following the passage of the 1852 constitution would 
witness many significant changes in Louisiana politics. The state’s 
Whig party, which had appeared to be riding a wave of success, 
suddenly collapsed. A combination of the national Whig party’s 
weakness and agreement on the Whig program of activist government in 
Louisiana contributed to the party's disappearance. In Louisiana and 
the rest of the United States, the Know Nothing party soon filled the 
role of chief opponent to the Democracy. This party capitalized on a 
rise of anti-immigrant sentiment. In Louisiana, the Know Nothings won 
several local races in 1854, narrowly lost the state’s governorship in 
1S55, and fell just short of capturing the state’s electoral votes for 
their presidential candidate in 1856. Like the Whigs, however, the 
national Know Nothing party could not hold together. And, as quickly 
as the party had arisen, it vanished almost as rapidly. Even after 
its national collapse, the Know Nothing party remained in control of 
New Orleans politics, but by 1857, the Democratic party dominated the 
rest of Louisiana.
Both the national Whig and Know Nothing parties disappeared 
because their northern and southern wings could not forge an agreement 
on the most important political topic of the 1850s— slavery. Prior to 
the 1850s, conflict over slavery had appeared in Louisiana political 
debate with partisans in presidential campaigns almost ritualistically 
accusing their enemies of being tainted by abolitionism. Slavery find 
abolitionism had always been one of several competing issues in 
political campaigns. Louisiana politicians combined discussion about
322
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slavery with debates over tariffs, government’s role in the economy, 
republicanism, ethnicity, and the extent of democracy. In the mid- 
1850s, however, most of these subjects faded from political exchanges, 
and slavery became the sole topic of political debate. Tension 
between northerners and southerners contributed to the emergence of 
the antislavery Republican party and led Louisianans to address 
seriously for the first time the subject of secession from the Union.
In the aftermath of Franklin Pierce’s victory and the passage of 
the state constitution on November 2, 1852, Louisiana politicians 
entered upon their final campaign of 1852. Under the new 
constitution, a full slate of state officers including a governor, a 
lieutenant governor, and one hundred and twenty-nine legislators would 
be elected on December 27. Both parties placed a positive spin on the 
November results. The Democrats focused on their overwhelming success 
in the presidential race, and the Louisiana Courier proudly quoted the 
New York Tribune’s assertion that "the whig party [is] not merely 
DISCOMFITED but ANNIHILATED," adding that Whig partisans "talk about 
the re-organization of the whig party! Why, the whig party is dead!" 
Despite the national rout of General Scott, many Louisiana Whigs 
remained optimistic. Whig journals stressed that party members should 
accent the great Whig constitutional victory not Scott’s defeat. Whig 
newspapers urged, "Exult then in your triumph— you have a Constitution
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which will soon go into operation" and reassured their readers that 
"the Whig party is at this day as strong as ever.”'
Louisiana’s Whig party faced two apparently contradictory 
difficulties: (1) the weakness of its national organization, and (21 
its success at the state level. With Scott’s resounding defeat, some 
questioned the national Whig party’s viability, especially in the 
southern states. Throughout the South, including Louisiana, political 
parties presented themselves as the best defenders of slavery in the 
national arena. Winfield Scott’s perceived unsoundness on the slavery 
question was a primary explanation for his disastrous performance in 
the region. While the Whig party’s traditional appeals may have 
worked better in Louisiana than elsewhere in the South, Louisiana 
Whigs were as sensitive to the slavery issue as their sectional 
allies. They, too, feared that Free-Soilers had corrupted the 
northern wing of their party making it unreliable on the slavery 
issue. Aware that their fellow southerners had rebuked Scott and the 
Whig party as unsound regarding slavery, the state’s Whig leaders 
realized that they faced an uphill battle to convince the rank-and- 
file to continue to rally around the name "Whig.”
Unfortunately for Louisiana Whigs, the decline of the national 
Whig party occurred simultaneously with the disappearance of many 
prominent differences between the two parties at the state level.
During the preceding two years, Whigs had used their advocacy of
*New Or 1 eans Louisiana Courier. November 30, 1852 (first quote); 
Baton Rouge Gazette. November 6 , 1852 (second quote); New Orleans Bee. 
November 30, 1852 (third quote). (Hereinafter all newspapers from New 
Orleans unless otherwise specified.)
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constitutional change to differentiate themselves from Democrats 
within the state, but this option was no longer available to them. 
Writing three years after the campaign, independent New Orleans 
politician Charles Gayarre asserted that in December 1852 the Whigs 
and Democrats "looked like twin brothers struggling for the love
of ’popularity.’" Discussing the host of state constitutional
revisions in this period, Michael Holt argues that this situation "was 
a classic case where political parties benefitted much more from the 
conflict over an issue than from its peaceful resolution." In 
Louisiana, this "peaceful resolution" occurred when the Democrats 
accepted the 1852 constitution and joined the Whigs in promoting a 
more activist government.2
The Whigs’ first opportunity to demonstrate that their party 
still possessed political vigor and differed from the Democrats came 
at the state nominating convention on November 29. The president of 
the convention declared that the Whigs were "a party which although 
apparently conquered was never subdued." Yet, despite his optimism, 
problems immediately surfaced. Twenty-six of Louisiana’s forty-eight 
parishes, mainly from the northern regions, sent no delegates. The 
difficulties continued as the three most prominent candidates for 
governor declined consideration. Congressman John Moore instructed 
his proponents to withhold his name from consideration, and later an 
ally congratulated Moore on his failure to obtain the nomination. 
Another Whig celebrated his "narrow escape" from receiving the party’s
Charles E. A. Gayarrd, Address to the People of Louisiana on the 
State of Parties (New Orleans, 1855), 2; Michael F. Holt, The Political 
Crisis of the 1850s. (New York, 1978), 107.
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nomination as lieutenant governor. The convention instead selected an 
unspectacular but loyal partisan, state auditor Louis Bordelon, for 
governor and nominated John Ray for lieutenant governor.J
In contrast, the Democratic gathering two days later proceeded 
smoothly. The party had stressed the importance of the country 
parishes sending delegates, and as a result only six parishes had no 
representation. Additionally, although in the months preceding the 
convention as many as eighteen names had been put forward for 
governor, by the time of the party gathering, the delegates no longer 
divided on their choice.4 On the first ballot, they overwhelmingly 
selected sugar planter Paul Hebert as the party’s gubernatorial 
nominee. The nomination of Hebert was a brilliant political stroke. 
Hebert had served as a state official, graduated first in his class at 
West Point, fought in the Mexican War, acted a delegate to the 1852 
constitutional convention, and possessed the additional benefit of 
being of mixed Creole and American heritage. At the constitutional 
convention, Hebert had signed the document but had voted against the 
unpopular total population clause, which counted slaves for
Official Proceedings of the Whig convention in Bee, December 3, 
1852; B. H. Payne to John Moore, December 11, 1852, W. F. Weeks to Moore, 
January 4, 1853, David Weeks Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi 
Valley Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State University 
(Hereinafter LLMVC); F.D. Richardson to Moses Liddell, December 24, 1852, 
Moses and St. John R. Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC (quote).
IFor party organization see Solomon W. Downs to Alonzo Snyder, 
November 20, 1852, Alonzo Snyder Papers, LLMVC; For multitude of
candidates see W. Wilson Matthews to Henry Lyons, August 26, 1852, Henry 
Lyons Papers, LLMVC; McMillan to Isaac Morse, October 28, 1852, Morse 
Family Papers, Library of Congress (Hereinafter LC); John Perkins to 
Charles Gayarr6, January 20, 1853, in Charles C. Jones, Autograph Letters 
and Portraits of the Signers of the Constitution of the Confederate 
States (Augusta, 1884).
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representative purposes. Hebert argued against the measure, asserting 
that "the only true democratic basis of Representation" was the number 
of qualified electors. Also, learning from their mistake of November 
1S51. the Democrats issued a forceful party platform declaring that 
they stood in favor of free banking, internal improvements, public 
education, and amendment of the total population basis of 
representation. As the Daily Delta observed, the Democrats had 
"reversed positions with the Whigs. They have at last awoke to the 
necessity of laying down a platform of State Reform."^
At the same time, the Whigs, who in the November 1851 elections 
had used a pro-Compromise of 1850 and strong pro-convention platform 
to catapult them to a large legislative majority, forgot this lesson 
and declined to define their program in 1852. While the Bee argued 
that "the Whigs established their platform two years ago, when 
locofocoism was afraid to open its lips," a more logical reason for 
the absence of a platform lay in party disagreement over the total 
population clause. If the party were to present a platform, it would 
have to take a stand on the constitution find thus, at least 
implicitly, on this constitutional issue. In some parts of the state, 
especially New Orleans, a plank supporting the clause would have meant 
political suicide, but formal objection to a clause in a constitution
Journal of the Convention to Form a New Constitution for the State
of Louisiana (New Orleans, 1852), 65-66, 100 (first quote, 66); For a
description of Hebert’s qualifications see Paul Hebert to John F.H. 
Claiborne, December 7, 1852, John F.H. Claiborne Papers, Mississippi 
Department of Archives find History (Hereinafter MDAH); Democratic 
platform in Louisiana Courier. December 26, 1852: Daily Delta, December
4 (second quote), December 15, 1852.
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which the Whigs wanted to take sole credit for would have caused 
political embarrassment for many other Whigs.8
While sidestepping the issue of representation, the Whigs
proudly claimed the rest of the constitution as their own. They
asserted that the constitution was the work of a Whig-controlled
convention and had been resisted by the Democrats. According to the
Bee's editor, the Whig party had carried this question against the
opposition of the Democratic party including its current slate of
candidates. He added that a Whig electoral defeat now "would be like
beginning to build a house, and not finishing it."7 Furthermore,
addressing the Democrats’ pro-constitution platform, another Whig
editor contended that the Democrats were "running Whig principles into
the ground." Democrat John Slidell admitted that "popular will is in
favor of a cooperation on the part of the state in public improvement"
and that his party would "carry it out in a proper spirit." Another
Democrat took a different view of partisan congruity. Focusing on the
expansion of democracy in the charter, he asserted that Whigs "have
0paid us the compliment to adopt our views.”
6Bee, December 8 , 1852 (quote); Plaquemine Southern Sentinel.
December 18, 1852. For an example of the problems that the total
population clause caused the Whigs see West Baton Rouge Capitolian Vis-A- 
Vis. December 22, 1852. This Whig newspaper feebly alleged that the 
clause was not a Whig measure but a Democratic trick just to get the 
constitution rejected. Every New Orleans paper regardless of political 
allegiance opposed the total population clause during this campaign.
7Bee, December 6 , 20, 22, 23, 1852 (quote).
0West Baton Rouge Capitolian Vis-A-Vis. December 8 , 1852 (first 
quote); John Slidell to James Robb, December 3, 1852, James Robb Papers, 
Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection (Hereinafter 
HNO) (second quote); W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, July 11, 1852, Pugh 
Family Papers, Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin
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By December both Louisiana parties had come to champion an 
activist government, and the Baton Rouse Gazette could proclaim that 
Louisiana was "whig to the back bone.” Ironically, while the Whigs 
had been the primary advocates of these measures, they suffered more 
from this convergence of views. The Whigs had used these issues to 
revitalize their party after passage of the 1845 constitution and to 
suppress all talk of forming a Union party in 1850. But. as the 
measures lost their salience, the Whig party lost some of its vigorous 
backing, particularly in New Orleans. The city?s delegation to the 
constitutional convention, including twenty-six Whigs and only one 
Democrat, demonstrated its strong support for the Whig program in 
July. By December, however, the Whigs could no longer use the same 
measures to distinguish between their party and the Democrats. But, 
the Democratic party had found a point on which to differentiate 
itself from the Whig party— formal opposition to the total population
aclause.
Having worked so hard for the passage of the constitution, many 
New Orleans Whigs wished to retire from the political scene and reap 
the benefits of their labors. The difficulties that the Whigs had in 
finding candidates in New Orleans where "it is asking a great deal of 
a man of business to absent himself during the busiest period of the 
year" illustrate this change in attitude. Not only did the party in 
1852 have to settle for its fourth choice as gubernatorial candidate, 
but also three of its four New Orleans senate nominees and one of
(Hereinafter UT) (third quote).
aBaton Rouge Gazette. December 25, 1852.
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their replacements declined their nominations. The Bee's editor 
declared, ’'it is no easy matter to find four capable gentlemen 
willing...to surrender the claims of their business avocations in the 
behests of party.”1 James Robb, who had served as a Whig in the 
previous state senate, now viewed his political work as complete. 
Considered "first, last, and always a banker," Robb wanted to return 
to his business interests. After being assured by Slidell that his 
prospective Democratic opponent would support the new constitution.
* fRobb rejected his Whig renomination for the senate.
The difficulty in finding men to accept a nomination for state 
office was not limited to the senate or to the Whig party. In an 
article entitled "The City of Declinations," the independent Dailv 
Delta reported, "at least half the gentlemen who were originally 
nominated [in New Orleans] have declined." The Democrats, however, 
did not suffer as much as the Whigs did from this problem, for not 
only did they have fewer refusals, but also they handled their 
difficulties with greater political acumen. By discovering a man’s 
interest in holding office before nominating him, the Democrats did 
not suffer the Whigs’ ignominy of having to change their mastheads 
repeatedly when their formal nominees rejected the offer. In 
addition, the declinations hurt the Whig party more than the Democrats 
because of the political climate in which they occurred. At a time
I0Dailv Delta. December 7, 1852 (first quote); Bee. November 26. 1852 
(second quote), December 3, 1852.
^Harry H. Evans, ’’James Robb, Banker and Pioneer Railroad Builder 
of Antebel lum Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. (January 1940) 
XXIII, 243 (quote); John Slidell to James Robb, December 3, 1852, Robb 
Papers, HNO.
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when the national Whig party was seen as teetering on the verge of
collapse, Louisiana Whigs could not afford the presence of any sign
that they were going to join this trend. In the state campaign, the
party was attempting to do everything in its power to show both its
members and its opponents that it still possessed political 
*2viability.
The results of the December 27 election confirmed the Whigs’
worst nightmares as "Locofocoism triumphed to its heart's content.”
Paul Hebert defeated Louis Bordelon in the race for governor, and.
likewise, the Democrats triumphed in the battle for the other five
statewide elective positions. Hebert captured fifty-three percent of 
the votes and won three of the Louisiana’s four regions, only losing a
close race in traditionally pro-Whig South Louisiana. Though Bordelon
performed competitively, the legislative results devastated the Whigs. 
Their representation in the state legislature fell from between fifty- 
five and sixty percent to thirty-eight percent. Since the appearance 
of the Whig party in the mid-1830s, neither party had ever been 
reduced to such a minority presence in the state capitol.13 (SEE 
APPENDIX B)
The outcome in New Orleans provides the key to understanding the 
Whig defeat. Greater Orleans had cast only 4,244 of its 9,751 votes
^Dailv Delta. December 7, December 16, 1852 (quote). For a Whig 
declination outside New Orleans see G. F. Connely to Andrew McCollam, 
December 14, 1852, Andrew McCollam Papers, Southern Historical
Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (Hereinafter 
SHC)
^Franklin Planters’ Banner. February 17, 1853 (quote); Estimates of 
the Democrats’ legislative majority appear in Louisiana Courier, January 
6 , 11, 1853? Daily Delta. January 6 , 12, 1853.
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in the governor’s race. 43.3 percent, for Whig Louis Bordelon- The 
city’s support of the Democratic party stands out even more when its 
legislative delegation is examined. With the Democrats capturing all 
four senate seats and nineteen of the parish’s twenty-seven 
representatives, the Bee lamented that "the loss in New Orleans [was] 
too great to be overcome by our gains in the interior." This 
Democratic victory stands in stark contrast to preceding Whig triumphs 
in the city. In previous gubernatorial and presidential elections, 
the Whigs had oniy once before received less than 48.8 percent of the 
vote in New Orleans. In the preceding legislature, three of the 
city’s four senators were Whigs as were eighteen of the city’s twenty- 
five representatives. In 1852, the Whigs had swept the municipal 
elections and had overwhelmingly controlled the city’s delegation to 
the constitutional convention. And, in November, the city had favored 
the adoption of the Whig constitution— 5,463 to 3,832, and even Scott 
had performed respectably in the city garnering 49.4 percent of the 
vote.
The Plaquemine Southern Sentinel commented, "It would take a man 
with a wise head to account correctly for the political vagaries of 
New Orleans." The Whigs’ problems in New Orleans, however, were not 
so mysterious and were evident as early as the municipal elections of 
March 1852 when the Independent Reform Movement appeared. The actions 
of this group demonstrated that partisan attachments in the city, 
especially among Whigs, were not solidly fixed. Scott’s defeat in the
**Bee, December 29, 1852, January 5. 1853 (quote). In 1846, the Whig 
gubernatorial nominee had received 46.1 percent of the vote.
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presidential election reinforced the idea that men in New Orleans had 
lost some of their enthusiasm for the Whig party. Additionally, the 
Whigs' effort to win immigrant support alienated many of the party's 
traditional supporters. Furthermore, the Democrats' use of the total 
population issue especially hurt the Whigs in Orleans Parish which 
would suffer more than any other from its enactment. In 1850. the 
parish contained 39.8 percent of the state?s white population but only
25.2 percent of its total population. The Louisiana Courier's 
unceasing efforts to remind voters of this disparity and the avowal of 
Democrats to remove the total population clause helped ensure a solid
| CDemocratic turnout, which contrasted sharply with Whig apathy.
The newspapers offered a broad spectrum of reactions to the Whig
defeat. Comparison to the Whig national disaster in November could
not be avoided, and, according to one Whig stalwart, "Nothing else
could be expected so soon after the election of General Pierce." A
partisan editor lamented,
Similar to the sweeping current of destruction which 
swallowed up the Whigs on the 2nd of November last 
throughout nearly the entire country, is the flood which 
submerged them in the State, undoubtedly, on Monday last.
The Democratic Louisiana Courier concurred that the people had
punished the Whigs for "their alliance with Sewardism in the national
contest." The collapse of the Whig party throughout the nation left
many Louisiana Whigs with the impression that the party was dead and
this perception contributed to their reluctance to campaign actively
^Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. January 1, 1853: Statistical View of 
the United States . . . Being a Compendium of the Seventh Census
(Washington, 1854), 487 (Hereinafter Seventh Census): Louisiana Courier. 
November 4, 7, December 26. 1852.
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in December. Trying to put a more positive spin on the results, some 
Whigs insisted that the Democrats had won only by adopting Whig 
principles. The Baton Rouse Gazette chose to take this optimistic 
approach when assessing the Democratic victors, "so long as they will 
support that portion of their platform, [internal improvements and 
banks]— we are satisfied, believing as we do that a rose will smell 
as sweet by any other name."10
The Democrats' performance in the 1853 legislative session did 
not disappoint many Whigs. Possibly realizing that any alternative 
apportionment method would anger some portion of the state, enough 
Democrats objected to the repeal of the total population clause of the 
constitution to prevent any change in the measure. Also, a majority 
of Democrats united with the Whigs to forestall an effort to nullify 
Judah P. Benjamin’s 1852 election to the United States Senate. Some 
Democrats had argued that, according to the constitution, the 1853 not 
the 1852 legislature possessed the right to elect a senator. With the 
Democrats now in the majority, this new senator would be a member of 
their party, but the party split over the expediency of this attempt. 
One legislator asserted it would place his party in "a disreputable 
position" but worried enough about his apparent agreement with the 
Whigs to have his speech published for his constituents. Others
W.F. Weeks to John Moore, January 4-, 1853, Weeks Papers, LLMVC 
(first quote); Plaquemine Southern Sentine1. January 1, 1853 (second 
quote); Louisiana Courier, January 11, 1853 (third quote); Baton Rouge 
Gazette. January 1, 1853 (fourth quote).
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probably feared the precedent that overturning the election of a 
senator would set for future legislatures, and the attempt failed.''
More important than their refusal to overthrow Benjamin's 
election, the Democrats' enactment of an activist government program 
satisfied many Whigs. Although, prior to its ratification, a Democrat 
had expressed the fear that the Whig framers of the 1S52 constitution
"wanted banks to steal the money of the people, and railroads to run
away with it.” the legislators did not act upon this apprehension.
The state had not chartered a bank in sixteen years, but the 1853 
legislature passed a general banking law which led to the creation of 
seven banks between 1S53 and 1857. These banks more than doubled the 
state's banking capital. Democrats and Whigs alike advocated banking 
bills with the index of disagreement between the two parties on 
banking topics falling from 69.9 percent in 1850 to 40.3 percent in 
1853. A country Whig newspaper expressed its satisfaction with the 
free banking laws, and a year later a Whig editor voiced his delight 
that the banking question had "swallowed up the support of both 
parties!"18
uWilliam H. Adams. The Whig Party of Louisiana (Lafayette, La.,
1973), 249-50; Speech of Mr. Wickliffe in the Senate of Louisiana on
a Joint Resolution to go into the Election for a Senator (New Orleans,
1853), 3 (quote); Leslie M. Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in 
Louisiana," (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1940), 357.
t8Pailv Delta. October 24, 1852 (first quote); George D. Green, 
Finance and Economic Development in the Old South: Louisiana Banking. 
1804-1861 (Stanford, 1972), 23-27; Data for index of disagreement from 
Kirk Pilkington, "Interparty Conflict in the Louisiana House of 
Representatives, 1848-1854," (Unpublished seminar paper, University of 
Virginia, 1978), 27; Franklin Planters’ Banner. May 5, 1853; Plaquemine 
Southern Sentinel. February 11, 1854 (second quote).
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The Democratic party proved equally generous in its support of 
railroads. Like banks, railroads had suffered from the restrictive 
provisions of the 1S45 constitution, and in IS52 Louisiana actually 
had less mites of track in use than ten years earlier. In 1853. 
however, legislators from New Orleans and the country parishes joined 
together to grant charters and to give state aid to railroads. The 
IS53 legislature inaugurated an era of railroad expansion in Louisiana 
which saw the state’s railroad mileage quadruple over the rest of the 
decade. Its members pledged S3.8 million of state aid to four 
projects, though because of restrictive conditions the state actually 
only paid the railroads one-half this amount. Votes in the 
legislature on the three most important railroad projects indicate an 
index of partisan disagreement of only 17.9 percent. The combination 
of virtually unanimous Whig backing, and solid pro-railroad sentiment 
among Democrats made for easy passage as each railroad received at
J f lleast 84.2 percent of the legislators’ support.
The action of prominent Democrats further demonstrates the 
bipartisan nature of Louisiana’s commitment to state support of 
internal improvements. In 1846, James D.B. DeBow, a New Orleans 
Democrat and editor of the commercial journal De Bow’s Review, spoke 
out against "the public crib" being pillaged by "the ruinous system of
19' E- Moise to James Robb. March 22 and April 14, 1853, James Robb 
Papers, HNO; Merl E. Reed, New Orleans and the Railroads: the Struggle 
for Commercial Empire, 1830-1860 (Baton Rouge, 1966), 68-87; Edwin D. 
Odom, "Louisiana Railroads, 1830-1860: A Study of State and Local Aid," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1961), 36, 84-112; Voting data 
from Richard N.G. Means, "Louisiana Politics and Internal Improvements, 
1850-1859," (Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1997), 106-112.
96.3 percent of Whigs and 78.4 percent of Democrats voted in favor of 
railroad aid.
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pledging public faith for works more properly belonging to individual 
enterprise." By the end of 1S52. DeBow had done an about-face and 
sounded Whiggish in asserting "with all the liberal appropriations by 
states in aid of railroads. I know of no instance in which the public 
weal or credit has suffered." Also. Democratic party leader John 
Slidell tried to help the state’s railroad movement. In 1853. he 
joined the state’s foremost railroad promoter. Whig James Robb, on an
unsuccessful trip to England to obtain European buyers for Louisiana
20railroad bonds.
While Slidell may have enjoyed a harmonious relationship with 
some prominent Whigs, he had enemies within his own party. The 
tension between Slidell and Pierre Soule, which had begun when the 
iatter won the 1848 Senate contest and persisted as each championed a 
different contender for the Democratic presidential nomination in 
1852, continued to divide the party. Slidell maintained that the 
Democrats’ December victory was a triumph for Slidel 1-Democrats but a 
defeat for the SouId faction which had "strenuously exerted [itself] 
to defeat two of our Senatorial ticket.” Slidell confidently added 
that in a Democratic legislative caucus, he would out-poll Sou Id "at 
least five to one." When President Pierce offered Slidell a Central 
American mission, Slidell shrewdly declined it because he realized the 
value of remaining in Louisiana. Senator Sould, however, found the
De Bow’s Review. (May 1846) I, 436 (first quote), (May 1852) X, 498 
(second quote); John Slidell to James Buchanan, May 27 and June 28, 1853, 
James Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (Hereinafter 
HSP); Louis Sears, John Slidell (Durham, NC, 1925), 101-4.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
33S
offer of a post in Spain too attractive to pass up and resigned his 
Senate seat to accept the office."1
Slidell saw Soule's resignation as an unexpected opportunity, 
and immediately set his sights on obtaining the vacated Senate seat. 
With the Democrats having an overwhelmingly majority in the 
legislature, the victor in the Democratic caucus would assuredly win 
the post. Perhaps realizing his mistake in providing his rival with 
such a fortuitous chance. Soule attempted to defeat Slidell. Denying 
stories that he and Slidell had arranged Slidell’s succession to his 
seat. Soule declared in a New Orleans newspaper that "I am not. and 
cannot be, in favor of his election." In a transparent effort to 
challenge Slidell. Soule’s faction argued that the new senator should 
come from outside of New Orleans and suggested several names including 
former Senator Downs. Governor Hebert, and Lieutenant Governor W.W. 
Farmer. In the week prior to the caucus, Baton Rouge was rife with 
rumors and electioneering, and in the caucus, a bitter battle ensued. 
Through six ballots, Slidell and Hebert traded the lead, but then 
Hebert's supporters withdrew his name. Two ballots later, Slidell won 
the nomination, and easily defeated the Whig nominee.
Slidell and Soule would battle over control of Louisiana’s 
Democratic party for the rest of the antebellum period with the former
^John Slidell to William Marcy, March 10, 1853, William L. Marcy 
Papers, in Sears, John Slidell. 99 (first quote): Slidell to James
Buchanan, December 31, 1852 (second quote), February 13. March 30, 1853, 
Buchanan Papers, HSP.
i2W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, April 20, 1853, Pugh Family Papers, 
UT; George W. Morse to John Moore, April 23, 1853, Weeks Papers. LLMVC; 
Weekly Delta April 24, 1853 (quote); James K. Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 
1845-1861," Louisiana Historical Quarterly (April 1930) XIII, 72-3.
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generally triumphing over the latter. A transplanted New Yorker.
Slidell had amassed a fortune in New Orleans and abetted his political
rise by marrying into the city’s Creole elite. B o m  in France, Soule
achieved a nationwide reputation as a lawyer and as a orator. Though
they possessed some divergent political views, their battle rested
more on personality than policy. While some Democrats, including a
congressman who claimed that Slidell and Soule "have no rights to make
their enmities the test of political orthodoxy," sought to remain
aloof from the power struggle, most partisans found they could not
avoid taking sides. Slidell welcomed opposition, for according to his
philosophy a politician could not have friends without having enemies.
and he realized he had "very bitter enemies & hosts of staunch
friends."J His adversaries referred to him as "King Slidell," "an
unscrupulous demagogue," "a Dictator." "the Van Buren of southern
politicians," and "a wire puller who moves the puppets on the public
stage." His friends offered a counter assessment. They called
Slidell a man who "in point of ability has few equals," and the
"sharpest, and most sagacious politician in the United States."
Obviously, Slidell did not have to worry about lacking opponents or
24allies either within or without the Louisiana Democratic party.
1John Perkins to John F.H. Claiborne, July 14-, 1854- (first quote), 
John Slidell to Claiborne, November 21, 1857 (second quote), Claiborne 
Papers, MDAH; For Slidell’s early years see Sears, John Slidell. 5-23.
24West Baton Rouge Capitolian Vis-a-Vis. November 23, 1853 (second 
quote); Plaauemine Southern Sentinel. Apri1 23, 1853 (third quote); A. 
OakeyHall, The Manhattener in New Orleans. (New York, 1851), 96 (fourth 
quote); London Times December 10, 1861 quoted in Eli Evans, Judah P. 
Beniamin. The Jewish Confederate (New York, 1988), 27 (fifth quote); 
Louisiana Courier, March 15, 1856 (sixth quote); Dai 1 v Crescent, February 
7, 1856 (seventh quote), April, 20, 1856 (first quote).
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If the Whigs hoped to exploit this Democratic division to return
to power, the 1853 elections disabused them of this notion. In March
1853. the Whigs suffered a tremendous defeat in the New Orleans
municipal races which had launched their early success in the previous
year. The new constitution scheduled state judicial elections for
April in an effort to separate them from partisan politics. Both
parties, however, offered tickets, and the election resulted in a
convincing Democratic triumph with Thomas Slidell, the brother of
Senator Slidell, winning the battle for Louisiana’s highest j'udicial
post, chief j'ustice of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Democrats
also captured the four associate j'ustice seats on the court. The
summer brought news of a Whig defeats in the rest of the country which
25further disheartened the party faithful.
At the Whig party’s August convention to nominate candidates for 
state treasurer, state auditor, and superintendent of public 
education, efforts to regroup were thwarted as only seven of 
Louisiana’s forty-eight parishes sent delegates. The party had no 
vitality left except in the Second Congressional District, the party’s 
traditional stronghold of the pro-tariff sugar parishes, which sent a 
Whig to the House of Representatives in 1853. In the other three 
districts, including the first where the Whigs did not nominate a 
candidate, Democrats easily triumphed. Democratic candidates also 
carried every state office contested, and the Whigs saw their already 
small fraction of legislative seats became even smaller.
25 Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 253-55.
26ibid., 255-7.
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The congressional elections highlighted the split within the 
parties as much as the division between them. In the Second District, 
where Whigs predominated, partisans feuded over the method of voting 
at the nominating convention. The party divided between country and 
city members, with Theodore G. Hunt of the city winning the nomination 
after an acrimonious battle.*' Sectional division also entered into 
the Democrats' selection process in the Third District. Here. John 
Perkins of Carroll Parish based his claim for the nomination on the 
failure of the party to acknowledge the northern portion of the state. 
Perkins successfully argued that "it would be neither just nor sound 
policy for the party to nominate any one...except [someone from] North 
Louisiana.” Perkins won the nomination, and the subsequent campaign 
demonstrated the Democrats’ overwhelming majority in the district.
While Perkins remained at home, his Whig opponent, who was better 
acquainted with most of the district, campaigned throughout the 
region. Despite the Whig’s strenuous efforts, Perkins easily won the 
contest.
The most vitriolic intraparty dispute occurred among the 
Democrats of the First District. In this district, which included all 
of Greater Orleans except the portion of the Crescent City above Canal 
Street, Charles Gayarre ran an independent campaign against William
L John Moore to J. Aristide Landry, May 21, 1853, Landry to Moore, 
July 7, 1853, T.G. Hunt to Moore, December 16, 1853, all in Weeks Papers, 
LLMVC.
John Perkins to John F.H. Claiborne, May 14, 1853 (quote), October 
20, 1853, Claiborne Papers, MDAH; For Whig Preston Pond’s exertions see 
Henry Marston to James Perkins, August 28, 1853, Marston to John Buhler, 
September 3, 1853, Marston to George C. McWhorter, all in Henry Marston 
Papers, LLMVC.
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Dunbar, the regular Democratic party nominee. A lifelong Democrat. 
Gayarre. a former United States senator and Louisiana secretary of 
state, claimed that a John Slidell—led clique, not the voters, had 
selected the obscure Dunbar. Thus, according to Gayarre. Dunbar's 
nomination was not binding on the party as a whoLe. Dunbar’s 
subsequent victory did not end the battle between Gayarre and the 
Democratic party but only added to the animosity. Gayarre had already 
divorced himself from Soule’s wing of the party because he believed 
that Soule had stolen the Spanish mission from him. Now, Gayarre 
distributed a pamphlet openly accusing Slidell’s branch of the 
Democracy of fraud. He expressed his surprise that the city could 
cast more votes than in the preceding November despite the presence of 
a devastating cholera epidemic earlier in the year. He attributed 
Dunbar’s victory to Democrats "spending immense sums of money" and
"multiplying five or six hundred stipendiaries.. .who voted as often as
29it was thought proper by their chiefs."
Though Gayarre never specified who had illegally voted, all 
readers of his pamphlet understood that immigrants provided the tools 
for Slidell’s schemes. Gayarre’s charge automatically had credence. 
Most politically-aware Louisianans were familiar with Slidell’s
IQAddress of Charles Gavarre to the People of the State on the Late 
Frauds Perpetrated at the Election Held on the 7th November. 1853. in the 
City of New Orleans (New Orleans, 1853), 8 (first quote), 13 (second 
quote); For agreement on fraud charges see Samuel J. Peters, Jr., diary, 
November 7, 1853, LLMVC; For tension between Gayarre and Soule see Edward 
M. Socola, "Charles E.A. Gayarr6 , a Biography," (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1954), 113-126; Charles Gayarre to Evert A. 
Duyckinck, November 26, 1854, in "Some Letters of Charles Etienne Gayarrd 
on Literature and Politics, 1854-1885," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 
(April 1950) XXXIII, 225-6; and Edward G.W. Butler to John Perkins, July 
22, 1855, John Perkins Papers, SHC.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
3 43
complicity in the Plaquemines Frauds of 1844. when he arranged for the
transport of Irish immigrants from New Orleans to Plaquemines Parish.
where they cast spurious ballots. Complaining about the purchase of
elections in New Orleans, a Baton Rouge newspaper asserted that "a
dead foreigner is not dead, as long as his immigration papers can be
found." The Bee protested the shameless corruption of the election.
and the Plaquemine Southern Sentinel hyperbolically contended that the
Democrats’ foreign political vote "controls the political destinies of 
30this country."
New Orleans served as a major port of entry for Immigrants. In 
the 1830s. over 50,000 immigrants arrived in the Crescent City, and in 
the 1840s, this number increased to 161,657. In the first five years 
of the 1850s, immigration exploded with approximately 250.000 
foreigners entering New Orleans. Though not all of these immigrants 
stayed in Louisiana, according to the 1850 census over one-quarter of 
the state’s white population was foreign bom. The immigrants were 
not evenly divided in the state. Almost ninety percent of them lived 
in Greater Orleans where over one-half the white population had 
emigrated to the United States. The other three regions presented a 
sharp contrast with over ninety percent of their population having 
been born in the United States. In 1850, Louisiana possessed the 
highest concentration of foreign b o m  in the South. Despite
JliBaton Rouge Weekly Comet. November 19. 1853 (first quote); Bee. 
November 9, 1853; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. December 10, 1853 (second 
quote).
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containing oniy 5.9 percent of the South's white population. Louisiana 
possessed 45.6 percent of the region's immigrant population.'
Perceived as unclean, drunken, criminal, and most importantly as 
dupes to scheming politicians, immigrants were not entirely welcome in 
Louisiana. The anti-immigrant diatribes of 1S53 followed a long 
tradition of nativism in the state, and antebellum Louisiana has been 
called "a veritable hotbed of nativism." The opposition to immigrants 
in Louisiana surfaced as early as the 1830s. In the 1834 
gubernatorial contest, Edward Douglass White, a man of Irish ancestry, 
achieved victory. In response to White's election and to a perception 
that he favored naturalized citizens in his appointment policy, 
nativists in New Orleans formed the Louisiana Native American 
Association which opposed the election of naturalized citizens and 
advocated a twenty-one year naturalization requirement. The following 
year, nativists established the True American, a New Orleans newspaper 
dedicated to their cause. In 1839, another nativist newspaper, the 
Native American, began publication, and a Florida parish diarist 
recorded, "the Native American cause appears to be on the increase."
Its opponents countered with their own newspaper, the Anti-Native 
American. Tensions ran so high that the founder of the Louisiana 
Native American Association and his sons attacked the Anti-Native
William J. Bromwell History of Immigration to the United States. 
(New York, 1856); Seventh Census. 45, 61. For comparison by region within 
Louisiana see TABLE 1.1.
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Americarr s office with axes. The attackers were shot, but despite 
their wounds, they succeeded in shutting the newspaper down.J:
As immigration increased in the 1840s. so did nativism. In 
1841. nativists held a state convention in New Orleans. Louisiana's 
Senator Alexander Porter, himself a wealthy Irish sugarcane planter, 
complained that "the mass [of immigrants] who come are of the poorer & 
more ignorant classes." With this "mass of ignorance" serving as 
pawns for demagogues, he hoped that immigrants would be forced to wait 
fourteen years before receiving the right to vote. AdditionalIv, 
opposition to immigrant voting contributed to Whig hostility to 
calling a constitutional convention which would eliminate the 
property-holding requirement for suffrage. At the 1S45 constitutional 
convention, though unable to maintain the property requirement, 
conservative delegates succeeded in expanding the state residency 
requirement from one to two years, partially in an effort to limit 
immigrant voting.1
Throughout the decade. Whigs and Democrats accused their 
opponents with using fraudulent immigrant votes to win elections.
32For the best discussion of nativism in Louisiana see Marius 
Carriere, "The Known Nothing Movement in Louisiana," (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Louisiana State University, 1977), 14-47; W. Darrell Overdyke, The Know 
Nothing Party in the South (Baton Rouge, 1950), 45-72, 91-126. (first 
quote, 13); and Earl F. Niehaus, The Irish in New Orleans, 1800-1860 
(Baton Rouge, 1965), 71-83. The information for my discussion of the 
development of nativism in Louisiana in the following paragraphs comes 
primarily from these sources. True American. August 3, 1835; Edwin A. 
Davis, ed., Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes of Louisiana. 1836- 
1846 as Reflected in the Diary of Bennet H. Barrow (New York, 1943). 
October 10, 1839, p. 166 (second quote).
^Alexander Porter to John J. Crittenden, January 2, 1841, Crittenden 
Papers, LC.
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These charges and countercharges culminated in the Plaquemines fraud 
allegations surrounding the 1344 presidential election. II legal ly 
cast immigrant votes provided Polk's margin of victory in Louisiana, 
etna led former Governor A.B. Roman to decry the system where "almost 
every foreigner who lands on our shores is manufactured into an 
American elector." These accusations of fraudulent immigrant voting 
contributed to nativists establishing a Native American party and 
running their own candidate. Charles Derbigny. for governor in 1S46. 
After Derbigny finished a distant third in the balloting, receiving 
only 2.6 percent of the votes, the Native American party disappeared, 
but nativism did not.J*
Though immigrants generally favored the Democratic party and 
nativists primarily preferred the Whig party, nativism did not 
precisely parallel partisan lines. Both Whigs and Democrats joined 
nativist associations, and both parties appealed to immigrants in 
elections. Before Slidell organized the Plaquemines Frauds, New'
Orleans Whigs had skirted the election law by allowing Irish 
immigrants who had paid for cab licenses to vote in 1842. In the 1852 
presidential election, both parties attempted to gamer the immigrant 
vote with the Whigs making their greatest effort to shed their 
nativist label. To woo voters, they emphasized Scott’s advocacy of 
granting citizenship to immigrants who joined the army, passed out
A.B. Roman to Henry Clay, December 2, 1844, in James F. Hopkins, 
et al., eds.. The Papers of Henry Clav (11 vols., Lexington, Ky. 1959- 
92), 10:169-70.
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campaign biographies in German, and stressed the conversion of Scott's 
daughter to Catholicism, but their appeals proved fruitless.'''
Although the Whig party had voluntarily forfeited its title as 
the nativist party in Louisiana in the 1S52 campaign, the increase in 
hostility toward immigrants in following years appeared to provide a 
possible issue which the party could employ to differentiate itself 
from Democrats and return to power. More simply, the abandonment of 
nativist appeals in 1852 did not preclude a return to them later. The 
interaction between national and state politics must be examined to 
explain the inability of Louisiana Whigs to employ nativism to 
resurrect the party in the 1850s. The viability of political parties 
in the antebellum South was based upon their ability to defend the 
South and slavery in a national arena. The presidential election in 
November 1852 indicated that the Whig party had virtually ceased as an 
organized political force in most southern states. No longer trusting 
each other on the slavery issue, the southern and northern members of 
the Whig party began to look for other political parties.
In Louisiana the passage of the 1852 constitution marked the 
disappearance of the Whigs’ most successful issue— advocacy of 
activist government— suddenly leaving the party as vulnerable in 
Louisiana as it was elsewhere in the South. The combination of the 
resolution of state issues and the weakness of the national party 
resulted in the sudden collapse of the Louisiana Whig party. From
^For Whig efforts to garner immigrant support in 1852 see Bee. 
August 17, 1852: Baton Rouge Gazette. October 30, 1852; Plaquemine
Southern Sentinel. September 11, 1852; Abner L. Duncan to John Moore. 
September 2, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC.
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control of the 1S52 legislature and constitutional convention, the 
party quickly* devolved into an uncompetitive minority unable to hold a 
successful statewide convention. By 1S54. because of the 
disintegration of the national party and the Louisiana Democrats'' 
adoption of the Whig program, even staunch partisan journals admitted 
that the Louisiana Whig party was dead.̂
With the Whig party throughout the nation moribund, nativists 
had to look elsewhere for a party, and the Know Nothing party soon 
filled the breach left by the Whigs’ collapse. The Know Nothing 
party, also known as the American party, was a national organization 
dedicated to nativism and anti-Catholicism. The party blamed the 
nation’s ills on the immigration of Catholics which had sharply 
increased in the 1840s and early 1850s. Its members charged that 
Catholics placed allegiance to the Pope over allegiance to the 
American government and were incapable of assimilating into the 
American political process. The party received the label Know Nothing 
because of its penchant for secrecy. When asked about the 
organization, its members responded, "I don’t know." The order began 
in New York in 1853 and quickly spread to New England and then
17throughout the United States, including Louisiana.
^Plaquemine Southern Sentinel, August 13, 1853; Bee. June 10, 1S54; 
Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 246-264.
37For examinations of the national Know Nothing organization see 
Michael F. Holt, "The Antimasonic and Know Nothing Parties” in Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., ed., History of U.S. Political Parties (New York, 
1973), 4 vols., 1:593-620; and Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The 
Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the 1850s (New York, 1992), 
20-74. The Know Nothing party also called itself the American party. For 
the sake of consistency, I will refer to them .as the Know Nothings 
throughout the chapter.
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Running on a platform of reform and nativism. the Know—Nothings, 
calling themselves the Reform Party, achieved a surprising victory in 
the 1854 New Orleans municipal elections in March and engaged in anti- 
Irish riots the following September. The party followed up on its 
success in the New Orleans election with victories in several races 
across the state in late 1854 and early IS55. Know Nothing candidates 
won local elections in East Feliciana. Union. Morehouse. Iberville, 
and St. Landry parishes. A Know Nothing also won a special election 
for the state legislature in East Baton Rouge Parish in November 1854. 
Additionally, the election of a Know Nothing candidate to the 
Louisiana supreme court in April. 1855, demonstrated the party’s 
growing statewide popularity.
In addition to anger over immigration, another element of the 
Know Nothings’ appeal stemmed from their championship of reform. In 
Louisiana this issue dovetailed with the perception that the 
Democratic party had become an oligarchy. Many Louisianans believed 
that intrigue and corruption had contributed to Slidell’s Senate 
victory in 1853, and that his money had purchased the fraudulent votes 
used to defeat Gayarre in his congressional race. After Gayarre’s 
defeat, a Whig newspaper had lamented that Democracy had "descended to 
the oligarchy of a few," and a Democrat told Gayarre that he had voted 
for him because he "object[ed] to wearing the convention collar." 
Complimenting his New Orleans friends on victory in the 1854 municipal 
elections, a Know Nothing from the Florida Parishes observed, "Where
38Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 265-7; Carriere, "The Know 
Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 65-77; Niehaus, The Irish in New Orleans. 
87-90.
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Democracy Rules there is generally room for Reform." .And, following: 
the triumph, a Baton Rouge nevspaper expressed delight that honest 
citizens of the Crescent City had finally broken through party 
corruption.'
The portrait of the Louisiana Democratic party as an oligarchy
received a further boost in 1854 when Gayarre published The School for
Politics: a Dramatic Novel. Gayarre, angry with both the Soule and
Slidell wings of the Democracy, presented a satirical view of the
election of a United States senator which roughly paralleled Slidell’s
victory in the 1853 Senate contest. Gayarre’s depiction of scheming
politicians who see political morality as "an obsolete idea"
illustrates his disgust with the attitudes of Louisiana’s Democratic
leaders. The politicians in The School for Politics ridicule the idea
of democracy and treat the people with scorn. One aspirant declares.
"the Science of politics —  consists in buying or being bought, in
using tools— or being used as such." Another politician describes the
easiest path to victory— buying newspapers and packing party
conventions. Tn the final scene, a character articulates Gayarre’s
view of the current political situation in Louisiana: "Although our
government is apparently, constitutionally, and on paper a democracy,
40m  reality and in practice, it is an oligarchy."
39Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. December 24, 1853 (first quote); 
James Aburton to Charles Gayarre, November 7 1853, Charles Gayarrd 
Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Henry Marston to Payne & Harrison, March 
21, 1854, Henry Marston Papers, LLMVC (third quote); West Baton Rouge 
Capitolian Vis-a-Vis, April 5, 19, 1854.
40Charles Gayarre, The School for Politics: A Dramatic Novel (New 
York, 1854), quotes from pages 79, 121, and 124 respectively.
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Though Gayarre publicly denied that his novel targeted any 
particular individuals or any political party, Louisiana readers 
easily identified his bulls-eye as John Slidell and the Democratic 
party. Referring to the 1S53 congressional campaign, the Democratic 
Louisiana Courier claimed Gayarre"s novel represented merely the 
outcry of a spurned partisan. It alleged that he had "deserted and 
denounced [the party] when his own arrogance and vanity caused his 
defeat before a convention of political friends.” Gayarre responded,
"I have refused allegiance to a clique in the party, and not to the 
party itself.” The distinction between Slidell and the Louisiana 
Democratic party, however, had disappeared, and the Bee could refer to 
Slidell as the "very incarnation of Democracy.” Gayarre soon 
abandoned his charade of party loyalty and cast his lot with the Know 
Nothing party.^
Slidell’s control of the Louisiana Democratic party encountered 
a test when he faced re-election to the Senate in January 1855.
Slidell told a close friend that he believed his victory would be more 
gratifying if he remained outside of Louisiana during the contest.
After his unexpected defeat in the 1848 Senate contest, Slidell had 
learned an important lesson and remained wary of leaving anything to 
chance. "Fully aware of the necessity of continued vigilance,”
Slidell asked John F.H. Claiborne, an editor of the Louisiana Courier.
*!For denials that the novel attacked any party see ibid., 5: and 
Charles Gayarre to Evert A. Duyckinck, September L2, 1854, in "Some 
Letters of Charles Etienne Gayarre," 224; Louisiana Courier. October 4, 
1854 (first quote); Charles Gayarre to the Editor of the Washington Union 
October 23. 1854 (New York, 1854), (second quote, p. 10); Bee, January 
13, 1855 (third quote).
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and James Robb, the Whig railroad promoter, to go to the statehouse in 
Baton Rouge to manage his campaign. Despite his expressed desire to 
stay in Washington. Slidell's inclination to micromanage the situation 
proved too great for him to overcome. Prior to the election, he 
returned to New Orleans, so that he could make it to Baton Rouge in 
less than a day if necessary- Slidell correctly feared that his 
enemies both outside and inside his party would try to combine in 
order to insure his defeat. His stratagems, however, proved superior 
to his enemies* plans, and he won both the Democratic nomination and 
the Senate contest on the first ballot- Despite all of his efforts 
and worrying, and apparently unaware of any irony, Slidell wrote to a 
friend, "There was really no doubt or trouble about my re-election."'i
By 1855, most Louisiana opponents of Slidell outside of the 
Democratic party had accepted Know Nothings label. Some historians 
have contended that Know-Nothingism in the South was "Whiggery in 
disguise," and Louisiana Democrats labelled the Know Nothing party "a 
Whig Trick.” This explanation is too simplistic. The bulk of the 
Know Nothing party did consist of former Whigs, both because many had 
a past affinity for nativism and because they found joining the 
Democratic party anathema. At the same time, however, the party in 
Louisiana was not simply a surrogate for the Whigs. Know Nothings
^John Slidell to John F.H. Claiborne, July 8 , 1854, (first quote). 
October 31, 1854, December 16, 1854, January 29, 1855, Claiborne Papers, 
MDAH; Slidell to James Buchanan, October 18, 1854, January 6, 1855, March 
5, 1855 (second quote), Buchanan Papers, HSP; Slidell to James Robb, 
November 5, 1854, Robb Papers, HNO; Louisiana Courier, January 19, 23,
1855. For opposition to Slidell see Charles Gayarre to Evert A. 
Duyckinck, December 26, 1854, "Some Letters of Charles Etienne Gayarre," 
228: W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, January 16, 1855, Pugh Family 
Papers, OT.
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proudly pointed out that they included four former Democrats on their 
state ticket in 1S55 and that ex-Democratic Senator Charles Gayarre 
had enlisted in the party. Some Know Nothings even sarcastically 
rebutted Democratic charges by countering that the Democratic party 
was a Whig trick- Not only did some Democrats become Know Nothings, 
but some Whigs refused to join the Know Nothings and eventually 
entered the Democratic ranks instead. Senator Benjamin proved to be 
the Democrats’ most significant Louisiana recruit. Both the defection 
of Democrats into the Know Nothing party and the presence of former 
Whigs in the Democratic party belie a one-to-one correspondence 
between Whigs and Know Nothings/ 3
One reason that some Louisiana Whigs proved reluctant to join 
the Know Nothing party involved its attitude toward Catholics. The 
national party opposed all immigrants, but specifically singled out 
Catholics who allegedly followed the dictates of the Pope over their 
elected political leaders in the united States. Louisiana Whigs had 
received their greatest support in South Louisiana, primarily because 
this sugar-cane growing region demanded a protective tariff. Catholic 
Creoles predominated in South Louisiana which had over three-fourths 
of its church accommodations in Catholic churches. These Catholic 
Creoles shared the Know Nothings’ animosity toward immigrants who 
served as tools for the Democratic party but challenged the party’s 
anti-Catholic stance. This issue proved more disruptive to the Know
43For a discussion of historians viewing Know-Nothingism as a Whig 
disguise see Carriere, "The Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 1-4. 
For Democrats’ accusations see ibid.. 95-8; and J.D. Richardson to John 
Liddell, September 4, 1855, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC; Pierce Butler, 
Judah P. Beniamin (Philadelphia, 1907), 151.
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Nothing party in Louisiana than it did in any other southern state 
because Louisiana contained the region's highest concentration of 
Catholics. According to the 1850 census, the state possessed 4S.S 
percent of the South’s Catholic church accommodations. Because of the 
presence of a significant numbers of Catholics in Louisiana, the 
state's Know Nothings denounced the national organization's anti- 
Catholic plank and instead stressed opposition to immigrants and to
Ifthe Democratic ol igarchy.*T
The divergent attitudes of Louisiana and national Know Nothings 
regarding the proscription of Catholics climaxed at the 1855 national 
convention in Philadelphia. Louisiana’s delegation included a 
Catholic, former Democrat Charles Gayarre. The convention refused to 
seat him, and ail but two of Louisiana’s other delegates boycotted the 
meeting in protest. The convention then proceeded to include an anti- 
Catholic plank in the party platform. Explaining his attempt to gain 
admission to the assembly, Gayarre stated that his goal had been "to 
tear the mask of hypocrisy" from the national party, and he believed 
that he had "rendered an immense service to [his] country" by forcing 
the convention to take a stance on Catholicism. Gayarre, who seemed 
to have a pamphlet prepared for every occasion, immediately published 
the speech that he had intended to give to the conference. Declaring 
that "Louisiana— cannot compromise away the Constitution of the
’̂Seventh Census. 137.
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United States." he asserted that Louisiana would adopt the platform
lz"save one rotten fragment of it.""
Gayarre’s pamphlet not only addressed Catholicism, but 
intertwined the religious issue with another topic important to 
Louisiana and the rest of the South— slavery. In the lS50s. tension 
between the North and the South over the expansion of slavery had 
increased, and Gayarre's pamphlet made a specific entreaty to 
southerners in the Know Nothing ranks. Appealing to this southern 
sensitivity regarding slavery, he compared "slaveholders enslaving 
negroes and Protestants enslaving Catholics" and alleged that the 
party sought to reduce Catholics to the level of "a white slave."
More importantly, he appealed to "Men of the South, you who are in the 
minority on so many questions in relation to the rights which you hold 
dearer than your lives." He asked if the federal government could 
unconstitutionally attack Catholics, what would stop it from attacking 
slavery next?*6
In the wake of the Philadelphia Know Nothing convention both 
state parties held conventions to prepare for the fall campaign to 
elect a governor and four congressmen. In June, the Democrats 
convened in Baton Rouge and resolved that they "had no sympathy" with 
the Know Nothings’ "religious intolerance." The party, however,
45Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery. 167; Socola, "Charles E.A. 
Gayarre," 144-48; Charles Gayarre to James D.B. DeBow, June 17, 1855, 
James D.B. DeBow Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North 
Carolina (Hereinafter DU) (first quote); Judge Gavarrd’s Address to the 
General Assembly of the Know Nothing Party Held in Philadelphia in May 
1855, (New Orleans, 1855), 27 (second quote).
&&Judge Gayarre’s Address —  . quotes on p. 16, 19, 8 respectively.
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concentrated more on slavery than on religion. The first six planks
of its platform addressed the slavery question and pledged the party's
opposition to tampering with slavery where it existed or in the
territories. The unity on an activist government program in
Louisiana, which had contributed to the Whig party's demise, was
apparent as the Democratic platform possessed no planks regarding
internal improvements, banks, tariffs, or constitutional revision.
Though united on a platform. Democrats faced some division over their
nominee for governor. Prior to the convention, north Louisiana
Democrats had demanded that their section deserved the nomination.
The convention, however, narrowly nominated Robert C. Wickliffe. a
state senator from the Florida Parishes, who had served as president
*7of the senate in the past session.T
Know Nothings gathered in a state convention on July 4 to 
prepare for the November elections. The representatives affirmed the 
state delegation’s withdrawal from the national convention. Following 
Gayarre’s suggestion, they adopted the entire national platform except 
for the article proscribing Catholics. Declaring "America should be 
governed by Americans," they pledged themselves to changing the 
naturalization laws and to opposing the interference of foreigners in 
the voting process and the immigration of paupers and criminals. 
Demonstrating fidelity to the South, two of the ten planks of their 
platform pledged opposition to governmental interference with slavery. 
For governor, they nominated Charles Derbigny, a Catholic who had run
47For North Louisiana’s preference for a candidate from its section 
see W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, March 3, 1855, Pugh Family Papers, 
UT; Proceedings of the convention in Louisiana Courier. June 22, 1855.
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for the post in 1S4-6 as the Native American party candidate. In a 
further effort to distance themselves from the national parry's
proscriptive policy, they included three other Catholics on their
- , it state ticket.
Despite the Louisiana Know Nothings' rejection of the national
party's anti-Cathoiic plank, the state’s Democratic party continued to
make political capital out of it. Slidell delighted in the effect the
action of the national convention would have in the Second
Congressional District— the Catholic Creole region— and predicted that
the Democrats would be able to capture many parishes which had
i gpreviously supported Whig candidates. Democrats made the national 
party's proscription of Catholics a linchpin of their 1855 
gubernatorial and congressional campaigns. They engaged in a three 
pronged attack. First, they contended that the Louisiana party’s 
rej'ection of the national plank was a lie. Second, they pointed out 
that regardless of the stance of Louisiana Know Nothings, the national 
party still proscribed Catholics. Third, and most effectively, they 
charged the Louisiana Know Nothing party with speaking out of both 
sides of its mouth. They alleged that in South Louisiana, Know 
Nothings preached their rej'ection of the national plank and celebrated 
the inclusion of Catholics on their ticket. In North Louisiana, 
however, where less than ten percent of church seating was in Catholic
^Bee. June 13, 1855.
*5John Slidell to W.W. Pugh, July 23, 1855, Pugh Family Papers, UT; 
For a Know Nothing who left the party over the religious question see 
Jefferson McKinney to Jeptha McKinney, September 11, 1855, Jeptha
McKinney Papers. LLMVC.
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churches, the order embraced the anti-Catholic test and. and according 
Democrats, gave Derbigny the oxymoronic label "Protestant Catholic." 
They added that Know Nothings claimed Derbigny would rather have his 
children killed than educated as Catholics.^
Although Gayarre asserted that twenty thousand Know Nothings in 
Louisiana rejected the national platforms and "only fifty Iowr bred 
scoundrels" accepted it. the Democratic charges were not entirely 
without merit. Outside of the predominately Catholic areas of the 
state— South Louisiana and Greater Orleans— some Louisiana nativists 
accepted the entire national platform. A Know Nothing meeting in 
Bienville Parish endorsed the national platform, and North Louisiana 
Know Nothings even offered a separate slate of state officers which 
included no Catholics. This ticket immediately fizzled, especially 
after its nominee for governor denounced it. Other Louisiana Know 
Nothings tried to compromise between the national and state party 
alleging that the national party only proscribed Roman Catholics and 
their papist doctrines. They contended that Creoles were Gailican 
Catholics who did not share the Roman Catholics’ papist ideology, and 
therefore were welcomed in the party.^
Despite a Louisiana Know Nothing’s contention that the whole 
religious controversy "was a mole hill, made into a mountain by our
^Carriere, "The Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 131, 140-2; For 
Democrats claiming northern Louisiana Know Nothings advocated 
proscription of Catholics see Baton Rouge Democratic Advocate. September 
13, 1855; For Catholic church seating see TABLE 1.1; Louisiana Courier. 
July 7, August 1, September 23 (quote), October 11, 24, 1855.
^Charles Gayarre to James D.B. DeBow, June 17, 1855, DeBow Papers, 
DU; Carriere, "The Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 87, 140-2.
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enemies.” the accusation placed Louisiana Know Nothings on the 
defensive, and they were forced to expend much of their efforts in 
denying it. Denouncing the charge that Know Nothings opposed 
Catholics as an "infamous falsehood” former congressman John Moore, in 
an angry Letter to the editor, impatiently explained that the party 
"utterly condemns anv attempt to make religious belief a test for 
political office." Another Know Nothing admitted that reports of the 
Louisiana delegation's exclusion from the national convention had 
contributed to the party's defeat in a judicial election. And. the 
Bee acknowledged that the action of the Philadelphia convention had 
stemmed the Know Nothing's momentum in Louisiana and proved disastrous 
because the Democrats had seized "the Catholic question [as] a God­
send to them, and they have used it, or rather abused it."^
If Louisiana Know Nothings divided over the presence of 
Catholics in their movement, they all agreed on opposition to 
immigrants. In Gayarre’s The School for Politics, a character 
articulates the Know Nothing attitude, ”1 don’t care how long they may 
have been naturalized, they can never become familiar with our 
institutions." During the 1855 campaign, a Know Nothing congressional 
candidate railed against "debased foreigners who are attempting to 
interfere with our government" and all partisans proclaimed that 
America must be ruled by Americans. Another candidate complained of 
"vast hords[sic]— composed chiefly of the rudest classes" who are
F.D. Richardson to John Liddell, September 12, 1855, Liddell Family 
Papers, LLMVC; John Moore to Thomas Johnson (editor of Franklin Planters’ 
Banner), August 13, 1855, Weeks Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Thomas Ellis 
to E.P. Ellis, June 28, 1855, Ellis Family Papers, LLMVC; Bee. October
22, 1855 (second quote).
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''uneducated, ignorant and prejudiced." Contending that immigrants 
drained the state treasury, a Know Nothing speaker asked the 
rhetorical question, "Who fill your parish prisons, your work-houses. 
your penitentiaries?"11
Throughout the campaign, the Know Nothings produced statistics
to answer this question and to show the baneful effect of immigrants
on Louisiana. Know Nothings asserted that foreigners were criminals.
beggars, and burdens on society. Citing the 1S50 census, the Bee
contended that foreigners were ten times more likely to be paupers
than were native-born Americans. A Know Nothing legislative candidate
explained that the nation’s prison population contained foreigners at
a rate six times more often than their percentage in the population
would suggest. Additionally, according the Know Nothing press, out of
the 13,“59 patients treated by Charity Hospital in New Orleans in
541S53. 12.333 were immigrants while only 1,534 were natives.
The Know Nothings particularly decried immigrants’ pernicious 
influence on Louisiana politics. According to the Bee, immigrants 
cast almost one-half of the votes in New Orleans and in the 1852 
presidential election had cast almost one-third of the votes in 
Louisiana, and consequently the foreign-born population provided the
33Gayarre, The School for Politics, 44 (first quote): George Eustis, 
Jr., 1855 Speech, Papers of George Eustis, LC (second quote); Speech of 
Colonel Theodore G. Hunt at the Houma Barbecue. Parish of Terrebonne, on 
the 15th of September (New Orleans, 1855), 5-6 (third quote): "Address 
of Adolphus Olivier" in Opelousas Patriot. September 22, 1855 (fourth 
quote).
^Bee, August 31, September 22, 1855; "Address of Adolphus Olivier” 
in Opelousas Patriot, September 22. 1855; For a desire to close down 
Charity Hospital because too many Irish immigrants used it see Robert 
Wilson to James Robb, March 8, 1852, James Robb Papers, HNO.
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balance of power in Louisiana elections. Assessing this situation, a 
Know Nothing congressional candidate employed a traditional republican 
argument to demonstrate what would happen if this trend continued. He 
contended that this flood of immigrants ”threaten[edj the overthrow of 
our American system of government” and eventually would lead to "the 
erection upon its ruins of monarchical establishments.” He concluded 
that immigrants "cannot be politically incorporated with and 
assimilated with us." Raised in monarchical regimes, the immigrants 
could not understand American political traditions. Thus, they became 
"mere instruments and creatures of cunning wire-pullers.” These wire­
pullers, of course, were Democrats, and the nativists estimated that 
almost ninety percent of naturalized citizens supported that party and 
that Ireland and Germany "poured out their hosts to swell the throng” 
at Democratic meetings.^'
The new topics of immigration and religious proscription joined 
the traditional issue of loyalty to slavery and the South in the 
campaign. As in prior campaigns, politicians regardless of party 
affiliation attacked their opponents’ slavery credentials. Know 
Nothings charged that foreigners opposed slavery because they competed 
with slave labor and because they came from countries where slavery 
did not exist. They claimed that it was more than a coincidence that 
the northern states with the greatest abolitionist sentiment contained 
the greatest percentage of immigrants. Additionally, with, according 
to their estimates, eighty percent of the foreigners settling in the
^Bee, July 21 (third quote), August 7, September 5, 28 (second
quote), October 15, 1855; Speech of Theodore G. Hunt   6 (first quote);
Gayarre, Address to the People of Louisiana. 30.
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North, immigrants helped further the North's majority over the South 
in Congress. The Know Nothings added that the vehement opposition of 
abolitionist newspapers to their party validated their own slavery 
credentials.30
As the Democrats questioned the Know Nothings7 attitude toward 
Catholics, they also doubted the party7s fidelity to slavery.
Alluding to the Know Nothings. Democratic Congressman John Perkins 
delivered a speech in May addressing how "certain disguised movements 
of Abolitionists of the North’7 were trying "to undermine the cherished 
institutions of the South.7’ A former Know Nothing, while expressing 
his agreement with the party’s opposition to foreigners, resigned from 
the organization partially because he feared that the party possessed 
a secret third degree "strongly connected with the principles of the 
northern abolitionists.77 Democrats seized on the allegation of a 
third degree in their assaults on Know Nothings. A Democratic 
newspaper contended that "Abolition is the backbone of the secret 
order," and another observed that the party was "nurtured and 
conceived in abolitionist hotbed" of Massachusetts. The charge that 
the northern wing of the order was "abolitionised" emerged as a staple 
of Democratic newspapers.^
56Baton Rouge Democratic Advocate. September 13, 1855; Plaquemine 
Southern Sentinel. October 20, November 3, 1855; Bee. May 24, July 27, 
August 17, 1855.
^Committee to John Perkins, June 5, 1855. John Perkins Papers, SHC 
(first quote); Jefferson McKinney to Jeptha McKinney, September 11, 1855, 
Jeptha Mckinney Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Plaquemine Iberville 
Gazette quoted in Southern Sentinel. February 10, 1855 (third quote); 
Louisiana Courier. February 1, May 10, July 10, 14, September 21, October 
21, 1855 (fourth quote).
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By 1855. debate over slavery in Louisiana and throughout the
United States meant debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act. In 1854.
Illinois Senator Stephen A. DougLas introduced a bill creating the
Kansas and Nebraska territories out of a portion of the Louisiana
Purchase. According to the terras of the Missouri Compromise of IS20.
slavery should have been prohibited in this area. At the behest of
southerners. Douglas, however, called for the explicit repeal of the
Missouri Compromise and for these territories to be admitted under the
basis of popular sovereignty. Though few believed that slavery could
exist in either Kansas or Nebraska, southerners considered the
incorporation of popular sovereignty into the bill a matter of honor
and an opportunity to see if northerners could be trusted regarding
slavery. The bill easily passed in the Senate and narrowly passed in
the House with the chief opposition coming from northern Whigs who
«unanimously voted against it.
In 1854, with a single exception, Louisiana’s congressional 
delegation supported the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the state’s 
legislature passed a resolution endorsing the measure. All four of 
Louisiana’s Democratic representatives, including Senator Slidell and 
three congressman, voted for the measure, and the 1855 Democratic 
platform contained a plank celebrating the bill. The actions of the 
other two representatives, both elected as Whigs, shows the divergent 
paths of Louisiana Whiggery. Declaring the measure to be a southern
58For the South and the Kansas Nebraska Act see Wi 11 iam J. Cooper, 
Jr., The South and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge, 
1978), 346-59; David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis. 1848-1861 (New 
York, 1976), 199-224.
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question. Senator Benjamin, who within two years would become a 
Democrat, voted for it. Congressman Theodore Hunt, however, contended 
that in 1820 the South had supported the Missouri Compromise, and he 
would continue to stand by it. Hunt, who in IS55 would run for re- 
election as a Know Nothing, voted against the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
because he felt slavery could not exist in the territory, and 
therefore the measure unnecessarily agitated the North, increased 
abolitionist sentiment, and consequently threatened the Union."
During the 1855 campaign, Democrats used the vote on the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act to show that only their party could be trusted on the 
slavery question. In an effort to demonstrate that northern Whigs and 
Know Nothings were abolitionists, the Louisiana Courier printed the 
vote from the House of Representatives, which indicated that the only 
northerners who voted for the bill were Democrats. Democrats 
excoriated the Know Nothing’s nomination of Hunt and alleged that 
Free-Soilers desired his election and that Hunt’s position was 
"worthier of a New England than a Louisiana candidate." Know Nothings 
tried to brand the Democrats’ charges as slanderous, but Hunt was 
clearly placed on the defensive. While maintaining that he had acted 
correctly in opposing the Kansas-Nebraska act and sticking to the 
Missouri Compromise, Hunt tried to save face by declaring that now 
that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had passed, he would not tolerate its 
repeal. Hunt faced a double dilemma. Not only did he have to
59For a discussion of the actions of Louisiana regarding the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act see Dolph W. McCleish, ’’Louisiana and the Kansas Question," 
(Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1939), 21-30; Democratic 
platform in Louisiana Courier. June 22, 1855.
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overcome the perception that he was unfaithful to the South, but. 
running in a predominantly Catholic district, he lost votes because of 
the religious question as well. These twin difficulties contributed 
to a Democrat being selected to represent the South Louisiana sugar 
cane-producing parishes for only the second time in the party’s 
history.^
Hunt’s loss in parishes which had previously cast majorities 
against Democratic candidates illustrates the confusing nature of 
party politics in Louisiana in LS55. On one hand. Know' Nothings tried 
to emphasize that both traditional parties had disappeared and that 
their organization included both Whigs and Democrats. Describing the 
party, the Clinton American Patriot declared "there is no Whig and no 
Democrat known among them...the parties...having passed away," and the 
Bee contended that the party was composed of equal portions of Whigs 
and Democrats. The French-language Le Meschacebe contended that the 
Know Nothing state platform could have been the work of a Democratic 
or Whig convention. Arguing that "the Democratic party is there but 
democracy is not,” Charles Gayarre proclaimed that "the occasion had 
arrived for the formation of a new party." To demonstrate the 
bipartisan nature of their party, the Know Nothings included three 
former Democrats on their state ticket, including their candidate for
60Louisiana Courier. July 22, September 6 (quote), December 1, 1855; 
Weekly Delta. September 30, 1855; Speech of Theodore G. Hunt. 4-, 7.
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lieutenant governor. Lewis Texada. Partisan newspapers also published 
the names of Democrats who had switched to their party.3i
On the other hand, the Democrats incorporated two different 
attitudes regarding the status of Louisiana parties. In regions where 
they had always been strong, they contended that only one party 
remained. They labeled the Know Nothing party as Whigs led by a 
different leader. With the national Whig party defunct, the Democrats 
provided the only vehicle to protect the South. Democratic newspapers 
asserted that many Know Nothings had come to this conclusion, and 
throughout the campaign printed lists of Know Nothings who had 
abandoned their party in favor of the Democracy.^ In areas such as 
South Louisiana where the Whigs had predominated and where they could 
exploit the Know Nothing’s anti-Catholicism, the Democrats tried a 
different tactic. In this region, they did not run Democrat 
candidates but supported "Anti-Know Nothing" nominees instead. With 
this stratagem, they hoped to attract Whigs who would not vote for a 
Democratic but distrusted the Know Nothings.
lClinton American Patriot, April 21, L855 (first quote); Lucy (St. 
John the Baptist Parish) Le Meschacebe. July 15, 1855 (second quote): 
Bee. March 16, July 6 , September 8, 1855; Charles Gayarre, Address to the 
People of Louisiana on the State of Parties (New Orleans, 1855), 8 (third 
quote).
^"Phantom" to the editor, October 9, 1855, James Muggah Papers, HNO; 
for lists of Know Nothing defections to the Democracy see Louisiana 
Courier. July-November, 1855.
63For Anti-Know Nothings in South Louisiana see Knight to W.W. Pugh, 
July 26, 1855, Pugh Family Papers, OT; Baton Rouge Democratic Advocate. 
August 23, September 6 , 1855; Louisiana Courier. July 17, August 14, 25, 
September 10, 1855; Houma Ceres. August 16, 1855.
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Charges of abolitionist tendencies, debate over immigration, and 
accusations of religious proscription dominated the 1855 campaign.
The Louisiana Courier succinctly summed up the Democratic campaign 
strategy in its contention that Know Nothing principles were 
"hostility to foreigners, the Catholic religion, and slavery.”
Previous Louisiana campaigns had experienced partisan divergence on a 
much wider range of topics. By 1855, however. Louisiana politicians, 
regardless of party affiliation, could agree on most issues. Almost 
everyone accepted the constitution of 1852 and its provisions 
regarding an activist state government. They also concurred on the 
charter’s democratic provisions— universal white male suffrage with 
almost all offices elective. Furthermore, as memory of French and 
Spanish rule and of the Louisiana Purchase faded, debate over 
candidates’ birthplaces became less and less common.
According to a country parish newspaper, the elections resulted 
in a "Grand Democratic Victory" and "the total annihilation of Know- 
Nothingism with all its proscriptive features." Receiving 53.7 
percent of the votes, Wickliffe defeated Derbigny for governor, and 
Democrats won three of the four congressional seats. The Know 
Nothings best showing occurred in Greater Orleans and the Florida 
Parishes where Derbigny obtained 51.2 and 51.5 percent of the votes 
respectively. The party also elected George Eustis, Jr., to Congress 
in the New Orleans-dominated First District. Undoubtedly, the 
Democrats’ accusations of anti-Catholicism hurt the Know Nothings.
Not only did Theodore G. Hunt lose his race for re-election to
CtTLouisiana Courier. May 24, 1855.
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Congress in the Creole parishes, but the Democrats also achieved their 
greatest victory ever in South Louisiana with Wickliffe receiving 5".S 
percent of the region's ballots.53 (SEE APPENDIX B)
A comparison of the support given to the Know Nothings' Catholic 
gubernatorial candidate Charles Derbigny and their Protestant Attorney 
General nominee Randall Hunt reveals some of that party’s internal 
tension over Catholicism. In the twenty parishes of North Louisiana, 
some of which endorsed the national party’s anti-Catholic platform. 
Derbigny’s candidacy had engendered controversy. In this region, the 
Protestant Hunt's vote exceeded Derbigny’s 6,736 to 6.205 (8.5 
percent) including Claiborne and O'nion Parishes where Hunt out-polled 
Derbigny 1,365 to 1,075 (27.0 percent). In contrast, in the seventeen 
parishes of predominately Catholic South Louisiana the two candidates’ 
support was almost identical (5,039 votes for Derbigny to 5,005 for 
Hunt). In all but one parish in this region, the two Know Nothings 
received within five votes of each other.
After the 1855 state contests, attention turned to the 1856 
presidential contest. As he had in both 1848 and 1852, John Slidell 
supported his devoted friend, Pennsylvanian James Buchanan, for the 
Democratic nomination. Writing from Washington to an ally in 
Louisiana, Slidell referred to "endeavoring to secure Mr. Buchanan’s 
nomination" as his "constant occupation." To another partisan,
Slidell claimed Buchanan, a northerner who stood with the South on the 
slavery question, was "bv far the strongest man in the [Democratic]
^Point Coupee Echo. Broadside, November 6, 1855, in William S. 
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC (quote); Election results Louisiana Courier. 
December 1, 1855.
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convention."06 With Slidell in Washington. Soule and his allies in 
Louisiana, who preferred Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas, the 
author of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. sought to control the state's March 
nominating convention. Tension between Douglas and Buchanan delegates 
disrupted the convention from the beginning with acrimonious disputes 
over the time it should start, who would serve as chairman, and 
whether legislators could serve as delegates. According to Soule, who 
attended the convention, opposition to the "Slidell clique" led the 
delegates to repudiate those who claimed to be Buchanan's "exclusive 
friends." Instead, they sent an unpledged delegation to the 
Cincinnati national convention. Delighting in the rebuff given to 
Slidell. Know Nothing journals celebrated the state convention as a 
Waterloo defeat for the "Napoleon of Louisiana."67
Soule appeared to have achieved a triumph over Slidell, 
especially since Soule had been selected as a delegate to the national 
convention, while Slidell had been rejected. Soule declared that he 
did not oppose Buchanan himself just Slidell, but the chief Soule 
organ in New Orleans openly advocated Douglas’s nomination. Though 
not a delegate, Slidell attended the Cincinnati convention to work for 
Buchanan’s nomination. Undoubtedly, he also strove to place 
Louisiana’s delegation behind his friend. In Cincinnati, Slidell once 
again proved his political sawy. At his behest, the Louisiana
^John Slidell to John F.H. Claiborne. June 22, 1856. Claiborne 
Papers, MDAH (first quote): Slidell to James A. McHatton, April 11, 1856. 
Benjamin Flanders Collection, LLMVC (second quote).
^Proceedings of the convention in Louisiana Courier. March 13, 1856: 
Pierre Soul6 to George Sanders, April 10, 1856, Pierre Soule Papers, DU 
(first quote); Bee, March 15, 1856 (second quote).
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delegation decided to cast the state's vote as a unit, and they 
selected Buchanan with only Soule dissenting. After Buchanan received 
the nomination. Louisiana newspapers expressed their amazement that 
"King Slide 11,r had recovered so spectacularly from his March defeat. 
Though earlier in the year. Slidell's name had been mentioned for the 
vice presidency, he denied any aspiration for the position. Instead, 
in an effort to restore party harmony at the convention, he 
spearheaded the nomination of John C. Breckinridge, a Kentucky 
slaveholder and ally of Douglas. Louisiana's delegation nominated 
Breckinridge, who was unanimously selected as the Democrats' candidate 
for the vice-presidency on the second ballot.
Emphasizing its commitment to Union over its aversion to 
immigrants and Catholics, the Know Nothing party selected as its 
nominee for the presidency former President Millard Fillmore, who in 
1852 had contended for the Whig nomination. The national convention 
seated the Louisiana delegation, which included a Catholic, and 
resolved against religious tests for office and interference with 
religious practice. Louisiana Know Nothings, especially former Whigs, 
voiced their pleasure with Fillmore’s nomination. His actions as 
president, particularly his support for the Compromise of 1850 and his 
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave law, had endeared him to 
southerners, and Louisiana Whigs had advocated his nomination for the 
presidency in 1852. Additionally, Louisianans had welcomed Fillmore
goJohn Slidell to James Buchanan, May 26, 1856, Buchanan Papers, HSP; 
W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, June 3, June 7, 1856, Pugh Family Papers, 
UT; Slidell to Robert Tyler, January 17, 1856, John Slidell Letters, DCJ: 
A.L. Diket, Senator John Slidell and the Community He Represented in 
Washington. 1853-1861 (Washington, D.C., 1982), 77-81.
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when he visited New Orleans in 1854. and on that occasion one 
expressed a sentiment which Louisiana Know Nothings would embrace as a 
battle-cry in 1S56— "No purer Patriot now lives than Mi 1 lard 
Fillmore."c?
According to Louisiana Know Nothings. Fillmore’s behavior as 
president had proved the desirability of his returning to the White 
House in 1S56. Throughout the campaign, whenever opponents challenged 
Fillmore’s fidelity to the South. Know Nothings responded by referring 
to his conduct in office. The Bee concluded that Fillmore would 
"protect the South in her inherent rights" just as he had done in 
1850. and each day during the campaign it published a quote from the 
deceased Whig statesman. Henry Clay, declaring that Fillmore "has been 
tried and found true, faithful, honest, and conscientious." And, when 
the Louisiana Courier attacked Fillmore, the Bee included a series of 
letters entitled, "The Courier vs. the Courier," which compared 
articles from that newspaper in 1852 to those in the present campaign. 
The Bee found it ironic that in 1852. the Louisiana Courier had 
praised Fillmore’s "noble efforts to check abolitionism” as president 
but now tried to portray him as an abolitionist.^
The nomination of Fillmore forestalled the attempt to reorganize 
a separate Louisiana Whig party in 1856. Declaring that "the 
prosperity and safety of this Union" depended upon its reorganization,
CQAnbinder, Nativism and Slavery. 207-10; Henry Mars ton to Payne and 
Harrison, March 28, 1854, Marston Papers, LLMVC (quote); Louisiana
Courier, February 27, 1856.
^Shreveport South-Western, October 15, 1856; Bee, August-November 
1856 (first quote), August 6 , (second quote), August 7, 1856.
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the Whig Party of Louisiana did hold a meeting in New Orleans and 
selected delegates to a Whig convention in Baltimore. The national 
convention endorsed Fillmore's nomination, and for the remainder of 
the campaign the Know Nothing and Whig parties of Louisiana were 
virtually indistinguishable. Most Louisiana Whigs had championed 
Fillmore’s unsuccessful bid for the party's nomination in 1S52 and 
faced no difficulty in advocating his election to the presidency in 
1S56. A New Orleans Whig meeting even instructed those voters who 
still called themselves Whigs to vote for a Whig (Fillmore) over a 
Democrat (Buchanan) and professed that only Fillmore’s victory could 
preserved the Union.^
While in the South, Buchanan faced Fillmore, in the northern 
states, a third candidate ran for the presidency— John C. Frdmont, the 
nominee of the antislavery Republican party. Though Fremont did not 
appear on the ballot in Louisiana, his nomination shaped the race in 
the state, and James D.B. DeBow called the campaign a "time of 
peculiar peril." Southerners viewed Fremont’s potential election as a 
threat to their section and their way of life. A Baton Rouge Democrat 
declared "we have to choose any one before Fremont" whose election 
would lead to "disunion and consequently to bloodshed." A Know 
Nothing pamphlet expressed a similar sentiment declaring Fremont "out 
of the question in the South, for all parties unite in detesting the 
principle which lays at the foundation of his political faith."
7*lBaton Rouge Weekly Morning Comet. September 7, 1856; Bee. July 8 ,
1856. For attempt to resuscitate Louisiana Whig party see "No. 2 (1856)," 
Letter to the Editor of the Commercial Bulletin, and Appointment, in 
Hennen-Jennings Papers, LLMVC; Louisiana Courier. October 15, 1856.
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Lamenting the election of a Republican speaker of the House in 
February 1S56. the only Louisiana Know Nothing in Congress worried 
that "abolitionism is getting too powerful in this country.
With the entry of Fremont into the race. Louisiana Know Nothings 
and Democrats adopted the same campaign strategy. The Bee contended 
the South "must stand firmly by her rights," and a Democratic 
congressman concurred that it was "the duty of the people of the South 
to meet together irrespective of party association."73 The parties 
also agreed that only one candidate could prevent Fremont's election. 
The parties disagreed, however, on which candidate could best defeat 
the Republicam nominee. On one hand, Know Nothings charged that 
Buchanan's candidacy was a red herring, and that "every Southern vote 
cast for Buchanan is virtually a vote in favor of Fremont." On the 
other hand. Democrats repeatedly warned Louisianans that Fillmore had 
no chance to win the race. Consequently, a vote for Fillmore would be 
a vote taken away from Buchanan and would be "practically a vote for
71the Black Republicans.”
Both Democrats and Know Nothings also labelled each other’s 
candidate as an abolitionist. Democrats resurrected stories from the
72James D.B. DeBow to My Dear Sir, August 20, 1856, James D.B. DeBow 
Letter, HNO (first quote); F.M. Kent to Mrs. A.A. Means, August 11, 1856. 
Kent Family Papers, LLMVC (second quote); "Fillmore and Donelson," July 
20, 1856, p. 8 , Ellis Family Papers, LLMVC (third quote); George Eustis, 
Jr., to John Moore, February 5, 1856, Weeks Papers, LLMVC (fourth quote).
73Bee. March 20, 1856 (first quote); John Perkins to Gentlemen, 
September 28, 1856, John Perkins Papers, SHC (second quote).
7<Bee, July 1, 16, 1856 (quote); Louisiana Courier. April 5 (second 
quote), June 14, 18, August 8 , 1856.
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184S presidential campaign when Fillmore ran for the vice-presidency.
As in that campaign, the Democrats produced an 1S3S Letter in which 
Fillmore had professed antisiavery sentiments and argued that as a 
congressman. Fillmore was "quite as sectional as any of his Black 
Republican opponents of the present day." Additionally, they charged 
that in many northern states the Know Nothing party had fused with the 
Republicans. The Know Nothings mocked the Democrats' labelling of 
Buchanan as a northern man with southern principles. They compared 
him to Martin Van Buren. a candidate who had previously received this 
title, but in the end had turned out to be opposed to slavery. Know 
Nothings also alleged that northern and southern Democrats differed 
over slavery, with northerners possessing a free-soil opinion against 
the spread of slavery into the territories.^
Charges of abolitionism and arguments over which candidate best 
protected southern interests had been a staple of presidential races 
in Louisiana for two decades. In a description which could have 
applied equally well to either party, the Bee charged that "the 
slavery question has, for the last twenty years, been the theme on 
which the Locofoco chiefs of the South have harped." and later added 
that "in every presidential election, the South has been blindly drawn 
into the support of the Democracy by the cry of slavery." Since 1836, 
Whigs, Democrats, and now Know Nothings in Louisiana had branded
Louisiana Courier. July 15 (quote), September 13, 28, 1856;
"Fillmore and Donelson," July 20, 1856, Ellis Papers, LLMVC; Bee, May 17, 
June 16, 1856.
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opposing presidential candidates as abolitionists or tools of 
abol itionists.,K
The LS56 campaign, however, presented, a difference from previous 
races. Unlike prior campaigns where sLavery was a campaign topic, in 
1S56 slavery was the campaign topic. The Louisiana Courier termed 
slavery "the great and pervading issue.*' Other traditional issues 
disappeared from Louisiana’s political discourse. In preceding 
elections, the candidates* ties to Louisiana, the tariff, the national 
bank, republicanism, and the Creole-American split had joined slavery 
in partisan debate. A decreased interest in these concerns when 
combined with the entry of the explicitly sectional Republican party 
into the campaign meant that by 1856 the slavery issue stood alone. 
Stumping for Buchanan in Maine. Louisiana Senator Benjamin expressed 
this sentiment when he declared "tariffs, free trade. United States 
Banks....and a thousand other issues of my early manhood, had all been 
settled by the people." In 1856. only one substantial issue remained 
in Louisianans’ minds— which party best protected the South and 
slavery. 1
Additionally, the slavery debate in 1856 differed as Democrats’ 
assessments of the national situation took on a more ominous tone.
They combined allegations of abolitionist tendencies and opposition to 
Republican victory with threats of disunion. In his inaugural
76Bee, September 9, (first quote), September 23, 1856 (second quote).
^LouisianaCourier. August 3, 1856 (first quote); Benjamin’s remarks 
from Portland Argus (second quote) in Pauline A. Randow, "A Collection 
of Speeches of Judah Philip Benjamin,” (Master’s thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1970), 149.
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address. Governor Wickliffe argued that if Congress would decline the 
admission of a slave state, "the time for separation will have 
arrived." and a Democratic meeting in Caddo Parish concurred. A 
circular distributed by a Democratic congressman declared that the 
South only wanted security for its people and institutions, and "if 
such security cannot be had any longer within the Union, she will have 
to seek it— and in my Judgment, the sooner, the better— out of the 
Union.” Louisiana had never been a hotbed of secessionists, and 
Senator SouLe had been chastised for his disunionist course in 1S50. 
but in 1S56 for the first time ail wdngs of the Louisiana Democratic 
party spoke openly of secession for the first time. Even the ever 
careful Senator Slidell got carried away with this theme and did not 
''hesitate to declare that if Fremont be elected, the Union cannot and 
ought not to be preserved.” '̂
Fillmore supporters in Louisiana branded Democrats as traitorous 
disunionists who must be defeated. They especially seized on 
Slidell's statement. Calling it the "insane ebullition of heated 
partisanship." Know Nothings expressed disbelief that anyone in 
Louisiana shared its sentiment. The Know Nothings celebrated the 
defection of a Democratic legislator who had voted for Slidell for the 
Senate but did not adhere to Slidell's dire forecast. In charging the 
Democrats with disunionist sentiments, the Know Nothings even invoked 
the revered name of Democratic leader Andrew Jackson. In the 1830s,
78Wickliffe inaugural in Louisiana Courier. February 1. 1856 (first 
quote): Louisiana Courier. March 11. 1856; John Perkins to Gentlemen, 
September 28, 1856, John Perkins Papers, SHC (second quote); Daily
Picayune. October 8, 1856 (third quote).
Reproduced w ith permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
when South Carolina had threatened secession. President Jackson had 
boldly declared that the Union "must and shall be preserved." The 
Know Nothings argued that perhaps they were the more legitimate heirs 
of Jackson, especially with his ward and nephew Andrew Jackson
7QDonelson as their vice-presidential candidate.'
In contrasting themselves with Democrats. Fillmore men giadly 
assumed the mantle as the party which most respected and best 
protected the Union. Know Nothings downplayed their opposition to 
immigrants, and instead made Unionism the centerpiece of their 
campaign decrying the sectionalism of both Republicans and Democrats. 
They claimed that Fillmore represented a middle course between these 
two extremists— the only truly national candidate. A Know Nothing 
asserted that Fillmore knew "no North as against the South." and 
another wondered "without Mr. Fillmore, how are to suppress the 
sectional proclivity of north and south?" Emphasizing this Union 
theme, pro-Fillmore clubs in New Orleans called themselves the 
Constitution Club and Union Hussars. Presenting a banner on behalf of 
the women of Shreveport, a Know Nothing orator declared Fillmore to be 
the only candidate who could "restore harmony and discord to our 
divided land."^
79Daily Picavune, October 8 , 1856 (first quote); Shreveport South- 
Western. October 15, 1856; Bee. September 23, 1856 (second quote).
80John Moore to Shreveport Committee, August 27, 1856, John Moore 
Papers, HNO (first quote); Glendy Burke to John J. Crittenden, August 10, 
1856, John J. Crittenden Papers, LC (second quote): Carriere, "The Know 
Nothing Movement in Louisiana,” 167-9, 181-2; Plaquemine Southern
Sentinel. September 27, 1856; Bee, June 23, July 8 , September 1, 1856 
(third quote).
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Though the Know Nothing party preferred to consider itself the 
party of the Union and the Const i cut ion. Democrats charged it with 
being more anti-immigrant and anti-CathoIic than pro-Union. A 
Democratic letter to the editor chastised the Know Nothings for 
"bickering about foreigners...and popery, when the whole country is 
convulsed on the momentous question of slavery." Despite the Know 
Nothing party's claim to the contrary, the Democrats warned Louisiana 
Creoles that the party wanted to proscribe them from political 
participation. As in 1855. this charge proved most effective in South 
Louisiana where voters who had actively supported Fillmore as a Whig, 
proved more reluctant to support him as a Know Nothing. '
Despite the party's nativist origins and the charges of the 
Democrats, opposition to immigrants played only a minor role in the 
Know Nothings' campaign strategy. And, more importantly, when they 
did discuss immigration, they discussed it in terms of its interaction 
with abolitionism. Know Nothings alleged that German newspapers 
throughout the country, including one in New Orleans, championed 
Fremont and claimed that immigrant voting would defeat slavery in the 
Kansas territory. The party also reminded voters that immigration 
added congressional seats in the North, and concluded that 
"abolitionism asks no better policy than the encouragement of foreign 
immigration." Overall, however, the party downplayed this aspect of
ClLouisiana Courier. July 19, 1856.(quote)
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its organization, instead preferring to distinguish itself from the
8*Democrats by its fidelity to the Union. ‘
Democrats in Louisiana gained a valuable ally when Senator
Benjamin officially joined their party. Elected as a Whig in 1S52.
Benjamin had refused to endorse either party in the 1S55 campaign. In
1856, because of the Republican party threat to slavery. Benjamin felt
he could no longer avoid making a partisan commitment, and in a speech
on the Senate floor he pledged his allegiance to the Democratic party.
In a letter expressing his willingness to stump for Buchanan, Benjamin
echoed the fears of many Democrats:
public affairs have reached such a point that it is 
inconceivable that there can exist two parties now in the 
South. He who does not see that a vote for Fillmore is in 
reality a vote for Fremont is incredibly blind...Such is
the feeling of old party prejudices that I verily believe 
that there are many old whigs who would see the Union
dissolved sooner than vote for a Democrat.
Democrats urged other Whigs to follow Benjamin's example, and the
Louisiana Courier celebrated his defection along with that of other
prominent Louisiana Whigs including former gubernatorial candidate
Alexander Declouet and the president of the 1852 constitutional
8 *convention Duncan Kenner.
Know Nothings attacked Benjamin for his defection into the ranks 
of his lifelong enemy. They concluded that the ambitious Benjamin 
desired re-election to the Senate, and that he had selfishly concluded
8"Bee, July 21, 1856; "FiLlmore and Donelson,” July 20, 1856, 17-18 
(quote on p. 18), Ellis Papers, LLMVC; Carriere, "The Know Nothing 
Movement in Louisiana," 165-6.
83Judah P. Benjamin to John Perkins, July 2, 1856, John Perkins 
Papers. SHC (quote); Louisiana Courier. October 11, 28, 1856.
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that his best chance involved allying with Slidell. The Bee alleged 
that the traitorous Benjamin had become "the blind dupe and victim of 
[Slidell's] seduction" and argued that Louisiana now only had one 
senator since a sycophantic Benjamin merely followed Slidell's 
footsteps. Another newspaper contended that a Senate seat would not 
quench Benjamin's insatiable ambition. It maintained that the 
foreign-born Benjamin sought the presidency, and only the Democrats 
would alter the Constitution to allow a man b o m  outside the United
31States to ascend to this office.
While it is impossible to measure the effect of Benjamin upon 
the campaign in Louisiana, the candidate of his new party. James 
Buchanan did capture the state's electoral votes and won the national 
contest. Buchanan swept the South and divided the northern states 
with Fremont, while Know Nothing Millard Fillmore only received the 
electoral votes of Maryland. In Louisiana, Buchanan triumphed in 
three of the four regions and received 51.7 percent of the state's 
votes. The historically Democratic North Louisiana and Florida 
Parishes sided with him. In South Louisiana, the combination of 
animosity concerning the Know Nothings’ religious proscription and 
sensitivity regarding slavery contributed to Buchanan receiving 60.6 
percent of the region’s vote— the greatest percentage ever received 
there by a Democratic presidential candidate. Only in Greater 
Orleans, where Know Nothing violence marred the election and forced 
many Democrats to stay away from the polls, did Buchanan suffer a
giBee, September 26, (quote), September 30, 1856; Plaquemine Southern 
Sentinel. May 17, 1856.
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tremendous defeat, which made the state race relatively close. (SEE 
APPENDIX A)
The election of 1S56 marked the end of the Know Nothing as a 
national party and weakened it as Louisiana party. With the northern 
and southern wings of the party unable to come to an agreement 
regarding slavery, the party soon disappeared. The party’s anti­
immigrant stance never had much appeal in most of the South, and when 
southerners perceived that it could not serve as an effective vehicle 
to protect slavery, they quickly abandoned it. As the Know Nothing 
party disappeared nationally and regionally, it collapsed much of 
Louisiana. The New Orleans party organization, however, countered 
this trend. Fillmore had captured the Crescent City by over 3.500 
votes, the largest majority ever given a presidential candidate in the 
city, and he won an astounding 70.1 percent of the vote in Greater 
Orleans. While disappearing in the rest of the state, the Know 
Nothings, preaching opposition to immigrants and using intimidation at 
the polls, continued to control New Orleans’ municipal government 
until the Civil War.^
Though New Orleans remained a Know Nothing stronghold. Democracy 
reigned triumphant throughout the rest of Louisiana. Since 1852, the 
party had fought off two potent challenges— the ratification of a Whig 
constitution and the sudden popularity of the anti-immigrant Know 
Nothing party. In the former instance, Democrats simply adopted the 
popular Whig state program and let fissures in the national
85Sou 16, The Know Nothing Party in New Orleans. 85-120: For Know 
Nothing intimidation see Robert M. Lusher, Diary, June 2. 1856, Robert 
M. Lusher Papers, LLMVC; Niehaus, The Irish in New Orleans. 90-7.
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organization destroy the Whigs. In the latter. Louisiana Democrats 
effectively employed their opponents anti-Catholicism against them 
and again watched as sectional tension over slavery contributed to the 
defeat of an apparently formidable state competitor. By the end of 
1S56. the Democratic party held the White House, occupied Louisiana’s 
governorship, possessed three of the state’s four congressional seats, 
and dominated the state legislature.
Democracy controlled Louisiana, but this mastery did not 
guarantee harmony. Tension between John Slidell and Pierre Soule 
divided the party, and without a common opponent, this animosity 
threatened to disrupt the organization. Also, the national Democratic 
party was not immune to the same sectional pressures which had 
destroyed the Whigs and the Know Nothings. Additionally, the 
antislavery Republican party had made a strong showing in the 1856 
presidential campaign, and Louisianans split on how best to react to 
this organization. Some talked of secession while others favored the 
Union. If the Republicans could gain the electoral votes of a few 
more states, then they could capture the presidency. Then. Louisiana 
Democrats would be forced to decide whether they favored secession in 
practice or merely in their rhetoric.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CHAPTER SEVEN- 
DEMOCRATS AND DISUNION. 1S5“-IS61
By 185“ the Democratic party controlled all of Louisiana except 
for New Orleans. Conversely, the Know Nothings dominated the Crescent 
City but had little influence in the country parishes. Within the 
city. Know Nothings used intimidation and violence to control access 
to the polls and ensure victory for their candidates. In most of the 
country parishes. Democrat candidates were unbeatable, but the absence 
of an organized opposition did not lead to harmony within Louisiana's 
Democratic party. Intraparty disputes replaced battles with Whigs and 
Know Nothings. Previously, Democrats had solved their problems in 
party caucuses and conventions but by the late ISSOs, congressional 
contests and even a governor’s race would see dissident Democrats 
rejecting the official party nominee and running their own candidates. 
Thus, disagreement within the Democracy resolved itself not in party 
meetings but on the campaign trail and at the polls.
In 1857 Louisiana Democrats attempted to use their control of 
the state legislature to gain command of New Orleans— the one area 
where they had almost no strength. They believed that their majority 
in the legislature could counteract the power of New Orleans Knowr 
Nothings. In 1856, the Democrats had succeeded in overturning the 
election of three Know Nothing senators from New Orleans and replacing 
them with Democrats. In March 1857, the legislature attempted to 
remove control of New Orleans elections from local Know Nothing 
officials. Following Governor Wickliffe’s 1857 address, the 
legislature, citing the "unparalleled disorder" of New Orleans 
elections, passed a bill giving the state government power over city
383
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elections. The bill established a central board of election including 
New Orleans5s mayor but composed mainly of members from outside of the 
city. It also created a powerful post— superintendent of elections. 
Selected by the governor, the superintendent could appoint an 
unlimited number of deputies and had broad powers of arrest. The vote 
on the measure demonstrates Its partisan nature— Democrats cast 94.7 
percent of their ballots in favor of the measure, while every Know
rNothing voted against it.1
New Orleans Know Nothings immediately attacked the law. 
especially the unprecedented power given to the superintendent of 
elections. According to the Bee, "at least nine-tenths of the 
community are radically hostile to this monstrous bill." The Bee also 
warned Democrats that the passage of this onerous measure would 
backfire on them and actually further reduce their minimal backing in 
the city. In opposing the law, Know Nothings tried to capitalize on 
southerners5 sensitivity to slavery and their own independence. One 
country' Know Nothing newspaper accused legislators of "attempting to 
enslave the people of the city," and another asserted that under the 
bill New Orleans tax-payers would be only as free as Russian serfs. 
Within New Orleans, only the Democratic Louisiana Courier defended the
Louisiana House Journal, 1857, 14-7; Leon C. Soule, The Know
Nothing Party in New Orleans: A Reappraisal (Baton Rouge, 1961), 86-7; 
Marius Carriere, "The Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," (Ph.d. 
dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1977), 208-10.
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measure, arguing that threats and violence throughout the 1850s had
1kept the city's true Democratic majority away from the polish
While in New Orleans Democrats hoped the election bill would 
ensure victory over the Know Nothings, outside the city intraparty 
squabbles overshadowed Know Nothing competition. Not surprisingly, 
the tension continued to involve the role of party chieftain John 
Slidell. Slidell and his allies attached themselves to the Buchanan 
administration and controlled the distribution of federal offices in 
Louisiana. His opponents within the Democratic party included two 
groups: partisans who resented Slidell’s control of patronage in 
Louisiana, and a growing portion of the Democratic party, called the 
southern or states-rights faction, that felt that the Buchanan 
administration could not be trusted to protect the South and slavery. 
This latter group had begun to speak of secession from the Union as a 
possible remedy for the South. With the SIidel 1-directed patronage 
policy of the administration favoring more moderate Democrats, these 
two groups of adversaries frequently overlapped.3
With his ally Buchanan in the White House, Senator Slidell used 
federal patronage to enhance his power and to increase the 
administration’s support in Louisiana. While in Washington, he
‘New Orleans Bee. February 28 (quote), March 2, 1857; Houma Ceres. 
March 7. 1857; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. March 2, 1857; New 
Orleans Louisiana Courier, February 12, 26, March 8 , 1857. (Hereinafter 
all newspapers from New Orleans unless otherwise specified)
3Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. October 14, 1857; Edward G.W. Butler 
to John Slidell, May 18, 1857, Butler Family Papers, Williams Research 
Center, Historic New Orleans Collection (Hereinafter HNO); W.W. Pugh to 
Josephine N. Pugh, March 12, 1857, Pugh Family Papers, Barker History 
Center, University of Texas, Austin. (Hereinafter UT).
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requested that Buchanan replace the New Orleans postmaster with a 
Slidell man. explaining that if no change were made then his ability 
to secure a pro-Buchanan legislature and elect a pro-Buchanan senator 
would be reduced. After securing the president's agreement to this 
change. Slidell returned to Louisiana in March to help his wing of the 
party. Arriving in New Orleans, Slidell soon left to visit the 
state’s northern parishes- Closely following what one newspaper 
sarcastically termed "The Progress of the Mighty Pilgrim.” his enemies 
charged that Slidell's North Louisiana travels had elaborate goals— to 
secure the reelection of the unpopular Thomas Green Davidson in the 
Third Congressional District, to obtain support for Fourth District 
congressman John Sandidge’s election to the United States Senate, and 
to aid Slidell’s own presidential ambitions. Slidell vehemently 
denied these accusations. He contended that his visit to North 
Louisiana had no connection with electioneering other than to get 
Sandidge reelected to Congress: not to have him placed in the Senate. 
Instead, he claimed to have gone to the region in an to secure support 
for a North Louisiana railroad.4
In May animosity between Slidell and his enemies within the 
party subsided enough for the Democrats to hold a relatively 
harmonious state convention in Baton Rouge to nominate candidates for 
minor state offices— treasurer, auditor, and superintendent of public
IJohn Slidell to James Buchanan, March 20, 1857, James Buchanan
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (Hereinafter HSP); John 
Slidell to Edward G.W. Butler, June 3, 1857, Butler Family Papers, HNO; 
Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. April 26, 1857; A.L. Diket, John 
Slidell and the Community He Represented. 1854-1861 (Washington, 1982J, 
109-110.
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education. Close ballots over whether to allow proxies to vote and 
over which office to nominate first signalled some dissension as did 
the necessity of four and five ballots co make selections for state 
auditor and superintendent of public education respective ly. Nro 
delegates, however, deserted the convention nor did any competing 
Democratic tickets emerge in the following months. The convention and 
ensuing parish ratification meetings declared their commitment both to 
the Democratic platform of 1S56 because it protected slavery in the 
territories and to President Buchanan's administration."
While the state convention proceeded smoothly, the concurrent 
gathering of Democrats of the Third District to nominate a candidate 
for Congress illustrated the divisions within the party. After 
caucusing until midnight, the meeting adjourned without selecting a 
candidate, and the delegates agreed to reconvene the following month 
in Baton Rouge. The district's Democrats split into two camps—  
proponents of the incumbent, SlideII-backed Thomas Green Davidson, and 
advocates of Andrew S. Herron, a states-rights Democrat currently 
serving in the legislature. At the subsequent district convention, 
tension arose when two delegations— one pro-Davidson and one pro- 
Herron— claimed to represent the Democrats of St. Tammany Parish.
When the convention decided to seat both groups, Herron’s supporters 
bolted from the meeting, and Davidson easily received the nomination.6
Proceedings of the state convention in Louisiana Courier. May 20, 
1857; Post-convention parish meetings in Louisiana Courier. July 12, 18, 
August 7, August 18, 1857; Resolutions of [Assumption] Parish Convention, 
1857, in Pugh Family Papers, OT.
L̂ouisiana Courier. May 20, June 19, 1857.
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In a district which the Democratic party had never lost and in 
the previous two contests had won by over one thousand votes. 
receiving the party's nomination had been tantamount to victory- 
Despite pleas for party unity, some Democrats refused to accept 
Davidson's nomination and argued that the convention had not 
represented the true feelings of the district. Calling Davidson "the 
pretended nominee for Congress." a St. Tammany Parish meeting urged a 
new gathering. Other parishes joined the anti-Davidson movement, and 
in September Democratic delegates from five of the district’s sixteen 
parishes met in Baton Rouge and nominated Laurent J. Sigur, an 
Iberville Parish legislator. Though Herron. Davidson's original 
opponent, did not contend for this nomination, he endorsed Sigur and 
campaigned on his behalf.^
The split within the Democratic ranks shaped the campaign.
Sigur Democrats listed a number of reasons to oppose Davidson. Some 
directed their challenges directly against Davidson’s unfitness for 
office. In a campaign speech, Sigur accused his opponent of ignorance 
and of failing to understand the issues before Congress, particularly 
those involving slavery. Another dismissed him as an "old tub of 
quack and trite vulgarisms" whose presence in Washington embarrassed 
the South. Others reminded voters that Davidson had backed an 
independent Democrat in opposition to the party nominee in a judicial 
election earlier in the year. This defection had divided the
7'Louisiana Courier. July 4, July 15 (quote), August 1, 7, 9, 11, 
September 2, 1857; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. October 13, 
1857.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
3S9
Democratic vote and contributed to a Know Nothing victory. They 
argued that Davidson's previous disloyalty forfeited party fealty in 
this race. Even the pro-Da^•idson Louisiana Courier admitted that the 
candidate had made a "grave error" in this instance but urged voters 
to sustain him as the regular Democratic nominee.4
Sigur supporters did not limit their attacks to Davidson's 
qualifications but challenged the proslavery credentials of Davidson. 
President Buchanan, and the national Democratic party. Delegates to 
the meeting that nominated Sigur passed resolutions condemning the 
administration's course in the territories as unfair to the South and 
asserted that, as a native of Louisiana. Sigur would protect states 
rights and southern interests. While Sigur's birth in Louisiana may 
have helped him. Davidson's birth in Mississippi certainly did not 
reduce his commitment to slavery. Davidson undoubtedly did not 
challenge the idea of states rights, and his opponents’ attempts to 
differentiate between the candidates’ positions regarding the South
Grepresented more a political tactic than an actual distinction.
Without any tangible measure separating the two wings, Sigur 
proponents seized this vague theme of commitment to the and slavery as 
a method to distinguish between the candidates. They used phrases 
such as southern rights, states rights, and fire-eating 
interchangeably, for their definitions were not as important as the
QSigur speech in Plaquemine Southern Sentinel (extra), September 14, 
1857: Poem (1857) and James Moore to Tom Ellis, February 8, 1857, (first 
quote) in Ellis Family Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State University (Hereinafter 
LLMVC); Louisiana Courier. August 1, 1857 (second quote).
gLouisiana Courier. September 3, 1857.
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effect they had on voters. A pro-Sigur newspaper maintained that the 
time had come for the formation of a southern party, and Herron 
praised Sigur as a states-rights advocate. According to a newspaper 
in his home parish. Sigur. a staunch defender of the South did not shy 
away from but welcomed the label "fire-band.” The national Harper’s 
Week1v viewed the candidates in terms of their contrasting stances on 
sectional politics when it described the race as between Davidson, a 
"Union Democrat.” and Sigur, a "Secession Democratic candidate.”1
Additionally. Sigur advocates attacked Davidson's association 
with Senator Slidell. Alluding to Slidell’s control of patronage in 
Louisiana, Sigur Democrats derisively referred to Davidson as the 
customhouse candidate and "a creature of oligarchy." A newspaper 
advocating Sigur's bid alleged that in addition to campaigning for 
Davidson during his spring tour of Louisiana. Slidell had spent 
S30.000 on his fall campaign. Sigur partisans contended that unlike 
Davidson, their candidate was not "a slave to a one-man interest or 
power." While demagogues from outside the Third District had selected 
Davidson, the people of the district had chosen Sigur. Declaring that 
"the iron chain of oligarchy is broken," a Know Nothing newspaper 
celebrated Sigur’s nomination, and the New Orleans Bee agreed that the 
Sigur-Democrats had acted "under the suspicion that their actions have
Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. October 16, 1857; Plaquemine 
Southern Sentinel. September 12, 1857 (first quote); Harper’s Weekly. 
December 5. 1857 (second quote).
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been hitherto controlled by the despotic will of handful of
: tleaders.
The Democratic division in the Thini District contributed to a 
brief increase in Know Nothing optimism throughout Louisiana. Because 
portions of the party stronghold New Orleans were included in both the 
Firsc and Second Congressional Districts. Know Nothings believed they 
had a chance in each of those races. In New Orleans, they hoped to 
capitalize on anger over the new oppressive election law to increase 
their majority over the city's Democrats and thus overcome Democratic 
majorities in the country parishes of these districts. While 
acknowledging the difficulty of winning in the Fourth District, they 
hoped that they could exploit the Davidson-Sigur split to win the 
traditionally Democratic Third District. Some Know Nothings even 
predicted that this Democratic division would weaken the entire state 
ticket and allow for their victory in the statewide contests.1*1
In their 1856 campaign for Fillmore, Louisiana Know Nothings had 
presented themselves as a conservative Unionist party, but in 1857 the 
party developed what one historian has referred to as a "creeping 
sectionalism.” The party joined southern rights Democrats in 
criticizing the Slidell Democrats for their support of what one Know 
Nothing congressional candidate derisively called "the Buchanan- 
Walker-Kansas Treachery”— referring to Buchanan’s Kansas policy,
•‘Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. September 12 (first quote), September 
19, November 14, 1857: Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet, September 
25, 1857 (second quote); West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. June 27, 1857 
(third quote); Bee. July 15, 1857 (fourth quote).
nBaton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. June 7, 1857; Letter to the 
Editor. July 1857, in Ellis Family Papers, LLMVC.
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particularly his refusal to recall the perceived antisiavery Governor 
Robert J. Walker whom a Know Nothing meeting referred to as a second 
Benedict Arnold. Using flawed logic. Know Nothings made the following 
argument: (1) Louisiana Democrats championed Buchanan: (2) Buchanan 
appointed Governor Walker: (3) Walker opposed slavery: (4) therefore 
Louisiana Democrats supported Governor Walker and his antislavery 
policies. The party also claimed that they had detected a growing 
rift between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic party 
and announced that the Democracy could no longer be considered a 
national party."
Slidell Democrats viewed the state and national situation 
differently. Unlike the pro-Sieur faction, they did not condemn 
Slidell but celebrated him. The Louisiana Courier proclaimed. "No man 
has ever done so much for the Democratic party of Louisiana as the 
Hon. John Slidell." They also branded their opponents as a "mixture 
of Disunionists and Know Nothings" and pronounced this combination "a 
dead failure." They praised Buchanan and separated him from the 
obnoxious Governor Walker. Democrats also continued to portray 
themselves as the only national party. According to the Louisiana 
Courier, the salvation of the nation and the preservation of slavery 
rested upon "a Southern union upon the Democratic platform in firm 
alliance with Northern Democrats standing on the same platform."
Writing to Slidell, a partisan scoffed at the states-rights Democrats’ 
idea of peaceable secession declaring "dissolve this Union and civil
' Carriere, "Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 195-200 (quote p.
200).
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
393
war and its concomitant horrors will be the immediate and unavoidable 
result.
Know Nothings joined the Sigur Democrats of the Third District 
in attacking the influence of Senator Slidell. They chastised him as 
a behind the scenes wire-puller and added new' charges of corruption. 
They contended that Slidell had profited from malfeasance in the 
administration of the Louisiana Swamp Land Fund. Also, they alleged 
that because of his northern birth and the lack of time that he had 
spent in Louisiana in the past few years. Slidell had no loyalty to 
the South. Earlier in the year, former Know Nothing Charles Gayarre 
had continued his personal crusade against the Slidell oligarchy. 
Writing A Sketch of Andrew Jackson bv Himself. Gayarre used the words 
of the great Democratic president to attack Slidell. As in Gavarre's 
previous works, Slidell is never mentioned by name, but undoubtedly 
Louisiana readers grasped the allusion to the senator. Gayarre 
contended that in the 1830s Jackson saw threats to the Onion coming 
from a national bank. In the 1850s, he would now see these evils in 
"the system of obtaining nominations through packed and bought up 
conventions, and of governing the people through an oligarchy of 
bankrupt politicians —  [which] is fast undermining the institutions 
founded by our ancestors." For Louisianans, this oligarchy could only 
mean Slidell and his minions who ran the Democratic party. The
!4Louisiana Courier. June 20, (second quote). June 25, July 9, (first 
quote). August 21, 1857 (third quote); Edward G.W. Butler to John
Slidell, May 18, 1857, Butler Family Papers, HNO (fourth quote).
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pamphlet implied that if Jackson were alive, he would destroy Slidell
t Cas he had destroyed the Bank of the United States."
As in the IS56 presidential campaign, know Nothings included 
opposition to immigrants in their rhetoric but did not make it the 
centerpiece of their campaign. They again contended that immigrants 
opposed the South and slavery. Gayarre also attempted to portray 
Jackson as giving sanction to nativism. In his biography, he cites an 
1S44 letter from Jackson complaining that the ’'monied aristocracy” of 
Mew Orleans used "foreign influence" to "crush the democracy."
Gayarre praised Jackson's "keen eye" which had "denounced the 
existence in our bosom of a foreign influence." Yet. he observed that 
in the lS50s Louisiana Democrats continued to ignore Jackson's 
warnings by denying the presence of a pernicious foreign influence in
the country. Democrats denounced the Know Nothings’ association with
nativism. Edward G.W. Butler, the source of the letters Gayarre used 
in his work on Jackson, declared that if Jackson were still living, he 
would consider Know Nothings contemptible because of their violent 
suppression of Democrats in New Orleans elections.10
Slidell’s role in the Democratic party and the conduct of the
Buchanan administration dominated the campaign. The additional topics
debated actually show the paucity of other issues available in
^West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. October 10, 1857; Plaquemine
Southern Sentinel, October 14, 1857: Charles E.A. Gayarre, A Sketch of 
General Jackson bv Himself (New Orleans, 1857), 17; Diket, John Slidell 
and the Community He Represented. 108.
l0Gayarre, A Sketch of General Jackson. 17 (Jackson quote), 19 
(Gayarre quote); West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. October 10, 1857; Edward 
G.W. Butler to James D.B. DeBow, March 13, 1857, Charles Gayarre
Collection, LLMVC.
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Louisiana. Legislative candidates of both parties addressed the topic 
of railroads. This debate fizzled as both sides spoke in favor of 
state aid in the development of internal improvements. Even in South 
Louisiana, where for the first time in over a decade the tariff on 
imported sugar reappeared as an issue, the parties did not differ 
substantially. In 185" Congress had reduced the duty on imported 
sugar, and Know Nothings attempted to use the votes of Louisiana 
Democrats in favor of this reduction against them. Louisiana 
Democrats in Congress, however, agreed on the importance of the tariff 
and had worked hard on its behalf. They contended that the resulting 
tariff was the highest that the sugar cane growers could have received 
and that the region should celebrate their efforts on behalf of the 
tariff.Ll
Despite their divisions, Louisiana Democrats emerged triumphant 
in the November election. Three months earlier, in a postscript to a 
list of Democratic difficulties, the Bee had acknowledged that 
Democrats had a way of solving their problems prior to election day 
and again that proved to be the case. The Democrats won all three 
statewide elections. They also triumphed in three of the four 
congressional battles. In the Third District, Davidson, the party’s 
regular nominee received 42.9 percent of the vote with Sigur garnering 
only 21.7 percent and the Know Nothing candidate 35.3 percent. The 
Democrats also kept a majority in both branches of the legislature.
'̂ Rai 1 roads-Henry Marston Diary, September 19, 1857, Henry Marston 
Papers, LLMVC; "Fellow Citizens," July 6 , 1857, Bythell Haynes Letter, 
LLMV'C: Tariff— Louisiana Courier. September 15, 16, October 2, 1857; 
Judah P. Benjamin to W.W. Pugh, January 8 , 1857, W.W. Pugh Papers, DT.
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They held 49 of the S7 nouse seats and 23 of the 32 senate seats - 
These numbers underestimate the breadth of the Democratic 1S5~ 
victory. Of the 9 Know Nothing senators. ~ were hold-overs from the 
prior term who had not faced re-election, and the Democrats won an 
astounding S2.7 percent of the races held outside Greater Orleans.
After its annihilation in this campaign, the Know Nothing party would
Jgnever again enter a statewide race in Louisiana.'
New Orleans and its surrounding area remained the only Know 
Nothing stronghold. If Democrats had hoped that the new election law 
would change this situation, they were disappointed. With Know 
Nothings challenging the statute in the state court system, the 
Democrats had refused to participate in the June municipal elections, 
and consequently the Know Nothings swept the races. Not wanting to 
waste their efforts, the Democrats waited until the court upheld the 
election law to nominate candidates for the November election. Since 
this decision occurred in October, the Democrats had very little time 
to choose standard bearers and to campaign. Even with the new 
election law, Know Nothings continued to practice intimidation, and 
their candidates triumphed in every Newr Orleans precinct. The party 
controlled 30 of the 33 legislative seats in Greater Orleans, and only 
one of the three Democrats had been elected. The other two had been 
appointed by the legislature in 1856 after it threw out Know Nothing 
votes. These Greater Orleans seats represented 62.5 percent of the 
Know Nothings’ total legislative delegation. In both the First and
! CBee. August 3, 1S57; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. January 27, 
185S; James K. Greer. "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly (June 1930) XIII. 267.
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Second Districts, the Know NTothing candidates left the city with a 
lead. Their candidate won i~ the former, but lost in the latter as 
Democratic majorities in the country parishes overcame the city
t .*»
vote.
By 1S58 outside of Mew Orleans, politicians of all stripes 
called themselves Democrats- In February, citing the lack of any 
partisan differences and asserting that "the Democratic party has 
swallowed up or destroyed all opposition." the two competing political 
newspapers in Iberville Parish merged into a single Democratic sheet. 
With everyone a Democrat, tensions were bound to arise within the 
party. The anti-Democratic Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet 
mocked the party as a collection of Unionists and secessionists, pro- 
and anti-administration men, those in favor of re-cpening the slave 
trade and those against it. The following year, the Alexandria Red 
River RepubIican separated the Democratic party into seventeen 
different classifications. Even the Democratic Louisiana Courier, 
while celebrating the power of its party, worried about its prospects
7()because of the divisions within the organization."
Headed by John Slidell, the major faction within Louisiana 
Democratic party backed the Buchanan administration and ostracized 
their Democratic enemies, especially those who had advanced Sigur5s 
candidacy. In fighting back, adversaries of Slidell within the
Sould, Know Nothing Partv m  New Orleans, 91; Plaquemine Southern 
Sentinel, January 27, 185S.
20Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. February 27, 1858 (quote); West 
Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. March 26, 1859; Louisiana Courier. May 4, 
1859; Mary L. McLure, "The Presidential Election .of 1860 in Louisiana," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly IX (October 1926), 638.
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Democratic party adopted a policy which had proved effective in 
interparty competition: they questioned the SiideIi-supported Buchanan 
administration's commitment to the South and slavery. Reminding its 
readers that "the question of slavery is no new thing." an editorial 
called slavery "the great turning point in American politics" and 
cited it as the most important issue dividing the Democratic party. 
Though Louisiana, unlike other southern states, did not have a long 
history of adamant states-rights proponents. Slidell’s adversaries saw 
fidelity to slavery as a possible method to distinguish between 
themselves and the Slidell faction- Although this course had failed 
in Sigur’s congressional bid, with sectionalism on the increase across 
the nation, they hoped it could prove more successful in the future.“
This move had two potentially dangerous consequences. First, in 
challenging John Slidell’s power. Democrats risked banishment from the 
party’s patronage trough. At least one Democratic legislator 
attempted to have it both ways. Trying to explain an anti-party vote, 
he claimed to follow party lines on party questions such as elections 
for speaker of the house. But, when more important issues arose, 
which he broadly defined as those affecting the state, the parish, or 
individuals, he did not know a party. A second more serious 
repercussion involved the disunionist atmosphere that the opposition 
created. Throughout the antebellum period, extreme states-rights 
views in Louisiana had been subsumed within the Democratic party’s 
caucuses and conventions. Many Democrats rejected these opinions, and
2fPlaquemine Sout hern Sent ine1, January 20, 27, 1858; "True 
Democrats," (1858) in Charles A. Brusle Papers. LLMVC (quote).
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still others realized that an open avowal of them would give the 
opposing party an opportunity to brand Democrats as disunionists. For 
instance, in the IS51 legislative and congressional elections, the 
Whigs had successfully exploited Democratic division over the 
Compromise of 1S50. In the late 1850s. without a competitive Whig 
party to take advantage of Democratic schisms, the party's states- 
rights faction became more outspoken. They took secessionist talk 
from party gatherings and brought it out in the open, and some 
Louisianans began to consider secession as a viable option if
tiantislavery forces gained power in the nation-*"
In the late ISSOs, states-rights Democrats in Louisiana made 
their presence most felt during legislative debates regarding slavery. 
First, in 1857, the legislature passed a bill banning the emancipation 
of slaves. Second, the following year it debated another measure 
calling for the selling into slavery of Louisiana’s free people of 
color except for those b o m  in the state or having special permission 
to remain. Third, later in the same session, a legislator introduced 
the more controversial African Apprentice Bill that called for 2,500 
African apprentices to serve in Louisiana for at least fifteen years 
each. Despite the label "apprentice," opponents of the bill justly 
claimed it would unconstitutionally re-open of the African slave
trade, which had been illegal in the United States for over fifty
nyears.
Y i"F.L. Claiborne letter in Pointe Coupee Democrat. April 10, 1858.
23Greer, "Louisiana Politics," 272; Joe Gray Taylor, Negro Slavery 
in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1963), 157; James Paisley Hendrix, Jr., "The 
Efforts to Reopen the African Slave Trade in Louisiana," Louisiana
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Proclaiming the bill, "the only southern measure introduced
during the session." its proponents charged its detractors with aiding
the abolitionists. They also portrayed themselves as democrats
because their proposal would make African labor affordable by all not
just the rich. Legislators against the bill claimed that its passage
would actually backfire and give northern abolitionists ammunition to
attack the South. By a 46-21 vote, the bill passed the House, but the
Senate postponed its consideration indefinitely. 15 to 13. The close
margin in the Senate led to charges that the bill had failed only
because of the machinations of Senator Slidell. Supposedly Slidell.
who worried that the bill’s passage would hurt President Buchanan and
the Democratic party in the North, had telegraphed an ally in the
Louisiana Senate and convinced him to switch his vote. Regardless of
whether Slidell’s influence had doomed the measure, the voting
demonstrates the difficulties the Democrats had in acting as a unit.
In the Senate. 8 Democrats voted in favor of the measure and 12 voted 
Hagainst it.'
In 1858 not only did the Democrats divide amongst themselves in 
the legislature, but they remained impotent in New Orleans. Years of 
thuggery in the Crescent City climaxed in the 1858 mayoral campaign, 
which according to a country parish newspaper, placed New Orleans "in
History X (Spring 1969), 97-123.
^Hendrix, "Efforts to Reopen the African Slave Trade in Louisiana." 
97-123; F.L. Claiborne letter in Point Coupee Democrat, April 10, 1858; 
B.H. letter in West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. May 29, 1858; Daily True 
Delta. March 21, 1858, in Brusle Papers, LLMVC. Hendrix does not find any 
correlation between the vote and the SlidelI-Soule split, and his vote 
tabulation is different than mine because he labels two New Orleans Know 
Nothings (Adams and Laidlaw) as Democrats.
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a state of anarchy." Without any regular Democratic party in the 
city, the opposition to the Know Nothings came from an independent 
party which sought to counter "years of disorder, outrage, and 
unchecked assassination.” With New Orleans's legacy of election day 
violence, the independents established a Vigilance Committee which 
seized an arsenal and occupied Jackson Square. The Know Nothings 
organized a counterforce, and the city seemed on the verge of civil 
war. At the last moment, a compromise was reached and the election 
was peacefully held. Fearing bloodshed, most voters stayed away from 
the polls, and the Know Nothings easily triumphed.'3
Paradoxically, the Democrats, who in 185S suffered from so few 
partisans in New Orleans that they did not nominate candidates, may 
have had too many followers in the rest of the state. The 1S59 senate 
race again demonstrated the difficulty that Louisiana Democrats had in 
uniting without the presence of a strong second party. Senator 
Benjamin desired to remain in Washington but his long association with 
the Whig party and its American System made many Democrats less than 
enthusiastic about his candidacy. Others challenged Benjamin not 
because of personal animus but because both he and Senator Slidell 
lived in New Orleans. These Democrats felt that North Louisiana 
deserved a senator. With the weak Know Nothings unlikely to nominate 
anyone, both Benjamin supporters and detractors believed that their 
candidate could use Know Nothing votes to win the contest.
25Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. June 5, 1858 (quote); John S. 
Kendall, "The Municipal Elections of 1858," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly V (1922), 357-76; Soule, Know Nothing Partv in New Orleans. 92- 
105.
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The Democratic party caucused in an effort to unite behind a 
candidate but after forty-tw.- ballots, the gathering adjourned without 
agreeing on a nominee. Many regular Democrats, especially north 
Louisianans. backed Fourth District Congressman John Sandidge. The 
caucus reconvened and after another inconclusive ballot, the Sandidge 
men withdrew in disgust. The remaining Democrats nominated Benjamin. 
Some Democrats agreed to back Benjamin because they feared the victory 
of a states-rights candidate more than triumph of Benjamin— ''a true 
Southern man” though ”no fire-eater, alarmist, agitator, [or] 
sectionalist.” The incumbent received enough Democratic support and 
five Know Nothing votes to lift him to a narrow victory. Benjamin's 
opposition knew immediately where to place the blame for his triumph—  
John Slidell who. according to their theory, had again used intrigue 
to elect a candidate against the wishes of the majority.*0
Describing the Democrats’ problems, the speaker of the house 
worried, "I have nothing pleasant to communicate, the [Democratic 
party as found here is completely disorganized by the Union of the 
K[now] Nothings and disaffected Democrats,” and another Democratic 
legislator later publicly complained that the good of the state 
suffered because of the divisions within the party. The Louisiana 
Courier agreed that "the parties appear to be both split and mixed up 
together." In the early weeks of the session, this disorganization 
crippled the legislative process. Constitutionally required to pass
^Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. December 4, 1858, January 29, 1859 
(quote); David W. Magi 11 to John Moore, January 23, 1859, Joseph T. 
Hawkins to Moore, January 27, 1859, David Weeks Papers, LLMVC: W.W. Pugh 
to Josephine N. Pugh, January 23, 1859, Pugh Family Papers, UT: Baton 
Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. October 20, 1858, January 26, 1859.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
403
an apportionment bill before any other legislation, the process 
dragged on for weeks. The debate eventually culminated in the 
Democratic lieutenant governor's resignation from his post as 
president of the state senate. He resigned because his party could 
not agree on the apportionment bill. His leaving further twisted 
allegiances in the capitoi. The anti-Slidell Democrats and Know 
Nothings disingenuously expressed outrage at the affront given to the 
lieutenant governor, while the regular Democrats saw the whole affair 
as a further attempt to split the party.*'
The division between Slidell and anti-Slidell forces that 
disrupted the legislature had even more serious repercussions in the 
1859 gubernatorial campaign. With no organized opposition to the 
Democracy, receiving the nomination at the May convention appeared to 
be equivalent to being named governor. The competing factions within 
the Democratic party scrambled to gain control of the convention, and 
a former Know Nothing predicted that there would be "a strong almost 
invincible array of Anti-Slidell forces." Sensing the party’s 
disharmony and realizing the importance of controlling the convention. 
Slidell travelled from Washington to New Orleans in March and, as in 
1857. made a tour of northern Louisiana. A northern Louisiana 
newspaper branded Slidell an autocrat and chief ruler of an 
"organization within the Democratic partyn that used the party for its 
own selfish purposes picking its nominees as much as two years before
:,W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, February 17, 1859 (first quote), 
February 26, 1S59, Pugh Family Papers, DT: Letter from W.M. Kidd in
Vernon Southern Times August 19, 1859; Louisiana Courier. January 26, 
1859 (second quote).
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each election. In New Orleans. Slidell's competitors blamed the 
Louisiana Club, an exclusive gentleman's club, for choosing the 
Democratic candidates as they sipped champagne, and then 
undemocratically dictated their choices to the rank and file of the 
party."
New Orleans remained the Achilles heel of the Slidell Democrats- 
-now referred to as Old Liners. In the city. Slidell's adversaries 
coalesced behind his long time nemesis Pierre Soule. Soule had not 
participated in the 185" campaign because he had been in Mexico 
unsuccessful ly fighting for a railroad contract against a company in 
which both Slidell and Benjamin had significant interests. Back in 
Louisiana. Soule called for an April 4 meeting at Odd Fellows Hall to 
take advantage of the Old Line Democrats' disorganization in the city. 
In a highly symbolic move, the delegates elected Maunsei White as 
president. In 1S4S, White, a Zachary' Taylor Democrat, had wasted his 
ballot rather than vote for Slidell for the Senate. White's defection 
from party ranks had cost Slidell the seat which eventually went to 
Soule. After selecting White, the convention denounced the corruption 
of the administration and of John Slidell and resolved to stand behind 
the doctrine of states-rights and state sovereignty. Its members, 
referred to as New Liners, called upon Democrats, Whigs, and Know 
Nothings to reject dictation of nominees and to rally behind Andrew S.
70John A. Smith to John Moore, March 7, 1859, Weeks Papers, LLMVC 
(first quote): John Slidell to Edward G.W. Butler, March 21, 1859, Butler 
Family Papers, HNO; McLure, "Election of 1860," 615-19; For complaints 
about Slidell's interference in northern Louisiana races see Vernon 
Southern Times, July 15, August 19, 1859 (second quote); Louisiana
Courier. April 6 , 14, 17, 1859.
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Herron for governor. By selecting Herron, a Legislator from East 
Baton Rouge Parish, they hoped to win converts in the country 
parishes
To demonstrate their independence from the Oid Line Democrats, 
the New Liners called for a different date for the selection of 
Orleans Parish delegates to the state convention. By 1S59 all 
Democrats in New Orleans voted for delegates by precinct in the same 
manner that they chose legislators. The state Democratic committee, 
controlled by Old Liners, had chosen May 16 as the date for this 
primary, but the Odd Fellows Hall meeting selected May 14 instead.
New Liners hoped that by gaining control of the largest delegation to 
the state convention, they could defeat Slidell’s designs. Efforts to 
compromise on a date failed, and elections were held on both dates. 
Thus, Orleans Parish sent two competing delegations to the Baton Rouge 
convention.
Slidell struck back at the Odd Fellows Hall traitors. He used 
his influence in the national administration to oust two Odd Fellow 
Democrats from their federally appointed positions. He informed 
President Buchanan that his journey to Louisiana had been successful—  
the Old Line Democrats would have a decided majority at the May 
convention and would "drive the Souleites for ever from our ranks."
‘ John Preston Moore, ed., "Correspondence of Pierre Soule: The 
Louisiana Tehuantepec Company," The Hispanic American Historical Review 
XXXII (February 1952), 59-72; Van D. Odom, "The Political Career of 
Thomas Overton Moore, Secession Governor of Louisiana," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly. XXVI (October 1943), 975-1054; Louisiana Courier. 
April 5, 1859; For split in the Democracy outside New Orleans see Baton 
Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. April 27, 1859. In 1859, Democratic
opponents to Slidell had several of labels including Odd Fellows, New 
Liners, States Rights Democrats, Purificators, and Bobtails.
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On May 25 the statewide Democratic convention sat competing sets of 
delegates from two smaller parishes. After hearing a speech by 
Slidell's ally Emile LaSere denouncing the Odd Fellows Hall meeting, 
it rejected the New Line delegates from Orleans Parish in favor of 
Slidell loyalists. Subsequently. Soule and his states-rights allies 
withdrew, and the convention proceeded to endorse the Buchanan 
administration. Six candidates were put forward for governor, and 
friends of each dutifully read letters from each one condemning the 
Odd Fellows Hall meeting. On the sixteenth ballot, the delegates 
selected Thomas Overton Moore as their nominee for governor. The 
nomination of Moore, a Rapides Parish sugar planter who had served in 
both houses of the state legislature, helped assuage north Louisiana 
Democrats who felt they had not received their fair allocation of 
offices. Though not a delegate to the convention, Slidell had gone to 
Baton Rouge to make sure it resulted in the triumph of his branch of 
the party. He expressed his pleasure with the nominations and 
asserted that "Soule is completely annihilated" as the entire state 
ticket consisted of "what they call here Slidell men."30
Soule and the New Liners did not concede the race. They 
realized that their only hope for winning the state contest rested on 
combining with former Whigs and Know Nothings. Soule tried to gamer 
Know Nothing party support by publicly voting its ticket in the June 
New Orleans municipal elections. In September the New Liners held a
30John Slidell to James Buchanan, May 2, 1859 (first quote), May 22, 
1S59, May 30, 1859 (second quote) Buchanan Papers, HSP: McLure, "Election 
of 1860," 624-6; West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. May 28, 1859; Baton 
Rouge Weekly Advocate. May 29, 1859.
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administration and the Democrats' maladministration of the state 
government. To emphasize their condemnation of the corrupt Old 
Liners, they referred to themselves as Purificators. and to attract 
support from all parties, they labeled their ticket simply "The 
Opposition." Although only five parishes sent delegates and over half 
the total delegates were from Orleans Parish, they proceeded to 
nominate Thomas J. Wells for governor. Wells, who like Moore resided 
in Rapides Parish, accepted the nomination and declared that he would 
redeem the state from "the degenerating and corrupting misrule of 
Slidellism." The meeting's resolutions did not mention Slidell 
specifically but condemned partisans who "enrichfedj themselves from 
the industry of an honest people” and decried the rewarding of 
partisanship instead of merit on both the national and state levels.
With two Democratic candidates in the race, former Whigs and 
Know Nothings faced a dilemma over which side to take. On one hand, 
they had long detested John Slidell, but on the other hand, they did 
not like the Opposition’s association with the doctrine of states 
rights which many Louisianans saw as a code phrase for secession. A 
Know Nothing newspaper hoped that its party could provide the balance 
of power in the election, but it could not decide which candidate to 
endorse. A former Whig expressed the predicament of Louisiana 
conservatives:
3iBaton Rouge Weekly Advocate. June 12, 1859; Convention proceedings 
in Daily Crescent. September 21, 1S59, Daily Delta. September 14, 1859; 
Wells’s acceptance in West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. October 22, 1859 
(quote).
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The first impulse (that is amongst us old Whigs) is to go 
against the perpetrator of the Plaquemines Fraud..-but
John Slidell is a safer man than Pierre Soule this is
sober second thought. Having all my old prejudices and 
not merely prejudices, but real objections to Mr. Slidell, 
suddenly starting up before me. I was ready to exciaim 
7Your hour has cornel7 but when I reflected that he was the 
representative of the Conservative branch of the Democracy 
in this state I paused and came to the conclusion to vote 
for Barrow [a Slidell Democrat running for state 
legislature] in order to secure defeat of the great 
Southern States Rights alias Dissolution of the Union, 
branch of the Democracy. For these fellows who are 
eternally preaching northern despotism. Southern 
oppression and peaceable withdrawal from the Union...I 
have a most sovereign detestation.
The conduct of the Know Nothing West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter further
demonstrates its party's difficulties. In the spring, it had asserted
that though it bitterly opposed Slidell and Buchanan, its antipathy
toward the ultra secessionist wing of the Democracy was even greater.
By September, however, the newspaper had reversed its stance and come
37out in favor of Wells.
Old Line Democrats mocked the pretensions of the Opposition 
party. Slidell expressed his view that the separation of the party 
into two wings actually helped the Democrats because it removed men 
like Soule from party caucuses, and he later added that Soule’s party 
existed only in his imagination. An Old Line Democratic newspaper 
warned partisans that the Opposition ticket consisted entirely of ex- 
Know Nothings hungry for office. To combat Wells’s candidacy, the 
Democrats emphasized the necessity of party discipline and asserted 
that the independent candidates ran only to advance their personal
JiBaton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. April 27, 1859; Thomas Gibbs 
Morgan to Henry Marston, August 23, 1859, Henry Marston Papers, LLMVC 
(quote); West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. January 29, September 17, 1859; 
Vernon Southern Times. September 23, 1859.
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interests. They also ridiculed the heterogeneous elements that faced 
them. Not only did the Opposition include both Binow Nothings and 
Democrats but even its Democrats were divided— they preached state 
rights but at the national level endorsed Illinois Senator Stephen A. 
Douglas, who held views on slavery in the territories which most 
southerners considered unsound.'*
The gubernatorial campaign became a referendum on Slidell's 
leadership of the Louisiana Democracy. Neither Moore nor Wells 
canvassed the state, and Moore even travelled to North Carolina for a 
month during the summer, while his patron Slidell remained in 
Louisiana. Wells charged that any corruption amongst the state’s 
recent governors stemmed from Siidellism, and the Opposition objected 
to his one-man rule in Louisiana. Wells portrayed himself as the man 
who would redeem Louisiana from this misrule. The president of an 
Opposition mass meeting stated that they had gathered "to express 
their dissatisfaction of the course pursued by the clique dynasty and 
the members of the Custom-house," and the meeting proceeded to 
denounce Slidell, the Custom-house, and all who supported these men. 
During the campaign. Opposition newspapers printed a long article 
detailing Slidell’s corruption from the 1844 Plaquemines Frauds to the 
present and alleged that he had placed the unqualified Moore on the
n *
J John Slidell to James Buchanan, September 28, 1859, Buchanan
Papers, HSP; Louisiana Courier. April 22, May 20, October 1, November 1,
1859.
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state ticket in exchange for the money necessary to bribe legislators 
to return Slidell to the Senate."’̂
In the concurrent legislative races, the candidates' stances on 
what should be done when Slidell's Senate term expired emerged as the 
most divisive topic. New Liners complained of his dictatorial conduct 
and contended that he looked out for his own interests before 
Louisiana's. They charged that Slidell ruled Louisiana 
autocratically, not only designating men for patronage posts but for 
elective offices, too. By 1859, many Louisianans had come to see 
Slidell as all-powerful. According to the Sugar Planter, which 
opposed Slidell, no doubt existed about his reelection to the Senate. 
Even if a majority in the legislature opposed his election, the West 
Baton Rouge newspaper despaired that Slidell would find a way to 
purchase or influence enough legislators to obtain victory.^
One purpose of Slidell's spring travels through North Louisiana 
had been to advance his own Senate candidacy. With Benjamin’s victory 
earlier in the year, both senators still lived in New Orleans, and the 
country parishes continued to clamor for a fairer distribution of the 
state’s Senate seats. Slidell’s trip had mixed results. Even an Old 
Line Democratic newspaper resented his attempt to influence 
legislative races. It claimed that North Louisiana would "never,
NEVER submit to Mr. Slidell’s interference in their home affairs."
*/
JGreer, "Louisiana Politics," 458-9; Louisiana Courier. October 13, 
(quote), October 18. 1859; Alexandria American. October 22, 1859 quote 
in Daily Crescent, October 29, 1859.
35West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter, September 10, 1859.
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Another replied that Slidell had proved lovai to the South and no 
northern Louisianans were superior to him in ability. An Opposition 
newspaper and a Ouachita Parish Democratic meeting called on 
candidates to pledge themselves to vote for a country Democrat to 
succeed Slidell. At the same time. Slidell advocates reminded north 
Louisianans that Slidell spent as much or more time in their region 
than he did in New Orleans- They also attacked the idea that 
geography should overshadow principles in picking a senator.'13
Old Line Democrats agreed that legislative races should turn on 
the candidates’ stances on the upcoming Senate election to fill 
Slidell's seat. A Democratic ratification meeting did not refer to 
policy issues but instead resolved that it had "unlimited confidence 
in the honor, talents, and patriotism of John Slidell." An Old Line 
newspaper asserted that Slidell had always been loyal to the party and 
that it belittled the intelligence of party members to portray him as 
having an unlimited influence over the party. It added that "Slidell 
seems to be the terror of the would-be-somebody politicians of the 
age" who attacked him because they do not "receive any aid politically 
or pecuniary from him." Old Liners also contended that accusations of 
Slidell’s omnipotence were exaggerated as the state’s last two 
governors had challenged his wing of the Democracy.^
^Odom, "Political Career of Thomas Overton Moore,” 18; Vernon 
Southern Times. July 15, (quote), July 22, August 19, 1859; Bossier
Banner. December 16, 1859; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. August
11, 1859; Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. August 27, 1859.
37West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. September 10, 1859; Plaquemine
Gazette and Sentinel. September 24, 1859, January 7, 1860 (second quote); 
Louisiana Courier. November 2, 1859 (first quote).
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The result of the IS59 campaign revealed that the discordant 
Opposition had not really challenged the Old Line forces. Moore 
achieved the largest margin of victory of any antebellum gubernatorial 
candidate, winning 62 percent of the vote. In the Florida Parishes. 
North Louisiana, and South Louisiana, he captured two-thirds of the 
votes. Moore's victory in 46 of the staters 4S parishes perhaps best 
exemplifies his dominance in the state. Not only did Moore win in 
every parish but Orleans and Terrebonne, but he beat Weils 
convincingly in most of them, achieving over sixty percent in 35 
parishes. The Democrats also obtained a large majority in the 
legislature, winning 79 seats with the opposition holding 36 and with 
10 independents. Only Greater Orleans continued its obstinate 
opposition to the Old Line Democrats. Prior to the election Slidell 
had complained of the difficulty in re-organizing the Democratic party 
in the Crescent City after years of terrorism and the controversy 
surrounding the Vigilance Committee of the prior year. The Old Lines’ 
Crescent City organ ran a series of articles entitled, "The Rule of 
Blood," which described the city’s recent history of violently 
suppressing Democratic votes. No matter, Greater Orleans gave 54.3 
percent of its ballots to Wells, and Old Line Democrats lost 22 of the 
27 legislative seats in the region. (SEE APPENDIX B)^
The elections for Congress further exhibited the Old Line 
Democrats’ dominance in the state. As in 1857, Democrats won three of 
the four races, losing only the First District. In that race, a Know
IQJohn Slidell to James Buchanan, July 3, 1859, Buchanan Papers, HSP: 
Legislative results in Vernon Southern Times. November 25, 1859;
Louisiana Courier. October 25, 26, 28, 1859.
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Nothing candidate defeated the Old Line Democratic nominee and a New 
Line Democrat. Old Line Democrats complained that if the New Liner 
had not entered the contest, the party would have won the district 
since the combined total of the two Democrats exceeded that of the 
Know Nothing victor. They also claimed that their candidates six-fold 
majority over the New' Line candidate represented the relative strength 
of the two wings of the Democracy in New Orleans. Outside New 
Orleans. Old Line Democrats ran virtually unchallenged. In the Second 
District, the Old Liner captured 57 percent of the vote, including
72.3 percent outside New Orleans. In the Third and Fourth Districts
their dominance was even greater with Old Liners obtaining 89.6 and
1973.3 percent of the votes, respectively.
The legislature which met following the November elections 
immediately focused on national issues, especially slavery and the 
upcoming 1860 presidential campaign. While the protection of slavery 
had long dominated Louisianans’ discussion of national politics, John 
Brown’s unsuccessful raid at Harper’s Ferry in October, 1859, had 
heightened the already strained atmosphere. A radical abolitionist. 
Brown had attempted to incite a rebellion among southern slaves. For 
many Louisianans, Brown was not a lone madman but an example of what 
all abolitionists wished to do. The Louisiana Courier referred to his 
raid as the "bold and unscrupulous attempt of the Abolitionists to 
trample under foot the constitutional rights of slave owners,” and 
added it showed "to what dastardly extremes the enemies of the South
jqGreer, "Louisiana Politics," 459-60; Louisiana Courier. November 
9, 19, 1859.
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are to determined to resort.” In his inaugural. Governor -Moore 
decried the wide-spread sympathy for Brown which existed in the North 
and warned that this northern sentiment had contributed to a greater
i Adistrust of that section in the South. "
With this tense sectional mood and with a presidential election 
impending. Governor Moore aid not limit his comments regarding 
national events to condemning John Brown's raid, but also broached the 
subject of secession- He sent a mixed message. He declared that 
Louisiana ’'has never at any period of our national history 
countenanced extreme opinions or violent measures," but added. "I am 
sure, however, that Louisiana dearly as she loves the Union will never 
separate herself from her sister siavehoiding states." The House 
Committee on Federal Relations issued a report agreeing with the 
governor. The report said Louisiana "desires to see the union 
perpetual" but "recognizes no higher duty than the protection of her 
slave institutions." While not desiring an immediate gathering of 
slave-holding states, the report urged the governor to call for an 
election of delegates if such a conference were called/'
Though not specifically mentioned, this discussion of national 
issues obviously referred to not only Brown’s raid but the November 
1860 presidential election and a fear that the antislavery Republican 
party might capture the presidency. In the Senate, the majority Old 
Line Democrats asserted that they knew of a candidate who could defeat
^Louisiana Courier, October 19, 21, 1859 (quote); Governor Moore 
inaugural in Louisiana House Journal, 5th leg., 1st sess., 20— 22.
I •’‘Louisiana House Journal. 5th leg.. 2nd sess.., 20-22; Resolution of 
Committee on Federal Relations in McLure, "Elections of I860,” 686-87.
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the Republicans and protect southern interests. They passed a 
resolution endorsing party chieftain John Slidell for the presidency, 
and several Louisiana newspapers concurred with this resolution.
Slidell denied any aspirations for the position but. after admitting 
his egotism, celebrated the endorsement as T’a great tribute to ray 
services to the democracy of Louisiana."*"
The national Democrats had scheduled their presidential 
nominating convention to meet in Charleston. South Carolina in April. 
1S60. On March 5. Louisiana Democrats held a convention in Baton 
Rouge to select delegates. The Old Liners dominated, with New Liners 
only controlling the delegations from a handful of parishes. The 
delegates passed resolutions endorsing President Buchanan and 
asserting Slidell’s qualifications for the presidency. They did not 
pledge their delegation to a particular candidate, but in two measures 
indirectly indicated their opposition to Stephen A. Douglas. With 
Buchanan not running for reelection, Douglas was considered the front- 
runner for the nomination. The Baton Rouge convention resolved that 
the delegation, which had an anti-Douglas majority, would cast its 
vote as a unit, ensuring that it would give no votes to Douglas. The 
delegates added that they supported the rule requiring a candidate to 
receive two-thirds of the votes to gain the nomination. This
"John Slidell to T.J. Semmes, March 23, 1S60, T.J. Semmes Papers, 
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, NC (Hereinafter DU); McLure, 
"Election of 1860," 686-87; Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. March 24,
1860.
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provision would make the nomination of Douglas, who controlled a
/ *majority but not two-thirds cf the delegates, very difficult.*'
Though not in Louisiana’s delegation. Slidell went to Charleston 
to work against Douglas. Slidell had long detested Douglas because he 
was a key Democratic rival to Slidell's friend James Buchanan. In 
1S5S the relationship between Slidell and Douglas had taken a further 
downturn when Slidell travelled to Chicago in order to work against 
Douglas’s reelection to the Senate. In Illinois. Slidell’s name had 
been associated with false allegations that a Louisiana plantation in 
Douglas’s custody was notorious for the maltreatment of its slaves. 
Slidell denied involvement in the affair, but the two politicians’ 
enmity continued to increase as they accused each other of attempting 
to make political capital out of lies surrounding the story. In 1859. 
Harper’s Weekly even accused Slidell of trying to provoke a duel with 
Douglas. Inaccurately contending that for Slidell duels were routine, 
the journal claimed that the Louisiana senator, unable to defeat 
Douglas politically, would seize this challenge as an opportunity to 
murder him.14
No duel occurred, but Slidell unquestionably desired Douglas’s 
political death. In Charleston, as in most Louisiana conventions 
where Slidell played a behind-the-scenes role, his name appeared in
^McLure, "Election of I860," 645-649. Slidell’s control of
Louisiana’s Democracy is evidenced by the vote on call to strike out the 
pro-Slidell resolution, which failed 206-34. For Souid’s opposition to 
the two-thirds rule see Pierre Soule to George Sanders, September 24, 
1859, Pierre Soul6 Papers, DU.
iiDiket, Senator Slidell and the Community He Represented. 145-156; 
Harper’s Weekly. January 8 , 1859, p. 18, col. 4.
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rumors that surfaced regarding corruption and bribery of delegates. A 
journalist claimed that Buchanan had sent Slidell to South Carolina 
solely to defeat Douglas's nomination, and in his memoirs, a Louisiana 
delegate agreed with this assessment. At the convention, northern and 
southern Democrats battled over the party platform's stance on 
slavery. Though Slidell had held moderate sectional views throughout 
his career, his hostility to Douglas led him to join southern 
extremists in this contest. When the South failed to receive the 
guarantees regarding slavery in the territories that it desired, 
southern delegates withdrew from the convention and called for a 
regional convention to meet in Richmond. Louisiana's delegation, by a 
vote of 10 to 2. decided to join this exodus. Because of the two- 
thirds rule, the remaining delegates could not muster enough votes to
4 Cnominate Douglas, and they adjourned to meet in Baltimore in June. '
Louisiana Democrats reconvened on June 4- in Baton Rouge to 
determine how to react to the Charleston convention. Both publicly 
and privately, Slidell called for an endorsement of the conduct of 
Louisiana's delegation and urged that it be recognized as a true 
representation of the feelings of Louisiana's Democrats. He believed 
that the "safety of the South can now only be secured by taking a bold 
& decided stand for the plaint,] explicitt,] unequivocal recognition 
of her rights by the Convention at Baltimore." The Dailv Delta agreed 
that the southern Democracy must resist the tyranny of the northern
45For Slidell at the national convention see William B. Hesseltine, 
ed., Three Aeainst Lincoln: Murat Halstead Reports the Caucuses of 1860 
(Baton Rouge, 1960), 10-1, 17-8, 66, 79: Richard Taylor, Destruction and 
Reconstruction: Reminiscences of the Late War, edited by Richard
Barksdale Harwell, (New York, 1955), 6 ; Dailv Crescent. May 2, 1860.
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majority, and a New Orleans meeting praising the delegates* conduct 
declared, "in the Union if we can: out of the Union if we must.” The 
June convention returned the same delegation to meet with the other 
seceding groups at Richmond later that month.^
A year earlier Soule had predicted that if the Charleston 
convention broke up. the "days of Jacksonian enthusiasm would be 
revived” and "political blackieggism" would be defeated. So. when 
Louisiana’s delegation withdrew from the convention, the Soule wing of 
the Louisiana Democracy condemned its actions- The Dailv True Delta 
blamed the South’s defection on unprincipled schemers, including 
Slidell, who had long controlled the federal government. The 
newspaper alleged that these men feared that a Douglas nomination and 
victory would end their reign of corruption. These placemen, who 
subsisted on profit and patronage, threatened the Union by joining 
southern fire-eaters in abandoning the convention. Two days after the 
Slidell wing met in Baton Rouge. New Line Democrats held a Douglas 
Convention in Donaldsonville attended by 21 of the state’s 48 
parishes. They condemned the Charleston delegation’s course as making 
personal preference paramount to party discipline. Then, they 
endorsed Douglas, and claiming to represent Louisiana’s true
John Slidell to T.J. Semmes, May 2, 1860, Semmes Papers, DQ; 
Slidell to W.W. Pugh, May 10, I860, Pugh Family Papers, UT (quote); 
Slidell Letter in Louisiana Courier. May 24, 1860; Editorial in favor of 
the secession of Louisiana delegation see Dailv Delta. May 2, 1860 in 
Dwight L. Dumond, ed., Southern Editorials on Secession (New York, 1931), 
69-71: New Orleans meeting in Willie M. Caskey, Secession and Restoration 
of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1938), 4 (quote).
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Democratic party, sent a delegation to the national Democratic
nconvention m  Baltimore.
An examination of Douglas's leading supporters in Louisiana 
illuminates the strange combination of national and Louisiana 
politics. Slidell's opposition to Douglas actually aided the Illinois 
senator's cause among some Louisiana Democrats even if they did not 
embrace his policy regarding slavery in the territories. At a New 
Orleans rally, former congressman Isaac Morse joined Soule in 
condemning the secession of the state’s delegation at Charleston and 
pronounced his opposition to anyone "identified with disorganization 
or disunion sentiments and designs." Ironically, ten years earlier, 
Morse and Soule had themselves been called disunionists when they were
the two members of Louisiana’s congressional delegation most closely
associated with opposition to the Compromise of 1850. In 1850, they 
had preached states rights and attacked the compromise which Douglas
had championed. As a consequence, Soule had been excoriated
SQthroughout Louisiana, and Morse had lost his seat in Congress.
In the late 1850s, New Line Democrats in Louisiana had taken a 
strong states-rights position to distinguish themselves from Slidell’s 
Old Liners. In 1857 Third District Democrats challenging the regular 
party nomination had adopted a militant southern stance as a method to 
attack Thomas Green Davidson. In 1859 Soule’s Opposition ticket had
11Pierre Soule to George Sanders, September 24, 1859, Sould Papers, 
DU (quote); Dailv True Delta, May 10, 1860 in Dumond, ed., Southern 
Editorials, 86-9; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. June 10, 1860.
isFor pro-Douglas, anti-squatter sovereignty view see Alexander F. 
Pugh, Diary, March 12, 1860, LLMVC; Morse address quoted in Caskey, 
Secession and Restoration. 4.
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again expressed their adherence to states rights, and this opinion had 
cost them among former Whigs. Though Slidell Democrats endorsed state 
rights themselves, in the tense sectional atmosphere. Soule and his 
allies had hoped to use a call for states rights to portray their wing 
of the party as more loyal to the South. Soule’s faction lacked 
precision both in describing how the Old Liners’ position regarding 
states rights was lacking and in defining what their wing of the party 
meant by the term. Some equated it with a desire for secession, and 
others with a strong proslavery position in Congress. Primarily they 
hoped that each voter would create a definition with which he agreed, 
and thus elevate the New' Liners to power.
After adopting states rights as a clarion call for years, Soule 
and his associates did a political somersault in the 1S60 presidential 
campaign. Never doctrinaire in their adherence to state rights, their 
antipathy toward Slidell easily overcame their fidelity to the 
measure. In this campaign, they decided that Old Liners had become 
more vulnerable to charges that they threatened the Onion than that 
they did not protect the South. Since New Liners’ main objective was 
to gain control of the state and not to advance a clear-cut ideology, 
they easily transformed their stance. Thus, because Slidell and the 
Old Line Democrats took on a distinct southern rights position by 
allying with the seceding delegates at Charleston, Soule and his 
allies decided to back the national Democrats and Douglas even if this 
switch contradicted their arguments of the past decade.
Old Line Democrats attacked the Douglas convention referring to 
it as an unauthorized assembly of dissatisfied politicians trying "to
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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barter away the rights of the South for the spoils of office.” They 
did not let the Mew Liners’ abandonment of states-rights phitosophy go 
unnoticed. A Democratic newspaper contended that "’never was the 
principle of 'States Rights’ so thoroughly carried out” as when the 
Baton Rouge convention praised the seceding delegates. Yet, the Soule 
faction which had long flaunted states rights as its "hobby” opposed a 
convention which carried out its own principles. The article 
concluded that this group "opposes everything indeed that does not 
emanate from the faction, or assist its adherents to office and 
power.” Later, the same newspaper claimed that though Soule used to 
be popular despite his disunion sympathies, his stock had now fallen 
because of his advocacy of Douglas and his new role as a "Union 
shrieker.
The Richmond convention met on June 12. and its members recessed 
to journey to Baltimore to give northern Democrats a second chance to 
adopt a pro-southern stance on slavery in the territories. Thus, 
delegations representing both wings of Louisiana’s Democratic party 
attended the Baltimore convention. The convention sat the anti- 
Slidell group which joined the other delegates in nominating Stephen 
A. Douglas for the presidency. The southern delegations that had 
seceded at Charleston, including Louisiana’s Slidell group, rejected 
this choice and nominated Kentuckian John C. Breckinridge. Speaking 
to the Baltimore convention, Pierre Soule berated those who had left 
declaring that they had abandoned the Democratic party— the only
' Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel, June 2. (second quote), July 7, 
(first quote); September 29, 1860.
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organization left in the country which could preserve the Union— and 
that this withdrawal could orly lead to disunion. He later added that 
their bolt from the Democratic party would not help southerners but 
would result in the election of an antislavery Republican. Another 
Louisiana Douglas proponent agreed and chastised Breckinridge men 
arguing that the South's woes could be blamed on their breakup of the 
national Democratic party (the only group which could defeat the 
Republicans), and southern legislators who had repeatedly yielded 
southern rights, especially Louisiana's two pro-Breckinridge 
senators. 'u
Breckinridge and Douglas faced a two other candidates—
Republican nominee Abraham Lincoln, who did not run in Louisiana and 
Tennessee Senator John Bell. In May, the newly formed Constitutional 
Union party nominated Bell, calling him the only non-sectional 
candidate in the race. With the Democracy divided and with no other 
national party, Constitutional Unionists in Louisiana met on July 4 
and called for all patriots to rally around the Constitution and 
Bell’s candidacy. Much of Bell’s support in Louisiana came from 
former Whigs who had long opposed the Democrats and preached adherence 
to the Union over states rights. One observed, "I can hear of but one 
old Whig who will support Breckinridge, but there is a good number of 
Democrats who will support Bell." These former Whigs, who had long 
detested Slidell and the Democrats, portrayed themselves not only as
50Waldo W. Braden, ed., "’Secession Means Disunion’: A Speech by 
Pierre Soule," Louisiana History VI (Winter 1965), 77-82; Bee, September
1, 1860; Maunsel White to James D.B. DeBow, December 10, 1860, James D.B. 
DeBow Papers, DU.
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defenders of the Union but also as representing the people against 
corrupt party leaders. A North Louisiana Bell supporter proclaimed 
that conservative men of his region embraced BelL's cause because they 
feared that a vote for Breckinridge could only plunge the South into 
revolution."1
Breckinridge supporters, who included Slidell and Governor 
Moore, stressed that neither Bell nor Douglas stood a chance, and thus 
the election was a contest between their candidate and Lincoln.
Siidell believed Douglas had been nominated by a bogus convention and 
would not get a single electoral vote. His candidacy would only split
the Democrats and ensure Lincoln’s victory. Another called Douglas a
traitor to the South and the Democratic party claiming he fought "the 
battle of the Black Republicans.... If he is a democrat. God save us
from such Democrats." Congressman Davidson added that he had found it
difficul to distinguish between the doctrines of Douglas and of 
Lincoln, and a Breckinridge elector asserted that Douglas's National 
Democratic platform was neither national nor democratic.^
Breckinridge Democrats also contended that only they protected 
southern institutions. They published The Challenge, a pamphlet that 
claimed Bell had voted with the abolitionists in Congress on the issue
~’‘Bee, July 3, 1860; Fred D. Tunnard Speech, July 4, 1860, LLMVC: 
John King to John Moore. September 7, 1860, John Moore Papers. HNO: For 
pro-Bell Whigs see unknown to Henry Mars ton, September 26 (quote), George 
A Freret to Marston, August 16, 1860, M. Watson to Marston, September 25, 
1S60, Henry Marston Papers, LLMVC.
c2J For Moore’s support of Breckinridge see Joseph P. Horner to Thomas 
O. Moore, October 8, 1860, Thomas 0. Moore Papers, LLMVC; John Slidell 
to Edward G.W. Butler, August 25, 1860, Edward G.W. Butler Papers, DU; 
Diket, Senator John Slidell and the Community He Represented. 220-1; B. 
Haynes to W.W. Pugh, October 13. 1860, Pugh Family Papers, UT (quote).
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of slavery in the territories. They also said that Bell's candidacy 
only created a division in tr South that would prevent the region 
from presenting a united front to the North. Constitutional Unionists 
realized the potential of this attack on their commitment to slavery.
A former Whig senator acknowledged the difficulty in opposing 
Breckinridge because it "looks like consorting with the enemies of the 
South, giving them aid and comfort.’’ A Constitutional Unionist 
newspaper disparaged the Democrats’ "eternal agitation of the slavery 
question." contending that they had relied on charges of abolition in 
presidential campaigns for more than thirty years. While these 
accusations had often been undeserved, they had never been more 
unmerited than in IS60. They called absurd the idea that Beil, one of 
the largest slaveholders in the South, opposed slavery."
In the strained sectional climate of i860, both Breckinridge and 
Bell proponents staked a claim to the Constitution but in different 
ways. Breckinridge supporters argued that the North threatened 
southern rights guaranteed in the Constitution, and that in order to 
save the ideals of the Constitution, the South might have to abandon 
the Union. A Breckinridge meeting resolved that "We will not 
surrender the rights guaranteed to us by the constitution." Slidell 
wrote a public letter explaining the evolution of his position. When
XM. Gill is to John Liddell, August 6, 1860, Liddell Papers, LLMVC; 
Charles M. Conrad to John J. Crittenden, April 19, 1860, Crittenden
Papers, Library of Congress (quote); Thomas Green Davidson to the People 
in Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel (Extra), August 25, 1860; The
Challenge (1860) in St. Martin Family Papers, Manuscript Department, 
Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (Hereinafter TU); B.B. Simmes 
letter in Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. July 7, August 11, 1860; Bee. 
July 20, August 5, 20, 29, 1860.
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he first entered the Senate, he felt "the Union had no more devoted 
worshiper[sic] at its shrine than I." but he had now arrived at the 
conclusion that "unless some great, and...unexpected revolution shall 
take place in the sentiment of the people of the free States, w'e can 
not w'ith safety and honor continue the connection much longer."’*
In contrast. Beil supporters believed that the Constitution 
provided the South with protection within the Union. They attached 
themselves to the Constitution by identifying themselves as the 
Constitutional Union party and naming two of their New Orleans clubs 
the Union Guards and the Constitution Club. A Bell meeting passed a 
resolution in favor of the "Constitution, the Union, and Enforcement 
of the Laws." Constitutional Unionists also reminded voters that in 
1S56. Democrats had pledged their support to Buchanan claiming that 
only he could save the Union. Using this rationale, these same men 
should now' support Bell. They called Breckinridge a sectional 
candidate and branded his supporters disunionists, adding that even if 
not all Breckinridge advocates were disunionists. all disunionists 
certainly were Breckinridge men.^
Despite the presence of three candidates in the race and the 
realization that the fate of the Union might hang in the balance at 
this election, the results roughly paralleled recent Louisiana 
contests. In an election in which over fifty thousand Louisianans 
participated, Breckinridge, the candidate of the Old Line Democrats,
54Caskey, Secession and Restoration, 8 (first quote); Weekly Delta. 
October 6, 1860 (second quote).
^Bee. July 6 , 16, August 3, 17, 1860.
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captured the state's electoral votes although he received only 44.9 
percent of the votes. Bell ~:nished second with 40 percent, and 
Douglas followed with 15.x percent. As in ail recent races, the 
Slidell candidate, in this case Breckinridge, performed best outside 
of Greater Orleans. He triumphed in North and South Louisiana and the 
Florida Parishes with an average of 51.9 percent of the vote. 
Furthermore, he achieved a plurality or majority in 3? of Louisiana's 
49 parishes. While Slidell exhibited his ability to return a majority 
in the country parishes, he again failed at securing the vote of New 
Orleans. In Greater Orleans, Breckinridge finished third with only 25 
percent of the vote. Bell, who won 9 parishes, led in this region 
with 47.9 percent, and the Soule-supported Douglas received 27.1 
percent of the vote in Greater Orleans. Competitive in the Crescent 
City, Douglas faltered in the country parishes, garnering only 10. S 
percent of the vote in the other three regions. The electoral votes 
of Louisiana and the rest of the South, however, proved irrelevant to 
the national outcome. Abraham Lincoln, who had not even appeared on 
southern ballots, gained the electoral votes of enough northern states 
to attain the presidency without southern help. (SEE APPEM5IX A)
After Lincoln's election, discussion over the steps necessary to 
respond to a Republican victory moved from theory to reality. In 
Louisiana, this debate involved the question of whether the state 
should secede immediately or whether Louisiana should meet with other 
southern states to decide what action to take. Fearing Lincoln’s 
election, a Breckinridge Democrat had asked:
What are we to do? Shall we remain quiet and wait to see
him inaugurated, and develop his plan and policy or shall
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
we anticipate what it will be. and act at once to take 
steps for our self-preservation? What snail these steps 
be! Shall we have a Southern Convention of the slave 
states or will each state act by itself? These are 
important questions.
For some the choice was straightforward, and one firebrand declared
that ’’The people of the City of New Orleans and of the state of
Louisiana...are almost unanimous in their determination not to live
under the government of a Black Republican Administration." Another
wrote in his diary, "all the talk now is disunion." and a third
equated the probability of Louisiana's secession "from this union with
its rotten Yankev[sicJ government” to the likelihood of the sun rising
each morning.jC
Slidell accurately assessed the situation. He felt that 
Louisiana was "not prepared to take the initiative in any measure of 
resistance," and he personally preferred a conference of southern 
states to secession. He recognized, however, that "a very large 
minority, perhaps even a majority of the people in L[ouisianJa d[idj 
not share [his] convictions" and instead favored more immediate 
action. Slidell also realized that Louisianans did not have a 
complete freedom of action in choosing their course. He knew that 
"other states will move & the rest will follow' with greater or lesser 
alacrity— Louisiana will not be the last to do so.” Sensing the 
electorate’s growing secessionist attitude, Slidell, ever the
■°B. Haynes to W.W. Pugh, October 13, 1860, Pugh Family Papers, UT 
(first quote): Henry L. Webb to E.C. Wharton, December 10, 1860, Edward 
C. Wharton Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Alexander F. Pugh, Diary, 
November IS, 1860, LLMVC (third quote); J.M Gaulden to Dear Friend, 
November 5, 1860, William W. Garig and Family Papers, LLMVC (fourth 
quote).
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practical politician, did not openly express his support for a 
regional conference but instead endorsed secession. Ten days after 
composing this letter, he wrote to President Buchanan. "Louisiana will 
act with her sister states of the South." and continued. "I see no 
probability of preserving the Union, nor indeed do I consider it 
desirable to do so if we could." Senator Benjamin, himself a 
moderate, concurred that "the wild torrent of passion" engulfing the 
South "can no more be checked by human effort... than a prairie fire by 
a gardener’s watering pot.” The day before penning this letter. 
Benjamin, in a public letter, had added to this excitement by agreeing 
with Slidell that since the interests of the South were no longer safe 
in the Union, secession was demanded.'
Like Louisiana’s two senators. Governor Moore privately opposed 
immediate secession. Prior to the Lincoln’s election, he had 
expressed the conservative opinion that even if the Republican 
triumphed, he would not favor secession and added. ”1 do not think the 
people of Louisiana will ultimately decide in favor of that course.” 
After Lincoln’s victory, however, Moore sensed that his prior views 
were at a variance with Louisiana’s secessionist climate.
Consequently, he ”deem[ed] it wise to fall in line with popular 
opinion" and advocate secession. He urged the necessity of keeping 
his previous anti-secession opinion secret. He added. "Were Slidell
^John Slidell to Edward G.W. Butler, November 1, 1860, Edward G.W. 
Butler Papers, DU (first three quotes); Slidell to James Buchanan, 
November 11, 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSP (fourth quote); Judah P. Benjamin 
to Samuel L.M. Barlow, December 9, 1860 (fifth quote) in James M. 
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War .Era (New York, 1988), 
237; Pierce Butler, Judah P. Beniamin. (Philadelphia. 1907), 203-4.
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or I to plead for rational thought at these times our positions would 
be worth nil to us."'*
Thus, the governor abandoned his stance against rash behavior he 
held during the presidential campaign and acted quickly. He called a 
special session of the legislature to meet in December. Addressing 
that body. Governor Moore emphcitical ly called for disunion. Declaring 
that "the Northern mind is poisoned against us.” he asserted. "I do 
not think it comports with the honor and self-respect of Louisiana, as 
a staveholding State, to live under the Government of a Black 
Republican President." The legislature heeded Moore's suggestion and 
passed a bill calling for a special convention to decide the state's 
course. On December 12. Moore signed the bill which scheduled an 
election for delegates for January 7, 1S61 and slated the convention 
to meet two weeks later.^
No partisan nominations were made during the brief campaign 
season. Instead, the race involved a contest between secessionists 
and cooperation!sts. The secessionists favored immediately joining 
South Carolina, which had seceded on December 20, outside the Union.
The cooperationists included everyone not in the first group, and thus 
they did not possess a unified viewpoint. A New Orleans newspaper
^Thomas 0. Moore to William H. Gist, October 20, 1860, quoted in 
Charles B. Dew, "Who Won the Secession Election in Louisiana?" Journal 
of Southern History XXXVI (February 1970), 19 (first quote); Moore to 
R.J. Brent, December 2, 1860, quoted in Edwin J. Putzell, Cui Bono: A 
Study of Secession in Louisiana (New Orleans, 1935). TU (second quote).
Special Message of Thomas O. Moore. Governor of the State of 
Louisiana, to the General Assembly, December 1860 (Baton Rouge, 1860), 
5, 7; D. Clerwell to Henry Marshal 1, December 17, 1860. Marshal 1-Furman 
Papers. LLMVC: Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. December 15, 1860.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
4 3 0
described the difficulty in using the term "cooperationist" since 
"with some it means delay, wi'h some conference with other states, 
with some it means submissionist." Most cooperationists desired 
Louisiana to act with the other states of the South in seceding or 
remaining in the Union. Because of the lack of party nominations and 
the short time for canvass, in many parishes candidates either ran 
unopposed or faced opponents who advocated the same position.^
In addition to secessionists and cooperat ionists. the state also 
possessed some Unionists, but they were a small group which, realizing 
the difficulty in winning seats in the convention merged themselves 
with the cooperationists. Blaming Lincoln’s election on the southern 
withdrawal from the Democratic convention, a Louisiana legislator 
claimed that the Republican would be impotent against an anti- 
Republican majority in Congress. This Douglas Democrat added that 
Lincoln’s election though sectional was constitutional and therefore 
did not necessitate secession. Hoping that the slavery question could 
be settled forever, an East Feliciana Parish Unionist believed that 
"the election of Lincoln could be made a blessing to the country." but 
this sentiment was not widely shared. In New Orleans, a secessionist 
exclaimed, "the Union men at any price now stand in such a minority 
that they don’t even speak of it." By December 1, all New Orleans 
newspapers acknowledged the need for, at the very least, a convention 
of southern states.61
60Dailv Crescent. January 5, 1861. (quote)
5‘Edward Delony to the People of East Feliciana in Baton Rouge Weekly 
Gazette and Comet. November 14, 1860; R.J. Bowman to Alexander K. Farrar, 
December 14, 1860. Alexander K. Farrar Papers, LLMVC (first quote); M.
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Secessionists decreed their course the only way to protect the 
South and its institutions from the antislaverv Republicans of the 
North. The Pointe Coupee Democrat asked its readers why they should 
remain under the rule of a government that strangled business and 
oppressed the state's energy. The heretofore conservative Bee agreed
that "The North and South are heterogeneous and are better apart We
are doomed if we proclaim not our political independence." To sway 
cooperationists. a Madison Parish secessionist explained that the 
election of secessionists was important to show the North that the 
southern threat was real, and the Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel 
agreed that the North would only give in to southern demands after 
secession not before it. Prominent New Orleans Presbyterian minister 
Benjamin M. Palmer preached a sermon proclaiming divine sanction for 
secession. According to Palmer, the Republican victory already ended 
the Union because it made the Constitution an "engine of oppression" 
and since the Union could not be saved, he urged southerners to secede 
and therefore "save the inestimable blessing it enshrines." Most New 
Orleans newspapers reprinted the sermon, and as many as fifty thousand 
copies were distributed in the Crescent City alone. After examining 
the document, Senator Slidell announced that he had "never read 
anything with more pleasure."*
Gill is to John Liddell, November 24, 1S60, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC 
(second quote): Greer, "Louisiana Politics,” 621.
62Pointe Coupee Democrat. November 24, 1860; Bee, December 14, 1860 
(first quote): James Foster to John Foster, January 7, 1861, James Foster 
Family Papers, LLMVC; Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. December 1, 1860; 
Benjamin M. Palmer, The South: Her Peril and her Duty. A Discourse 
delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, New Orleans, on Thursday. 
November 29. 1860 (New Orleans, 1860), quotes 12, 16; Haskell Monroe.
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Secessionists stigmatized ail cooperationists regardless of 
their actual stance as submit .ionists. In the weeks preceding the 
convention, the N'ew Orleans Dailv Delta and the Baton Rouge DaiIv 
Advocate did not distinguish among the opponents of immediate 
secession. A New Orleans secessionist described the cooperationists 
as "all such Abolitionists. Black Republicans. Union shriekers. Knee 
benders, traitors. &c that we have among us." Senator Benjamin warned 
of the "widespread ruin, degradation and dishonor" which would result 
"from tame submission" that cooperationists advocated. Others agreed 
that secession had become a matter of honor for the South- Discussing 
these allegations, a cooperationist wrote to Governor Moore that he 
and others had to hide their true feelings and come out in favor of 
secession because they feared punishment after Louisiana seceded.3'
Louisiana cooperationists faced a difficult task. Branded as 
submissionists. they had to explain how their position protected the 
South and Louisiana better them secession did. In addressing this 
charge, some cooperationists demonstrated that the two groups differed 
only on means, not on the result. Asserting that his enemies had 
twisted his words, a cooperat ionist claimed. "I am no submiss ionist, 
or Unionist in that sense of the word; I am in favor of Louisiana
"Bishop Palmer’s Thanksgiving Day Address," Louisiana History IV (Spring 
1963j. 105-118; John Slidell to Samuel A. Cartwright, December 25, 1860, 
Samuel A. Cartwright Papers, LLMVC (fourth quote).
r*■'Dew, "Who Won the Secession Election in Louisiana?" 21: M. Gillis 
to John Liddell, November 20, December 22, 1860 (first quote). Moses 
Liddell and Family Papers, LLMVC; Benjamin quote in Charles P. Roland, 
"Louisiana and Secession," Louisiana History. XIX (.Fall 1978), 395; John 
S. Summerlin to Governor Moore, December 5, 1860, in Putzell, Cui Bono. 
86-7.
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going, with the neighboring States, out of the present Union." 
According to this definition, the oniy difference between 
secessionists and cooperations involved the phrase, "with the 
neighboring States” or as the platform of the Friends of United 
Southern Action iterated, it was not against secession but against 
"separate and hasty state action." Pierre Soule, the most prominent 
cooperationist. expressed a similar attitude in arguing for a southern 
convention. Asserting "I am no submissionist." Soule admitted that 
having "to choose between ignominy or revolution. I am for 
revolution!" But, like many other cooperationists. Soule believed 
that if secession should occur, it should be in conjunction with the 
other slave states.
Other cooperationists denied that the choice rested solely on 
when secession should occur. After listening to a fiery secessionist 
sermon, a church member complained that the preacher and others had 
forgotten the close bonds that existed between the South and the 
North. Claiming that separate secession looked very foolish, another 
cooperationist urged, "if we have common cause why not combine
before Let the whole South propose the conditions on which she is
wi 11 ing to remain in the Union." The Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and 
Comet agreed that "there are remedies yet left us within the Union.”
The Sugar Planter appealed both to readers’ patriotism and to their
^Letter from Edward G.W. Butler to P.M. Lambremont (editor of the 
Gazette and Sentinel). December 27, I860, Butler Family Papers, HNO 
(first quote); Platform of the Friends of United Southern Action, 
December 27, 1860, James G. Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (second quote); 
Pierre Soule, "A Card," December 22, 1860, Hennen-Jennings Papers, LLMVC 
(third quote).
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economic interests. Reminding them that Lincoln's election had been 
constitutional, it urged them to stay in the Union as long as the 
South’s rights were protected. The newspaper added that membership in 
a confederacy of southern states would put an end to the protective 
tariff on sugar cane which southern Louisiana growers required to 
remain economically competitive.83
The January ~ election resulted in a triumph for the 
secessionists. They captured 32.7 percent of the popular vote and 29 
of Louisiana's 4S parishes. More significantly, they secured at least 
SO of the 130 seats at the convention, and a secessionist joyfully 
declared "we have ail made up our minds to seceed[sic] from the 
Union." As Slidell predicted, events beyond the borders of Louisiana 
had affected the debate in the state. By the time of the January 
election. South Carolina had seceded, and four other states had 
already elected secessionist-controlled state conventions. Once one 
state seceded, the probability of others joining increased 
substantially. For many cooperation no longer meant staying in the 
Union but now meant leaving it, and within two weeks a cooperat ionist 
would admit that "the strongest Union men have abandoned all hope of 
reconciliation & are calmly awaiting the crash of collision." A 
secessionist delegate claimed he would have preferred to cooperate
Mrs. L.J. Stanton to Governor Moore, December 14, 1860, in Putzell, 
Cui Bono. 94-5; Mattie to My Dear Sister, [January 1861], W.W. Pugh 
Papers, UT (first quote); West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter, December 1, 
December 8 , 1860; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. December 25, 1860 
(second quote).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
435
with other states but as they have decided to act separately Louisiana 
must join them. (TABLE 7.1)^
TABLE 7.1
Vote for Delegates to the Secession Convent ion
Secession
Secessionist Cooperat ionist Percent
FLORIDA 1522 2130 41.7NORTH LA 8205 6178 57.1ORLEANS 5056 4944 50.6
SOUTH LA 6140 5556 52.5
20923 18808 52.7
The election did not follow the results of the November 
presidential race. Despite its importance, twenty percent fewer 
voters participated in the January contest. This absenteeism probably 
did not indicate a repressed Unionist sentiment, but instead stemmed 
from the lack of competitive races in many parishes— in 18 parishes 
the winner received over 75 percent of the vote. The vote of New 
Orleans shocked many observers. Because of the Crescent City’s 
commercial ties to the North and Greater Orleans’s repudiation of 
Breckinridge in the presidential contest, much of the cooperat ionists’ 
hope rested in this region. Instead, Orleans Parish joined Madison 
Parish as the only two of the twelve parishes that had gone against
John S. Foster to James Foster, January 11, 1861, John Foster 
Papers, LLMVC (first quote); E.J. Ellis to Brother, January 22, 1861, 
Ellis Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Dew, "Who Won the Secession Election 
in Louisiana?" 23; The most extensive investigation of the convention 
lists 80 members as secessionists, 44 as cooperat ionists, and 6 as 
doubtful, Ralph Wooster, "The Louisiana Secession Convention," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly XXXIV (April 1951), 105; Edward G.W. Butler letter 
in Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel, December 29, 1860; For realization 
that once one state left others would follow see M. Gill is to John 
Liddell, November 9, 1860, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC.
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Breckinridge in November to vote in favor of secessionist candidates 
in January. In Greater Orleans, the secessionists won 20 of the 25 
seats contested, and a cooperationist lamented? "New Orleans after a 
conservative career of so long a time has at last disgraced herself by 
voting secession. ”0,
The city’s vote revealed the conditional nature of Unionism not 
only within New Orleans but throughout Louisiana. Describing the 
crowd at a secessionist Southern Rights Association gathering, an 
observer saw "all shades of politics" as people of "all avocations, 
occupations, ages &c stood together in defense of southern rights." 
Obviously. Lincoln’s election was the most significant change which 
had affected secession sentiment in Louisiana. Labelling Breckinridge 
supporters as disunionists did not equal tolerance for a Republican 
president. As early as the day after the election, according to a New 
Orleans secessionist, Bell and Douglas men no longer ”roll[ed] their
eyes with such holy horror at the names of secession." Most people
probably agreed with the Weekly Delta on the impossibility of viewing 
Lincoln’s election as anything other than a display of northern 
animosity. In December, the Bee, which had supported Bell, declared
rcthe Union severed and called New Orleans "the hotbed of secession."
“'Roland, "Louisiana and Secession," 393-4; For lack of competition 
see A.F. Pugh, Diary? January 7, 1861, LLMVC; For a race by race
comparison see Charles B. Dew, "The Long Lost Returns: The Candidates and 
Their Totals in Louisiana’s Secession Election," Louisiana History, X 
(Fall 1969), 353-69; E.J. Ellis to E.P. Ellis, January 10, 1861, Ellis 
Family Papers, LLMVC (quote). In contrast, in the presidential election, 
only 3 parishes gave a candidate over 75 percent.
68M. Gillis to John Liddell, November 24, 1860, Liddell Family 
Papers, LLMVC (first quote); J.M. Gaulden to Dear Friend, November 5, 
1860, William W. Garig and Family Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Greer.
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In addition to Lincoln's election, four other stimuli 
contributed to the change in sentiment in New Orleans. First, at the 
special meeting of the legislature. Governor Moore adamantly called 
for secession. Although he based his stance on the idea that a 
secessionist majority already existed in the state, his speech 
probably swayed some Louisianans who favored cooperation. Second. 
Reverend Paimers's widely-publicized secessionist sermon helped shape 
opinions not only in the Crescent City but throughout Louisiana.
Third, with South Carolina having already seceded and four other 
states having already elected secessionist conventions, the southern 
climate had changed dramatically in the two months before the January 
vote. Fourth. Sliae11-supported candidates had never fared well in 
New Orleans, and many New Line Democrats and Know Nothings probably 
refused to vote for Breckinridge because Slidell championed his 
candidacy. With the January race not an openly partisan contest, this 
anti-Slidell logic no longer applied. This combination of forces
.*Qcombined to produce a secessionist victory in New Orleans.0
After the election, even the conservative Dailv Picayune 
admitted that there was "no Union party left in Louisiana," and a 
diarist tersely concluded, "Cooperation is dead.” The state 
convention met in Baton Rouge on January 24 with the result a foregone
"Louisiana Politics," 628-32; Bee. December 22, 1860 (third quote).
Prominent businessman and former Whig state senator James Robb recognized 
the conditional nature of New Orleans Unionism and left Louisiana for the 
North in the summer of 1860, James Robb to unknown, August 9, 1860, James 
Robb Papers, HNO.
69Monroe, "Bishop Palmer’s Thanksgiving Day Address," 108; Lane C. 
Kendall, "The Interregnum in Louisiana in 1861," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly (April 1933), 187.
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conclusion. With five other southern states having seceded by that 
date, for many Louisianans cooperation now meant secession. The 
secessionists elected Alexander Mouton. a former Senator and governor, 
as president of the convention. On the first day. a delegate read a 
letter signed by Louisiana's entire congressional delegation that 
declared "the time for argument has passed, that of action has 
arrived....We recommend immediate and unqualified secession." The 
delegates agreed. The last hope of cooperation within the Union— a 
call to send delegates to a Nashville convention— failed 106 to 24. 
showing that cooperation was a dead letter in Louisiana. On its third 
day. the convention overwhelmingly adopted a secession ordinance, 113 
to 17, and subsequently all but 7 delegates signed the document. The 
pro-secession vote easily exceeded the number of the number of 
secessionist delegates present. A cooperationist offered an 
explanation for why he and others had voted for this cause. He 
unenthusiastically explained, "similar action having already been 
taken by her neighbors, Louisiana of necessity followed.”7®
After the vote, Mouton declared the connection between Louisiana 
and the United States dissolved, and pronounced the state, "a free, 
sovereign, and independent power." Then, as Governor Moore entered 
the chamber, a large banner depicting an eight foot pelican feeding 
her young was brought out to replace the American flag. A priest 
blessed the banner, military music played, and cannons boomed.
7QPai lv Picayune. January 9, 1861 (first quote): A.F. Pugh, Diary, 
January 8, 1861 (second quote): Roland, "Louisiana and Secession," 396-7; 
Official Journal of the Convention of the State of Louisiana (New 
Orleans, 1861); Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 8 (third quote).
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Delegates entered their reasons for voting in favor of secession upon 
the official record and retained their pens as keepsakes of the 
historic moment. Subsequently, the convention recessed to reconvene 
in New Orleans where the streets were decorated with fiags and 
transparencies, and fireworks exploded as secessionists paraded 
through the city. Upon reconvening, the convention selected 
representatives attend a conference of seceding states meeting in 
February in Montgomery. Alabama. And. on March 21. 1S61. they 
transferred Louisiana's loyalty to the nation established in 
Montgomery— the Confederate States of America.'*
In New Orleans, the delegates ratified the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1861. the state's fourth constitution in fifty years. 
The writing of the new charter took almost no time, for the convention 
adopted the 1852 constitution almost word for word, only deleting any 
mention of the federal government. Having revised their constitution 
twice in the preceding sixteen years, Louisianans saw no need for 
changes in their organic law. Jacksonian democracy had reached its 
limits with universal white male suffrage and all major offices being 
elective. Railroad fever had not dissipated during the 1850s. so 
activist government also went unchallenged. So, despite having an
71Roland, "Louisiana and Secession." 396-7; Official Journal of the 
Convention of the State of Louisiana: For a delegate’s description of the 
events see series of letters from Lemuel Conner to Fanny Conner in Lemuel 
P. Conner Papers (Four January and two February letters at HNO, three 
March letters at LLMVC). For best description, of events following 
secession vote see letter of January 25, 1861, HNO.
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opportunity to rewrite the entire charter, the Louisiana delegates 
merely altered a few words.'*
An overwhelming majority of the delegates agreed on the 
constitution and on secession, and these men expressed their 
intolerance for any who continued to object to their actions. The 
treatment of James G. Taliaferro, a delegate from Catahoula Parish who 
spearheaded the minimal opposition to secession, reveals their 
hostility. A former Whig. Taliaferro authored a protest which claimed 
secession would lead to anarchy and war which would destroy Louisiana. 
According to the protest, southern rights would be better protected 
within the Union than in a weak: confederacy. The majority not only 
disagreed with his dour assessment but refused to include it in the 
official record of the convention. After this rejection, Taliaferro 
returned to Catahoula where he owned the Harrisonburg Independent. the 
only newspaper in the state which still opposed withdrawal from the 
Union. In response, secessionists immediately began raising funds to 
establish a newspaper in his parish to combat what they saw as his 
malign influence.7*
As secessionists suppressed Taliaferro's protest, they also 
tried to hide the vote totals from the January election for delegates 
to the secession convention. Their 52.3 percent majority hardly
V“The 1861 constitution does not even merit a separate section in 
Warren M. Billings and Edward F. Haas. ed., In Search of Fundamental Law: 
Louisiana’s Constitutions. 1812-1974 (Lafayette, La., 1993).
n"James G. Taliaferro’s Protest, James G. Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC. 
For efforts to challenge his newspaper see Henry Peck to John Liddell. 
February 18, 1861, and L.P. Blockson to Liddell, March 5, 1861, Liddell 
Family Papers, LLMVC.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
441
represented a mandate for withdrawal from the Union. Although this 
vote undoubtedly underestimated secession sentiment because many races 
were uncontested and because as other states seceded many 
cooperationists would become secessionists. it could prove 
embarrassing. Cooperationist newspapers demanded the official 
returns, but none appeared for months and then only semi-official 
results were published in the DaiIv Delta. These results slightly 
exaggerated the secessionist vote, crediting them with 54.2 percent of 
the ballots. The official returns would not be published for over one 
hundred years. Also, unlike in 1845 and 1S52. the delegates also 
refused to allow the electorate to vote on the new constitution, 
justifiably contending that the only true issue— secession— had been 
thoroughly discussed prior to the January 7 election.
Louisiana secessionists wanted the state to appear as unified as 
possible because, like most Louisianans, they realized the frightful 
consequences of their actions. After reading Lincoln’s March 4 
inaugural, a Concordia Parish delegate wrote to his wife from the
Louisiana convention, "This is war It is now necessary for the
Southern Confederacy to make every preparation for a most desperate 
conflict." Addressing a militia unit after Louisiana had seceded, 
Senator Benjamin regretted that he spoke "in the belief that our 
independence is not to be maintained without the shedding of blood.” 
Even cooperationists recognized the need to defend their homeland 
after Louisiana seceded. After the election of delegates to the
Dew. "Who Won the Secession Election in Louisiana?" 23; A.F. Pugh, 
Diary, January 7, 1861, LLMVC.
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secession convention, a cooperationist admitted. "If it comes to the 
worst, as southerners we must fight to the last man.” Before 
Louisiana had officially seceded. Governor Moore, despite his earlier 
moderation, had already ordered the seizure of the United States 
arsenal at Baton Rouge and taken control of a pair of forts on the 
Mississippi River below New Orleans. Additionally, he had loaned arms 
and ammunition to Mississippi which had left the Union prior to 
Louisiana. '
The secession of Louisiana raises the question of how a state 
which had always lagged behind the rest of the South in terms of 
secessionist rhetoric suddenly abandoned the Union in 1861. One 
historian has called it "perhaps the Least likely state of the Deep 
South to attempt to break from the Union." and another agrees that 
”[a]t the beginning of the secession movement. Louisiana was without 
doubt the most conservative of the Gulf States.”76 Unquestionably, 
throughout the majority of the antebellum period Louisiana had never 
welcomed threats to dissolve the Union. Very few Louisianans had 
embraced South Carolina’s attempt at nullification the 1830s. and the 
state legislature had emphatically declared that it considered the 
doctrine to be treasonous. The Whig party in Louisiana did not share
Lemuel P. Conner to Fanny Conner, March 4, 1861, Conner Papers, 
LLMVC (first quote); Benjamin speech in Daily Crescent. February 23, 1861 
(second quote); E.J. Ellis to E.P. Ellis, January 10, 1861, Ellis Family 
Papers, LLMVC (third quote): Odom, "Political Career of Thomas Overton 
Moore,” 25—7. For a cooperat ionist delegate who soon joined the army see 
David Pierson to William H. Pierson, David Pierson Letter, April 22, 
1861, LLMVC; For belief that war would not occur see M. Gill is to John 
Liddell. March 9, March 15, 1861, Liddell Papers, LLMVC.
7*”°Roland, "Louisiana and Secession.” 389 (first quote); Caskey, 
Secession and Restoration. 16 (second quote).
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
4 4 3
Che state-rights proclivity of its southern neighbors and instead 
embraced the more national1stic ideas of Kenry Clay. The presence of 
sugar cane meant that some Louisianans welcomed national activism, at 
least in the form of a tariff. In 1851. after Isaac Morse and Pierre 
Soule spoke out against the Compromise of IS50. the Louisiana 
electorate punished both men and their party. In IS56. Millard 
Fillmore, running as more of a Unionist than a know Nothing almost 
captured the state's electoral vote. Even in 1860. the combined total 
of Bell and Douglas votes exceeded that of Breckinridge by more than 
ten percent.
By the end of IS60 conditions had changed significantly.
Slavery, which for years had been a topic in campaigns, completely 
overshadowed all other issues. In earlier campaigns, the extent of 
democracy, the Creole-American split, state activism, and tariffs 
could eclipse slavery or at least join it as topics of debate. 
Additionally, the presence of a vibrant two party system throughout 
most of the antebellum period helped suppress disunionist talk in two 
ways: it gave conservatives an electoral opportunity to punish the 
fire-brands, and it subsumed most fire-eating talk within the 
Democratic party. With the disappearance of campaign debate over many 
non-slavery issues and the absence of any organized opposition to the 
Democrats in the late 1850s, the protection of southern rights emerged 
as a way for disaffected Democrats to challenge the regular party.
Also, the rise of Jacksonian democracy contributed to secession. 
By 1860, politicians felt a need to cater to voters In way that was 
unnecessary in the 1820s. In the 1820s, a Louisiana governor could
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claim that the people of Louisiana should have no voice in government 
and with only propertv-hoider voting, many of the people indeed did 
not have a voice in the political process. The elimination of 
property requirements for suffrage in the 1845 constitution and the 
reduction of residency restrictions in the 1852 charter along with the 
increase in the number of elective offices in both these documents 
gave the people a voice they did not have in the 1820s. By i860. 
Senators Slideil and Benjamin and Governor Moore did not have the 
option of ignoring public opinion. With universal white male 
suffrage, more people had a vote and therefore a voice in Louisiana 
politics. Recognizing this change, both senators and the governor 
publicly championed secession despite their personal preferences for a 
less drastic approach.^
When examining secession in Louisiana, one must be wary of 
equating the earlier rejection of secessionist talk with a lack of 
commitment to the South and slavery. Louisiana’s Unionism was always 
a conditional Unionism. Although most Louisianans may have opposed 
secession during the majority of the antebellum period, they did not 
believe that it was unconstitutional. Louisianans questioned the 
right or need to secede at various times, but because they felt it was 
unnecessary at that time, not because they felt it was illegal. If 
they believed that the best protection for the state, the South, and 
slavery no longer rested in the Union, then secession could occur.
Until the election of the Republican Abraham Lincoln, Louisianans
77Governor Thomas Bolling Robertson in John B. Dawson to William S. 
Hamilton, April 4, 1825, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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feared the fire-eaters' secessionist solution more than the problems 
they faced by remaining in the Union. Lincoln’s election, however, 
convinced a majority of Louisianans for the first time that their 
state and its institutions would be better off outside rather than 
inside the Union. With this catalyst, Louisiana acted quickly and in 
a most southern manner, seceding just a month after fire-eating South 
Carolina.
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On the night of October 12, 1861, in Charleston, South Carolina, 
John Slidell, along with his wife and family, boarded the Theodora, a 
small ship designed to slip through the Union naval blockade. After 
Louisiana's secession in January, Slidell had resigned from the Senate 
and then accepted a diplomatic post from the newly formed government 
of the Confederate States of America. He was embarking on the first 
[eg of a journey to France to represent the nascent nation at the 
court of N'apoleon III. As the ship carefully made its way out to sea. 
Slidell, always a meticulous planner, could be confident that the 
training he had received during his lengthy Louisiana political career 
would help guide him in his post.
Born in New York, Slidell arrived in Louisiana in IS 19 and 
within a decade entered the state’s political arena. His early 
political experiences provided him more with invaluable lessons than 
with victories. This period of Louisiana’s political development 
emphasized personal relationships and ethnicity over partisanship. In 
182S Slidell made an unsuccessful bid for Congress, but for his 
efforts on behalf of the state’s hero Andrew Jackson in the concurrent 
presidential contest, he received an appointment as a federal district 
attorney. In this patronage post, Slidell learned the importance of 
back room politics and manipulation from a master, fellow Democrat 
Martin Gordon. At first Slidell and Gordon were allies in the Jackson 
party, but Gordon would soon view Slidell as a threat to his control 
of the state. Using his close ties to the national administration, 
Gordon had Slidell ousted from his post in LS33. The 1830s also
446
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provided Slidell with the lesson that many Louisianans. whether Creole 
or American, voted on the basis of ethnicity regardless of party 
affiliation, in LS35 Slidell’s marriage into New Orleans’s Creole 
elite provided him with a link; to that ethnic group. In 1S37 this 
connection proved to be insufficient as Slidell lost a contest for the 
United States Senate because several Creole legislators preferred a 
French-speaking candidate.
In 1S3S Slidell waged another unsuccessful campaign for 
Congress. In this race, he discovered that Louisiana politicians 
could gain valuable political capital by attacking their opponent’s 
fidelity to slavery. The 1S36 presidential campaign had introduced 
Louisianans to the potency of charging one’s opponent with 
abolitionist tendencies. Two years later, Slidell employed these 
allegations in a state contest for the first time. Slidell lost, but 
his assertions had gained his campaign publicity. After the mid- 
lS30s, in almost every race, whether for president, governor, or 
Congress, Louisiana politicians would routinely accuse their opponent 
or his party of possessing antislavery sentiments.
Although Slidell suffered these early setbacks, from this period 
onward his career was primarily a success. More than any other 
Louisiana politician, Slidell capitalized on the growing importance of 
political parties in the state. Elected to Congress in 1342, Slidell 
stressed that allegiance to the Democratic party transcended any other 
commitment. A single-vote defeat in a I84S Senate contest provided 
Slidell with the last reminder that political victory required 
unceasing vigilance. Armed with this final lesson. Slidell and his
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chosen candidates would never lose a Louisiana race in the 1850s.
From 1853 to 1861, he served in the United States Senate and ruled the 
Louisiana Democratic party. Employing the power of party loyalty. 
Slidell supposedly hand-picked governors, United States senators, and 
even a president. His enemies spoke his name with trepidation, and 
they, along with his friends, considered Slidell omnipotent. He 
deftly wielded the patronage of the federal government and his own 
wealth to maintain party discipline and tolerated no challenge to his 
rule.
Slidell’s success involved a blend of dictation and democracy. 
While apparently in control of the Louisiana political situation, 
Slidell, and the rest of the state’s politicians, realized that they 
often did not lead but followed the people. Recognizing the growth of 
Jacksonian democracy, they tailored their stances to meet the 
electorate’s views. A southern Democrat, Slidell, nonetheless 
realized the importance of a sugar cane tariff for Louisiana, and he 
along with most of the state’s other Democrats championed this 
exception to free trade doctrine. Despite its long battle against 
activist government, his Democratic party espoused state aid to 
railroads after the electorate ratified the 1852 constitution.
Slidell also sent voluminous documents from Washington to his 
Louisiana constituents and travelled throughout the state to meet 
them. Most significantly, after a long career as a moderate on the 
sectional issue between the North and the South, Slidell reluctantly 
embraced the secession movement when he perceived that a majority of 
Louisianans favored it.
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As the Theodora sailed into the Atlantic Ocean on its way to 
Havana, the man who best personified Louisianans’ antebellum political 
world could not have realized that he would never see his adopted 
state again. The combination of the issues which Slidell had deftly 
employed for so many years: the politics of slavery, partisan 
commitment, and the rise of Jacksonian democracy had thrust his state 
and the entire Union into a terrible war.
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